Entrepreneurship and SME sector development in post-genocide Rwanda : a search for the 'missing middle' by Poole, David Leonard
Poole, David Leonard (2016) Entrepreneurship and SME sector development in post-genocide Rwanda : a 
search for the 'missing middle'. PhD Thesis. SOAS, University of London. 
http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/id/eprint/23794 
Copyright © and Moral Rights for this PhD Thesis are retained by the author and/or 
other copyright owners. 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non‐commercial research or study, without prior 
permission or charge. 
This PhD Thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the copyright holder/s. 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or 
medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders. 
When referring to this PhD Thesis, full bibliographic details including the author, title, 
awarding institution and date of the PhD Thesis must be given e.g. AUTHOR (year of 
submission) "Full PhD Thesis title", name of the School or Department, PhD PhD Thesis, 
pagination.
Declaration for SOAS PhD thesis 
 
I have read and understood regulation 17.9 of the Regulations for students of the 
SOAS, University of London concerning plagiarism. I undertake that all the material 
presented for examination is my own work and has not been written for me, in whole 
or in part, by any other person. I also undertake that any quotation or paraphrase 
from the published or unpublished work of another person has been duly 
acknowledged in the work which I present for examination. 
 
 
Signed: ____________________________  Date: _________________ 
 
Entrepreneurship and  
SME Sector Development in 
Post-genocide Rwanda:  
a Search for the  
‘Missing Middle’ 
David Leonard Poole  
Thesis submitted for the degree of PhD  
2016 
Department of Development Studies 
SOAS, University of London 
!1
Abstract  
This thesis aims to gain an understanding of why a new entrepreneurial class 
and a vibrant small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) sector have failed to 
materialise in post-genocide Rwanda.  
Vision 2020, the government’s economic and social development plan, set the 
goal of transforming Rwanda into a middle-income country by the year 2020. 
This was to be brought about via the emergence of a new entrepreneurial class 
and a dynamic SME sector that would deliver economic growth, employment 
and a stable and secure future for the country’s citizens. But despite 
implementing a comprehensive strategy that conforms to orthodox development 
theory, the desired SME sector is conspicuous by its absence.  
The thesis examines the validity of the theoretical arguments that underpin the 
strategy, the context within which the economic transformation was expected to 
occur and specific stimulus measures that were taken. Possible explanations for 
the mismatch between anticipated outcomes and reality were explored via face 
to face interviews with successful and aspiring entrepreneurs in Rwanda.  
Analysis of the interviews with successful entrepreneurs revealed a divergence 
between their characteristics and experiences and orthodox theory. Contrasting 
these findings with those from the interviews with aspiring entrepreneurs 
facilitated identification of a sub-set of proto-entrepreneurs, who were a close 
match to successful entrepreneurs both in the characteristics they displayed 
and the entrepreneurial journey they intended to take. However, the paucity of 
proto-entrepreneurs and the anticipated lengthy gestation period that is likely to 
accompany the development of their enterprises challenge both the common 
conception that developing economies are populated by a vast number of 
‘entrepreneurs in waiting’ and the assumption that the supply of credit and 
business skills training will trigger the formation of a dynamic SME sector.  
The thesis also highlights the unintended consequences of resources being 
misdirected as well as the risk of leaving behind a large body of well-educated 
but disillusioned individuals, who anticipated being included in an economic 
success story, which has not come to pass and generated the sustainable 
volume of employment that was an explicit objective of Vision 2020.   
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Preface  
In line with the belief in the transformational power of small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs), Vision 2020, the Rwandan government’s economic and 
social development plan, anticipates the emergence of a new entrepreneurial 
class that will catalyse the formation of a dynamic new private sector. In addition 
to prompting economic growth and poverty reduction it is anticipated that 
Rwanda’s economic transformation from agricultural to knowledge-based 
society will produce the tax revenues that the government will need to fund 
public goods and reduce reliance on external aid (Minecofin, 2000: 4). 
The World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Index indicates that considerable 
progress has been made in establishing business-friendly institutions, to the 
extent that Rwanda ranks second out of the 47 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(World Bank, 2016). Financial support is available in the form of loan 
guarantees via the Rwandan Business Development Fund (BDF) and the near 
ubiquitous provision of microcredit. Major government initiatives targeted 
specifically at stimulating entrepreneurship and SME formation have been 
developed including a large-scale national business plan competition, run by 
the Rwandan Ministry of Trade and Industry (Minicom). There is also an 
abundance of ‘entrepreneurship training’ backed by international and local 
NGOs, government, overseas development agencies, educational 
establishments and international financial institutions. 
Despite the efforts designed to stimulate domestic entrepreneurship and SME 
sector development, evolution of the much vaunted SME sector has not come 
about. The Rwandan economy remains dominated by a mass of single-worker 
micro-enterprises. Against its target of achieving middle-income status by 2020, 
the purchasing power adjusted GDP per capita of $1,661 ranks only 163rd of the 
178 countries for which data is available, placing the economy firmly in the 
bottom decile for average income (World Bank, 2016d). That this should be the 
case is surprising given the extent of the initiatives that have been undertaken. 
The need to resolve the apparent paradox is of particular relevance to post-
genocide Rwanda given that Vision 2020 explicitly promises peace and 
prosperity on the back of entrepreneur-led economic growth. The country also 
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faces a significant demographic challenge: with a median age of 18.8 years and 
with 61 percent of its population under 25 (CIA, 2016), there is an urgent need 
to create a large and sustainable volume of employment opportunities.  
This thesis explores and attempts to explain why a new entrepreneurial class 
and a vibrant SME sector are struggling to materialise in Rwanda despite all the 
supportive measures that have been instigated. 
Terminology 
Before examining the Rwandan context in detail, it is necessary to define 
carefully the key phenomena that the research will be addressing, namely: 
SMEs and entrepreneurs. The main focus of the research is the SME sector, 
which the Rwandan government believes will be the engine of economic 
growth. In addressing this central phenomenon it is also important to consider 
the individual entrepreneurs who bring these SMEs into existence. Although 
both terms are used widely throughout the academic literature and policy 
documents, there is a marked lack of consistency about what exactly is meant 
when they are used. It is therefore important at the outset to determine clearly 
the meaning that will be given to both terms in the context of this thesis and the 
research that underpins it. 
Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises 
SMEs constitute a segment of commercial enterprises that, by definition, falls 
midway between micro-enterprises and large corporations. But despite the 
apparent clarity of this segmentation, there is considerable variance in the scale 
of enterprise that is considered to be an SME. The European Commission, for 
instance, defines the segment as comprising enterprises that employ between 
10 and 249 individuals, to which is added a secondary financial filter as shown 
in Table P.1. 
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Table P.1 European Commission SME Categorisation 
(Source: European Commission, 2005: 14) 
This segmentation is designed to ensure that “support measures are granted 
only to those enterprises which genuinely need them” (ibid: 5). Yet when 
examined closely, it is clear that it is cast so broadly as to render it essentially 
useless, as can be seen in Table P.2.  
Table P.2 European Union Enterprise and Employment Distribution 
(Source: Derived from Muller et al., 2014) 
With a mean of less than two employees per micro-enterprise, it is difficult to 
fathom why the European Commission should have set an upper threshold of 
nine for the category. A much lower cut-off would have better reflected the make 
up of this segment, given that the Centre for Strategy and Evaluation Services 
(CSES) identified that more than half of all European enterprises are firms that 
have no employees at all (CSES, 2012: 74). Ranging from the traditional self-
employed sectors of transport and agriculture to crafts, the micro segment in 
Europe also includes the more recent phenomenon of freelancers in the ICT 
and creative industries using service companies to capture and account for their 
income, expenses and tax liabilities. 
Enterprise Category Employees Turnover or Balance Sheet Value
Micro 1-9 ≤ € 2 million
Small 10-49 ≤ € 10 million
Medium 50-249
≤ € 50 million turnover or   
≤ €43 million balance sheet value
Micro Small Medium Large Total
Number of enterprises 19,969,338 1,378,374 223,648 43,517 21,614,908
Share of total 92.3% 6.4% 1.0% 0.2%
Number of employees 38,629,012 27,353,660 22,860,792 44,053,576 132,897,040
Mean number of employees 1.9 19.8 102.2 1012.3 6.1
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The European Union eloquently demonstrates the increasingly sloppy and often 
schizophrenic application of the term SME. On the one hand the EU’s economic 
development plan, the Lisbon Agenda, refers narrowly and precisely to “the 
importance of creating a climate favourable to small and medium sized 
enterprises (SMEs)” (EU, cited in CSES, 2012: 15). According to the EU’s own 
segmentation this means the 7.4 percent of enterprises, numbering 1.6 million, 
that employ between 10 and 249 people. Yet in other contexts, like the 2013 EU 
conference ‘Europe Works for SMEs’, it is perfectly common to find references 
made to “the 21 million SMEs in the EU” (European Commission, 2013: 1) - a 
usage that conflates SMEs and micro-enterprises. This subsuming of the micro-
enterprise category into SMEs facilitates the creation of great headline 
assertions such as “85 percent of net new jobs in the EU’s private sector are 
created by SMEs”, or that they are “Europe’s job engine” (ibid.). But these 
claims are neither surprising nor useful when subsuming micro-enterprises into 
SMEs results in a category that includes all bar a minuscule 0.2 percent of 
enterprises that fall above the 250 employee threshold that defines Europe’s 
large enterprises. 
The EU segmentation was standardised in 2005 and adopted by all EU 
countries. While this facilitates cross-country comparisons, it does raise the 
question of whether such standardisation hides more than it reveals. 
Examination of the individual data sets that underpin the EU’s 2014 report on 
SMEs (Muller et al., 2014) reveals that SMEs in the Czech Republic and 
Greece account for 36.3 percent and 30.4 percent of employment respectively, 
despite having the smallest SME sectors in the whole of the EU                     
(just 3.7 percent of enterprises in both cases). In contrast, Germany’s SME 
sector, which at 17.8 percent is the largest of any EU country, accounts for    
44.3 percent of German employment. But this is significantly less than Latvia, 
which has 51.3 percent of employees working in an SME sector that comprises 
just 10.7 percent of enterprises in the country. To add to the confusion, 
Germany maintains two separate SME definitions. For the EU it reports figures 
in line with the EU standardisation, but the Institut für Mittelstandsforschung 
(IfM) in Bonn maintains the use of the traditional range of 10 to 499 for SMEs. 
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Within Africa individual definitions of what constitutes an SME also vary widely, 
as shown in Table P.3. 
Table P.3 SME Definitions used by African States
(Source: IFC, 2010a)  
Ethiopia was also included in the IFC data, but did not differentiate between 
medium and large enterprises. Less than ten employees is defined as small, ten 
and above is defined as one category: medium and large. 
This problem of arbitrariness is not restricted to individual countries either. As 
Table P.4  shows, multilateral institutions engaged in development can also be 
seen to be at odds with each other over what constitutes an SME. 
Country
SME Upper Limit for Number of 
Employees
Maximum Revenue or Turnover Maximum Assets
Algeria 250 2 Billion Dinars 500 Billion Dinars
Botswana 100 $270,000 none
Kenya 100 5 Million to 800 Million KSh none
Mauritius 50 none none
Mozambique 100 none none
Nigeria 50 none none
Rwanda 100 none none
South Africa
200 for all categories except 
agriculture (100) varies by sector varies by sector
Tanzania 100 none none
Uganda 250 10 Million to 50 Million USh 50 Million USh
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Table P.4 SME Definitions used by Multilateral Institutions 
(Source: Gibson and van der Vaart, 2008: 5) 
The lack of consistency is also well illustrated both by Gibson and van der 
Vaart’s (2008) and Ayyagari et al.’s (2007) reviews of the official SME definitions 
employed by various governments. For the former the official upper limit for 
SMEs in Tanzania is 200 employees, for the latter it is 20, while the IFC figure, 
indicated in Table P3 is set at 100. Amplifying the confusion, Japan varies the 
employee element of its SME definition by sector. In transportation the upper 
limit is set at 300, in wholesaling and services at 100, while the retailer upper 
limit is set at 50 workers (Lindner, 2004: 9). Despite the common parlance, it is 
unlikely that a 20 employee food processor in Tanzania will closely resemble a 
100 employee equivalent in Norway, let alone a 500 employee undertaking in 
Germany. 
Whilst the lack of a consistent classification makes cross-country comparisons 
problematic, it is also clear that a one-size-fits-all approach would be 
inappropriate: a 100 employee enterprise in a developing economy would be a 
very different proposition to a developed economy enterprise employing a 
similar number of individuals. This difficulty leads Gibson and van der Vaart 
(2008) to question the whole validity of an employee-based classification and to 
advance the proposition that a turnover segmentation would be more 
appropriate. Whilst the context point is well made, it must be acknowledged that 
validating turnover in developing economy contexts depends on enterprises 
maintaining accurate financial accounts, which could be highly problematic 
when dealing with SMEs that may often operate informally. Additionally, shifting 
Institution
SME Upper Limit for 
Number of Employees 
Maximum Revenue or 
Turnover
Maximum Assets
World Bank 300 $15,000,000 $15,000,000
Multilateral Investment Fund 100 $3,000,000 none
African Development Bank 50 none none
Asian Development Bank
none - uses individual 
government definitions
none none
UNDP 200 none none
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to a financial segmentation still leaves similar problems. A developing economy 
enterprise with a $5 million turnover is likely to be a more significant player in its 
own domestic market than a $5 million turnover enterprise in a developed 
economy marketplace.  
Given the inescapable issue of context, it might be better to recognise it and 
adopt a quartile-based segmentation whereby a given enterprise’s status would 
be determined relative to the distribution of enterprises in its own particular 
domestic economy. Micro, small, medium and large enterprises could thus be 
defined according to which quartile of their domestic enterprise distribution they 
fall into. This would have the benefit that the SME sector would always be that 
which comprises the second and third quartiles of a given economy’s enterprise 
size distribution, whether defined by headcount or turnover. Although it is 
beyond the scope of this thesis, adopting such a segmentation might facilitate 
more meaningful cross-country comparisons. It must be acknowledged though 
that this too would initially have limitations in the case of highly under-developed 
economies, such as Rwanda, where the vast bulk of enterprises are very small 
indeed and typically feature only one self-employed individual. An initial 
separation into quartiles in this context would still concentrate enterprises at the 
lower end of the distribution, but it would nonetheless provide more meaningful 
insights into the impact of government policy as the enterprise distribution 
changed over time.  
As this thesis focuses exclusively on the Rwandan context, the SME sector will 
be taken to mean that segment of enterprises that comprises the middle ground 
between micro and large enterprises, which is defined specifically by the 
National Institute for Rwandan Statistics to be those enterprises that employ 
between 4 and 100 individuals (NISR, 2015a: 10). The Rwandan segmentation 
will be examined fully in Chapter 1. 
Entrepreneurship and Entrepreneurs 
An entrepreneur is essentially an individual who brings a new commercial 
enterprise into existence. The word has its origins as an economic term in     
18th century France, where it was first used by Richard Cantillon to distinguish 
between the separate economic roles of labour, landowner and entrepreneur. 
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As such, entrepreneurship is concerned with the ability to identify new 
commercial opportunities and coordinate the resources required to realise the 
latent commercial potential that exists. 
Unfortunately, as interest in the process of entrepreneurship has expanded, so 
too has misappropriation of the term. It has become increasingly fashionable to 
modify the original meaning and apply it to any of a broad range of activities 
that imply some form of innovation, the most common being social 
entrepreneurship - the creation of enterprises designed to address social 
issues. Other misappropriations that can be readily encountered include 
artrepreneurship, political entrepreneurship, educational entrepreneurship, 
parentrepreneurship and the World Bank’s more recent use of norm-
entrepreneur to describe someone who instigates a change in social norms 
(World Bank, 2015: 54). None of these have much to do with the original notion 
of the entrepreneurial process and undermine the clarity needed when 
addressing the complex issues surrounding economic development.  
Given that this thesis is concerned specifically with the role that the Rwandan 
Government expects will be played by entrepreneurs in the creation of new 
commercial enterprises that will generate economic growth and incremental 
employment, the thesis will focus on individuals who create new commercial 
entities that are intended to be self-sufficient by virtue of their ability to produce 
long-run profit streams and incremental employment. 
Summary 
In the light of the above discussion, the thesis will use the following definitions: 
 SMEs: small to medium-sized enterprises, defined in Rwanda as  
 enterprises that employ 4 - 100 people 
 Entrepreneur: an individual who creates a viable new commercial  
 enterprise, acting either on their own or in teams 
 Entrepreneurship: the process through which a viable new commercial 
 enterprise is created. 
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Chapter 1 The Rwandan Context 
1.1 Introduction 
The development strategy that the government of Rwanda is pursuing was first 
elaborated in its economic plan Vision 2020. Written in 2000, and with frequent 
references to unity, inclusiveness, political stability, absence of discrimination, 
social cohesion, rule of law and the embedding of democracy, the plan aims to 
transform Rwanda into a middle-income country and spells out the broad 
components of the strategy. 
Central to the original strategy, and the subsequent updates, is a belief in the 
emergence of a class of domestic entrepreneurs that will create a new and 
vibrant small to medium-sized enterprise sector:  
 The emergence of a viable private sector that can serve as the principle 
engine of the economy is paramount to Rwanda’s development and key 
to this will be fostering an environment conducive to SME growth and 
development (Minicom, 2012: 11). 
This belief in the transformative power of entrepreneurs and the SMEs they will 
create is expressed again unequivocally by President Kagame in his essay ‘The 
Backbone of a New Rwanda’, where he states: 
  It is increasingly clear to us that entrepreneurship is the surest way for a 
nation…to develop prosperity for the greatest number of people 
(Kagame, 2009: 12). 
This chapter will focus on reviewing the context within which this new class of 
Rwandan entrepreneurs and their SMEs is expected to emerge, institutional 
arrangements and strategies that have been employed to support them, and the 
degree to which their emergence can be discerned.  
1.2 Country Overview 
1.2.1 Geopolitical Considerations 
There are two significant regional issues that warrant initial consideration. First, 
as a landlocked country short on natural resources, it could be argued that 
Rwanda is at a major competitive disadvantage economically and risks 
becoming a hostage to its neighbours (Collier, 2007: 55). However, it should be 
noted that being landlocked has not prevented Botswana from becoming         
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“a development success story” according to the World Bank (2015b), having 
moved from being one of the poorest countries in Africa to become “one of the 
fastest growing economies in the world” (ibid.). Baumol, Litan and Schramm 
(2008: 9) have also pointed out that a similar context clearly has not been a 
major handicap to other economies such as Switzerland, which is also 
landlocked, but benefits nonetheless from its close proximity to the European 
single market. In fact, there is every reason to believe that Rwanda too could 
overcome its supposed geographic isolation and benefit from the emerging East 
African Community single market of Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and 
Uganda and its combined population of 130 million. Although it is not yet clear 
when the single market will be fully implemented, significant progress has been 
made in reducing cross-border tariffs between the participant countries and in 
laying the plans for a single currency. Taken together with the presence of 
institutions that underpin the rule of law and support enterprise, which will be 
addressed below, Rwanda and its capital Kigali would seem well placed to 
become an attractive location for its common market neighbours both to do 
business and to base their commercial headquarters. Indeed this very route - 
becoming a regional haven - is identified by Collier as a possible solution to the 
problem of being a landlocked country (2007: 60). 
The second significant geopolitical issue is the presence in the eastern part of 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) of the 10,000-strong Force 
Democratique de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR), led by perpetrators of the 1994 
genocide, who have mounted periodic raids and terrorist acts in Rwanda. Two 
grenade attacks in Musanze in northern Rwanda in January 2014 (Associated 
Press, 28th January 2014) raised concern that the twentieth anniversary of the 
genocide might be marked by further violence, but in the end this did not 
materialise. The situation is further complicated by periodic cross-border raids 
mounted by the Congolese army to loot Rwandan villages, the most recent of 
which resulted in Congolese fatalities when the looters were engaged by the 
Rwandan army (New Times, June 14th 2014). Although they appear to have 
reduced in frequency, such incursions clearly raise the prospect of some direct 
action by Rwanda in eastern DRC. 
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Rwanda’s Government has been accused of supporting a pro-Rwandan rebel 
group, the M23, in eastern DRC following the release of a UN Security Council 
report in mid 2012 (Hege et al., 2012). Looked at dispassionately, the Rwandan 
Government must be expected to secure its borders and plainly has a 
responsibility to protect its citizens. It would be naïve in the extreme to assume 
that President Kagame, a proven military leader, would not try to destabilise the 
Congo based FDLR terrorist threat. Indeed, the doctrine of making pre-emptive 
strikes or using proxy forces against such potential threats is one that is hardly 
uncommon amongst developed nations. In this context too, Vision 2020, 
perhaps presciently, made the observation that the 1910 partition of Africa 
removed roughly a third of Rwanda’s territory, along with the bulk of its previous 
store of natural resources (Minecofin, 2000: 5). Given the ongoing lack of 
stability in the DRC, one is tempted to surmise that this observation might have 
put down a marker for claims to pre-existing rights over some of the territory 
and resources of eastern DRC. Although it is difficult to identify what these 
potentially disputed territories might be, the following map, taken from 
Rusagara’s Resilience of a Nation (2009: 208), indicates that pre-partition 
Rwanda comprised a land mass that was approximately 50 percent bigger than 
it is today and encompassed large parts of eastern DRC.  
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Figure 1.1 Map of Ku-aanda 
(Source: Rusagara, 2009) 
1.2.2 Demographics 
When Vision 2020 was published in 2000 it observed the need to take action to 
encourage a reduction in the Rwandese birth rate, without which the population 
was forecast to rise to 16 million by 2020. The 2012 Population and Housing 
Census, undertaken by the National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda (NISR), put 
the population in 2012 at 10.5 million, and identified that the birth rate had 
indeed fallen from its 2000 level. Projecting forwards at the 2012 recorded 
growth rate of 2.6 percent (NISR: 2012) suggests that the population will in fact 
only hit 12.9 million in 2020 - slightly below the level of 13 million targeted by 
the government. With a land mass of just 24,668 km2, some 18 percent larger 
than Wales, this would yield a population density in 2020 of 522 people per 
square kilometre, compared to its current level of 460 (World Bank, 2016e). 
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Much is made of the fact that Rwanda is already the most densely populated 
country in Africa and that it ranks 19th globally (ibid.). But even at the 2020 
projected level of 522 people per square kilometre, it still falls way behind, for 
example, the current Bangladeshi level of 1,222 and ranks only one place 
behind Holland, which is not generally regarded as an overcrowded country. 
However, given that 90 percent of the population is still rurally located and 
predominantly engaged in subsistence agriculture (CIA, 2016), the increasing 
population density does highlight the need for long-term structural change. 
The median age of 18.8 indicates a skew towards youth in the country’s 
population distribution, with 61 percent under 25 (ibid.). Within this broad skew, 
the most immediate concern is the fact that 34 percent of the Rwandan 
population falls within the narrow 18 - 30 range (Finscope, 2016: 14). If the 
government’s economic policies do bear fruit, Rwanda may benefit from what 
the World Bank refers to as a “demographic dividend” as some two million new 
workers are expected to enter the job market by 2022 (World Bank, 2013: 45). 
But conversely, failure to meet the economic aspirations of this group raises the 
stakes considerably for the government, as any economic shortcomings are 
likely to be seized upon by the FDLR rebel forces. 
1.2.3 Donor Funding 
Government expenditure has historically been heavily reliant upon direct budget 
funding by donors, which has been described as both ultimately “dehumanising” 
by President Kagame (cited in Crisafulli and Redmond, 2012: 111) and 
tantamount to begging during a meeting with Alex Ruzibukira, Director General 
of Minicom.  
In the wake of the 2012 UN Security Council report claiming that the M23 in the 
DRC had received support from Rwanda, donors dramatically scaled back their 
support despite the government’s strenuous denials of involvement. In 2012 aid 
donations were estimated to account for some 40 percent of the government’s 
budget , so the impact of this reduction was considerable. The World Bank 1
estimates that it resulted in a shortfall of $232 million between what the 
Rwandan Government had anticipated receiving and what was actually 
 Discussed in a meeting with Alex Ruzibukira, Director General of Minicom.1
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delivered (World Bank, 2013: 17). Although posing immediate and significant 
challenges, the government was able to overcome the shortfall, partly via 
increased borrowing but also as a result of higher than expected tax receipts. 
Despite these cuts in donor funding, media coverage would suggest that 
Rwanda’s rehabilitation with the donor community was relatively swift. By the 
middle of 2014 the New Times (7th June, 2014a) was able to report on 
commitments to large increases in support from both the World Bank and the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC). According to the report the World Bank, 
which at the time provided $500 million a year in support, had indicated it would 
be prepared to provide additional funding of between $200 million and         
$250 million a year in order to help realise the country’s economic and poverty 
reduction objectives. At the same time the IFC, which in 2013 channelled    
$13.3 million, or 6.4 percent, of its total African spend into five projects in 
Rwanda under its Entrepreneurial Development Programme (IFC, 2013: 23) 
indicated it would be prepared to advance another $120 million to Rwanda. 
Data from DfID’s Development Tracker website (DfID, 2014) also revealed that 
substantial UK funding was again finding its way to the Rwandan Government, 
albeit via individual government departments rather than directly to the Ministry 
of Finance.  
The experience of having to cope with large cuts in donor funding clearly had 
an impact, though. The budget for the fiscal year to July 2015 indicated a 
marginal reduction in the reliance on donor support from 40 percent to 38.1 
percent of the full year’s budget total (New Times, 15th June 2014b), and in the 
latest budget for the year to July 2016 Minister of Finance, Claver Gatete, 
presented figures to parliament that indicated further reductions in the reliance 
on external support (New Times, 11th June 2015). The total budget for the year 
stands at Rwf 1.768 trillion ($2.3 billion). Of this the minister anticipates that 
66.4 percent, Rwf 1.174 trillion ($1.6 billion), will be financed domestically with 
just 20.2 percent of the balance coming from donor grants of Rwf 358.3 billion 
($474.1 million) and 13.3 percent from loans of Rwf 235.7 billion              
($311.9 million). 
Further evidence for the government's desire to find its own solutions and 
reduce its reliance on external aid can also be discerned in the August 2012 
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introduction of the Agaciro Development Fund (Agaciro, 2016). This is a 
sovereign wealth fund, which encourages private individuals and public 
servants to commit to a monthly payroll deducted contribution to the fund. It also 
accepts one-off donations from companies and government. The money raised 
is then intended for investment in projects that fit with the national economic 
development objectives. Agaciro, broadly meaning ‘dignity’ in Kinyarwandan, 
has clearly resonated with the population. By March 2016 the fund had already 
accumulated Rwf 31 billion, equivalent to $41 million. Whilst it must be 
acknowledged that this is only a relatively small amount when set against the 
donor aid that Rwanda has historically received, it nevertheless demonstrates 
the government’s desire to become increasingly self-reliant. Despite its success 
in raising income, the fund’s website does not, however, list any actual 
investments. Similarly, the financial statements to December 2015 make no 
reference to expenditures beyond the fund’s operating costs, perhaps indicating 
that its main purpose is to build reserves that could provide a short-term 
financial buffer in response to any future fluctuations in donor funding. 
1.2.4 The Post-genocide Political Settlement 
In the aftermath of the genocide Rwanda adopted a presidential system of 
government, with presidential powers kept in check by an elected parliament. 
The constitution specifically proscribes divisions along ethnic lines or the 
creation of political parties with an ethnically exclusive membership or agenda 
(Golooba-Mutebi and Booth, 2013: 3). It also restricts the dominant political 
party to no more than 50 percent of cabinet posts, thereby encouraging cross-
party coalition and consensus building that matches the country’s long-term 
interests. Under the constitution, women are guaranteed a minimum of 30 
percent of positions on all representative bodies, and following the 2013 
elections actually occupy 64 percent of parliamentary seats. Although 
government power is theoretically balanced by the parliament, the Rwandan 
Patriotic Front (RPF) won 78 percent of parliamentary seats in the 2013 
elections and consequently dominates the country’s politics to the extent that 
Rwanda is “de facto a one party state” (Bozzini, 2013: 11).  
Article 101 of the 2003 approved constitution stipulated that the president would 
be elected for a term of seven years and was restricted to serving only two 
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terms. Elected in 2003 the current president, Paul Kagame, was therefore due 
to stand down in 2017. However, following extensive media coverage arguing 
the desirability of extending his tenure, parliament was petitioned and asked to 
consider reforming the constitution. The requisite national referendum was held 
in December 2015, with 98.4 percent of voters approving two major changes to 
the constitution. These allow President Kagame to stand for a third term of 
seven years, after which the presidential term will change from seven to five 
years, hence in theory Paul Kagame could remain in power until 2034. 
In practice the Rwandan system of government is highly analogous to corporate 
management, as detailed in Crisafulli and Redmond’s Rwanda Inc. (2012). 
Policy is debated at cabinet retreats, which it is claimed seek to discuss and 
agree the programmes that are needed to address the main issues facing the 
country. Once formulated, policy is then handed down for local implementation, 
although central control is reinforced via the Imihigo system. The plural form of 
the Kinyarwandan word Umuhigo, which signifies a ‘vow to deliver’, Imihigo 
requires that all public servants commit to annual performance standards that 
have to be signed and witnessed in public. Performance against these public 
commitments is actively monitored and evaluated. Those who are judged to 
have achieved a minimum 80 percent performance rating are awarded a bonus 
equivalent to 5 percent of their annual salary, 70 percent performance yields a  
3 percent bonus and those falling below 60 percent are at risk of losing their 
jobs.  
Implementation of the devolved strategy is overseen by the president in the 
manner of a CEO coordinating the implementation of a corporate business plan 
- in the words of Faustin Mbundu, Chairman of the Private Sector Federation: 
“We call him the CEO of Rwanda…He runs the country like a business” (ibid: 
92). The corporatist style does leave room for criticism, however. Even though 
Vision 2020 spelled out a commitment to good governance and included a 
specific reference to ensuring transparency, the government’s preference for 
conducting debate behind closed doors leaves room for doubts to be raised 
about this commitment. Indeed it is a specific criticism levied by Reporters 
Without Borders, whose 2015 Press Freedom Index assigned Rwanda the low 
rank of 161st of the 180 countries that make up its index. It must be 
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acknowledged, however, that press freedom is a contentious subject in Rwanda 
given the extensive role that radio, most particularly Radio Télévision Libre des 
Milles Collines, played in priming and maintaining the genocide. To the extent 
that transparency is normally seen as a key tool in combatting corruption, any 
lack of transparency also casts the government’s apparent zero tolerance for 
corruption into an interesting light. It points to the possibility that it is a function 
of political will, linked to the objective of creating a business supportive context, 
rather than being derived from external pressure. 
Questions about rent-seeking are raised by the RPF’s ownership of Crystal 
Holdings, formerly known as Tri-Star, a corporation that holds commercial 
assets. Previously the RPF’s production department, this was used to raise 
funds for the RPF while it was in exile. It now owns stakes in large-scale 
enterprises in a range of industrial sectors including telecommunications, 
property development and media. Similar questions also arise from the 
Rwandan Ministry of Defence’s ownership of commercial assets via Horizon 
Group. Booth and Golooba-Mutebi (2011) argue, though, that rents have been 
systematically captured by these corporate entities, thus preventing their 
appropriation by individuals; indeed they suggest that early defections from the 
RPF appear to have been by individuals who anticipated a more flexible and 
traditional attitude to appropriating rents.  
Poorly endowed with natural resources and with the recent experience of the 
genocide, Rwanda would appear to fulfil two of the three conditions that 
comprise “systemic vulnerability”, which it has been argued leads to the 
emergence of the development state (Doner, et al., 2005: 329). The third 
condition, the need to be able to make side payments in order to maintain a 
broad coalition of interests, is obviated by the central appropriation of rents. 
Instead it has enabled the government to subsidise economic policy, driven by 
the belief that long-term nation building and the pursuit of economic and social 
development represent the best option for overcoming the ethnic problems of 
the past (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi, 2011:8). It is argued further that this 
model, a form of developmental (neo)patrimonialism (ibid: 21), is more 
appropriate to low-income countries like Rwanda than the orthodox 
prescriptions promoted by the international community. It facilitated, for 
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instance, being able to put up the substantial risk capital needed to fund a 
successful joint venture with MTN to establish a Rwandan mobile phone 
network. With a relatively small population, and therefore a limited potential 
subscriber base, moving into Rwanda would not at the time have been a 
commercial priority for South African based MTN, but was feasible with the 
funding that was injected by the government via Crystal Holdings. 
With the parliament dominated by the RPF, little in the way of effective 
opposition that can hold the government to account, a corporatist style of 
management and a change to the constitution that will extend the president’s 
term, it is easy to conclude that power in Rwanda is very much in the hands of 
one individual: President Paul Kagame. But suggestions that this automatically 
implies a lack of political space or a “decent into tyranny” (Miller, 2012)  are 2
oversimplified. Rather, it needs to be seen in the context of trying to address the 
country’s unique recent history and immediate challenges (Golooba-Mutebi and 
Booth, 2013: 5) and in the light of the RPF’s core principles of power sharing 
and inclusiveness, which translated into a rejection of a winner-takes-all 
approach to government in the aftermath of the genocide (ibid: 11). That this 
system leaves itself open to criticism that it is dictatorial is obvious. It does 
though have some clear benefits. In the aftermath of the genocide it has 
permitted the government single-mindedly to pursue an agenda that it believes 
is appropriate for rebuilding and unifying the country and has led to it being 
credited for “its high degree of organization, its capacity to manage resources 
efficiently and its focus on delivering results” (Bozzini, 2013: 6). 
1.3 Vision 2020 
The government’s economic development plan Vision 2020, written by the 
Rwandan Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (Minecofin), set the 
ambitious aim of transforming Rwanda into a middle-income country by the year 
2020, with high levels of domestic savings and investment and a parallel 
reduction in the reliance on external aid (Minecofin, 2000: 4). The strategy to 
deliver this transformation comprised six main pillars: good governance, 
underpinned by a capable state; enhancing the productivity, value and  
 Miller produced several articles and broadcasts during 2012 and 2013 for Channel 4’s 2
Dispatches criticising Britain’s ongoing aid donations to Rwanda. 
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market-orientation of the agriculture sector, as well as linking it to other sectors 
of the economy; private sector development, spearheaded by entrepreneurship 
and competitiveness; human capabilities development; infrastructure 
development and the promotion of regional integration (ibid.).  
Implementation of the plan was divided into three overlapping time scales, the 
first of which aimed to achieve macro-economic stability, reduce debt and the 
reliance on foreign aid through focussing on trade liberalisation, tax reform , 3
privatisation and market-driven exchange and interest rates. This phase also 
sought to begin the shift away from government provision of goods and services 
in favour of the private sector. On these foundations, the medium-term phase of 
the plan focused on deepening the move away from agriculture through 
exploiting competitive advantages that were perceived to exist in a cheap and 
multi-lingual labour force, in particular by developing the service sector of the 
economy. In parallel, this medium-term element of the economic plan also 
committed to investing significantly in health, education and infrastructure. The 
long-term and key element of the economic plan, taking it up to 2020, 
envisages the creation of a vibrant middle class and the emergence of 
productive entrepreneurship, underpinned by a broadening and deepening of 
the financial sector, enhanced use of information technology and a greater 
investment in education, particularly in the areas of science and technology.  
Included in the text is the aim of replacing an entire generation of “trained 
teachers, doctors, public servants and private entrepreneurs” (ibid: 8; author’s 
italics) that it is claimed was lost when the genocide took the lives of up to one 
million people , and prompted potential victims, and later perpetrators, to flee 4
the country. A body of literature covering the events that led up to the 1994 
genocide and how it was carried out has developed , but there is a general lack 5
of detailed information about the genocide’s impact upon Rwanda’s professional 
and commercial classes. Hatzfeld’s (2008) interviews with perpetrators did 
 The level of tax revenue that would be generated by the plan is not computed, although the 3
core assumptions include public spending initially equivalent to 10 percent of GDP, declining to 
8 percent after 2005.
 The UN estimates that 800,000 people were killed; the Rwandan government puts the figure at 4
1,071,000 (SURF, 2013).
 See for instance Gourevitch (1999), Dallaire (2003), Melvern (2006) and Hatzfeld            5
(2008, 2008a, 2009).
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indicate that the killings provided profitable opportunities for looting, but there is 
nothing in his accounts to suggest that the killings targeted businesspeople in 
particular. What is feasible, but unproven, is that those potential victims who 
had the financial means, such as business owners, had a better chance to exit 
the country quickly. The accounts do indicate that a middle class including 
business owners was well represented amongst the initiators and perpetrators 
of the genocide. It is reasonable to assume then that they too would have been 
part of the mass exodus of perpetrators who fled to the Congo in the aftermath 
of the killings.  
What is indisputable is the immediate and devastating impact that the genocide 
had on the economy. Rwanda’s GDP had been declining from its 1990 peak of 
$2.55 billion, but was still at $1.97 billion in 1993 before crashing to just      
$0.75 billion in 1994, the year of the genocide. By 2000, the year that the 
government launched Vision 2020, it had climbed back up to $1.73 billion but 
was still well short of its pre-genocide levels.  
The plan set very specific milestones for GDP and GDP per capita (Minecofin, 
2000: 23), as summarised in Table 1.1. 
Table 1.1 Vision 2020 GDP and GDP per Capita Targets 
(Source: Minecofin, 2000: 23) 
The core target of achieving middle-income status implied moving from a GDP 
per capita level of $220 in 2000 to nearly $900 in 2020, fuelled by an annual 
growth rate of 7.5 percent. Against this ambitious target, growth has been 
impressive. By 2014 nominal GDP and GDP per capita had risen to $7.9 billion 
and $696 respectively. However, the World Bank’s threshold for lower middle-
income status is recalculated periodically and at the time of writing stands at 
$1,046 (World Bank, 2016g). Hence Rwanda is still firmly anchored amongst 
the low-income countries with a rank of 168th out of the 182 countries for which 
the World Bank displays 2014 GDP per capita data (World Bank, 2016a). 
2005 2010 2015 2020
GDP ($ Millions) 1,218.75 2,147.85 3,957.28 7,291.04
GDP per Capita $231.39 $336.48 $542.63 $875.08
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Moving to the World Bank’s PPP adjusted data (2016d) raises the GDP per 
capita figure to $1,661, but still leaves Rwanda in the bottom decile of the 
distribution with a rank of 163rd of the 178 countries listed.   
The original economic plan has been the subject of two major updates since 
2000. The first of these, the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction 
Strategy (EDPRS) was undertaken in 2007 and set a revised framework for the 
period 2008 to 2012. This was then superseded in 2012 by a further review 
(EDPRS 2), which set revised targets and updated strategies for the five years 
2013 to 2018. The revised plan retained the key objective of achieving middle-
income status by 2020 and updated the corresponding target GDP per capita 
figure to $1,240, which was expected to be achieved via an average GDP 
growth rate of 11.5 percent (Minecofin, 2012: 2). The ongoing expectation that 
this growth will be driven by development of the private sector is stated explicitly 
in President Kagame’s foreword to the updated plan: 
 The EDPRS 2 period is the time when our private sector is expected to 
take the  driving seat in economic growth and poverty reduction 
(Minecofin, 2012: viii). 
It could be argued that achieving middle-income status is an arbitrary target, 
which to the extent that it is a relative measure, is irrelevant versus Rwanda’s 
economic progress and how that performance translates into welfare 
improvements for the population. However, it is a specific target for the 
economic plan and is expected to be realised through the strategy of supporting 
the evolution of a vibrant SME sector, so it is important to assess the veracity of 
the income per capita level that is implied by achieving the target. 
At a 2014 actual GDP level of $7.9 billion, factoring in the targeted growth rate 
of 11.5 percent across the remaining six years to 2020 yields a forecast real 
GDP, at 2014 prices, for 2020 of $15.2 billion. Dividing this by the projected 
2020 population figure of 12.9 million, calculated at section 1.2.2, yields a real 
GDP per capita figure of $1,175 - close to, but below, the EDPRS 2 target of 
$1,240. 
Both the EDPRS 2 revised target of $1,240 and the author’s derived figure of 
$1,175 for GDP per capita would place Rwanda within the World Bank’s current 
lower middle-income band. However, as already noted, the income thresholds 
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are periodically updated by the World Bank. Whilst it is impossible to draw any 
clear conclusions about where the middle-income threshold will sit in 2020, a 
straight line extrapolation from its value in 2000 ($761) through its current value 
suggests that a figure of $1,224 for 2020 would not be inconceivable. This 
would tend to suggest that Rwanda could indeed realise lower middle-income 
status by 2020 based on the EDPRS 2 targeted figure of $1,240 if it can 
achieve its stated growth target, but would fall short of the target if the author’s 
projection of GDP per capita is accurate. In this regard, an analysis by Ernst 
and Young has also concluded that Rwanda will not actually reach middle-
income status until 2025 (Igihe, 2013). Much is clearly dependent upon whether 
the government’s forecast 11.5 percent average annual growth rate can be 
delivered, which in turn is predicated on the much vaunted private sector’s role 
in creating SMEs that can consistently contribute to that growth in the run up to 
2020. 
Compared to the targeted annual growth rate of 11.5 percent underpinning the 
government’s GDP per capita objective, the compound annual rate of growth 
that has been achieved over the last five years is 9.7 percent, as shown in Table 
1.2, which also clearly highlights the impact that cuts in donor funding had on 
the annual growth rates in 2013 and 2014. 
Table 1.2  Rwandan GDP Growth 
(Source: Derived from the World Bank, 2016b) 
Against this backdrop considerable effort has gone into fashioning a climate that 
would be conducive to enterprise development. This encompasses establishing 
Year GDP in $ Millions Annual Growth Rate 5 Year Compound Growth
2009 5309.0 10.7%
2010 5698.5 7.3%
2011 6406.7 12.4%
2012 7219.7 12.7%
2013 7522.0 4.2%
2014 7890.2 4.9% 9.7%
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a stable banking sector, a favourable governance context and investment in 
infrastructure, which will be explored in the next section.   
1.4 Creating a Climate for Enterprise Development 
1.4.1 Banking 
The National Bank of Rwanda (BNR ) is mandated to conduct a monetary 6
policy that will produce price stability and low inflation. At the time of writing the 
annual inflation rate stood at 4.4 percent for the year to February 2016 (BNR, 
2016). With a freely floating currency, the BNR’s main economic lever is the use 
of its Repo rate, which governs the rate of interest that it extends to commercial 
banks. This has been held at a relatively consistent rate during the past ten 
years, ranging between 6 and 7 percent and at the time of writing was at the 
midpoint of this range at 6.5 percent.  
While a competitive exchange rate can have an impact on economic growth,     
it is also important to minimise volatility and thereby incentivise exports and 
encourage investment (Ocampo et al., 2009: 107). The central bank does, 
therefore, occasionally engage in market transactions in order to smooth out 
any such volatility. As a result, although there has been a gradual decline in the 
value of the Rwandan franc versus the dollar over the past ten years this has 
been moderate, as can be seen in the following graph, which displays the 
modal values for the exchange rate for the past ten years versus the US dollar  7
(the full tabulation is included in Appendix A). 
 Although its official title is the National Bank of Rwanda, it has retained its original French 6
acronym ‘BNR’ derived from ‘Banque Nationale du Rwanda’.
 Throughout the thesis, where a dollar equivalent to Rwandan francs is given it will be at the 7
modal value for the exchange rate for the year in question.
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Figure 1.2 Rwandan Franc/US Dollar Exchange Rates Over Time 
As well as contributing to macroeconomic performance the BNR is also 
responsible for licensing, supervising and ensuring the stability of the financial 
sector. According to the BNR’s website this comprises the central development 
bank, twelve commercial banks, one cooperative bank, a network of 491 user-
owned savings and credit cooperatives (Saccos) and fifteen micro-finance 
banks of which twelve are limited liability enterprises (BNR, 2016).  
1.4.2 Governance 
Vision 2020 identified the establishment of a good governance platform as a 
key priority that would underpin macroeconomic stability and provide a 
supportive context for the government’s business development strategy. This is 
fully consistent with the World Bank’s position that “countries with strong 
institutions prosper by creating an enabling environment that facilitates private 
sector growth” (World Bank, 2016c).  
Various indices can be consulted to gain a degree of insight into the extent to 
which Rwanda appears to match this objective. It must be recognised, though, 
that such indices are often constructed on the basis of subjective assessments, 
which may deviate from reality, and that African development statistics are also 
subject to both “validity and reliability” problems (Jerven, 2103: 16). 
Nevertheless, the cross-country comparisons contained in these indices do 
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provide a degree of insight into the extent to which Rwanda appears to be 
meeting its aim of fashioning a context that will support entrepreneurs and 
enterprise development.  
In the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Index  (World Bank, 2016) 8
Rwanda ranks in the top third of the 189 countries included in the composite 
global ranking . Amongst the 47 countries that make up the Sub-Saharan Africa 9
category, Rwanda occupies second place. It comes top for registering property 
and getting credit, and third for ease of obtaining construction permits. The 
overall ranking though is compromised by lower scores for trading across 
borders and enforcing contracts, which ranked 28th and 20th  respectively. 
Applying the low-income countries filter to the Ease of Doing Business Index 
data shifts Rwanda into top position overall for the 34 nations that make up the 
World Bank’s low-income grouping. 
To enhance the institutional support for entrepreneurship the process for 
registering a business has been streamlined through the Rwanda Development 
Board (RDB). In theory this provides a one-stop-shop where a new enterprise 
can be up and running in a matter of hours. This is indeed reflected in the time 
taken to complete the individual steps included in the Ease of Doing Business 
data, although in aggregate the process is judged to take 5.5 days rather than a 
few hours (World Bank, 2016). Once completed the East African Community 
(EAC) protocols allow a business registered in one member country to trade 
without further registration in all of the EAC countries. 
In order to bring about improvements in resolving commercial disputes, the 
government established separate commercial courts and recruited expatriate 
judges from Mauritius to populate them (Minicom, 2012:15). Like Rwanda, 
Mauritius is a member of the Commonwealth of Nations, formerly the British 
Commonwealth, with English as the official language but where French is also 
widely spoken. The judges would therefore have been able to integrate rapidly 
into the Rwandan legal system, as suggested by the high rankings that accrue 
 Although the World Bank publishes a “Doing Business” report, its on-line index is labelled the 8
“Ease of Doing Business” index. The former includes data from the latter. 
 The index is a composite of scores on ten individual topics. Interestingly on the sub-index for 9
getting credit Rwanda actually ranks second globally, beaten only by top placed New Zealand.
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in the Ease of Doing Business Index for resolving insolvency and enforcing 
contracts (World Bank, 2016). 
The supportive commercial context would also seem to be demonstrated by low 
levels of corruption, as seen in the Graft Index that features in the IFC 
Enterprise Survey’s profile for Rwanda. The Graft Index records the frequency 
with which firms were expected or requested to make a gift or informal payment 
when applying for six different public services or licenses. Overall this records a 
score for Rwanda of just 5 percent, suggesting that corruption is low            
(IFC, 2011: 13). Where problems do occur, these tend to be skewed towards 
large firms, especially those applying for construction permits.  
Table 1.3 Graft Index Scores for Rwanda 
(Source: IFC Enterprise Survey, 2011: 13) 
Although based on perceptions rather than objective measures, a similar picture 
can also be seen in the 2015 Transparency International Corruption 
Perceptions Index. At a relatively high ranking of 44th out of 168 countries, 
Rwanda falls just outside the index’s top quartile and is fourth highest of all 
African countries behind Botswana, Cape Verde and the Seychelles 
(Transparency International, 2015). This broadly positive outlook is further 
reinforced by the East Africa Bribery Index, which shows only a 2.9 percent 
likelihood of encountering a situation where a bribe would be sought or 
expected - much less than the rates recorded for the other EAC countries 
(Transparency International, 2014:1).  
Firm Size Graft Index
Small 0%
Medium 4.8%
Large 20.1%
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Table 1.4 East African Bribery Index 
(Source: Transparency International, 2014: 1) 
The index also shows that where corruption is encountered in Rwanda, it is 
most likely to occur when dealing with the police, as is the case for all the 
countries in the East African Community (ibid: 2). But here too Rwanda appears 
to perform better than its neighbours, with the likelihood of encountering police 
corruption recorded at just 6.0 percent of interactions, and down from           
10.7 percent in 2013 (ibid: 28).  
Overall, the perceived level of corruption in Rwanda is seen to be falling, with 
74 percent of the study’s sample reporting that they believed corruption had 
reduced in the previous twelve months, compared with only 10 percent who felt 
it had increased. Projecting forward, a similar picture was observed with regard 
to the anticipated future level of corruption, with 78 percent anticipating that the 
level of corruption would continue to fall during the next twelve months and only 
7 percent expecting it to increase (ibid: 33). The survey also identified a very 
high level of satisfaction with specific measures taken by the government to 
curb corruption, such as public wealth declarations that are required of senior 
public officials, the creation of an anti-corruption department in the Rwandan 
Revenue Authority and regular auditing of government ministries’ accounts by 
the Auditor General’s Office. The ongoing commitment to improving governance 
is also evidenced in the fact that the government’s annual budget includes a 
specific and sizeable allocation against improving the accountability of its 
institutions. In the financial year to June 2015 this stood at Rwf 53.1 billion   
($78 million), representing an increase of 34 percent on the previous year (New 
Times, 14th June 2014c). 
Country Likelihood of Encountering Bribery
Rwanda 2.9%
Kenya 12.3%
Uganda 17.9%
Tanzania 19.0%
Burundi 19.4%
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The composite Worldwide Governance Index (WGI, 2015) also seems to 
confirm that a context that should be broadly supportive of business 
development has indeed been progressively fashioned.  
Table 1.5 Worldwide Governance Index Scores for Rwanda  10
(Source: WGI, 2015) 
A similarly positive picture is revealed in Table 1.6 by disaggregating the Ibrahim 
Index of African Governance (IIAG, 2015). 
Table 1.6 Ibrahim Index of African Governance Scores for Rwanda 
(Source: IIAG, 2015) 
Taken together the various governance indices would appear to paint a 
generally positive image and suggest that the corporatist approach to 
government discussed in section 1.2.4 has been an efficient way to implement 
policy designed to support enterprise development. However the weak rankings 
observed in the sub-indices for participation and human rights (IIAG, 2015) and 
Indices 2004 2009 2014
Political stability and absence of violence 14.42 29.86 42.72
Rule of law 23.44 37.44 61.06
Regulatory quality 26.47 42.11 58.65
Control of corruption 39.02 62.68 76.92
Government effectiveness 32.68 49.76 56.25
Voice and accountability 10.58 11.37 17.24
Sub-indices 2015 Score Score Change Over 5 Years Rank (Out of 52)
Safety and rule of law 62.0 +3.3 12
Sustainable economic opportunity 63.5 +2.1 7
Human development 71.0 +5.3 9
Participation and human rights 46.3 +0.7 30
Composite Index 60.7 +2.9 11
 The indices indicate the percentage of countries worldwide that rank lower than the indicated 10
country, so that higher values indicate better governance scores.
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voice and accountability (WGI, 2015) would suggest that outsiders have little 
scope to engage in the debates that frame such policies.  
1.4.3 Infrastructure Development 
Vision 2020 also observed that major infrastructural investment would be 
required. According to the Rwanda Development Board the government invests 
nearly 10 percent of its annual spend in infrastructure projects, which include 
improving roads, constructing a new airport to serve as a hub for the Great 
Lakes region, and improving public transport (RDB, 2015). It has also made 
significant investments in telecommunications in order to enhance its 
broadband capabilities and position Kigali as a potential high value-added 
internet hub for the region - a strategy that would seem to mirror that 
undertaken by Malaysia in the mid 1990s. By 2012 telecommunications 
investment in Rwanda had already reached $95 million, and in addition to the 
2,300 kilometres of fibre optic cable across the country its network had been 
connected via the East African coast to undersea cables that deliver 
international connectivity (Crisafulli and Redmond, 2012: 9). The telecoms 
development plan also received a considerable boost in 2013 when Korea 
Telecom and the Rwandan Government jointly announced that agreement had 
been reached for Korea Telecom to invest a further $260 million in developing 
broadband capabilities (New Times, June 11th 2013).  
A major EAC regional railway project is also in the early stages of development, 
which would give Rwanda access to the ports of Mombasa and Dar es Salaam 
(Mineac, 2011: 33). Developing the network across the EAC is an ambitious 
project that will clearly require massive funding. It did though receive a 
significant boost in 2014 with an agreement from China’s Exim Bank  to 11
provide Kenya with 90 percent of the money required to fund the first stage of 
its development (New Times, 6th May 2014d), with the balance of the funding to 
be provided by the Kenyan Government. The Rwandan element of the plan 
involves building two new railways from Kigali. The first would connect to the 
Tanzanian network, at a cost of $5 billion, with a second to connect with the 
Kenyan network at an estimated cost of $13 billion. Although it is not clear yet 
 The bank exists to promote foreign trade and investment as well as development assistance.11
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how these would be funded, both are listed on the RDB’s website as potential 
private-public partnerships (RDB, 2015). 
The importance of these railway connections in providing a commercial gateway 
to overseas markets is reflected in the fact that Rwanda’s export trade has 
historically been dominated by its near neighbours. In 2012 some 75 percent of 
exports went to East African Community countries and a further 15 percent went 
across the border to neighbouring DRC (World Bank, 2013: 10). Gaining access 
to the Kenyan and Tanzanian ports and the parallel development of the single 
East African Community market, potentially with a single currency, would 
therefore present a major commercial opportunity to Rwanda if it can succeed in 
its goal of building scalable and competitive businesses.  
In addition to its plans for rail links, the government is also committed to 
investing heavily in other infrastructure projects that will support private 
enterprise development. The potential for using Lake Kivu, which borders on the 
DRC, as an inland waterway that can be used to transport goods is also being 
examined (RDB, 2015). In addition, the lake is thought to contain some 55 
billion cubic meters of methane gas, held in suspension at a depth of 300 
meters. If this can be extracted cost-efficiently, it presents a considerable 
opportunity to generate electricity for both domestic and export markets. The 
gas extraction rights were awarded in 2011 to Contour Global, which estimates 
that up to 100 megawatts of electricity could be produced annually (Contour 
Global, 2012).   
1.5 Stimulating SME Sector Development 
The text of Vision 2020 acknowledged that the agricultural sector had limited 
potential to drive the economy and determined that growth should be grounded 
in Rwanda’s comparative advantage, which was defined as: 
 …a plentiful supply of cheap labour, a large multi-lingual population, a 
strategic location as the gateway between East and Central Africa as 
well as its small size, making it easy to build infrastructure (Minecofin, 
2000: 9).   
There is little in this comparative advantage to suggest though that a vibrant 
SME sector would emerge as a spontaneous reaction to the convergence of 
cheap labour and a supportive institutional context. The government has 
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therefore taken on the mantle of development state and become actively 
engaged in upgrading the economy, a strategy that is fully consistent with 
Chang’s view that comparative advantage is nothing more than a “base-line” 
that developmental states can deviate from (Lin and Chang, 2009: 495). As part 
of this upgrading it has instigated a number of strategies that are designed 
specifically to support the emergence of an entrepreneurial class that can set up 
and develop the vibrant SME private sector that Vision 2020 envisages. 
1.5.1 SME Regional Cluster Strategy 
In 2012 the government introduced the SME Regional Cluster Strategy, with the 
objective of capitalising on regional concentrations of raw materials and 
workforce skills (Minicom, 2012). Based on Porter’s  theories of regional 12
competitive advantage (Porter, 1998, 2000), the strategy identifies 20 ‘unique’ 
SME product clusters across the 30 districts of Rwanda, ranging from 
agricultural processing and fish farming, through tourism and ceramics, to 
business process outsourcing (Minicom, 2012: 10). Based initially on a random 
survey of 404 enterprises, equivalent to just 0.3 percent of the total number of 
enterprises that exist in the country, the strategy document identified five 
product clusters for each district, from which one priority cluster was selected 
for each district outside Kigali and two for each of the three districts in Kigali.     
A full list of the clusters is included in Appendix B.  
Throughout the strategy document explicit references are made to the 
importance of the SME sector. There is no overt discrimination against ‘informal 
sector’ establishments, indeed the foreword to the strategy document 
recognises that establishments across the formality spectrum play a “crucial 
role in the country’s development” (ibid: 3).  
The cluster strategy acknowledges that Rwandan SMEs tend to be 
uncompetitive compared to similar enterprises in neighbouring countries      
(ibid: 12) and stresses the importance of quickly establishing efficient, 
competitive and scalable SMEs that will be able to capitalise on the single East 
African Community market when it comes fully into existence. In addition to 
 Interestingly, Michael Porter is a member of President Kagame’s Presidential Advisory 12
Council (Crisafulli and Redmond, 2012: 99).
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mapping out the regional specialisations, the programme also identified five 
cross-cutting issues facing all the SME clusters. These were: cluster 
organisation, access to finance, access to market information, skills 
development, and production capabilities. To address these Minicom has 
developed short and long-term strategies, which have been allocated to 
individual government departments for implementation. The major actions to be 
undertaken include the appointment of regional cluster managers, providing 
improved access to market information and finance, targeted education and 
training, and the development of graduate entrepreneurship programmes    
(ibid: 58).  
The first stage in the process of identifying and selecting product clusters was 
overseen by District Cooperative Officers and Vice Mayors, who were charged 
with shortlisting suitable product clusters based on four key criteria, namely: the 
number of SMEs already operating in a particular cluster, the number of 
cooperatives in the cluster, how many people the product cluster employs or 
could employ and especially whether it had the potential to generate high and 
rising wages, plus the average annual turnover per SME. In developing the 
strategy consideration was also given to additional criteria such as the proximity 
of the raw materials that would be required, whether a plan for exploiting the 
cluster at district level existed, and the cluster’s export potential. 
The clusters identified from this selection process were then reviewed and 
prioritised in discussion with stakeholders. The cluster strategy actually makes 
several references to involving stakeholders in the process and these are 
variously referred to as national and local government and the private sector, 
although they are not identified specifically. The main government stakeholder 
is likely to have been Minicom, which has overall responsibility for implementing 
the strategy, supported by district administrators. Further insight can, however, 
be found in the schematic representations of the 30 individual district plans. 
These diagrammes suggest a matrix approach involving major institutions 
including the IFC and World Bank, development NGOs, government ministries 
and agencies, and the Private Sector Federation, which is broadly equivalent to 
a chamber of commerce.   
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The 20 SME product clusters identified in the original assessment are listed in 
Table 1.7. 
Table 1.7 Identified Regional SME Product Clusters 
(Source: Minicom, 2012: 10) 
At the end of the process a list of five products was identified for each individual 
district. In most cases there is evidence of convergence across the product 
categories, mainly reflecting the national dominance of farming. For instance 
Gatsibo district’s list features leather, maize, rice, coffee and cassava. But in 
some cases the linkages look more tenuous - Kicukiro, a district of Kigali, for 
Products
Horticulture
Fish
Milk
Meat
Honey
Wood
Fashion and tailoring
Essential oils 
Leather
Irish potatoes
Eco-tourism
Macadamia nuts
Spices
Ceramics and pottery
Handicrafts
Maize
Minerals, including precious stones, gems and jewellery
Cassava
Wheat
ICT and business process outsourcing
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example features a diverse list of weaving and handicrafts, meat, furniture, 
agro-processing and coffee.  
The finally selected schedule of priority clusters differs though in some 
important ways from the initial list. The originally identified clusters of 
horticulture, Irish potatoes, maize, cassava and wheat do not figure at all in the 
final schedule, which additionally includes a number of categories that did not 
feature in the initial list, namely: banana wine, pineapple, silk and passion fruit. 
Furniture is also included in the final schedule, although this is arguably linked 
to wood in the original list. Similarly, mining is assumed to be equivalent to 
minerals in the original schedule.  
Table 1.8 details the final list of clusters that were selected and the frequency 
with which they occur across the country’s 30 districts. The most popular cluster 
activity is milk, including butter production, which is the priority for four districts, 
followed by production of essential oils and fishing related activities, which are 
both prioritised for development in three of the 30 regional districts. 
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Table 1.8 Regional SME Cluster Frequency 
(Source: Minicom, 2012: 21) 
The ongoing dominance of agriculture in the economy is evident in the fact that 
18 of the clusters relate broadly to agriculture, while adding in the fisheries 
related clusters raises the agriculture and fisheries element to 21, or 70 percent, 
of the clusters. Whilst this obviously reflects the actual situation at the time, it 
stands in stark contrast to the fundamental plan to migrate from an agricultural 
to a knowledge-based economy and the EDPRS 2 target of generating 200,000 
off-farm jobs per year (Minecofin, 2012: 55).  
Product Frequency
Milk, including butter production 4
Fish, including fishing, fish-farming and fish-flour 3
Essential oil 3
Banana wine 2
Pineapple 2
Furniture 2
Pork 2
Weaving - handicrafts 1
ICT - software development 1
Fashion and tailoring 1
Leather 1
Macadamia nuts 1
Pottery 1
Eco-tourism 1
Honey 1
Mining 1
Silk 1
Passion fruit 1
Spices 1
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With no central database of enterprises, implementation of the cluster strategy 
is devolved to provincial level managers, located at business development 
centres, who are charged with identifying SMEs that might qualify for support 
and then connecting them with the institutions and government programmes 
that might be able to help. Clearly with such a devolved programme, much 
depends upon the capabilities and motivations of the individual managers. This 
was evidenced when discussing the SME Regional Cluster Strategy during an 
interview with Eusebe Muhikira, the Rwanda Development Board’s Head of 
Trade and Manufacturing Department. During the discussion it was conceded 
that the results of the programme have been “very mixed”, that only three of the 
five provincial managers were viewed as being effective, and that the strategy 
seemed only to work with communities that are in very close geographic 
proximity to the business development centres. 
On the face of it, there would seem to be some considerable logic in the 
regional product cluster strategy and the attempt to tailor government and 
institutional support to pre-existing concentrations of materials and expertise, 
and the explicitly stated objective of identifying and supporting those 
entrepreneurs who would seem to have high potential. Additionally, efforts to 
facilitate greater levels of collaboration and integration between regionally 
complementary businesses and to seek to improve their competitiveness would 
also seem to make sense. But despite the apparent logic of the cluster strategy, 
it is possible to take issue with what might be seen as an overly prescriptive 
strategy and its attempt to pull entrepreneurs into very specific commercial 
sectors identified by government.  
Although Porter advances the argument that governments should actively try to 
facilitate cluster development (Porter, 2000: 26) he also observes that they tend 
to form independently, sometimes “in spite” of government, and seems to 
suggest that privately led initiatives that enlist government support are more 
likely to be successful than government led initiatives (ibid: 31). He also notes 
that cluster boundaries need to reflect the economic realities, rather than 
political boundaries (ibid.), which rather calls into question the very logic of 
picking clusters on the basis of district geography.  
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Isenberg (2013: 232) goes even further and argues strongly against such 
interventions on the basis that entrepreneurs reside in the margins, rather than 
in the mainstream, and that government action that pulls them into the middle 
ground is both alien to them and even counterproductive. Rather than delivering 
opportunities ‘on a plate’, he argues that entrepreneurs are quite able to find 
opportunities for themselves and that the real commercial opportunities will tend 
to reside where everyone else - policymakers included - think they do not exist. 
In particular he takes issue with a ‘famous development economist’ who has 
developed a methodology for identifying sectoral strategies that governments 
should incentivise entrepreneurs to occupy, and goes on to claim that such 
sectoral cluster strategies are “misguided and potentially harmful” (ibid: 233). 
He argues forcefully that governments should, at most, aim to fulfil the role of 
market maker through deploying government expenditure, reducing barriers to 
market entry and publicising commercial successes. Rather than trying to push 
entrepreneurs into specific sectors, Isenberg stresses that the government’s 
role is to create a supportive context and observes that “opportunities pull 
entrepreneurs, whether incentives push them there or not” (ibid: 239). 
1.5.2 Hanga Umurimo 
In October 2012 Minicom launched Hanga Umurimo, a strategy devised 
specifically to stimulate positive attitudes towards entrepreneurship and to 
encourage individuals to embark on the process of SME creation and thereby 
build towards the realisation of Vision 2020 (Minicom, 2012a). Subtitled “Start 
Small, Grow Big”, the literal translation of the Kinyarwandan Hanga Umurimo is 
“Create Own Jobs” - a call to action that encourages people to think about 
creating jobs rather than seeking employment, which might not exist, or 
defaulting to subsistence activities. Young people, especially students, were 
targeted through a communications programme designed to fashion positive 
attitudes towards entrepreneurship as a career choice. Financial institutions 
were also included as secondary targets for the communications strategy, with 
the objective of generating favourable attitudes amongst those individuals that 
would be expected to advance credit to the budding entrepreneurs who 
responded to the call to action.  
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Training is a key element of the strategy, with the joint aim of both enhancing 
business management skills, including business plan writing, and also raising 
individuals’ levels of self-confidence when they come to seek credit from 
financial institutions. For this the Hanga Umurimo programme draws heavily on 
the International Finance Corporation, which provides skills training for the 
Minicom recruited service providers as well as training on the IFC SME toolkit. 
The Hanga Umurimo plan is comprehensive and identifies key stakeholders as 
well as a wide range of delivery partners that encompasses government 
ministries, the National University of Rwanda , the Private Sector Federation, 13
the IFC and NGOs. The core aim of the plan is the identification of individuals 
with the right aptitude and the subsequent nurturing of what are judged to be 
“good business ideas” (ibid: 2). The main mechanism for achieving this 
objective is a national business plan competition, which is coordinated at district 
level. Where funding is subsequently provided for an enterprise, 75 percent of 
the financial risk is underwritten by the Business Development Fund and the 
remaining balance of 25 percent has to be covered by the enterprise applicant.  
An evaluation of the project undertaken by Management Consult Associates 
(MCA) for Minicom and the IFC determined that within three weeks the 
awareness campaign yielded 16,032 applications from individuals who wanted 
to participate in the business plan competition. From this the review panel 
selected 50 SME concepts per district (MCA, 2013: 9). The resulting 1,500 
potential enterprises received initial business training from five Minicom 
appointed service providers, one for each of the country’s five provinces, who 
were responsible for data collection, liaising with applicants, helping them to 
prepare their business plans and supporting the loan application process, as 
well as participating actively in the final selection process (ibid: 10).  
The original plan was to select ten business plans per district, yielding a total of 
300 across the country, but this was increased initially to 600 by adding in the 
next ten best plans per district. Following the provision by the IFC of 
incremental funding, this was then increased again to a total of 30 business 
 Although originally a single university, in November 2013 all of Rwanda’s state run 13
universities were amalgamated to form a single university under the National University of 
Rwanda name.
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plans per district. The resulting 900 business plans, written to a predetermined 
IFC defined format, were judged by a panel of ‘experts’ comprising bankers, 
professional services providers, civil servants and the chairman of the Access to 
Finance Forum (AFF) - a body mandated to mobilise and sensitise the 
population to join financial institutions as well as recommending ways to 
overcome constraints to accessing finance.  
Winning business plans were circulated to the banks, confirming that they had 
been approved and that the individuals behind them had received the requisite 
business skills training. When accepted by a bank, the loan details were then 
forwarded to the BDF who, after undertaking due diligence checks confirmed 
that they were guaranteeing 75 percent of the loan amount. This took the form 
of a guarantee certificate that the enterprise owner took to the loan provider to 
confirm that the underwriting was in place via the BDF, thereby triggering 
release of the loan. 
Whilst laudable in its aims, winners have nonetheless found it difficult to obtain 
the funds needed to get their enterprises off the ground. This points to 
fundamental difficulties with the strategy’s architecture. First, it is assumed that 
the judging panel have the experience and skills necessary to recognise a 
viable business idea and the ability to assess accurately the risks involved. 
Furthermore, the judges are unlikely to want to be seen as a bottleneck to 
implementation of the government’s strategy and are therefore likely to fall into 
a quantity over quality mindset. Second, even though 75 percent of the 
commercial banks’ risk is underwritten by the BDF, the banks still bear             
25 percent of the risk themselves. Being sensitive about the ratio of non-
performing loans in their portfolios they will be averse even to BDF underwritten 
loans if there is any uncertainty about an individual’s ability to make 
repayments. Thus they will seek to reassure themselves about the viability of 
winners’ concepts and to select those they feel are likely to be able to repay 
their loans, rather than processing them automatically. The more the 
programme tries to deliver volume to support the strategy, the more the 
commercial banks can be expected to deepen their reservations about the 
plans they are being asked to fund. In fact their reserve would seem to be well 
founded - a frank and revealing interview with Maryse Nyirubutama Uwera, the 
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Professional in charge of Innovation and Business Development at Minicom , 14
emphasised that many applicants think the loans that they receive are a 
government grant, which in turn leads directly to repayment defaults.  
Shortcomings in the Hanga Umurimo programme have also been conceded 
more recently by Trade and Industry Minister Francois Kanimba. Appearing 
before parliament to explain why the programme appeared to be failing, the 
minister also said that many people thought they would obtain free money that 
they could use to start a business and added that it appeared many had 
artificially inflated their business projections in order to obtain the free money 
that they thought was on offer (New Times, 13th March, 2016).  
The project evaluation undertaken by MCA also identified that in aggregate only 
58 percent of the business competition winners were actually able to meet the 
25 percent collateral requirement (MCA, 2103: 19), suggesting that the 
screening process had failed to exclude enterprise ideas that would never 
manage to trigger full-scale financial backing, even despite the BDF guarantees 
(ibid: 19). To overcome this problem the BDF is now examining the scope for 
equity participation in enterprises, alongside its 75 percent loan guarantee 
function, making it a commercial partner in the businesses. Whilst this is also to 
be applauded, a flaw clearly still persists. The supposition that a panel of 
‘experts’ that collectively have little or no experience of setting up and running a 
business should nevertheless be adept at spotting potential entrepreneurs and 
viable business plans seems highly optimistic. Furthermore, the decision to 
select enterprise ideas on the basis of a pre-determined format - the IFC 
standardised template (Minicom, 2012a: 2) - assumes the appropriateness of a 
one-size-fits-all approach to planning. Indeed, the use of such a business plan 
template has the hallmark of having more to do with overcoming the judging 
panel’s lack of familiarity with business plans and a corresponding inability to 
assess the commercial potential of the business concepts that they were being 
asked to judge. 
 The information contained in this section is based both on a review of the available 14
documentation and notes made during a meeting with Maryse Nyirubutama Uwera, who in a 
frank and open discussion revealed helpful insights that would not have otherwise been 
available.
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The project appraisal also identified that, after completing their training, the 
trainees had only a single day to refine and present their business concepts to 
the selection panel (MCA, 2013: 25). The selection panel too had faced a 
similarly daunting task in having only a week to pick 1,500 trainees from the 
initial 16,032 applications and typically had to handle between 80 and 100 
business concept presentations per day (ibid: 27). The net result is that, despite 
the high level of interest in the competition, by June 2014 only 170 business 
plans had actually been funded . Of additional concern is the fact that            15
74 percent of the enterprises that are receiving funding are sole-proprietorships 
(ibid:16), which sits uneasily with the claim that a key screening criterion for the 
1,500 selected business ideas was their “potential to create jobs” (ibid: 26). It 
consequently raises the question of whether the strategy might be 
compounding the very problem it seeks to address, rather than solving it. 
In addition to the national business plan competition the Hanga Umurimo 
strategy also integrates two further components designed to support SME 
development: Project Pour la Promotion des Petits et Micro-enterprise Rurales 
(PPPMER), and Proximity Business Advisors (Probas). 
1.5.3 Project Pour la Promotion des Petits et Micro-enterprise Rurales 
PPPMER is a district level programme that is supported by the UN’s 
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), which exists primarily to 
enhance levels of food security and reduce poverty by acting in the interests of 
what they refer to as ‘subsistence’, emerging and expanding SMEs. As its 
French name suggests, PPPMER was originally started in 2000 - before 
Rwanda joined the Commonwealth of Nations in November 2009 and formally 
adopted English as its first language. 
According to the IFAD project brief for Rwanda, PPPMER’s aims will be 
achieved through a combination of developing viable SMEs, training individuals 
who are in possession of “entrepreneurial potential” , supporting local 16
initiatives, strengthening grassroots organisations and facilitating financial 
access for the rural poor (IFAD, 2014). The anticipated result of this intervention 
 Figure confirmed by Maryse Nyirubutama Uwera, the Professional in charge of Innovation 15
and Business Development at Minicom.
 The document does not, though, explain how such potential would be recognised.16
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matrix is the development of rural SMEs that will become sources of 
incremental income in areas of high population density, via the opening up of 
secondary and service markets. Despite IFAD’s overt agricultural remit, these 
are expected to be “especially in areas such as petty commerce, repair shops 
and handicrafts” (ibid.).  
The strategy also seeks to support the development of apprenticeships in areas 
such as carpentry and tailoring in an effort to help young, vulnerable, individuals 
who did not complete their schooling. Under the PPPMER scheme, apprentices 
are given Rwf 18,000 to fund six months of training, which is provided by a local 
neighbour who is skilled in the particular craft. Half of this funding is a 
government grant, the other half is provided as a repayable microcredit from the 
local savings and credit cooperative (Sacco).  
Beyond the top-level information provided in the IFAD briefing document, 
Minicom’s own description of the scheme (Minicom, 2014) indicates the 
existence of a well-thought-out approach to the stated objective of supporting 
rural SMEs. The programme is divided into two key elements and details the 
existence of two separate funds that can award grants to specific projects. The 
first of these is the Technological Innovation Fund, which lends support to 
projects that are designed broadly to improve methods of production such as 
funding new equipment, technology training, product quality improvements and 
testing the viability of new products. The second fund, the Marketing Support 
Fund, finances the development of promotional materials, marketing strategies, 
and the opening up of new distribution channels. The funds available for a 
single project are not inconsiderable, with grants of up to Rwf 10 million and a 
planning assumption of a grant average of Rwf 8.2 million (ibid: 3).   
1.5.4 Proximity Business Advisors 
Hanga Umurimo’s strategic architecture is completed by the Probas: sector 
level business advisors who are typically rural artisans or SME owners. Probas 
are not employed by Minicom - they receive their remuneration via a voucher 
scheme. An intending entrepreneur seeking business advice buys a voucher, 
which costs Rwf 50, from their local Sacco. This functions basically as an order 
for the Proba’s services. Probas, who also receive IFC business skills training in 
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order to enhance their ability to advise people who are planning to set up an 
enterprise, subsequently redeem the vouchers at the Sacco for Rwf 5,000.  
On the face of it, the Probas scheme looks like an ingenious way for budding 
entrepreneurs in rural settings to get the kind of guidance that they would not 
normally be able to access. Furthermore, the Probas are expected to take their 
best prospects to the local Sacco and help them to obtain the loans they need 
to start their enterprises. Typically these fall into the Rwf 500,000 to               
Rwf 1 million range and constitute in the main agriculture orientated businesses 
such as maize and milk processing, production of cassava flour as well as retail 
shops and handicrafts, plus some services such as bicycle taxis and car 
washing. Unfortunately, as with the national business plan’s bias, each Probas 
scheme is administered on the ground by a six-person committee made up of 
the District Vice Mayor responsible for economic matters, the District Executive 
Secretary, the Rural SME Facilitator, the District Cooperative Manager, a Sector 
Executive Secretary and - finally - a lone SME representative selected by the 
local community (Minicom, 2012a: 8).   
In line with conventional thinking, the strategies to support entrepreneurship 
make frequent references to ensuring access to finance, which is also the 
subject of a specific strategy.  
1.5.5 Access to Finance 
Developing access to finance was seen by the Rwandan Government as a 
critical factor in achieving its economic plan. Vision 2020 emphasised the 
promotion of microcredit that, in combination with investments in vocational and 
technical training, would especially support young self-employed workers 
(Minecofin, 2000: 13). Additionally, the 2006 Financial Sector Development Plan 
observed the need to build an effective microfinance sector that could deliver a 
broad range of financial products for the unbanked, thereby triggering savings 
that would build capital markets and facilitate investment (Finscope, 2012:1). 
Despite the accent placed on microfinance, by 2008 only 3 percent of Rwanda’s 
adult population had savings with either a microfinance institution (MFI) or a 
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savings and credit cooperative (Minecofin, 2009: Executive Summary ) and 17
over half the population were unable to access any form of financial services at 
all, whether formal or informal (Finscope, 2012: 11).  
Recognising that the government’s economic agenda could not be realised 
without an effective financial sector that could mobilise savings and recycle 
them into long-term investments, such as backing new SMEs, Minecofin 
devised the Umurenge Saccos Strategy with the aim of massively expanding 
the national coverage of Saccos (Minecofin, 2009). The plan received a 
substantial budget allocation of Rwf 4.3 billion ($7.6 million). The lion’s share of 
this funding, Rwf 3.3 billion, was used to subsidise the operating costs:            
80 percent in the first year, reducing to 50 percent in year two and 30 percent in 
year three. A further Rwf 850 million was allocated for equipment, Rwf 63 million 
to train staff and Rwf 9 million to raise awareness and interest in Saccos across 
the population (ibid: section 5.2). Strategic partnerships were also sought with 
formal banks and microfinance institutions so that cases that were beyond the 
means of an individual Sacco could be referred to a formal institution for 
support. 
The strategy of expanding the distribution of Saccos can only be regarded as 
an outstanding success for Minecofin, with financial service providers now 
distributed densely right across the country. The 2012 Financial Inclusion 
Report (Finscope, 2012) revealed that 44 percent of the population now live 
within five kilometres of an MFI, and 91 percent live within five kilometres of a 
Sacco . Apart from the continued uptake of Sacco accounts, inclusion has also 18
been aided more recently by the development of mobile banking, which by 2016 
was being used by 2.3 million adults (Finscope, 2016: 34). As a result of the 
strategy financial exclusion had reduced dramatically from 52 percent of the 
population in 2008 to 11 percent in 2016, just one percentage point away from 
reaching the Vision 2020 target of reducing financial exclusion to 10 percent of 
the population.  
The strategy document does not use page numbers, so references refer to a section of the 17
plan, as published.
 For the 2016 Finscope report the proximity measure was changed from distance to average 18
travelling time and gives an average travelling time of 47 minutes to a Sacco and 52 minutes to 
an MFI. 
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Finscope’s data also throws up some additional and surprising insights. 
Although there are a total of 34 MFIs present in Rwanda (Mix Market, 2014), 
their combined share of the lending market remains unexpectedly low , with 19
two and a half times more people borrowing from a cooperative Sacco. In fact 
MFIs appear to have benefitted very little from the government’s financial 
strategies. In 2008 only 3.9 percent of adults had taken up an MFI product and 
by 2012 this share was virtually stagnant at 4.1 percent (Finscope, 2012: 18). 
Whilst this might be partly explained by the MFIs’ traditional focus on credit 
products, rather than savings, it may also be linked to an apparently low level of 
trust generally for the MFI sector. Only 3 percent of individuals said they would 
trust an MFI with their savings or as a provider of credit (ibid: 39), while in 
contrast Saccos received a much higher approval rating of 49 percent for 
savings and 50 percent for credit provision (ibid: 42). The high approval rate for 
Saccos as a source of credit did not, however, translate into a high demand for 
their loans. 42.0 percent of individuals joined a Sacco in order to save, another 
8.8 percent to have a safe place to keep their money, and only 13.8 percent 
were motivated by the opportunity to obtain credit (ibid: 41). 
Saccos and MFIs both pale into insignificance, though, against informal 
borrowing. The data, seen in Table 1.9, shows increased usage across all 
sources of credit but that informal sources continue to dominate. 
 Interestingly, although Mix Market identified the presence of 34 microfinance institutions in 19
Rwanda, it was seen at section 1.4.1 that the central bank lists only fifteen that have been 
officially licensed.
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Table 1.9 Sources of Credit 
(Source: Finscope 2016: 54) 
In aggregate 51 percent of adults in Rwanda rely solely on informal sources of 
credit, up from 43 percent in 2012 (Finscope, 2016: 53). It is worth noting 
though that the analysis is based on the number of loans advanced, and says 
nothing about the amount borrowed. A corresponding analysis based on value 
might have raised the importance of the more formal sources of lending, but this 
was not an area covered by the report. It also provides no analysis of the 
increasing reliance on informal credit, making it impossible to assess the impact 
of rates of interest charged on formal loans, which typically range between 16 
and 18 percent for commercial banks and 24 percent on money borrowed from 
Saccos (New Times, 24th February, 2016a). It is significant though that the 
motives for taking out credit are dominated by consumption needs, with           
34 percent needing to borrow to cover living expenses, 11 percent to cover 
medical costs and 8 percent to cover non-medical emergencies. 
In contrast to the success in increasing the distribution of Saccos, the 2012 
Finscope report revealed that the general population still tended to be wary of 
credit. Although 56 percent had used credit in the previous twelve months 
(Finscope, 2012: 9), 68 percent of adults indicated that they preferred not to 
borrow (ibid: 9) and 28 percent said they would be embarrassed to admit that 
they had needed to borrow (ibid: 8). Amongst non-borrowers, 45 percent said 
Source 2012 2016
Bank 3% 4%
MFI 1% 2%
Mobile money 2% 3%
Sacco 2% 5%
Employer 3% 6%
Informal group 18% 41%
Moneylender 2% 3%
Shop credit 27% 34%
Farmers association 3% 6%
Family and friends 28% 32%
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they did not take on credit because they were worried that they would not be 
able to repay the money (ibid: 16). The existence of such attitudes to debt may 
partially explain the preference for taking loans from local, ‘known’, informal 
sources that might be more flexible with regard to repayment than the more 
rigid constraints of unfamiliar formal providers - similar to the phenomenon 
observed by Banerjee and Duflo in Bangladesh, where rescheduling of informal 
debts often proves to be considerably more pliant than loans from formal 
institutions (2011: 167).  
The underlying weakness in the demand for credit is also revealed in the fact 
that 68 percent of adults said they preferred to save up to buy something rather 
than take out a loan. In fact Finscope’s recent data reveals a striking preference 
for savings rather than credit products. In 2016 it was recorded that 86 percent 
of adults were saving - up from the 2008 level of 71 percent (Finscope, 2016: 
50). But it is informal savings that again dominate, as summarised in Table 1.10. 
Such informal savings are a relatively common phenomenon across Africa and 
traditionally take the form of saving in groups so that unexpected expenses, 
typically funerals, can be met out of the group’s funds.  
Table 1.10 Savings Mechanisms Used by Rwandans 
(Source: Finscope, 2016: 51) 
The aggregate total in Table 1.10 adds up to considerably more than             
100 percent, implying that individuals are using more than one savings 
mechanism. It also correlates with the report’s finding that 66 percent of 
individuals use both formal and informal financial products, such as maintaining 
a formal bank account for their income but in parallel also belonging to a 
Savings Mechanism 2012 2016
Bank 14% 13%
MFI 3% 4%
Sacco 21% 27%
Savings group 40% 54%
Someone in household 8% 16%
Secret place at home 20% 25%
Mobile money 0% 17%
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savings group in order to be able to access funds to cover emergency 
consumption such as unexpected medical expenses (ibid: 20). This 
phenomenon of utilising a portfolio approach to managing finances is also fully 
consistent with Banerjee and Duflo’s Bangladeshi findings (2011).  
Although the Finscope report makes interesting reading and throws light on 
some of the dynamics of the Rwandan financial market, it may nonetheless 
mask a key flaw in the government’s core economic strategy, which relies on a 
fundamental assumption. It requires that people will create savings accounts 
with the formal institutions, which would then be recycled back into the economy 
as investment loans. As banks only hold fractional reserves, they are able to 
issue credit that is at a much higher multiple of the savings amount. But if 
individuals are favouring informal, typically group savings, then this money is 
not creating the formal bank savings that the government anticipated would be 
recycled into funding SME startups that can catalyse growth and employment .  20
It is also worth noting that the 2012 Finscope report appeared to contradict the 
traditional microcredit model, which advances loans in preference to women 
because they are viewed as more likely to pay off their loans than men . This 21
was not reflected in the Rwandan case, where 56 percent of MFI borrowers and 
55 percent of Sacco borrowers are men (Finscope, 2012: 38, 41). Even though 
these shares are significant in themselves, the skew in favour of lending to men 
becomes even starker when one considers that they represent only 42 percent 
of the Rwandan population. This over-representation of the male population can 
also be seen in the case of community savings clubs. Although on the face of it 
savings clubs seem to be dominated by women, at 55 percent of members  
(ibid: 45), women make up 58 percent of the Rwandan population; thus here too 
men are over-represented relative to their population share. More importantly 
though, despite the claims made by the microfinance industry, the money they 
advance does not appear to be used to establish commercial enterprises, rather 
it is used to support current consumption requirements, especially emergency 
expenditure - a phenomenon that will be explored more fully in the next chapter. 
 Even if some informal savings might be invested in businesses, this is not leveraged up by 20
the bank multiplier effect.
 Unfortunately the gender analysis was dropped from the 2016 report, so it is not possible to 21
assess any underlying trend. 
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A further contradiction can be observed in the Business Development Fund’s 
2012 annual report. The Chairman’s and CEO’s joint foreword to the report 
congratulates itself on increasing its underwriting portfolio by 97 percent year-
on-year, comments on changes that it has made to its loan guarantee process 
in order to increase support for SMEs and claims to have underpinned          
Rwf 40 billion in disbursements that small businesses need to “fuel their growth 
and create jobs” (BDF, 2013: 3). Yet the same text indicates that the bulk of the 
loans it guaranteed in the year were “channeled [sic] largely in support of 
agriculture” (ibid.). The discrepancy clearly raises serious questions about the 
degree to which the BDF’s loan underwriting is actually contributing to the 
realisation of the government’s aim of bringing about a fundamental 
transformation of the country’s economy versus reinforcing the dominance of 
the very sector that the strategy is intended to supplant, as spelled out by 
President Kagame: 
 We understand that achieving prosperity requires a metamorphosis of 
our economy. We are fundamentally changing our economy to move 
away from a dependence on agriculture toward a knowledge economy 
(Kagame, 2009: 4). 
The Rwandan economic plan hinges on the creation and development of an 
efficient private SME sector “spearheaded by competitiveness and 
entrepreneurship” (Minecofin, 2000: 4) that will underpin the transition from an 
agricultural to a knowledge-based economy. It is therefore important at this 
juncture to examine the commercial landscape and assess the degree to which 
the desired SME sector can be discerned. 
1.6 Enterprise Distribution 
In June 2015 the National Institute of Statistics for Rwanda (NISR) published its 
latest comprehensive survey of enterprises in the country, and defined them 
according to the segmentation shown in Table 1.11. 
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Table 1.11 Rwandan Enterprise Segmentation 
(Source: NISR, 2015a: 10) 
The census uses a very broad concept of employment - that of ‘in establishment 
workers’ (NISR, 2015a: 13). This encompasses paid workers, the self-employed 
and unpaid family members. It has also dramatically broadened its definition of 
what constitutes an enterprise. In the 2011 census, street vendors, taxi and 
motor drivers, road and building construction sites plus temporary retail booths 
were specifically excluded from the data (NISR, 2011: 31). These exclusions 
have been dropped from the latest census, which has adopted the broader 
International Labour Organisation’s (ILO) definition. Consequently “self-
employed street vendors, taxi drivers, home-based workers, etc. are all 
considered enterprises” (NISR, 2015a: 23). A petty vendor would thus be 
categorised as both enterprise owner and as the worker employed in that 
enterprise.  
The census recorded a total of 154,236 establishments of which the vast bulk, 
90.1 percent, are categorised as micro-enterprises employing 1-3 people. SMEs 
accounted for just 9.9 percent of total establishments, and LSEs 0.2 percent of 
the total. But a closer analysis shows that even this low incidence of SMEs is 
overstated. The top-level enterprise distribution given in the report includes 
entities such as local and international NGOs, government and civil society 
enterprises and cooperatives, which need to be stripped out of the quoted 
figures in order to arrive at an objective assessment of how the enterprise 
distribution reflects the Vision 2020 aim of creating a vibrant SME private sector. 
Excluding the spurious categories and focusing purely on the private enterprise 
category produces a very different picture, as indicated in Table 1.12. 
Enterprise Segment Number of Workers
Micro 1-3
Small 4-30
Medium 31-100
Large >100
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Table 1.12 Distribution of Private Sector Enterprises 
(Source: Derived from Table 4.4 NISR, 2015a: 45)  
The SME sector thus accounts for only 6 percent of private sector enterprises, 
but this figure too overstates the number of SMEs.  
In the previous census (NISR, 2011) the lion’s share of all enterprises,          
53.5 percent, fell into the ‘household’ economic sector, which was defined as 
businesses that were owned by individual households, and which did not 
regularly hire employees. Rather, the work was typically carried out by own-
account workers supported by unpaid family members. This was followed by the 
private sector, which accounted for 41 percent of enterprises nationally. For the 
2015 report these two categories have been merged into a single private sector 
category and the household sector has disappeared completely from the 
analysis. The 2015 figures for the private SME sector will therefore include 
household level enterprises that depend on the support of unpaid family 
members, hence even the low reported figure of 6 percent for private sector 
SMEs is likely to be significantly overstated .    22
The data in the census also show a considerable skew away from the kind of 
knowledge-based enterprises that the government’s strategy is seeking to 
catalyse. The very broadly drawn grouping of ‘wholesale and retail trades, 
including the repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles’ accounts for              
53.3 percent of all enterprises, while ‘accommodation and food services’ 
accounts for another 30.4 percent. The report also shows that 94.7 percent of 
all enterprises categorised by the 2015 report as private were informal, with a 
median number of workers reported as one (NISR, 2015a: 26), indicating that 
Enterprise Segment Establishments Percentage
Micro 137,297 93.9%
Small 8,412 5.7%
Medium 380 0.3%
Large 138 0.1%
Total 146,227 100.0%
 Applying the same ratios that were reported in the previous census would suggest that the 22
private SME sector would account for only 2.5 percent of total private enterprises. 
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these are self-employed enterprises. Additionally, 54.5 percent of the 315,076 
workers in private enterprises were unpaid, 95.8% of private firms were sole 
proprietorships and 91.8% did not keep financial accounts. Thus the report’s 
assertion of an annual “growth of 24.4 percent in the total of private and 
business orientated mixed establishments” (ibid: 16) creates a seriously 
erroneous impression. In reality the private sector in Rwanda is characterised 
by informal household level subsistence enterprises which are, if anything, 
supported by unpaid family workers. 
The recently published Integrated Household Living Conditions Survey      
(NISR, 2015) also indicates that the country’s economy remains orientated 
towards agriculture, with 87 percent of all households actively engaged in crop 
production and 65 percent owning livestock. Production remains highly labour 
intensive, with hoes and shovels the main tools employed, and modern 
agricultural equipment almost completely absent. The fact that only 21 percent 
of agricultural production is sold also indicates that the vast bulk of agricultural 
production is for own consumption. The National Agricultural Export 
Development Board (NAEB) data shows that Rwanda’s exports are also 
dominated by agricultural produce, with tea and coffee being the main products 
exported, as indicated in Table 1.13. 
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Table 1.13 Rwanda’s Main Agricultural Export Products  23
(Source: compiled from NAEB, 2015)  
A mining sector that exports tin, tantalum and tungsten ores along with a small 
amount of gold and gemstones has also developed. Accounting for only      
$96.4 million in 2010 (RDB, 2014) by 2014 it had risen to a value of          
$210.6 million (RDB, 2016) . Tourism has also started to increase in 24
importance, and in the financial year 2013/2014 tourist visits to Rwanda rose by 
3 percent to 1.17 million visitors, yielding a total value of $297.4 million 
(Minicofin, 2014: 20). 
1.7 Conclusion 
Rwanda’s economic strategy is centred on fashioning an institutional and 
business environment that will support the emergence of a class of 
entrepreneurs and the SMEs they are expected to create. To this end the 
Product Export Value 
Coffee $64.0 million
Tea $61.8 million
Cereal and grains $44.5 million
Live animals $23.7 million
Meat $12.9 million
Milk $10.0 million
Dairy $15.2 million
Hides and skins $11.8 million
Horticulture $6.7 million
Pyrethrum $1.8 million
Other $29.9 million
Total $282.3 million
 Figures are for the fiscal year to June 2015.23
 Although the recent data listed on the RDB’s website does not indicate which countries these 24
minerals are exported to, the website previously listed China, Germany and the USA as the 
sector’s main export markets (RDB, 2014).
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government has overseen the creation of a context that it anticipates will favour 
enterprise formation, as evidenced by the generally positive governance ratings, 
levels of access to finance and commitments to infrastructure development. 
Measures to stimulate uptake of entrepreneurship in particular are also 
widespread, ranging from the Hanga Umurimo national business plan 
competition, PPMER, Probas scheme, the SME Regional Cluster Strategy, 
business risk underwriting via the BDF and the teaching of skills that are 
thought to be appropriate to entrepreneurship. Furthermore, the particular 
political settlement that has emerged in Rwanda has meant that the government 
has been able to achieve a high degree of consensus about how best to go 
about achieving its development goal and has enabled the single-minded 
pursuit of the related strategies.  
Reflecting on the claim that SMEs in OECD countries account for 95 percent of 
all firms, 60 to 70 percent of employment, 55 percent of GDP and the majority of 
all new jobs (Minicom, 2012: 11), the government plainly believes that the 
underlying dynamics of a developed economy can be replicated in Rwanda and 
will catalyse the transition from agrarian to knowledge-based economy. It is also 
proceeding in the belief that a dramatic turnaround can be achieved within a 
very short timescale: the 20-year term of Vision 2020. 
In essence the economic strategy is predicated on the assumption that there is 
an abundant pool of individuals who can become entrepreneurs and create the 
dynamic SME sector that is desired. However, despite everything that has been 
done, there is little evidence so far of the anticipated emergence of the new 
entrepreneurial class that will spearhead economic growth and generate the 
high levels of employment that are envisaged in the economic plan. Enterprise 
distribution remains very heavily skewed towards a vast number of informal, 
single-worker micro-enterprises. Instead of generating genuine employment 
there is a risk that the strategy “may simply force people to ‘hire’ themselves at 
starvation wages” (Amsden, 2010: 60). 
The next chapter will examine the main theories relating to entrepreneurship 
and enterprise formation with a view to assessing the veracity of the 
assumptions that underpin the government’s strategy. 
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Chapter 2 The Theoretical Context 
2.1 Introduction 
Domestic entrepreneurs are increasingly thought to hold the key to the 
economic progress of developing economies: by creating new commercial 
ventures it is anticipated that they will stimulate the development and continued 
expansion of an economy’s small and medium sized-enterprise (SME) sector 
and thereby make a significant incremental contribution to economic growth, 
employment and poverty reduction. This growing belief in the transformational 
power of SMEs would appear to have derived in large part from the emergence 
of SME sectors in developed economies.  
Following the second industrial revolution of the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries, large scale enterprises (LSEs) were able to exploit economies of 
scale and scope to the extent that they came to dominate the pre-1970 
commercial landscape, particularly following the 1960s “conglomerate merger 
wave” (Carree and Thurik, 2011: 557). LSEs consequently became the main 
focus of interest for politicians and economists alike, who saw the mass 
production of standardised goods as the primary driver of industrial economies 
(Stenkula, 2006: 2). The 1970s though witnessed the beginning of a shift in 
LSEs’ fortunes and the rise of SMEs, as demonstrated by the share of 
employment in the USA accounted for by Fortune 500 companies. In 1990 
these LSEs’ share of employment stood at 20 percent, but by 1996 had receded 
to just 8.5 percent (Carree and Thurik, 2011: 559). The reduced importance of 
LSEs and corresponding rise of SMEs is attributed to a number of factors 
including technological advances, increased globalisation, deregulation and 
changing consumer preferences (ibid: 558), a decay in the returns to scale and 
the rising significance of entrepreneurs (Stenkula, 2006: 2). Whilst these factors 
would be expected to be favourable to SMEs’ development, it is likely that the 
major shocks that confronted LSEs in the 1970s would have also played a 
significant role in shifting the balance. Being both highly capital intensive and 
heavy consumers of oil (both as raw material and energy source), LSEs in both 
the USA and UK were seriously affected by the combined effects of a 
quadrupling of the oil price between 1973 and 1974 (Baumol and Blinder, 2012: 
217), a doubling of the price between 1978 and 1979 (Begg, et al., 1994: 499) 
!66
and the high interest rates employed to counter subsequent high inflation. 
Faced with the combined penalties of high oil prices and high cost of capital 
many heavy industries struggled to survive, and those that could embarked on a 
process of spinning-off subsidiaries and down-sizing in order to concentrate on 
core competencies (Carree and Thurik, 2011: 562). Coupled with the 1980s 
trend for deregulation and a shift of emphasis towards service industries, which 
tend to favour SMEs, changes in the commercial landscape post-1980 were 
thus characterised by the rise of SMEs and a parallel demise of LSEs rather 
than the rise of entrepreneurs and SMEs alone.  
At the same time developing economy governments were finding that neither 
import substitution nor export orientation were able fully to deliver the economic 
benefits that had been anticipated (Acs and Virgill, 2011: 488). They 
consequently turned their attention to the role that entrepreneurs and SMEs 
could play as a stimulus for growth, spurred on by both the enhanced 
significance that SMEs seemed to have in developed economies and their overt 
promotion by specialist units of the World Bank and the United Nations 
Industrial Development Organisation (ibid: 486). Held to be the most dynamic 
part of a developed economy, the belief is that the importance of SMEs can be 
extrapolated directly to developing economies - that they can be the “driving 
force of any country’s economy” (de Vries, 2000: 5; original italics). Thus 
although originating in developed economies, belief in the economic power of 
SME sectors has become the development orthodoxy, as reflected in the World 
Bank’s stated commitment to deliver economic growth, employment and poverty 
alleviation via development of SMEs (World Bank, 2001, cited in Ayyagari et al., 
2007: 415), the African Development Bank’s insistence that they are critical to 
the development of African nations (Calice et al., 2012: 5), the assertion by the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC) that SMEs are important drivers of 
growth “across Sub Saharan Africa” (IFC, 2014) and the commitment by the 
UK’s Department for International Development (DfID) to implement strategies 
to finance 300,000 SMEs in low income countries (DfID, 2011: 14). 
Consequently, developing economy governments and the global institutions that 
support them have been keen to promote measures to facilitate development of 
dynamic SME sectors. 
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As SMEs do not come into existence by themselves, developing economy 
governments need a supply of entrepreneurs who will create them in the first 
place. Academic analysis of how entrepreneurs in developing economies come 
into existence and the structures that support them remains, though, far from 
extensive. Consequently the observation by Lingelbach, de la Vina and Asel 
(2005: 1) that “entrepreneurship in developing economies is arguably the least 
studied economic and social phenomena in the world today”, still resonates. 
That this should be the case is somewhat unexpected, given the extent to which 
entrepreneurship is generally credited with catalysing both economic growth 
and new employment (Thomas and Mueller, 2000: 287; OECD, 2004: 5; 
Tesfayohannes, 2006: 234, 235) and that it is assigned a key role by the major 
global financial institutions seeking to foster growth strategies for developing 
economies. Additionally, even though the entrepreneur as a factor of economic 
growth in industrialised economies has been the subject of analysis and 
theorising for over 100 years, there is still no general unified theory of 
entrepreneurship. Early assertions that some individuals possessed character 
traits that gave them an entrepreneurial predisposition were posited and 
developed, but were far from universally agreed upon. Taken together with the 
lack of evidence from developing economies, one is left confronted with a 
discourse that often seems to be pulling in divergent directions. 
The absence of a unified theory of entrepreneurship and a paucity of truly 
reliable evidence around SME sector formation makes it exceedingly difficult for 
policymakers to determine, with any real sense of confidence, how best to 
proceed when attempting to design and implement policy measures that will 
lead directly to the creation and expansion of the SME sector that is desired. 
Furthermore, the diversity of opinion on how and why entrepreneurs emerge 
and how best to support them is such that developing economy governments 
are frequently faced with taking policy decisions that essentially constitute little 
more than leaps of faith based on the discourse surrounding entrepreneurship. 
It also exposes them to being influenced by a broad array of vested interests, 
be they providers of microcredit, management consultants, NGOs or 
economists of various persuasions. 
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This chapter will examine existing theories of entrepreneurship. To impose a 
degree of structure on the disparate views and aid analysis, the principal 
arguments will be organised into three main groups, which are broadly 
categorised according to the underlying hypotheses that entrepreneurship is 
fundamentally a matter of economics, of psychological characteristics, or of 
individuals’ access to various forms of capital. In this segmentation access to 
capital refers not only to finance, it encompasses also human capital, such as 
training and education, and social capital in the sense of personal networks that 
can be leveraged. One approach promoted by the Global Entrepreneurship 
Monitor (GEM) arguably attempts to bridge the economic and capital allocation 
camps, but it will be argued that fundamental weaknesses in its data and 
theoretical model are such that this attempt largely fails. It will therefore be 
included in the first, economic, category.  
As explored in the Preface, in order to address the complex issues surrounding 
enterprise creation it is necessary to fix clearly the meaning of the terms 
‘entrepreneur’ and ‘entrepreneurship’. Throughout this thesis the term 
entrepreneur will be taken to mean an individual who creates a viable new 
commercial enterprise, acting either on their own or in teams. The term 
entrepreneurship refers to the process of establishing said viable new 
commercial enterprise. Hence the entrepreneur will be treated consistently as 
one who creates an enterprise, irrespective of whether they employ innovation, 
copy others’ ideas, exploit an identified opportunity, or are driven by financial 
gain or personal characteristics. While such concepts might lead to different 
policies and outcomes, they do not in and of themselves constitute alternative 
definitions. They relate narrowly to ‘how’ and ‘why’ entrepreneurs create 
enterprises and are fully encompassed within the definition of entrepreneurship 
employed in this thesis. 
2.2 The Entrepreneur in Economic Theory 
Whilst there seems to be broad agreement in the economic camp that the 
entrepreneur plays a key role in generating economic growth and employment, 
there is considerable disagreement about the process by which this comes 
about. The main debate has tended to polarise primarily between whether it is 
by virtue of their creativity or innovative capacity, or as a result of identifying and 
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capitalising on market opportunities. This section will look at the main 
arguments in this regard. 
2.2.1 The Entrepreneur as Disruptor of Market Equilibrium 
Richard Cantillon, an Irishman living in France in the 18th century, is generally 
credited with having first acknowledged the economic role of the entrepreneur. 
Although the exact date of publication is unknown his Essai Sur La Nature Du 
Commerce, which is thought to have appeared sometime between 1730 and 
1734, uses the term for the first time to distinguish between the separate roles 
of labour, landowner and entrepreneur. This initial usage of the term was further 
amplified during the 19th century, particularly by the French economist Jean-
Baptiste Say who went on to distinguish between entrepreneur and enterprise 
manager. Whilst both can share similar roles in administering an enterprise, Say 
differentiated clearly between them on the basis that only the entrepreneur is 
engaged in taking risks in the form of putting at stake both his own funds     
(Say, 1826: 303; cited in Koolman, 1971: 279) and his reputation (ibid: 274). 
Say additionally identified the primary role of the entrepreneur as a coordinator 
of the factors of production but critically differentiated between entrepreneurial 
and capital functions (ibid: 270), which had otherwise tended to be treated as 
synonymous. Although entrepreneurs can, and do, put their own money at risk 
the distinction is important because it allows that entrepreneurs can also obtain 
credit from capital markets in order to realise their enterprise objectives, rather 
than having to rely entirely upon their own resources. It also clearly positions 
capital’s essentially passive role versus the active coordinating function of 
entrepreneurs in the process of enterprise creation and postulates a four-factor 
model of production comprising land, labour, capital and entrepreneur, as 
opposed to Cantillon’s three-factor model of labour, landowner and 
entrepreneur.  
Whilst the role of the entrepreneur can thus be traced back to the 18th and 19th 
centuries, it is arguably Schumpeter’s seminal The Theory of Economic 
Development (1983) that moved the entrepreneur centre-stage in economic 
theory. Originally published in German in 1911, the work was subsequently 
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translated  into English in 1934 following Schumpeter’s move to the USA in 25
1932. Central to Schumpeter’s approach is the notion of ‘creative destruction’, 
whereby entrepreneurs employ superior knowledge to disrupt market 
equilibrium by forming new enterprises that make traditional methods of 
production redundant (ibid: 66). It is important to note that Schumpeter’s notion 
of creative destruction represents a revolutionary combination of factors and 
consciously rules out incremental change: Schumpeter cites the development of 
the railways as an example, pointing out that it was not stagecoach makers who 
created commercial railways and that simply making more stagecoaches would 
never have created a railway: 
 …that kind of change arising from within the system which so displaces 
its equilibrium point that the new one cannot be reached from the old 
one by infinitesimal steps. Add successively as many mail coaches as 
you please, you will never get a railway thereby (1983: 64; original 
italics) .   26
Although noting that the ideal state of equilibrium is “never attained” (ibid: 62), 
the equilibrium model is nevertheless drawn upon to build the platform for 
Schumpeter’s theory of economic development. The theoretical construct of 
market equilibrium, though, implies conditions of perfect information, and 
therefore a context that allows no price variability and no competition. In reality 
markets under a capitalist system are unlikely to ever achieve such an idealised 
condition, which implies an all-pervading state of knowledge that is hard to 
imagine. Although market equilibrium may have been a useful intellectual 
construct to aid theorising, in reality markets will only approximate to this 
idealised state - a kind of ‘fuzzy equilibrium’ is probably as close as one could 
ever expect to get. If the idealised condition of market equilibrium is a 
simplification not found in reality, then creative destruction would have to occur 
in situations of non-perfect equilibrium. This becomes more explicit in 
Schumpeter’s later work, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, which stresses 
the incompatibility of perfect competition and creative destruction (2010: 90). 
 By the time the text came to be translated into English, the original had been radically 25
modified and reduced from its original 548 pages to 369. The translation to English that 
appeared in 1934 was based on this later 1926 German version.
 Notwithstanding the elegance of the point, there is some evidence though that early railroad 26
carriages were in fact modified stagecoaches (Sarasvathy, 2008: 186), although Schumpeter 
probably had locomotive steam engines in mind when making the point, rather than railway 
carriages.
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Schumpeter’s assertion that the entrepreneur “forever alters and displaces the 
equilibrium state previously existing” (1983: 64) therefore needs to be 
interpreted figuratively, rather than literally. Hence Schumpeter’s entrepreneur 
acts against a tendency towards equilibrium, which is never reached.  
Like Say, Schumpeter draws a conceptual distinction between entrepreneurs 
and capitalists, which he uses to dispense with the idea that a shareholder is an 
entrepreneur. But, departing from Say, the distinction is used to position the 
capitalist as the bearer of risk and thus “disposes of the conception of the 
entrepreneur as risk bearer” (ibid 75) - a position Schumpeter goes on to stress 
further when asserting “the entrepreneur is never the risk bearer” and “risk-
taking is in no case an element of the entrepreneurial function” (ibid: 137). 
Schumpeter does though concur partially with Say when conceding that the 
entrepreneur “may risk his reputation”, thus a more figurative interpretation may 
also be deployed to infer that Schumpeter is referring primarily to the financial 
risk that the entrepreneur faces.  
Schumpeter also adopts the stance that an individual is only an entrepreneur 
during the period when he is actively engaged in the process of carrying out the 
new combinations that destabilise equilibrium, and as soon as the enterprise 
becomes established as a going concern he ceases to be an entrepreneur and 
becomes a normal businessman (ibid: 78). Thus for Schumpeter, 
entrepreneurship is a purely transient state, which would suggest that the 
entrepreneurial class envisaged specifically in the Rwandan government’s 
economic plan would be in a constant state of flux, rather than being fixed, as 
successful entrepreneurs transition into being businessmen and are replaced by 
new entrepreneurs. It is important to note though that an entrepreneur’s 
activities may not be restricted to a single enterprise, as some go on to become 
serial or portfolio enterprise founders (Birley and Westhead, 1993; Balunywa 
and Rosa, 2009). The existence of such habitual entrepreneurs means that 
SMEs, once established, do not have to be actively managed by the 
entrepreneurial founder. In the case of serial entrepreneurs this is by definition 
not the case, as the founding entrepreneur typically sells on a successful 
enterprise to an investor, who then installs a manager while the original founder 
goes on to create another new enterprise. Similarly portfolio entrepreneurs, 
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although not selling off successful enterprises, may choose to install managers 
to run individual units on their behalf once they are successful. 
2.2.2 The Entrepreneur as Exploiter of Arbitrage Opportunities 
In contrast to Schumpeter’s concept of creative destruction, Kirzner takes the 
position that the entrepreneur is one who spots market information asymmetry 
and then exploits corresponding market disequilibrium: the entrepreneur as 
arbitrager (1973: 18). Thus entrepreneurship for Kirzner consists in the act of 
seeing that an opportunity exists because markets are already in a state of 
disequilibrium (ibid: 47). So instead of moving markets away from equilibrium, 
Kirzner takes a position that is diametrically opposed to Schumpeter and 
asserts that the changes brought about by entrepreneurial action “are always 
towards the hypothetical state of equilibrium” (ibid: 73). Identifying the essential 
flaw in arguments derived from the equilibrium model, Kirzner argues that if an 
entrepreneur were one who used superior market knowledge to exploit 
opportunities, then he simply could not exist in a general equilibrium market that 
assumes perfect and ubiquitous information. Thus Schumpeter’s entrepreneur 
would be unable to possess any form of superior knowledge and therefore 
could neither act nor indeed exist. To the extent that arbitrage can occur by 
virtue of spotting and acting on instances of disequilibrium, Kirzner also takes 
the position that entrepreneurship can be exercised without initial ownership of 
the asset in question (ibid: 16). From this he deduces that everyone is a 
potential entrepreneur, and disagrees with Schumpeter’s position that 
entrepreneurs are a special minority of individuals (Schumpeter, 1983: 93).    
Given that Kirzner’s argument proceeds from the premise that entrepreneurship 
consists of acts of arbitrage taken in imperfect markets, he naturally also takes 
issue with Schumpeter’s pedantic assignment of risk as a purely capitalist 
function. Arguing that in an imperfect market the entrepreneur would be 
operating under conditions of imperfect knowledge, then by definition the role of 
the entrepreneur must be subject to uncertainty and therefore a degree of risk 
(Kirzner, 1973: 78). Furthermore, an entrepreneur using their own finance would 
by definition be simultaneously performing both an entrepreneurial and 
capitalist function (ibid: 49), thus making it difficult to maintain Schumpeter’s 
strict separation of these roles.  
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Although Kirzner and Schumpeter’s respective positions would appear initially 
to be irreconcilable, they quickly take on the form of a false dichotomy when 
viewed in the context of real world markets. If, in the real world, markets can 
only ever approximate to equilibrium, then under the resulting near-equilibrium 
condition there should be scope for a Schumpeterian innovating entrepreneur to 
possess and use a degree of superior knowledge to create new combinations 
and to have an incremental disequilibriating impact. Kirznerian entrepreneurs, 
alert to the new entrepreneurial profits on offer, could then be expected to follow 
the lead of Schumpeter’s entrepreneur, to bring about corrections to the 
market’s imperfect knowledge and thereby act in an equilibrating manner. Thus 
the real world market is more likely to exhibit oscillations between near-
equilibrium and marginal disequilibrium, thereby allowing plenty of scope for 
pioneering creative destroyers and arbitragers to co-exist. 
2.2.3 Entrepreneurs as Innovators and Replicators 
Baumol, winner of the Global Award for Entrepreneurship Research in 2003 and 
increasingly venerated as the leading contemporary authority on the economic 
role of the entrepreneur, acknowledges this scope for parallel coexistence. 
Cutting to the quick he dismisses the use of theoretical equilibrium models, 
thereby permitting the simultaneous existence of both Schumpeterian and 
Kirznerian entrepreneurs (Baumol 2010: 15) and defines an entrepreneur 
broadly as anyone who organises a new firm, irrespective of whether they are 
an originator or follower. Baumol draws a clear distinction, however, between a 
minority of ‘innovative entrepreneurs’ and a majority of ‘replicative 
entrepreneurs’ who copy the formers’ inventions, and although he fails to make 
an overt connection, his innovative entrepreneur bears remarkable similarity to 
Schumpeter’s creative destroyer and his replicative entrepreneur to Kirzner’s 
arbitrager. Commenting that an entrepreneur is “someone who 
undertakes” (ibid: 18) - a virtually literal translation of the German ‘Unternehmer’ 
- he does though arguably betray a certain empathy with Schumpeter, who 
used the German term in his original writing .  27
 Schumpeter’s original work in German: Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung used the 27
term Unternehmer. This was translated into ‘entrepreneur’ when the work was subsequently 
published in English.
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Throughout his work Baumol seems keen to stress the superiority of value 
creating innovative entrepreneurship, especially small firms that produce the 
breakthrough technology that more conservative, risk-averse, large companies 
are unable to engage in (ibid: 31). This preoccupation with innovation reappears 
as a theme in Baumol and Blinder’s Economics: Principles and Policies (2012) 
and is also evidenced in his collaboration with Litan and Schramm, where 
entrepreneurship is constrained even more tightly to the generation of an entity 
that provides a “new product or service or that develops and uses new methods 
to produce or deliver existing goods or services at lower cost” (Baumol, Litan 
and Schramm, 2008: 2; original italics). Baumol’s unflinching commitment to the 
importance of innovative entrepreneurship is also further reflected in his 
signposting of a link between innovation and expenditure on education that 
raises human capital and thereby facilitates further enhancements in innovation 
(ibid: 96). Taken together with the development of human and physical capital 
that he also attributes directly to innovation, Baumol concludes that innovation 
is “responsible for most of the growth of production, production per capita, and 
productivity that followed the Industrial Revolution” (ibid.). Support for this 
position is also seen in Drucker’s insistence that “innovation is the specific 
instrument of entrepreneurs” (Drucker, 2011: 17). However, although Baumol 
seems to draw heavily on Schumpeter, Schumpeter himself would appear to 
take issue with the stress that is given to innovation when he comments that it is 
“not advisable, and it may be downright misleading, to stress the element of 
invention as much as many writers do” (Schumpeter, 1983: 89). 
It is easy to be distracted by Baumol’s apparent preoccupation with innovative 
entrepreneurship and to conclude that the replicative entrepreneur has little 
significance in economic development. On closer examination it is clear though 
that Baumol does give due, though rather scant, credit to the replicative 
entrepreneur. From his observation that 90 percent of the benefits of innovation 
do not accrue directly to the innovator (Baumol, 2010: 95), one can deduce that 
imitating replicators must reap the bulk of the economic potential that follows 
from an innovation. Thus if, as Baumol claims, over half of the USA’s current 
growth rate can be ultimately attributed to innovation, it must follow that a 
significant element of this growth is achieved because replicative entrepreneurs 
take up and exploit innovative entrepreneurs’ leads.  
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Whilst Baumol has much to offer the discourse, it is unfortunate that his 
pronouncements go largely unchallenged in the context of development, given 
that his work is very heavily orientated towards highly developed economies like 
the USA . Innovative entrepreneurship may be extremely relevant to highly 28
developed economies operating at the technological frontier but the distinction 
may be far less significant in developing economies where markets are 
frequently far from saturated, and where the very process of development is 
often seen to be a matter of shifting along learning curves. In such contexts 
replicative entrepreneurship could have a very significant role to play. Although 
Baumol concedes (ibid: 105) that imitation (i.e. replicative entrepreneurship) is 
important for the technological progress of developing economies, he fails to 
stress the role that it could play in their economic growth and its capacity for 
generating incremental employment. Consequently there is a real risk that 
developing economies, like Rwanda, might well be seduced by Baumol’s 
acolytes into initiating policies that understate the role that replication might 
play. 
2.2.4 Institutions 
Baumol also introduces an important distinction between ‘productive’ and 
‘unproductive’ entrepreneurship, and defines unproductive entrepreneurship as 
activities such as rent-seeking and organised crime (ibid: 152). He would 
appear to believe that entrepreneurs make a conscious decision about whether 
to pursue a productive or unproductive entrepreneurial course, thereby implying 
a coldly exploitative psyche that can move freely between a “parasitical 
existence” (ibid: 153) that damages the economy and an economically 
beneficial one. According to Baumol, much depends on the institutional 
settlement. If the ‘rules of the game’ favour productive over unproductive 
entrepreneurship, then enterprising individuals will tend to move from the latter 
to the former (ibid: 192). A fuller indication of the type of institutions that he is 
alluding to is given in Baumol, Litan and Schramm (2008: 7), which specifies a 
functioning financial system that can channel funds to entrepreneurs, flexible 
 The pervasiveness of Baumol’s influence is seen for example in the comment “is there 28
anything else to be learnt about entrepreneurship that hasn’t already been said by Baumol?”, 
volunteered during a conversation with Professor Peter Rosa of Edinburgh University Business 
School, a former member of GEM’s data team in Uganda.
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labour markets and effective rule of law - particularly with respect to contract 
enforcement and property rights. Additionally these need to function in a 
manner that ensures that it is easy to form a business, without time consuming 
and expensive red tape, and facilitate the ability to abandon a failing enterprise 
by putting it into bankruptcy. 
It was seen in the previous chapter that the development of such institutional 
arrangements is already well advanced in Rwanda. Baumol’s argument that this 
should lead to productive rather than parasitical entrepreneurship would seem 
to be borne out by the observed low incidence of corruption and the 
government’s ability to capture rents centrally and deploy them to support 
economic development.    
2.2.5 Necessity versus Opportunity 
A view that developing economy entrepreneurship is driven fundamentally by 
necessity has gained in popularity via the increasing influence of the Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM), an annual comparative analysis of 
international data on rates of entrepreneurship. Initially set up as a joint venture 
between London Business School and Babson College , it is now a 29
collaboration between Babson College, Universidad del Desarrollo , Universiti 30
Tun Abdul Razak  and Tecnológico de Monterrey  and includes in its 31 32
partnership base the International Council for Small Business (ICSB), a non-
profit organisation that provides training for entrepreneurs and small businesses 
and the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), which reports 
directly to the Canadian Minister of International Development. Having started 
data collection in 1999, the GEM dataset is now considerable in scope. The 
2015/2016 report covers 60 countries and over its full 17-year period GEM has 
gathered data across a total of 100 countries. 
 An American business school, claiming to be “recognized internationally as a leader in 29
entrepreneurial management education” (Kelley et al., 2011: 79).
 A Chilean university whose website claims it is known “for its entrepreneurial hallmark”.30
 A Malaysian university and winner of the Higher Education Ministry’s 2015 prize for 31
Entrepreneurial Private University of the Year.
 A Mexican university with a mission to “educate leaders with an entrepreneurial spirit”.32
!77
GEM expounds the thesis that the majority of developing economy 
entrepreneurs are driven by necessity, due to the absence of realistic 
alternatives for employment, whilst developed economies’ rates of 
entrepreneurship are more a function of opportunity. Its derived necessity-
opportunity model suggests that high levels of necessity-driven 
entrepreneurship in underdeveloped economies begin to drop off once 
economic growth starts to increase and pure necessity becomes less of a 
driver: individuals are able to find alternative, secure employment and benefit 
from the emergence of social safety nets. The model employs a U-shaped 
curve to describe a subsequent increase in rates of entrepreneurship that is 
exhibited in more highly developed economies, as individuals can use more 
readily available capital to exploit commercial opportunities (Acs et al., 2004: 
12; Kelley et al., 2011: 27). Thus a dichotomy is observed whereby high levels 
of entrepreneurship are either a function of necessity (in developing economies) 
or opportunity (in developed economies), with the interstitial range populated by 
countries with low levels of entrepreneurship. Although more recent analysis 
has increasingly tended to focus on a more nuanced segmentation based on 
Porter’s differentiation between factor-driven, efficiency-driven and      
innovation-driven economies (Porter et al., 2002; cited in Amaros and Bosma, 
2014: 20), GEM still holds to its basic differentiation between necessity and 
opportunity entrepreneurship. Whilst it deserves credit for embarking on an 
analysis of entrepreneurship that encompasses both developed and developing 
economies, and for highlighting the link between new firm creation and 
economic dynamism (Bosma et al., 2012: 19) its approach can, nonetheless, be 
criticised on a number of fronts.  
First, the very notion of ‘necessity entrepreneurs’ is highly questionable. GEM 
defines such necessity entrepreneurs as individuals who “are involved in 
entrepreneurship because they had no other options for work” (Kelley et al., 
2011: 64) - a position that sits uncomfortably with an approach to 
entrepreneurship that implies volition, be it Schumpeter’s original notion of 
entrepreneurs as revolutionary actors who make conscious attempts to disrupt 
market equilibrium, Kirzner’s arbitragers who deliberately exploit disequilibrium, 
or even Baumol’s intentional innovators and replicators. In underdeveloped 
economies those acting out of necessity are likely to be petty-vendors or  
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self-employed individuals, who are typically engaged in a whole portfolio of 
survival strategies. Where goods or services are offered, they characteristically 
lack any significant form of differentiation or innovation and mainly constitute 
‘enterprises’ that are generally unprofitable once the full cost of labour is 
factored in (Banerjee and Duflo, 2011: 214). To categorise such activities as 
acts of entrepreneurship is seriously misguided. They are first and foremost 
activities undertaken by individuals who are engaged in doing something rather 
than nothing (i.e. rather than starving), and are extremely unlikely to create 
employment, let alone generate the economic growth that developing economy 
governments are seeking.  
Second, the GEM’s model of the entrepreneurial process is based on a concept 
of Total Early Stage Entrepreneurial Activity (TEA), defined as a measure of 
initial and nascent entrepreneurship. Nascent entrepreneurs are categorised as 
individuals who are in the process of taking some ill-defined action aimed at 
setting up an enterprise, but where the owner has been unable to draw more 
than three months’ wages or income. Initial entrepreneurs are meanwhile 
designated as owner-managers of new businesses that have been able to fund 
more than three, but less than 42, months’ wages  (Kelley et al., 2011: 63). The 33
fact that TEA is defined by GEM as including nascent entrepreneurs who are, 
according to the authors of the 2013 report, merely at “the stage in advance of 
the start of a new firm” (Amaros and Bosma, 2014: 53, author’s italics) adds 
considerable confusion. It means that the author of any half-baked concept 
which has no real commercial potential is nevertheless regarded as an early 
stage entrepreneur according to GEM’s categorisation. By its own definition, 
nascent entrepreneurs are not engaged in fully fledged entrepreneurial 
activities, so to include them in the data for a model that attempts to link 
entrepreneurship to GDP looks far from legitimate and leads to some truly 
astonishing claims. The 2010 report data for instance (Kelley et al., 2011: 22) 
classifies more than half of the entire population (52.2 percent) of Vanuatu as 
early stage entrepreneurs. Worse still, some elements of its analysis focus on 
an even more precarious concept of ‘intending-entrepreneurship’, defined as 
 Confusingly, in describing the modelling process, the authors of the 2013 report omit the 33
wages or income requirement and substitute them with the time the enterprise has been in 
existence (Amaros and Bosma, 2014: 19).
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individuals who have expressed the intention of starting a business sometime in 
the succeeding three years (ibid: 63). Although echoing the increasingly 
common notion of a swathe of ‘entrepreneurs in waiting’, it must be 
acknowledged that including such intending entrepreneurs in a serious analysis 
of entrepreneurship is highly problematic. Kelley et al.’s 2015/16 GEM report 
(2016: 102), for instance, records 67 percent of the entire population of Senegal 
as individuals who, implausibly, intend to start a business during the next three 
years.  
This all adds weight to the view that GEM’s core approach to entrepreneurship 
is seriously flawed and reinforces the view that the bulk of TEAs included in 
their analysis relates to individuals who will ultimately fail in their entrepreneurial 
ambitions. It is therefore unsurprising that the 2013 GEM report observes that 
economies in their dataset that see a high level of business start-ups correlate 
positively with a high incidence of enterprises being abandoned by their owners 
(Amaros and Bosma, 2014: 13). This was expanded further in the 2015/2016 
report, which revealed for instance, that for every ten people in the Philippines 
who are “currently starting or running a new business, there are seven who 
have discontinued one in the past year” (Kelley, et al., 2016: 21). Similarly, by 
GEM’s own admission, economies with high TEA rates have been seen to 
correspond with low levels of anticipated employee numbers in the enterprises 
concerned: 
 …if one is interested in linking entrepreneurship to indicators of 
economic performance (such as job growth) a simple count of start-ups 
or self-employed is not sufficient (Amaros and Bosma, 2014: 13). 
Support for excluding both nascent and intending entrepreneurs from the mix 
can be found directly in Schumpeter, who identifies entrepreneurs as those 
individuals whose specific function is that of creating new enterprises 
(Schumpeter, 1983: 74). In other words an entrepreneur only comes into 
existence at the point where an enterprise is actually created and thus it is quite 
unacceptable to conflate intending or nascent entrepreneurs with actual 
entrepreneurs, in much the same way that nascent or intending surgeons would 
not be classified as individuals capable of carrying out medical operations, no 
matter how much they might aspire to do so.  
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The integrity of the data underpinning the GEM’s analysis is further undermined 
by the observation that the concept of necessity entrepreneurship appears to 
have been largely retro-fitted to explain away the high levels of TEA that were 
found in low-income contexts as a result of weaknesses in the original definition 
of TEA and the corresponding failure to differentiate adequately between 
survivalist strategies and genuine entrepreneurship - an interpretation that was 
endorsed during an informal discussion with one of the authors of the 2003 and 
2004 GEM national reports for Uganda. It is also self-evident that, in the 
absence of a true market opportunity, no amount of necessity is going to result 
in an economic exchange (i.e. there will be no trade), so a concept of 
opportunity must surely figure in any realistic model of entrepreneurship. The 
opportunity/necessity distinction therefore bears the hallmark of a false 
dichotomy and the U-shaped curve a false construct. If necessity 
entrepreneurship is consequently disallowed from the mix, GEM’s model 
probably resolves itself into a simple construct whereby an upward sloping 
curve displays a correlation between GDP per capita and levels of 
entrepreneurship, but without inferring any direction of causality.  
More worryingly, the GEM approach also leaves considerable scope for policy 
error. Under the headline “Facilitate Necessity, Encourage Opportunity” (Kelley 
et al., 2011: 58), the authors of the 2010 GEM report appear to speculate that a 
legitimate course of action for governments could be deliberately to reduce the 
benefits of employment, in order to stimulate more necessity-driven 
entrepreneurship, presumably on the pretext that a Darwinian market will 
ensure that some will survive and be successful and thereby lead to economic 
growth and employment. Without any sense of irony, the authors gloss over the 
obvious contradictions in this position. Namely, that on the basis that the 
majority of new commercial ventures fail, forcing people out of employment and 
into necessity-driven entrepreneurship must inevitably lead to increased levels 
of poverty (as capital invested in unsuccessful new ventures is eliminated). 
Furthermore, those enterprises that do succeed will struggle to recruit labour if 
the employment benefits they offer have been deliberately reduced in order to 
make it a less attractive option than necessity-driven entrepreneurship. By 
propagating the false benefits of necessity entrepreneurship, GEM’s proponents 
may well catalyse inappropriate policy decisions and actually hinder economic 
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development. The ethics of forcing poor people into the more precarious 
existence that is implied by what GEM refers to as necessity entrepreneurship 
(predominantly petty vending) are also, obviously, highly questionable. 
At a minimum GEM needs to conduct some form of longitudinal analysis of their 
dataset in order to address the question of how many intending or nascent 
entrepreneurs actually create viable enterprises and then to apply an element of 
discounting to their core TEA data to better reflect the extent to which it 
represents actual levels of entrepreneurship. It simply defies logic to equate 
intending or endeavouring to establish an enterprise with having actually started 
one. Rather than addressing these essential weaknesses, though, GEM now 
seems intent on compounding its shortcomings. In the 2011 extended report it 
added ‘entrepreneurial employee activity’ into the mix, defined as “employees 
developing or launching new goods or services” for their employer (Bosma et 
al., 2012: 53). It has also added ‘social entrepreneurship’, and makes the claim 
that for their purposes entrepreneurship encompasses: 
 …any attempt at new business or new venture creation such as self-
employment, a new business organization, or the expansion of an 
existing business, by an individual, a team of individuals, or an 
established business (Amaros and Bosma, 2014: 18). 
To the extent that any established commercial enterprise seeks to grow 
organically rather than stand still, the definition would seem to risk re-
categorising a whole raft of normal business development activities as 
entrepreneurship, as well as treating petty vending survival strategies and social 
ventures as if they were fully equivalent to creating a commercial enterprise.  
In a further tangential development GEM has now also begun capturing 
subjective assessments of entrepreneurial well-being, such as work-life balance 
and job satisfaction. Although advisedly sounding a note of caution about the 
results, the authors of the 2013 report claim to have identified evidence for a 
link between well-being and involvement in entrepreneurship and that their 
data: 
 …show initial evidence that involvement in entrepreneurial activities, 
both in early stage and established phases, is related to personal 
evaluation of higher subjective well-being (ibid: 64).  
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This is an assertion that is difficult to accept when the claim is based on GEM’s 
all-encompassing definition of entrepreneurship, which incorporates those who 
are only planning to start an enterprise, ‘social entrepreneurs’, nascent 
entrepreneurs, so-called ‘entrepreneurial employees’ and even managers 
engaged in normal business expansion strategies. 
Examining the research instrument, an interviewer administered questionnaire, 
also suggests weaknesses in the underlying methodology. By way of example, 
the block of questions relating to enterprise owner-managers allows for a “don’t 
know” response to the question “are you, alone or with others, currently the 
owner of a business you help manage, self-employed, or selling any goods or 
services to others”. If the answer given is “don’t know” the research instrument 
instructs the interviewer to explain “perhaps we were not clear on what we 
mean with a ‘business’. If you personally share in the profits of selling any 
goods or services to others that can be a business”. Thus by the logic of the 
research instrument a subsistence farmer selling an agricultural surplus at 
market could presumably be categorised as an enterprise owner-manager, as 
could an employee receiving a profit-share bonus or even arguably a thief.  
The more it expands its definition of entrepreneurship, the more GEM risks 
approaching the point where it will ultimately incorporate all of humanity and 
consequently compound its growing irrelevance . 34
2.2.6 Enterprise Formation 
While the entrepreneurship literature associates the entrepreneur with the 
phenomenon of enterprise formation, it largely tends to gloss over the reason 
why it is that entrepreneurs chose to create commercial enterprises, or ‘firms’.  
It is important to address this shortcoming briefly, given that Rwanda’s 
objectives envision quite specifically that its entrepreneurial class will form the 
commercial enterprises that will constitute its SME sector. 
The general equilibrium model, which is the key reference point for both 
Schumpeter’s and Kirzner’s theories about the role of the entrepreneur has, at 
 It is interesting to note that London Business School, one of the two founding institutions, are 34
no longer listed as a sponsor in the recent 2015/2016 GEM report (Kelley et al., 2016). Attempts 
to uncover the reasons behind their departure elicited responses that were exceedingly tight-
lipped. 
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its core, the assumption that market transactions are mediated by the price 
mechanism. In this simplified view of the world there is no reason for firms to 
exist at all. Rather, markets would be characterised by a nexus of exchanges 
between individual actors, so the fact that firms do exist in the real world must 
signify that something other than the price mechanism is at work. This apparent 
paradox was explored fully by Coase who, in The Nature of the Firm (1937), 
observed that there must be an underlying economic reason why firms are 
brought into existence and deduced that relying purely on the price mechanism 
to bring about an efficient allocation of resources implied a price, in the form of 
information and contract costs (ibid: 390), which could be obviated by 
organising production at the level of the firm.  
Although he does not make the point explicitly, it can also be assumed that at 
the enterprise level the cost of obtaining market information can be amortised 
across long-run production such that firms are able to take on information costs 
that individual actors would be unable to bear. A further cost can also be 
surmised: the cost of failure. An institutional arrangement that permits the 
creation of limited liability companies restricts potential losses in the case of 
enterprise failure to the firm’s share capital, thereby restricting the personal cost 
to the entrepreneur’s investment. Thus by acting through the agency of a firm, 
an enterprise founder can significantly reduce the element of personal risk that 
he would face if he were an individual actor, with unlimited exposure, relying 
merely on the price mechanism to inform his decisions. 
Commercial enterprises, operating in the real world, are consequently able to 
produce goods and services far more efficiently than a network of individual 
jobbers. Entrepreneurs, in forming enterprises, perform a resource coordinating 
function that replaces and is more efficient than the price mechanism. This 
insight makes it clear that developing an effective SME sector will be 
significantly more economically efficient than relying on mass self-employment. 
Indeed for countries like Rwanda, who seek to move to a knowledge-based 
economy producing sophisticated high value-added goods and services 
capable of competing in international markets, it is quite inconceivable that this 
could be achieved without capitalising on the contract and information 
economies that accrue to firms and which cannot be captured by a nexus of 
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individual self-employed actors. Additionally, the existence of fewer, larger, and 
therefore more visible enterprises in place of a mass of individual jobbers 
facilitates more efficient tax collection and the enforcement of compliance with 
government regulations. 
2.2.7 Summary 
Economic theory is useful in identifying the entrepreneur as a key factor in 
economic development, and taken together with Coase’s theory of the firm 
lends support to the appropriateness of Rwanda’s attempts to stimulate the 
emergence of a dynamic SME sector via domestic entrepreneurs. Whilst there 
are substantial differences of opinion on how the entrepreneur impacts upon 
economic development, the main proponents of economic theory do seem to 
share a common view that entrepreneurship is largely a matter of spontaneous 
combustion, based on the underlying assumption that there is a corpus of 
potential entrepreneurs that are constantly scanning the horizon for 
opportunities, and that they will spontaneously emerge to take advantage of 
such opportunities if the requisite institutions are in place. This would also seem 
to be the basic tenet underpinning GEM’s casting of a broad range of intending 
entrepreneurs, petty vendors and self-employed individuals as people who are 
somehow engaged in the entrepreneurial process, even when many of them 
have nothing more than a vague intention to start a business at some ill-defined 
point in the future. Consequently, little is provided in the way of specific policy 
guidance beyond the observation that the entrepreneurs who create firms are 
catalysts of economic growth and the standard institution-building rhetoric 
summarised in Baumol’s claim that “devoting resources (both funds and effort) 
to institution building ultimately leads to greater returns from 
entrepreneurship” (2010: 187). The evidence in Rwanda, though, would seem 
to indicate that even if having the right institutions is a necessary precondition, it 
is by no means a sufficient one and that the evolution of a dynamic SME sector 
must incorporate factors beyond the institutional. With this in mind, the following 
section will look at the argument that it is access to capital that determines 
levels of entrepreneurship. 
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2.3. The Role of Capital Access in SME Formation 
In direct contrast to the essentially passive perspective of economics, the 
capital allocation (‘allocationist’) approach takes a far more deterministic stance. 
Allocationists broadly adopt the position that entrepreneurial activity and SME 
formation in developing economies is suppressed because potential 
entrepreneurs lack access to various forms of capital - predominantly financial, 
but also to a degree human and social capital - and are therefore deprived of 
the opportunity to engage in entrepreneurial activities. Echoing aspects of 
GEM’s dubious necessity-opportunity model, its advocates principally advance 
arguments whose common denominator is fundamentally investment: that more 
money is required in order to generate financial capital, particularly in the form 
of microcredit, that enhanced education and training is needed to raise the 
stock of human capital, and that facilitating improved access to support 
networks will yield improvements in social capital. 
Used extensively in the sphere of economics, business and entrepreneurship 
the term ‘capital’ can, nevertheless, be problematic. It is encountered in a wide 
variety of guises including financial capital, physical capital, variable (wage) 
capital, fixed capital, working capital and risk capital, as well as human capital 
and social capital. Most of these are variations on the concept of capital as a 
factor of production and essentially relate to the deployment of money for the 
purpose of producing goods or services for sale. This is far less clear cut with 
the terms ‘human capital’ and ‘social capital’. The former is used to denote the 
stock of knowledge, skills, experience and personal attributes possessed by an 
individual, while the latter can encompass capital owned in common by a 
community, the set of norms that bind a community together, or reciprocity and 
the network of social relations that might be leveraged. Both terms lack the 
essential fungibility that is implied by capital as a factor of production. Despite 
this difficulty, both terms have become fully embedded in the entrepreneurship 
literature, alongside the less problematic term ‘financial capital’.  
An important distinction is also drawn in the entrepreneurship literature between 
‘specific’ and ‘general’ human capital, a distinction which it is difficult to address 
without referring directly to human capital. This section will therefore address 
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the three concepts of capital that dominate the entrepreneurship literature - 
those of financial, human and social capital. 
2.3.1 Financial Capital 
Calls to increase access to credit are based on the belief that potential 
entrepreneurs in developing economies struggle to obtain the finance they 
need. It is maintained that cross-country analyses, such as those undertaken by 
the OECD and the World Bank, provide compelling evidence that ensuring 
access to a plentiful supply of credit is a critical component of SME 
development (OECD, 2004: 5) and that this problem of financial access is 
particularly exacerbated in developing economies (IFC, 2010: 23). Lamenting 
this general lack of financial access, the OECD’s 2006 publication The SME 
Financing Gap (OECD, 2006) similarly asserts that the inability to access 
finance in developing economies is “especially worrisome” on the basis that it 
hinders the development of SMEs that are the source of a large share of both 
employment and national income (ibid: 11).  
Thus conventional wisdom runs that improved levels of financial access in 
developing economies would be disproportionately beneficial to SMEs      
(Beck, 2013: 25), who can therefore be expected to make a disproportionately 
high contribution to economic growth, employment and poverty reduction. This 
view is also clearly reflected in the 2009 G20 meeting’s initiation of a Financial 
Inclusion Experts Group (FIEG) with the joint aims of supporting the 
development of innovative financial delivery to the poor and enhancing the 
financing of SMEs. Its SME Finance Sub-Group subsequently committed itself 
to pursuing a development agenda by “focusing on providing SME Finance 
solutions for developing countries in particular” (IFC, 2010: 5). The logic for this 
commitment is found in the joint assertions that “Small and Medium Enterprises 
(SMEs) play a major role in economic development, particularly in emerging 
countries” (ibid: 6) and that “access to finance remains a key constraint to SME 
development in emerging economies”.  
Such claims are, though, usually advanced without being backed by hard 
evidence. Indeed the report emanating from the G20 meeting admits in its own 
text (ibid: 7) that, despite extensive efforts to stimulate SMEs, little in the way of 
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analysis has been undertaken and that consequently not much is actually 
known about the effectiveness of financial interventions taken in support of 
SMEs. Despite this admission the IFC is, though, happy to follow the popular 
line and press on regardless with the business of advocating the necessity for 
increased financial access for developing economies’ entrepreneurs. It is 
interesting to note, however, that its declamations about developing economy 
SMEs’ struggle to obtain such finance are made in the context of contradictory 
parallel assertions that much has already been done to address this very 
problem, specifically that: 
 The role of International Finance Institutions (IFIs) and Development 
Financial Institutions (DFIs) to foster SME financing in the developing 
world has been significant so far (IFC, 2010: 8). 
Such an apparent paradox is readily explained. As is widely acknowledged, the 
vast majority of new businesses fail within the first three years of operation 
(Chell, 2008: 231). It is one thing for the global institutions to bemoan 
developing economy SMEs’ lack of access to credit, but when the banks that 
are expected to advance these funds face a fiduciary duty to constrain risk and 
a commercial compulsion to compete with one another, it is hardly surprising 
that credit should be a scarce resource if lenders are confronted by a diverse 
range of individuals, the majority of whom are seeking finance for enterprises 
that will in all probability fail. Furthermore, in the aftermath of the global credit 
crisis, the Basel II framework requires that banks align their capital structures 
with the risk profile of their loan portfolios (IFC, 2010: 29). Although some 
leeway was given to SME lending on the basis that SME failures, being 
relatively small enterprises, would be less threatening to banks’ balance sheets, 
national interpretations of Basel II often do not make this allowance on the basis 
that such additional leeway was given without supporting evidence (ibid: 30). 
Indeed the IFC’s generic claim that Basel II’s impact on lending to SMEs is 
“neutral to positive” (ibid: 29) appears to be based wholly on evidence from the 
EU (ibid: 30). It does not therefore follow that developing economy lenders 
would be unconcerned about loan quality when facing calls to facilitate greater 
access to credit by SMEs - indeed the resulting tension they face can be seen 
directly in the case of Rwanda, where banks’ sensitivity to portfolio risk appears 
to remain a limiting factor despite the government’s loan underwriting 
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programme, as observed at section 1.5.2. Additionally, the claim that surveys 
such as those undertaken by the World Bank have revealed that SMEs face 
greater constraints in accessing finance than large firms (ibid: 13), and that this 
is especially true in low income economies (ibid: 23), is wholly fatuous when the 
World Bank’s threshold delineating large firms from SMEs is set at 300 
employees (as discussed in the Preface). It is completely unsurprising that such 
surveys should reveal that large corporations employing more than 300 people, 
and presumably with a considerable track record, should find it easier to access 
credit than SMEs, which even in the very highly developed EU context typically 
have a workforce that is only 3 percent of the size of a large corporation . That 35
the problem should be exacerbated in developing economies, where average 
SME workforce numbers can be expected to be even lower, is also anything but 
surprising.  
2.3.2 Microcredit to the Rescue 
While mainstream banking struggled with responding to demands to fund 
aspiring entrepreneurs, popular attention shifted increasingly to microcredit. Led 
primarily by international development agencies and charities that sat outside 
the mainstream banking sector, and who were therefore immune to the 
accountability demands of shareholders, the scale of the microcredit industry is 
now considerable. Using data from the Mix database (Mix, 2014), the 2015 
Microfinance Barometer published by Convergences  reported that the 1,391 36
microfinance institutions providing financial results for 2013 represented a 
combined loan portfolio of $95.1 billion with a client base of 105.9 million 
borrowers (Convergences, 2015: 3), representing annual growth in financial 
assets of 12.9 percent and borrowers of 10.3 percent. The market’s geographic 
breakdown is indicated in Table 2.1. 
 Derived from Table P2, the mean SME employee scale in Europe is 31.3 compared to a 35
mean of 1,012.3 for LSEs.
 That microcredit is now big business is evident from the company it keeps. Convergences 36
lists BNP Paribas, Unilever, Orange, and L’Oréal amongst its sponsors, while its Microfinance 
Barometer is part funded by MasterCard.
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Table 2.1 Scale of the Global Microcredit Market 
(Source: Convergences, 2015)     37
The underlying logic informing the development of microcredit resides in the 
presumed presence of an extensive pool of ‘entrepreneurs in waiting’ that can 
be catalysed into existence if they could access small amounts of credit. Yunus 
(Yunus and Jolis, 2003; Yunus and Weber, 2007, 2010) and de Soto (2001) give 
popular voice to this notion. De Soto’s position hinges on poor people’s property 
rights. His core argument being that once their property is recognised, no matter 
how meagre, it constitutes an asset that can be used as collateral that can 
facilitate access to credit. In contrast, Yunus and his followers advocate the 
provision of small amounts of non-collateralised debt and the use of social 
pressure, such as group lending, to ensure repayment rather than the risk of 
forfeiting collateral. What they share is an unquestioning belief in the ubiquitous 
entrepreneurial capacity of poor people, as plainly expressed in Nobel Prize 
winner Yunus’s claim that “every single human being, even one barefoot and 
begging in the street, is a potential entrepreneur” (2003: 216).  
The sheer naïvety of such a claim and the total implausibility of the existence of 
such a vast untapped reservoir of entrepreneurial talent is exposed by the 
observation that there is no logical reason why the distribution of 
entrepreneurial characteristics in developing economies should be any different 
to that in the rest of the world. Some will have the potential, but the majority will 
Region Gross Loan Portfolio Active Borrowers
Africa $8.3 billion 8.7 million
East Asia and Pacific $22.5 billion 13.4 million
Eastern Europe and Central Asia $14.1 billion 3.1 million
Latin America and Carribean $38.1 billion 21.9 million
Middle East and North Africa $1.6 billion 2.0 million
South Asia $10.7 billion 56.7 million
Total $95.1 billion 105.9 million
 In the 2013 Microcredit Barometer, it was estimated that the institutions that provide data 37
represent approximately 80 percent of the total microcredit market (Convergences, 2013: 2). 
Factoring this into the above figure and extrapolating the 2014 growth rate of 12.9 percent 
across the two succeeding years implies a total value of $171 billion for 2016. 
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not (Dichter, 2008: 181). That this should be the case would seem to be borne 
out by statistical analyses, which have consistently shown that only about         
8 percent of a nation’s population are typically engaged in entrepreneurial 
activities (Minniti, 2006, cited in McMullen, 2011: 196; OECD, 2013). Thus 
arguments that extending microcredit to a vast pool of poor people will unleash 
massive levels of entrepreneurship and thereby bring about economic growth 
and poverty reduction look highly optimistic.  
Although the microcredit industry has long promoted itself on the basis that the 
money it advances is used to build businesses and that they are facilitating 
entrepreneurship by poor people, its occasional anecdotal success stories, 
used as a platform to support fund-raising campaigns in donor countries, simply 
do not equate to robust evidence that microcredit is fuelling domestic 
entrepreneurship and the creation of SMEs in developing economies. On the 
contrary, in contrast to the marketing hype surrounding microcredit there is 
mounting evidence that it has no significant commercial impact and that the vast 
bulk of loans that are advanced are used predominantly to satisfy short-term 
consumption needs, a phenomenon that Ellerman refers to as “consumption 
smoothing” (2008: 153). Similar conclusions have also been reached by Collins 
et al. (2009: 159), who examined three years’ worth of ‘Grameen II Diaries’ from 
NGO Microsave and by Rahman (2008: 195) on the basis of research carried 
out for NGO CARE.  
Rahman found that the expectation microcredit would meet poor individuals’ 
working capital requirements was not met. Instead loans were initially used to 
fund consumption and for meeting medical or educational costs. Similarly, while 
Collins et al. found that those with existing enterprises might use microcredit to 
pay for retail stocks, it was also used for a diverse set of other purposes. They 
concluded: 
 …it is clear that an early hope of microfinance lending - that virtually 
every loan would be invested in a micro-enterprise - has not come about 
(2009: 167). 
This pattern is also evident in the Rwandan access to finance data, in Table 2.2, 
where it can be seen that 84 percent of microcredit is used for purposes that 
constitute consumption smoothing.   
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Table 2.2 Motives for Taking a Microcredit Loan in Rwanda 
(Source: Finscope, 2012) 
That this should be the case is hardly surprising when one considers        
Collins et al.’s additional observation that “one of the biggest challenges of living 
on two dollars a day is that it doesn’t always come” (2009: 181). Hence the 
overriding imperative for many poor people of accessing microcredit simply in 
order to survive.  
Where microcredit is used for commercial purposes, this is invariably in 
connection with petty vending activities that help satisfy daily subsistence 
needs. Rather than being an expression of entrepreneurship, such activities are 
more likely to be about creating some form of ‘job’ where none exists (Banerjee 
and Duflo, 2011: 26). Whilst this does not invalidate the importance of 
microcredit for many poor people, it is important to recognise that such petty 
vending merely functions to move individuals to a marginally enhanced 
subsistence position rather than being an expression of entrepreneurship. The 
same conclusion is also reached by a number of authors including Dichter 
(2008: 181), who points out that a poor person going to market in the hope of 
securing a small amount of cash should not be conflated with real business or 
entrepreneurship, by Roxin (2013) with his observation that being poor but 
economically active is not the same as being an entrepreneur, and by 
Lingelbach et al. (2005: 8) who observe that such enterprises make no 
meaningful contribution to economic development whatsoever.  
Banerjee and Duflo also noted that the micro-enterprises created by poor 
people are: “too small and utterly undifferentiated” (2011: 218), and that the 
operators of such micro-enterprises would usually be better off were they to 
pool their resources and create larger scale enterprises that could operate more 
Use Of Loan Share
To cover living expenses at time of difficulty 39%
School fees 9%
Emergency medical costs 10%
To repay an informal loan 26%
Total 84%
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efficiently and compete more effectively. In a similar vein, it has also been 
argued that by wilfully directing a large proportion of microcredit at highly 
inefficient subsistence agriculture, rather than medium-sized farms where 
economies of scale could yield an incrementally beneficial economic impact, the 
net effect of microcredit is that scarce financial resources are directed at 
activities that in the long run are “the least efficient way of promoting rural 
development” (Bateman, 2012: 595; original italics).  
It is important to remember too that microcredit is a zero-default concept. It is 
typically organised on a group-lending basis, where members of the group 
police repayments by individual borrowers in order to ensure the on-going 
credit-worthiness of the rest of the group, so that they will be able to borrow 
when their turn comes around. Whilst this peer-group pressure is a useful risk-
reduction strategy for microcredit lenders, the formula feels wholly at odds with 
the notion that entrepreneurship naturally implies a preparedness to engage in 
a degree of, albeit quantified, risk-taking. Additionally, the microcredit model 
requires a high repayment frequency (usually bi-monthly), which tends to favour 
petty vending activities, which generate small but regular cash flow, in 
preference to the ‘lumpy’ returns and longer timeframe of genuine new 
enterprise development.  
Hardly surprising then that the whole pretext for microcredit, that the money 
would be used to catalyse entrepreneurship, simply “has not come 
about” (Collins et al., 2009: 167). Rather than perpetuating the myth that 
microcredit is fuelling entrepreneurship, it would be more appropriate to heed 
Dichter’s call “radically to reduce our expectations about microcredit, and thus 
better align ourselves with reality” (2008: 191). Indeed to continue to do 
otherwise risks distracting developing economy governments from 
implementing alternative policies that could address poverty reduction directly, 
instead of continuing to pursue ineffective programmes based on microcredit. 
2.3.3 Repositioning Microcredit 
In the face of its abject failure to achieve its primary goal - catalysing 
entrepreneurial development - one might be forgiven for wondering why 
microcredit continues to persist at all. Instead of facing the reality of their failure, 
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though, microcredit appears to be going through a subtle re-branding. 
Repositioning Yunus as a social entrepreneur (Nicholls and Young, 2013: ix) for 
having inspired the microcredit movement (Grenier, 2013: 119) and lauding him 
as a latter day Florence Nightingale (Drayton, 2013: 45), microcredit can seek 
renewed legitimacy in the emerging social entrepreneurship and social finance 
discourse. Thus its failure to bring about economic gains becomes unimportant 
if it is counterbalanced by the delivery of broader social gains that accrue in the 
form of social entrepreneurship and financial inclusion . This is aided by the 38
development of micro-savings, money transfer and insurance products (Sabin, 
2015: 158), which then enables microcredit to be positioned as just one product 
in an expanded micro-finance portfolio. Thus it is possible to claim that social 
entrepreneurs are providing “new financial services to the poor” (Nicholls and 
Young, 2013: x) and to make a virtue of Morgan Stanley’s and Citigroup’s 
bundling and selling of securitised loans (for which read microcredit), by 
relabelling it social entrepreneurship.  
Reclassifying entrepreneurship as “commercial entrepreneurship” (Austin et al., 
2006:1; Estrin et al., 2013: 481) permits the conceptualisation of a 
corresponding social entrepreneurship, which is cast as the socially minded 
equivalent of commercial entrepreneurship. The latter seeks to maximise 
profits, while the former seeks to maximise social value. Convoluted arguments 
are employed that position social entrepreneurship as a response to market 
failure, whereby social entrepreneurs enter spaces that are insufficiently 
profitable for exploitation by commercial entrepreneurs. Or alternatively, that 
social entrepreneurship generates social capital that is subsequently exploited 
by commercial entrepreneurs (Estrin et al., 2013: 497). The prize for the most 
convoluted argument arguably belongs though to McMullen (2011) for his 
conceptualisation of ‘development entrepreneurship’.  
Making the point that microcredit is no silver bullet and that just providing more 
of it feeds into consumption smoothing rather than enterprise development, 
McMullen offers “an economic theory of social entrepreneurship” (ibid: 186), 
 A good example of this shift in emphasis was evidenced in a face-to-face meeting with the 38
CEO of microcredit provider Uwego Opportunity Bank in Kigali. When asked a direct question 
about whether the bank’s activities were having an economically beneficial impact, the answer 
was couched in terms that cast doubt on the author’s preoccupation with economic gains and 
that Uwego’s mission encompassed more than its clients’ material wellbeing. 
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which he labels ‘development entrepreneurship’ and places at the nexus of 
interactions between ‘institutional entrepreneurship’, ‘social entrepreneurship’ 
and ‘business entrepreneurship’ as indicated in Figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.1 McMullen’s Development Entrepreneurship Model 
(Source: McMullen, 2011: 187, simplified for clarity) 
His argument appears to be that less developed economies lack the formal 
institutions needed to facilitate market development, particularly those relating 
to property rights and the rule of law (ibid: 192). Business entrepreneurs, being 
utility maximisers, do not seek to develop these institutions because to do so 
would imply a cost. It therefore falls to social entrepreneurs to engage in 
institutional entrepreneurship and bring about institutional changes that make 
Baumol’s productive entrepreneurship more attractive. Thus social 
entrepreneurs bring about institutional changes that benefit business 
entrepreneurs who then subsequently go on to demand further institutional 
improvements. Hence the argument runs that low-income countries need social 
entrepreneurs who will facilitate the institutional entrepreneurship that is a pre-
requisite for inclusive economic growth (ibid: 208).    
Much of what is described as social entrepreneurship, though, can be quite 
adequately categorised as acts of altruism. Whilst there is plainly nothing wrong 
with altruism or the associated generation of social gains that might accrue to a 
community, the attempt to recast such benefits as some special form of 
entrepreneurship seems misguided at best and self-serving at worst if it permits 
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allocationists to neatly sidestep the issue of enterprise viability and claim to be 
generating social returns in the face of growing criticism of their failure to 
generate sustainable commercial returns. Even McMullen’s subtle differentiation 
between “market-appropriating entrepreneurship”, “social business 
entrepreneurship”, “profit-motivated entrepreneurship”, non-income earning 
“social innovation”, partial income earning “social entrepreneurship” that makes 
a contribution to operating costs, and “socio-political activism”, which earns no 
income, does little to dispel the underlying concern. 
Given that the essential point of entrepreneurship is the creation of commercial 
enterprises that are self-sustaining by virtue of being able to generate long-run 
profit streams, McMullen’s architecture borders on the bogus. It is entirely 
unhelpful to invoke the spurious category of social entrepreneurship, let alone 
institutional entrepreneurship, business entrepreneurship or indeed his 
hypothesised resultant development entrepreneurship. Low income countries, 
such as Rwanda, are endeavouring to stimulate entrepreneurship - period.       
In order to do so they are addressing the question of which institutions are 
needed to underpin that objective and these institutions are, to a degree, 
shaped by civil society. Charities, meanwhile, have always commonly employed 
income generating activities both to raise dispersible funds and to contribute to 
their operating costs. To attempt to label each of these elements as some 
special form of entrepreneurship in order to arrive via social entrepreneurship at 
an unconvincing model of development entrepreneurship is self-indulgent 
mental gymnastics of the worst kind: it provides nothing in the way of useful 
insight or guidance for developing economy governments that are engaged in 
Herculean efforts to stimulate economic growth and poverty reduction. 
To achieve Vision 2020, Rwanda needs the creation of independent, self-
sustaining, commercially viable enterprises that increase GDP, provide 
employment and generate tax revenues that can be invested in public goods. 
Followed to its logical extreme, though, what passes for social entrepreneurship 
(i.e. altruism) risks prompting ‘neo-dependency’ rather than commercial self-
sufficiency. The underlying sense is that the social entrepreneurship discourse 
has more to do with legitimising on-going charitable support of                      
non-self-sufficient enterprises and the corresponding perpetuation of 
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misconstrued microcredit programmes. While this might be all very well for the 
NGO and development agency employees who enjoy the benefit of 
comparatively up-scale living conditions and attractive (often tax-free) salaries 
for delivering such programmes, the resulting context is one in which there is a 
high probability of misguided and ineffective policies and significant misuse of 
scarce resources.  
Presentations by microcredit providers Opportunity International and Oiko 
Credit at a 2013 microcredit conference (Bad Boll, 2013) also provided 
corroborating evidence that microcredit institutions are increasingly seeking to 
justify their activities on the basis of supposed ‘holistic social gains’ in order to 
counter the growing realisation that their economic impact is not proven. 
Foremost amongst these gains were claims relating to facilitating financial 
inclusion, an argument that on the face of it seems to begin to acknowledge that 
microcredit is fundamentally about advancing money to poor people in order to 
facilitate their daily survival via the very consumption smoothing that Ellerman 
pointed to (2008: 153). Such a potentially laudable objective though is 
thoroughly compromised when one observes that those most in need are the 
ones who pay the highest interest rates for accessing such loans (Waterfield, 
2013; Rosenberg et al., 2013: 2) and raises the question of the degree to which 
the expansion of microcredit is driven by a desire to expand financial markets 
rather than stimulating economic growth and employment in developing 
economies. The case of Compartamos eloquently illustrates the point. In 2000 
Mexican NGO ACCION used an initial USAID direct grant of $1 million to set up 
a for-profit microcredit subsidiary. One is inevitably forced to wonder ‘for whose 
benefit?’ when some seven years later the same subsidiary’s stock market 
launch realised a capital value of $300 million for its shareholders (Waterfield, 
2013). There is a certain hypocrisy too when lenders employ arguments about 
holistic social gains to deflect criticism about their failure to realise the original 
objective of stimulating entrepreneurship, whilst simultaneously maintaining the 
microcredit entrepreneurship myth when conducting fund raising campaigns or 
providing feedback intended to maintain the engagement of their supporters.  
When the dialogue at the Bad Boll microcredit conference (2013) revealed that 
growth and market share strategies were uppermost in the minds of delegates, 
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one is again forced to question who the primary beneficiary of the industry is - 
those paying excessive rates of interest as part of their daily struggle to survive, 
or the salaried fundraisers and loan officers of the lending institutions? In this 
context too, Taylor (2012: 607) makes the telling observation that consumption 
smoothing is really just a euphemism for credit-driven survival strategies, and 
that the treatment of the global poor as if they were a homogenous group facing 
financial exclusion is a proposition that is now increasingly being used to 
legitimise a growing commercialisation of microcredit. Institutional investors, 
pension funds, sovereign wealth funds and wealthy individuals are all now 
actively engaged in financing microcredit (Rhyne, 2009: 79), which raises the 
obvious question of the degree to which, under the guise of financial inclusion, it 
might increasingly be merely a cynical exploitation of the world’s poorest people 
- essentially a new spin on the sub-prime lending strategy that was a pre-cursor 
to the 2008 global financial crisis. Direct evidence for this can be discerned in 
Rosenberg et al.’s (2013: 2) analysis, which indicates that despite the increased 
numbers of MFIs now offering microcredit, the interest rates charged to the 
poorest communities have actually increased rather than being driven down by 
higher levels of competition. Although the standard riposte from the microcredit 
industry is that they face higher operating costs when lending small amounts to 
poorer groups, the authors give the lie to this defence when observing that 
these poorer communities are the most profitable to lend to (ibid.). They also 
point out that the poorest users of microcredit are typically obliged to maintain 
part of their loan in the lender’s compulsory savings products, alongside the 
credit products that they are sold (ibid: 4), thus providing the lender with a 
useful buffer in the event of periodic default by the borrower. Given that the 
repayments that have to be made are calculated on the whole capital sum 
advanced, not the net of savings figure, the effective interest rate charged is 
therefore actually raised above the already high theoretical rate. 
2.3.4 Human Capital 
Development of ‘human capital’ is held to be one of the key components of 
economic growth (UNCTAD, 2005: 4; Vivarelli, 2012: 20; Alvarez and Barney, 
2014: 160). Governments and NGOs have therefore invested heavily in 
education and training, in order to enhance the stock of human capital in 
!98
developing economies (Alvarez and Barney, 2014: 160, citing Romer, 1990, 
Lucas, 1998, Cohen and Soto, 2007). 
Although Gedajlovic et al. (2013: 459) note that it is often difficult to draw a clear 
dividing line between ‘social’ and ‘human' capital, in the context of economic 
development the tendency is to treat human capital as a clearly separate 
phenomenon. Citing Lepak, Takeuchi and Swar (2011), Alvarez and Barney 
(2014: 165) define it as comprising the sum total of knowledge, skills and 
abilities that an individual possesses, along with any other characteristics which 
might have a productive value with respect to work. It encompasses a broad 
range of skills including literacy, leadership characteristics, the ability to 
communicate with and motivate others plus the ability to work in teams and 
problem solving (ibid: citing Nahapiet and Ghosal, 1998; Greenwood, Li, 
Prakash and Deephouse, 2005). In addition to their diversity such skills also 
vary considerably in their level of sophistication, ranging from basic levels right 
up to university degrees (ibid: 166) and, although not mentioned specifically by 
the authors, would presumably also include numeracy. 
Human capital theory has its origins in attempts to explain variances that were 
observed in employees’ financial returns in developed economies and included 
the Mincerian earnings regressions, named after Jacob Mincer, that postulated 
a return-on-investment dimension to education. The underlying hypothesis was 
that those individuals who had invested in raising their stock of skills would 
actively seek to obtain a higher level of income having made such investments 
(Rauch and Rijsdijk, 2013: 925), an argument that clearly also chimes with the 
traditional rational choice concept of economic theory: a rational actor facing 
such higher costs would logically seek to obtain a higher return against having 
incurred them. At the aggregate level the argument is that investments made in 
education, which improve the knowledge and skill base of the population, will 
translate directly into workers’ ability to increase their level of output at the same 
level of physical capital (Begg, et al., 1994: 537), thereby generating growth. In 
the context of the economic development of low-income countries, this has 
migrated to the belief that if the store of human capital in a developing economy 
can be enhanced, then this will catalyse improvements in commercial 
performance, economic growth, improved incomes and poverty reduction and 
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will overcome the constraints in physical capital investment that might prevail in 
low-income economies. It would seem logical, too, that individuals with higher 
levels of human capital, and who therefore possess greater levels of knowledge 
and skill, are more likely to perceive opportunities for new commercial 
enterprises and have greater levels of insight into how to exploit them.  
Following Becker (1993), both Alvarez and Barney (2014: 170) and Rauch and 
Rijsdijk (2013: 925) draw an important distinction between two types of human 
capital: the ‘general’, comprising schooling and work experience that can be 
utilised in multiple settings, and the more narrowly focused ‘specific’, which 
encompasses industry specific knowledge, prior experience of self-employment 
and the employment experience of one’s parents. Although it might be expected 
that general and specific human capital would have a combined additive effect, 
Rauch and Rijsdijk’s (2013) longitudinal analysis of the two forms revealed 
some surprising results. Whilst it was found that general human capital was 
positively correlated with enterprise growth, specific human capital was found to 
be negatively correlated with growth (ibid: 934). Thus general education and 
general knowledge would appear to be beneficial to enterprise performance, in 
a way that specific human capital is not. This leads Rauch and Rijsdijk to 
recommend that it is broad general knowledge development that both individual 
entrepreneurs and governments need to invest in. 
Reviewing the status of research into entrepreneurship in general, Kenworthy 
and McMullen commented particularly on the lack of robust testing of human 
capital theory (2013: 985). Notwithstanding the observation, some hard 
evidence for a link between entrepreneurship teaching and subsequent 
behaviour has actually been sought. Walter et al.’s (2013) analysis of university 
entrepreneurship students claimed to have established a positive correlation 
between entrepreneurship education and future intentions to become self-
employed, although the relationship was found to apply only to male students 
and not to female ones. Leaving to one side the fact that the content of the 
supposed entrepreneurship teaching, as described by the authors, appeared to 
differ little from standard business management training, and that the authors 
conceded that whether entrepreneurship can actually be taught is contested 
(ibid: 178), there are a number of significant and obvious flaws in the study.     
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To equate mere future intent with actual entrepreneurship is clearly far from 
legitimate, as was discussed fully at section 2.2.5 with respect to the GEM data. 
Similarly, equating self-employment with growth-inducing entrepreneurship is 
stretching the point a bit too far when self-employment has at best, according to 
Alvarez and Barney, only a very limited impact on economic growth (2014: 162).  
Even more tellingly, in direct contrast to Walter et al.’s findings, Bae et al.’s 2014 
meta analysis of the same subject area concluded the exact opposite: that 
entrepreneurship education is not effective in shaping entrepreneurial intentions 
once pre-course entrepreneurial predisposition is controlled for. In other words, 
the Walter et al. study failed to realise that those who sign up for 
entrepreneurship training are likely to be the very individuals that already want 
in the future to be entrepreneurs, thus rendering Walter et al.’s findings 
redundant. When Bae et al. controlled specifically for this pre-course 
predilection, they “found no significant effects for entrepreneurship education on 
entrepreneurial intentions” (Bae et al., 2014: 241). To the extent that such 
entrepreneurship training constitutes an attempt to raise individuals’ specific 
human capital levels, the findings would seem to corroborate Rauch and 
Rijsdijk’s (2013) conclusion that entrepreneurs benefit more from general 
education, that enhances their general human capital, rather than engaging in 
entrepreneurship training that would raise their specific human capital . 39
Despite the evidence that general education is more beneficial, there is no 
shortage of efforts to teach entrepreneurship, presumably predicated on the 
continuing and common core supposition of the existence of a vast pool of 
potential entrepreneurial talent that just needs to be shown how to act - a belief 
that can be traced back to the 1980s when business schools began 
incorporating entrepreneurship modules into their MBA programmes, based on 
the notion that entrepreneurial success could be attributed directly to the 
successful implementation of strategic planning. This unquestioning faith in the 
benefits of teaching entrepreneurship has now expanded to such an extent that 
 It might be argued that if entrepreneurship training encompasses the skills needed to 39
undertake basic cash flow and profit and loss calculations, it might enhance numeracy and lead 
to a marginal increase in the aggregate level of human capital, thereby making a contribution to 
economic growth. However, any such contribution to aggregate human capital is likely to be 
infinitesimal when set against the transformational aim of entrepreneurship training and raises 
the obvious question of whether funds invested in such training would be better employed in 
mainstream general education.
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it is perfectly common to find major business schools and universities across 
the globe offering dedicated degrees in entrepreneurship in the clear belief that 
students can be taught how to be successful entrepreneurs . Such thinking is 40
also clearly in evidence in Rwanda, where an initial desk survey by Babson 
College (2011), intended to map the entrepreneurship development landscape 
that Babson would be competing in, revealed a total of 24 competitor 
institutions who were actively delivering programmes designed to stimulate 
Rwandan entrepreneurship . These ranged from international and domestic 41
NGOs, private enterprises, domestic and international universities, as well as 
the overseas development arms of donor governments.  
Belief in the benefits of human capital development can also be discerned in the 
fact that microcredit providers now also commonly make obtaining credit 
conditional on borrowers participating in financial literacy and basic business 
skills training, in keeping with the already explored preconception that they can 
thereby become successful entrepreneurs - a belief that sometimes can take 
some curious twists. Alvarez and Barney (2014: 167), for instance, make the 
assertion that putting together a rudimentary business plan, obtaining and 
repaying a microcredit and learning basic business skills are all things that can 
help those in extreme poverty to build their store of human capital. Yet the 
practical benefit of this enhancement is seriously questionable when the 
overriding motive for obtaining microcredit is to facilitate consumption 
smoothing rather than creating a business, as was explored in section 2.3.2.     
It plainly borders on the absurd to enhance an individual’s stock of specific 
human capital by teaching them how to write a business plan for an enterprise 
they will never create. This is not to imply that some individuals would not 
benefit from such basic skills training. The issue is rather the blanket approach 
that sees a budding entrepreneur on every corner and the fad for trying to 
‘teach entrepreneurship’ to all on the basis that such teaching automatically 
increases the likelihood that they will become entrepreneurs. 
 A brief survey by Saint Louis University (2016) turned up 224 business schools and 40
universities offering degrees in entrepreneurship or small business development.
 Limited in scope, the report clearly understates the number of institutions actively involved.41
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A similarly odd belief in specific human capital investment’s impact on 
entrepreneurship is also evident in GEM’s “Model of Entrepreneurial Processes 
Affecting National Economy Growth” (Amoros and Bosma, 2014: 44). Despite 
conceding earlier that there is a central problem with locating evidence for 
economic performance within its all-encompassing definition of 
entrepreneurship (ibid: 13), the 2013 GEM report nonetheless still offers its 
model as an explanation of the processes that produce economic growth.         
A core element of the model is its “Entrepreneurial Framework Conditions”, 
which is informed by the “National Experts Survey” that forms a key part of 
GEM’s methodology (ibid: 45). This requires an assessment of the degree to 
which entrepreneurship education is delivered throughout the education 
system, including all the way down to primary school (ibid.). Whether training 
primary school children to be entrepreneurs is actually beneficial is not 
analysed, but the clear implication is that those behind the GEM reports also 
subscribe to the belief that entrepreneurship training does raise levels of 
entrepreneurship and subsequently impacts on economic growth. The reasons 
for holding to the belief are not difficult to find though. The universities behind 
GEM are all very actively involved in entrepreneurship teaching, and the 
generation and sale of corresponding materials , so plainly have a vested 42
interest in avoiding any admission that there might be an inherent weakness in 
linking entrepreneurship teaching to the generation of entrepreneurs or 
economic growth.  
2.3.5 Social Capital 
While a distinction can be drawn between capital owned by society as a whole, 
the shared norms that bind a community together and the network of personal 
connections that can be exploited by an individual, the entrepreneurship 
literature focusses narrowly on the latter. This section will therefore also focus 
on the entrepreneur’s ability to leverage their personal network of contacts.  
It is claimed that social capital has special relevance to development as it “plays 
an essential role in the entrepreneurial success” (Gedajlovic et al., 2013: 456; 
original italics). Estrin et al. (2013) have even attempted to legitimise their 
 Including Babson’s 2014 bestseller Teaching Entrepreneurship. 42
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arguments for social entrepreneurship by suggesting that it is the source of the 
social capital that entrepreneurs subsequently exploit. Described by Chell as 
part of an entrepreneur’s “strategic armoury” (2008: 77), it would indeed seem 
logical that a broadly based network of contacts would expose an entrepreneur 
to a greater range of information about possible opportunities as well as 
providing a wide array of potential resources that can be utilised to exploit those 
opportunities, such as enabling access to key decision makers that might be in 
a position to influence the success of the intended venture. Defined as an asset 
that is available to an individual by virtue of their position in a social network 
and/or the nature of their social relationships (Gabbay and Leenders, 1991; 
cited in Jonsson and Lindbergh, 2013: 662), it has been observed by a wide 
range of authors that entrepreneurs tend to be well networked and that they 
actively leverage those networks in order to exploit perceived opportunities 
(Birley, 1985; Aldrich and Zimmer, 1986; Johannisson, 1987, 1995; Dubani and 
Aldrich, 1991; Chell and Baines, 2000; all cited in Chell, 2008: 3).  
Although social capital has become embedded in the development vocabulary 
and figures in both academic and policy documents relating to enterprise 
creation, Fine argues that the term is “oxymoronic” on the basis that capital is 
by its very nature inherently social (Fine, 2001: 15; 2010: 3). Given that the 
dominant discourse relates primarily to the development and leverage of social 
networks and the reciprocity that is contained in them, it would indeed seem 
questionable whether anything is gained by attempting to position the existence 
and utilisation of such networks as some special form of capital. Social 
networks would appear to be perfectly adequate as a definition.  
The social networks that entrepreneurs establish may be assessed along two 
key dimension: their ‘density’ and ‘intensity’ (Kreiser et al., 2013). While the 
former is a function of how many individual relationships exist in a network, the 
latter represents the degree of effort that has to be invested in maintaining it. 
Their examination of entrepreneurs’ network ties led the authors to conclude 
that it is the density of an individual’s network, i.e. the number of ties, that is 
important, rather than their intensity. It would seem that having a large number 
of weak ties brings greater exposure to a range of resources, whether 
information or finance, while a smaller number of intense ties requires 
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considerable effort to be expended in maintaining their quality, and therefore 
implies a greater cost. Network density is consequently found to be positively 
correlated with enterprise formation, while network intensity is found to be 
negatively correlated. 
In spite of the attention that has been given to the supposed phenomenon of 
social capital, it is difficult to find much in the way of specific insights or 
guidance about measures that could be employed by developing economy 
governments to actively enhance it, other than the general suggestion that 
mentoring and the input of external advisors might help entrepreneurs to 
succeed (Lingelbach et al., 2005: 7). However, mentoring normally implies both 
close physical proximity between the mentor and the person being mentored 
and a good supply of experienced mentors who can periodically provide the 
input needed. Clearly this is a significant problem in a context that is 
characterised by the kind of polarised commercial landscape that is evident in 
Rwanda: a low number of large corporations, a mass of micro-enterprises, and 
an acute shortage of the very entrepreneur-led SMEs that aspiring 
entrepreneurs would want to gain exposure to. Consequently there are limits to 
what can be achieved even with enlightened initiatives such as Kigali’s ‘KLab’ 
technology hub, which aims to provide networking and mentoring support to 
aspiring IT entrepreneurs.  
Some embryonic efforts at remote mentoring have been made, whereby 
aspiring entrepreneurs in developing economies are linked to mentors in 
developed economies via Skype, telephone and email. A good example of this 
is the Grow Movement, which attempts to link aspiring entrepreneurs in 
Uganda, Rwanda and Malawi with remote mentors in countries such as the UK, 
Canada and Australia . But in the five years it has been operational the Grow 43
Movement has provided mentoring to only 483 individuals, 165 of which were in 
Rwanda, and resulted in the creation of just 911 new jobs across all three 
countries (Grow Movement: 2015). Whilst this is clearly encouraging, it is 
difficult to see it being readily scaled up to a point where it might have a 
The Grow Movement is supported by London Business School, Ashridge Business School, 43
Cass Business School and the UK’s Management Consultancies Association.
!105
significant impact on levels of enterprise formation in developing economies in 
general and Rwanda in particular.  
It is also worth noting that entrepreneurship literature has a tendency to focus 
very much on the positive, enabling character of social networks. This does not 
mean, however, that they have a purely positive dimension as they could 
equally be employed by a dominant group to protect their self-interest and make 
it difficult for new entrants to exploit the commercial opportunities that are 
present . 44
2.3.6 Summary 
There is no doubt that the allocationists do raise some important issues around 
the problem of access to financial, human and social capital in developing 
economies. But their ‘Pot Noodle’ approach to development - in place of hot 
water, ‘just add capital’ - falls short of the mark. As put by Bradley, McMullen, 
Artz and Simiyu (2011: 36), even where access to financial, human and social 
capital is provided, it is no ‘silver bullet’ - to be successful, developing economy 
entrepreneurs still need to innovate and/or differentiate their offerings. 
Furthermore, if it were as simple as just adding capital, then one would expect 
to observe higher rates of entrepreneurship as levels of economic development 
increase and access to capital rises. This though is at odds with GEM’s claims 
that, as development increases, rates of entrepreneurship initially appear to 
decline (Kelley et al., 2011). It also fails to explain why highly developed 
economies, which have readily available capital, in all its forms, are not 
thoroughly awash with entrepreneurs.  
Microcredit’s well-documented failure to achieve its goal of stimulating 
entrepreneurship amongst poor people leaves it with a considerable dilemma. 
On the one hand it is clearly attempting to reposition itself as a provider of social 
gains or deliverer of financial inclusion, yet at the same time it continues to 
peddle anecdotal evidence in support of the entrepreneurship myth in order to 
attract donor funds and to maintain supporter engagement. This is clearly a 
 In a related observation Miller (2015), has argued that entrepreneurship literature also tends 44
to focus largely on the positive side of entrepreneurial activity, and has suggested that there 
could be merit in exploring possible negative dimensions such as a tendency for narcissism, 
mistrust and ruthlessness and their possible negative social effects.
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more palatable sell than the alternative, but perhaps more accurate scenario, of 
extracting profits from sub-prime lending to the world’s poorest communities. 
Either way, it is unlikely to spark the economic transformation that is sought by 
developing economy governments. Although microcredit providers have 
broadened their activities to incorporate business and financial literacy training 
in the belief that it enhances borrowers’ abilities to start businesses this, as with 
much in the microcredit arena, seems to have been done without supportive 
evidence that it actually makes any difference. Such unfounded leap of faith 
approaches look even more questionable when for instance ASKI, the 
Philippine arm of Opportunity International, insists on beginning its group 
lending meetings with bible studies (Bad Boll, 2013) and consequently raises 
further uncomfortable questions about the existence of alternative agendas 
amongst some in the microcredit community. 
Efforts to deepen human capital through general education and broad 
knowledge development may provide a sound basis for enhancing the ability of 
certain individuals to better identify and exploit opportunities, and may have a 
role to play in facilitating that exploitation, but efforts to raise specific human 
capital by attempting to teach entrepreneurship to a wide audience on the 
premise that ‘all can be entrepreneurs’ is seriously problematic when there is 
compelling evidence suggesting that it does not actually translate into more 
individuals becoming entrepreneurs. 
Despite differences of emphasis, the allocationists’ core proposition that 
development can be catalysed if aspiring entrepreneurs in developing 
economies could just gain access to finance and build their stock of human 
capital borders on the deceitful when it leads poor people into pursuing a goal 
that the majority have no realistic hope of ever achieving. This is even more the 
case if pursuing that goal involves their putting at risk even the limited assets 
that they possess. In the light of shortcomings in the allocationists’ approach to 
economic development and the improbability of entrepreneurial potential being 
ubiquitous, the next section will examine whether there is evidence for it being a 
minority, rather than a universal, characteristic.  
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2.4 Entrepreneurship as a Function of Psychological Makeup 
Diametrically opposed to the allocationists’ broad conception that ‘all can be 
entrepreneurs’, is the view that entrepreneurship is the preserve of a minority of 
individuals whose personal characteristics set them apart from others. This 
particular perspective is well reflected in Isenberg’s observation (2013: 177) that 
entrepreneurship is not about central distribution tendencies, but is rather about 
characteristics that are to be found in the extremes. Thus in any normal 
distribution of characteristics, the entrepreneurs will tend to be found in the 
distribution tails, not in the main body of the distribution curve.  
Categorising entrepreneurs as a special minority group, Schumpeter (1983: 81) 
had already pointed to a number of distinguishing characteristics including 
natural competitiveness, a need to prove themselves, deriving pleasure from 
engaging in the creative process and a tendency to strive for success for its 
own sake rather than the financial reward that it yields (ibid: 93). In this he 
clearly concurs with Baumol’s observation that entrepreneurs typically accept 
financial rewards that are significantly lower than they could expect if they were 
in orthodox employment , but that they experience counter-balancing 45
psychological benefits (2010: 49), such as the satisfaction of being their own 
boss (Baumol and Blinder, 2012: 413). Rather than developing this 
psychological insight though, Baumol reduces the observation to an argument 
that entrepreneurs have a tendency to be overoptimistic and speculates that 
innovative entrepreneurs are likely to be “self-selected risk-lovers” (2010: 66), a 
position that diverges dramatically from Schumpeter, who insisted that the 
entrepreneurial function is non-risk taking. It also sits uneasily with literature that 
tends to suggest that entrepreneurs are actually rather adept at identifying and 
avoiding risk. This question of the degree to which entrepreneurs embrace risk 
when setting up their enterprises is a recurrent one - it will crop up in several 
guises. Rather than just dealing with it piecemeal, it will also be addressed in its 
own right towards the end of this section, which seeks to examine the 
 Although entrepreneurs may not be primarily motivated by financial returns, it must be 45
admitted that a successful entrepreneur has the option to cash-in the enterprise value and 
realise a capital gain, which taken together with their historic earnings from the enterprise is 
likely to exceed the opportunity cost of such orthodox employment.
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arguments that entrepreneurship correlates with the possession of certain 
individual characteristics. 
2.4.1 Psychological Traits of Entrepreneurs 
The development of traits theory is primarily associated with psychologist G. W. 
Allport, who hypothesised that personality characteristics would follow a normal 
distribution across a population, thereby paving the way for the exploration of 
personality as a predictor of behaviour (Chell, 2008: 84). Although Gartner 
(1988) questioned the use of psychological traits to characterise entrepreneurs, 
on the basis that observing their behaviour would be more revealing, the belief 
in the prevalence of certain key personal attributes amongst entrepreneurs was 
widely accepted and is encountered right across the economic, psychological, 
sociological and business studies literature. The underlying hypothesis is that 
certain individuals possess personality traits that predispose them towards 
following an entrepreneurial course (De Vries, 2000), to the extent that some 
even become habitual entrepreneurs, launching multiple enterprises (Birley and 
Westhead, 1993; Balunywa and Rosa, 2009).  
The early approach and dominant discourse on traits theory focussed on three 
characteristics in particular. Described by Chell as the ‘Big Three’, these are: 
the need for achievement, an internal locus of control and a propensity for 
tolerating risk (Chell, 2008: 88). The first of these - a high need for achievement 
- was posited by psychologist McClelland (1967) as the key determinant of 
entrepreneurial behaviour. It expresses itself as a preference for striving to 
overcome difficult challenges, a preparedness to accept responsibility and a 
desire for personal improvement. Need for achievement also tends to be 
associated with a preference for challenges that require the exercise of mental 
agility, imagination and the use of complex arithmetic (ibid: 216). McClelland 
additionally appears to concur with Schumpeter and Baumol over the 
preparedness to accept negative financial returns when he observes that 
historical accounts of 19th century entrepreneurs seem to indicate that they 
were not primarily motivated by financial returns (ibid: 233), thereby implying 
that the need for achievement is not financially driven.  
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The second entrepreneurial characteristic, internal locus of control, has its 
origins primarily in Rotter’s 1966 work on learning behaviour. Although he was 
actually writing at the time about the differential impact on learning that would 
result from whether reward reinforcement was perceived to be internally or 
externally controlled, individual locus of control was subsequently subsumed 
into entrepreneurial traits theory as a reflection of the degree to which one feels 
in control of one’s own future (Chell, 2008: 98), a corresponding fear of being 
subject to the control of others and an anti-authoritarian predisposition           
(de Vries, 2000: 5). Individuals with an internal locus of control believe that they 
are able to take steps to actively shape their destiny, while those with an 
external locus of control perceive themselves to be at the mercy of events 
around them. Thus entrepreneurs, being individuals with an internal locus of 
control, are people who feel empowered to initiate enterprise formation while 
those individuals with an external locus of control would not.  
The third major personality trait theorised is that of one’s preparedness to deal 
with risk. Although for McClelland (1967: 211) this propensity was limited to a 
preference for taking only intermediate risks, the general perception is of 
entrepreneurs as risk-takers. They are thought to be undeterred by the 
probability of enterprise failure and exhibit a heightened propensity for risk-
taking when compared to business managers (Sexton and Bowman, 1985: 134; 
Begley and Boyd, 1987: 88; Busenitz, 1999: 336; Baumol, 2010: 66). Although 
classically this risk is seen as financial, it would also encompass the risk to 
one’s personal and commercial reputation should the venture fail. 
The hypothesis that entrepreneurial behaviour is dependent upon the degree to 
which these three character traits are present in an individual is, however, highly 
contestable. McClelland examined an impressive array of sources and 
undertook extensive studies to support his hypothesis that an “achievement 
motivation is in part responsible for economic growth” (1967: 36). Employing a 
methodology derived from Freud’s waking fantasies and free association 
techniques (ibid: 39), McClelland initially conducted research on male college 
students that appeared to confirm that some individuals had a need for 
achievement bias, which could be assessed and scored for individual subjects. 
Subsequent tests with children as young as five and adolescent boys  
!110
(ibid: 211), appeared to show that those with a high need for achievement 
exhibited certain discernible characteristics such as a preference for only taking 
moderate risks, a preparedness to take on responsibility and a desire for 
feedback on their progress. Arguing that individuals who exhibited such 
characteristics would be well suited to the entrepreneurial role, McClelland 
thereby inferred that high need for achievement (‘high n Achievement’), being 
virtually synonymous with entrepreneurship, was the engine of economic 
growth: 
 The parallel between the behaviour evoked by high n Achievement and 
that required for the entrepreneurial role is so close that one can 
understand much better how a  high n Achievement level in a society 
can produce more rapid economic development (ibid: 239). 
Conceding that the supposed presence of a high need for achievement 
amongst children and students did not necessarily mean that they would go on 
to become entrepreneurs, McClelland endeavoured to obtain further support for 
this possibility by testing for the trait amongst mid-ranking businessmen 
attending training programmes at M.I.T. and Harvard Business School.     
Cross-checked against managers attending training courses in Italy, Turkey and 
Poland, as well as students studying for a career in the professions and 
American civil servants, the findings were mixed to say the least. Although 
business managers in the USA, Italy and Poland were all found to score 
significantly higher on need for achievement than professionals in their own 
countries, the opposite was found in Turkey. Furthermore, although private 
sector managers in Turkey and Italy had higher need for achievement scores 
than their contemporaries in the public sector, this was not replicated in the 
USA, where public sector managers actually marginally outscored their private 
sector equivalents (ibid: 295) . The clear implication is that even if individuals 46
with a strong need for achievement are well suited to an entrepreneurial career 
(ibid: 259), it does not follow automatically that those exhibiting the trait will 
necessarily follow the entrepreneurial track.  
The biggest shortcoming in McClelland’s assertion that the entrepreneur 
provides the essential link between the need for achievement trait and rapid 
 At the time the research was undertaken Poland was still a communist economy, so only its 46
public sector was examined.
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economic growth (ibid: 205), though, can be seen in the complete 
interchangeability that he allows between the terms business manager and 
entrepreneur. His entire argument about supposed entrepreneurial behaviour 
and associated characteristics is thoroughly weakened by the astonishing 
revelation, somewhat disingenuously hidden away in a footnote to the chapter 
on Entrepreneurial Behaviour, that the research actually failed to look 
specifically at entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurial behaviour is therefore merely 
inferred from people who are not, actually, entrepreneurs. Given the reverence 
that is generally accorded McClelland, it is worth quoting his footnote in full: 
 Throughout the chapter, the terms entrepreneur, executive, manager, 
and the like will be used interchangeably, despite the ease and clarity 
with which these roles have been distinguished by economists and 
sociologists. The reason is a simple practical one: while we were able to 
distinguish clearly in Chapter 6 what we meant by the entrepreneurial 
role, when it came to picking particular individuals to test, we had no 
refined instruments of job analysis available to decide who was really 
acting in an entrepreneurial way. Instead we were forced to fall back on 
job titles, or on occupational statuses; and, in the jumble of terminologies 
used in firms, both here and abroad, we were able to distinguish only a 
single very generalised managerial status in which we could not pick out 
sub-types with any degree of success. The confusion adds to error, of 
course, and once again stresses the fact that while our groupings, 
though crude, are generally sufficient to establish the existence of a 
relationship, they are by no means precise enough to provide a valid 
estimate of its extent (ibid: 300; original italics).  
By failing to cross-validate the hypothesised link between high need for 
achievement and entrepreneurial behaviour with an actual cohort of 
entrepreneurs, the whole argument about need for achievement as an 
entrepreneurial trait is left in limbo and, although the trait became thoroughly 
embedded in the entrepreneurship literature, there is actually no robust basis 
for it in McClelland’s oft-cited work. Indeed all one can say with any confidence 
is that need for achievement appears to be associated with the behaviour of 
some middle-ranking business managers and that its association with 
entrepreneurship, on the basis of his evidence, is purely hypothetical. Indeed 
McClelland’s insight would seem to border on the tautological: those who 
achieved appeared to have a need to achieve. That it should nevertheless have 
become so universally accepted in entrepreneurial traits theory is striking. 
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A very similar criticism could be levied at the locus of control trait. Despite being 
largely treated in the entrepreneurship literature as if it were a simple binary 
condition, it is unlikely to be merely a matter of internal versus external control. 
It would seem far more likely that these conditions represent two polar extremes 
on a continuum, with a very high degree of variability in between. Indeed 
Rotter’s (1966) original work on the impact of internal versus external control on 
learning reinforcement refers frequently and quite specifically to it being a 
continuum. Whilst it may well be the case that the internal locus of control end 
of the spectrum is more associated with entrepreneurship, it does not follow that 
this can be taken as providing evidence for a causal relationship where a high 
internal locus of control leads individuals into enterprise formation. It is perfectly 
possible, in fact, to argue that the reverse could be the case: if the internal-
external locus of control is a continuum, rather than a binary condition, then an 
individual might arguably see the setting up of an enterprise as a legitimate 
means of recalibrating their perception of where they feel they fall on the 
internal-external control spectrum. To imply that having a high locus of control is 
predictive of entrepreneurial behaviour would consequently also be a false 
inference. It could just as equally be a predictor of many other career choices 
that allow a heightened sense of personal freedom, including various forms of 
self-employment such as becoming an artist, shepherd or taxi driver. 
The third of the Big Three traits, that of risk propensity, is shrouded in confusion 
and misnomer. Despite the popular perception that entrepreneurs are prone to 
taking risks, there is actually strong evidence suggesting the exact opposite.     
It has been argued that although they are excited by being engaged in 
undertakings that are challenging, entrepreneurs’ strong desire to succeed 
means that they actually tend to avoid high-risk situations and therefore, 
contrary to popular contention, are averse to actions that are akin to gambling 
(McClelland, 1967: 224; Meredith et al., 1982; cited in Chell, 2008: 102). 
Instead they are believed to prefer to engage in activities where they feel the 
outcome is related to the exercise of their skill, and are adept at deliberately 
quantifying and limiting risks (McGrath, 2000; Chell, 2008: 48), a position that 
would seem to echo Schumpeter’s original insistence (1983: 137) that risk-
taking is not an entrepreneurial function. Arguing that it is increasingly 
recognised that the risk-taking entrepreneur is simply a myth,  
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Isenberg (2013: 205) introduces the helpful analogy of mountaineering to 
explain the apparent confusion (ibid: 207). To the lay person mountaineering 
would be perceived as decidedly risky. But mountaineers take deliberate action 
to mitigate that risk by using the best equipment and proceeding with the utmost 
caution. They are aware of the risks involved, but seek to avoid them; yet 
external observers, who are unaware of the risk-reducing action that 
mountaineers take, regard them as risk-takers. The analogy would seem to 
chime particularly well with the observation that entrepreneurs seem to avoid 
both low and high risk situations - the former because they want to feel 
challenged, the latter because they want to succeed (Meredith et al.,1982: 25; 
cited in Chell, 2008: 102). 
A further problem with traits theory rests in the tendency to treat the Big Three 
traits as if they were completely independent variables, when a reference back 
to the original materials suggests that this is anything but established. In 
referring to McClelland’s earlier work on need for achievement (McClelland et 
al., 1953; cited in Rotter, 1966: 3), Rotter suggests that those individuals at the 
internal end of the internal-external control scale could be more prone to strive 
for achievement (ibid: 21). He also refers to a 1960 experiment conducted by 
Liverant and Scodel (ibid: 19) which observed that individuals at the internal 
control end of the scale also exhibited a preference for intermediate probability 
betting, which appears to match the suggestion made by McClelland that 
individuals with a high need for achievement also tend to prefer games of 
chance where the outcome probability is intermediate (McClelland, 1967: 211). 
If these observations by Rotter are indicative of covariance between the three 
traits, then it would seriously undermine the tendency to treat them as wholly 
independent variables. 
With all its concomitant weaknesses, it is hardly surprising that traits theory 
failed to resolve itself into a unified predictive model or that the list of 
hypothesised traits just continued to expand and now includes overconfidence 
(Busenitz, 1999; Salamouris, 2013), optimism (Cooper et al., 1988), and 
possession of high energy levels that are expressed by an ability and 
preparedness to work the long hours required to establish a venture (Sexton 
and Bowman, 1985; Begley and Boyd, 1987). It has similarly been argued that 
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entrepreneurs have a high need for autonomy (Sexton and Bowman, 1985; 
Lumpkin and Dess, 1996) as well as a heightened tolerance of ambiguity - 
meaning that in contrast to the majority of individuals, who find ambiguity 
stressful, entrepreneurs appear to actively seek out and enjoy such situations 
(Sexton and Bowman, 1985).  
Additional attempts that have been made to distinguish between entrepreneurs 
and the general population include Eysenck’s theories of personality type, 
based on assessments of three psychological factors: neuroticism, degree of 
extraversion versus introversion, and psychoticism (Chell, 2008: 123); the ‘Big 
Five’ model of personality as a function of neuroticism, extraversion, openness, 
agreeableness and conscientiousness developed by Dreary and Mathews 
(1993; cited in Chell, 2008: 123 ) and the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator 
personality profiling tool which identifies sixteen possible personality types 
based on the work of psychiatrist Carl Jung. All share a common problem with 
traits theory, namely, whether a distribution of characteristics displayed in a 
population can be reliably used to infer the behaviour of a single individual.  
Despite this obvious shortcoming, interest in using such psychometric profiling 
as a predictor of entrepreneurship can be seen in its recent use as a potential 
modelling technique which, alongside standard credit scoring, it is argued could 
help banks to assess who they should advance loans to (Klinger et al., 2013). 
Tests undertaken initially in Peru, Columbia, Kenya and South Africa have 
suggested that the variables of extraversion and educational background 
correlate positively with enterprise success, while integrity and digit span were 
negatively correlated with enterprise profitability. But, as one might expect, the 
tests revealed that integrity is also strongly negatively associated with default.  
In other words the least honest individuals are the most likely to default. Whilst 
hardly surprising, this leaves the banks with a considerable dilemma. On the 
one hand they would want to lend to the more honest entrepreneurs and 
thereby avoid default, but the observed inverse relationship between integrity 
and profitability that was also evident in the study suggests that these are 
individuals who are more likely to start less profitable enterprises, and might 
therefore indicate a long-run inability to repay. On the other hand, the most 
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likely to be profitable are, perversely, the very individuals the banks would want 
to avoid - those with a heightened propensity to default. 
By failing to address core weaknesses in its approach traits theory has largely 
failed to keep pace with the allocationists’ popularist insistence that ‘all can be 
entrepreneurs’ and so has tended to fall out of favour in recent years. This might 
be about to change though in the wake of some interesting work undertaken by 
Sarasvathy (2008) and a growing band of her followers, and opponents, who 
are beginning to reignite the debate about the psychological makeup of 
entrepreneurs. Although Sarasvathy has tended to position herself as being 
distinct from traits theorists, her work has much in common with this earlier 
approach. 
2.4.2 Effectuation - Traits Revisited? 
To explore the characteristics of highly successful (‘expert’) entrepreneurs, 
Sarasvathy deployed a technique known as ‘thinking aloud protocols’. The 
research sample were presented with hypothetical business start-up problems 
and asked to think aloud about how to resolve them. Their monologues were 
recorded and transcribed, and the resulting transcripts subsequently analysed 
to identify the vocabulary and underlying thinking processes that were being 
used. The results led Sarasvathy to distinguish between two types of logic: 
normal deductive logic, which she refers to as ‘causal’, and the inverse, which 
she calls ‘effectual’. She then uses the term ‘effectuation’ to describe the use of 
this second type of logic (2008: 16). Whilst causal logic helps individuals to 
make decisions, Sarasvathy maintains that it is effectual logic that enables one 
to construct possible future scenarios (ibid: 73), particularly in a context of 
uncertainty. Although her expert entrepreneurs sample were capable of using 
both types of logic, she found that they had a marked preference for using 
effectual logic when dealing with the uncertainty that surrounds new venture 
creation. Thus whereas causation tends to focus externally on predetermined 
markets or fixed goals and marshals the requisite resources to achieve them, 
Sarasvathy’s entrepreneurs tended to focus inwardly and go through a process 
of identifying the means they have at their disposal. This entails identifying “who 
I am, what I know and whom I know” (ibid: 78). Having thus assessed the 
available resources, they then imagine possible future ends and engage in an 
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iterative process of creating and exploiting opportunities as they arise (ibid: 38). 
In simple terms, causation and effectuation can be seen to be the obverse of 
each other. Causation starts with a given end objective and seeks the right 
balance of means to achieve it, thereby maximising utility. Effectuation, though, 
starts with a given set of means and explores multiple possible ends that can be 
realised with the means at hand. 
Contrary to Baumol’s casting of entrepreneurs as “self-selected risk-
lovers” (2010: 66), Sarasvathy’s evidence suggests that their inward focus, use 
of effectual logic and preparedness to act iteratively preconditions them to 
believe that they can transform current realities in their favour (Sarasvathy, 
2008: 86). Thus rather than embracing risk (Baumol, 2010) or minimising risk 
(McGrath, 2000), entrepreneurs embark on the inverse process of seeking to 
“make success happen” (Sarasvathy, 2008: 17). Whilst at face value this might 
still seem to contain an element of risk and to echo the tendency to be 
overoptimistic that was identified by traits theorists, it is mitigated by the 
entrepreneur’s calculation of ‘affordable loss’ (ibid: 15), whereby risk is 
constrained by the effectuator’s objective quantification of what they are 
prepared to lose in the process of testing whether a venture is viable. This 
would seem to echo the preference for intermediate betting that is posited by 
traits theorists and also sits well with McGrath’s (2000) view that a key 
entrepreneurial characteristic is the ability to quantify and limit financial 
exposure. It is worth drawing a key distinction here, too, between venture failure 
and the failure of the entrepreneur. The literature often conflates the two, but to 
an effectual entrepreneur calculating and acting according to affordable loss, 
one can easily imagine that venture failure may be merely one step on the 
iterative journey towards ultimate personal success. This very point, that failure 
may be a precursor to success, also conforms with Hirschman’s position that 
“lofty achievements”, including the economic, “come about by stumbling rather 
than through careful planning, rational behaviour” (2015: 13). 
Most economists, business schools and even allocationists proceed though on 
the basis that opportunities are somehow ‘out there’ waiting for entrepreneurs of 
whatever hue to employ causal logic to exploit them - that opportunities 
somehow pre-exist entrepreneurial action. Sarasvathy’s work calls into question 
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this traditional notion of entrepreneurs constantly ‘scanning the 
horizon’ (Kirzner, 1997: 72) for pre-existing opportunities that they can exploit.  
If Sarasvathy is right, then it opens up the possibility that instead of being 
discovered, markets are “more likely made than found” (Sarasvathy, 2008: 17; 
original italics), as a result of entrepreneurs’ deployment of effectuation.  
In contrast, the causal logic approach to strategic planning is typified by the 
Segmentation, Targeting, Positioning (STP) approach made famous by      
Kotler (1994: 93). It begins with a predefined market that contains all potential 
customers, which is then segmented to reveal a niche that can be profitably 
exploited. A customer proposition is developed and tested for resonance with 
the targeted niche, ahead of developing a communications strategy designed to 
appeal to the customer target. This process identifies a fixed end goal, usually 
expressed in terms of the desired share of a pre-defined market, and then 
seeks to identify and marshal the resources that will be needed to achieve that 
defined goal. According to Sarasvathy, such causal reasoning is appropriate in 
situations where the future is predictable, and aids the selection of appropriate 
measures where the environment is independent of actions taken. It is seen in 
the classic approach undertaken in “MBA classrooms” (Sarasvathy, 2008: 73) 
and is expressed in the logically constructed formal business plan.  
The distinction between causal and effectual reasoning has important  
implications, given that classic business training tends to be dominated by a 
causal orientation. Although business schools often include some form of 
entrepreneurship module, such as case studies of successful entrepreneurs, 
the core logic seems to be that mastering a broad portfolio of business skills 
results in the creation of a perfectly formed embryonic entrepreneur who has 
the ability to segment a market, identify a profitable niche and write a ‘bankable 
business plan’ that would qualify for the bank credit or venture capital that it is 
perceived would be needed to get the venture started . But if entrepreneurs 47
are dealing with uncertainty and acting contingently, rather than following a 
means-end rationality, it could well be that business schools, governments and 
NGO training programmes in developing economies are simply teaching the 
wrong things. Teaching causal logic based classic business skills may be 
 In essence this assumes that business management and entrepreneurship are synonymous.47
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appropriate for developed economies, which need a regular supply of 
competent business executives to be employed in established enterprises, but 
might be highly questionable for countries like Rwanda if such teaching 
produces a massive cohort of classically trained middle-managers for a highly 
evolved commercial sector that has not yet been brought into existence. What is 
more, if there is an effectuation dimension to entrepreneurship, then potential 
entrepreneurs in developing economies are likely to have it knocked out of them 
by the time they have completed formal business training built on a platform of 
causal logic.  
The problem becomes even more acute when one considers that developing 
economies’ banking sectors and business development funds, being risk 
averse, will be on the lookout for bankable business plans - plans that have 
been developed using a highly causal logic approach. If potential entrepreneurs 
eschew causal logic in favour of effectuation, they are unlikely to get past the 
front door, despite the fact that their particular psychological makeup might 
make them more likely to succeed. This has serious implications for the policies 
that developing economy governments implement to stimulate entrepreneurship 
and may partially explain why an SME sector is still struggling to emerge in 
Rwanda despite all the efforts that have been made. It may also go some way 
to clarify the observation that in Rwanda obtaining finance is still claimed to be 
the biggest handicap to enterprise development (IFC, 2012: 4), even though 
Chapter 1 concluded that finance is widely available.  
Sarasvathy’s theory of effectuation is not, though, without its detractors. 
Examining a broad array of literature through “the decision-making lens of 
effectuation theory” Goel and Karri (2006) make an implicit link between 
effectuation and certain character traits, including: a predisposition for non-
conformity (ibid: 485), high achievement orientation (ibid: 486), preference for 
innovation (ibid.), and high levels of self-efficacy (ibid: 485). They also introduce 
the additional psychological concept of ‘over-trust’, the tendency to trust beyond 
the level that a particular context would suggest is justified, and go on to argue 
that entrepreneurs have an inbuilt predisposition to over-trust compared to 
others (ibid: 479). 
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Although Sarasvathy and Dew (2008) put up a spirited argument against linking 
effectuation to psychological traits, their argument was weakened by the heavy 
use of anecdote and the fact that their main source of evidence was an 
unpublished PhD thesis (Allen, 2003; cited in Sarasvathy and Dew, 2008: 732). 
Furthermore, in conceding that Allen’s evidence indicates that a link between 
effectuation and self-efficacy cannot be ruled out (ibid: 732) their defence is 
considerably undermined given that Goel and Karri (2006) identified self-
efficacy as a combination of sub-traits including emotional stability, self-esteem 
and internal locus of control (ibid: 485). Karri and Goel’s (2008) arguments 
about effectuation being conditioned by psychological traits were driven home 
even further in their response to Sarasvathy and Dew’s (2008) rebuttal, with 
Sarasvathy ultimately seeming to hedge her bets when conceding in her book 
that “there may of course be a traits aspect to effectuation” (2008: 131). By 
failing adequately to address Goel and Karri’s arguments, room is therefore left 
for a predisposition for effectuation to be conditioned by psychological 
characteristics that were identified in the earlier literature. Despite these 
shortcomings, Sarasvathy’s theories have rekindled interest in entrepreneurs’ 
psychological makeup and suggest potentially fruitful areas for research, both in 
developed and developing economy contexts.     
In drawing attention to the importance of recognising the key distinction 
between causal and effectual thinking, and the preference amongst expert 
entrepreneurs for the latter, Sarasvathy would seem to have concurred with the 
traits theorists’ and Schumpeter’s underlying thesis that entrepreneurship is a 
minority capacity. However, this position would appear to be seriously at odds 
with her more recent activities. Effectuation now boasts its own website , which 48
actively recruits instructors of effectuation and promotes the corresponding 
teaching materials. Foremost of these is the joint production of Effectual 
Entrepreneurship (Read et al., 2011), a hybrid effectuation course book/self-
help workbook that makes overt and positive references to both Yunus (ibid: ix) 
and microcredit (ibid: 201). Thus it would seem that Sarasvathy has taken to 
siding with the allocationists’ view that ‘all can be entrepreneurs’, if they just 
follow her teachings and learn how to think effectually, rather than causally.  
 http://www.effectuation.org48
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2.4.3 Risk, Uncertainty and Heuristics 
It is perfectly common to find the term risk used in relation to enterprise 
creation. Knight, cofounder of the Chicago school of economics, makes the 
important point however that its use is highly ambiguous (2006: 19). It is 
sometimes used to refer to a phenomenon capable of being measured, but 
sometimes not. This ambiguity led him to argue for a clear separation between 
‘risk’ and ‘uncertainty’, where it is only ‘measurable uncertainty’ that constitutes 
risk. Its probability of occurring can be assessed statistically, whereas 
uncertainty in its proper sense is something that cannot be measured, by virtue 
of being unknowable, and represents a phenomenon now commonly referred to 
in the entrepreneurship literature as ‘Knightian uncertainty’ .  49
Knight’s distinction is an important one. A corporate manager with sufficient 
resources and data on historical performance is better able to assess the 
likelihood of possible outcomes, based on known probability distributions     
(ibid: 199). They can therefore quantify the risks they will face, and can even go 
as far as insuring against adverse outcomes. In contrast, entrepreneurs who 
create new enterprises typically have very little information to go on. Because 
they cannot possess perfect knowledge, in the sense of knowing the outcome 
that will derive from starting a new venture, they operate in a context of 
uncertainty and have to rely largely on their instincts when assessing the 
viability of a new opportunity. They are dealing with a unique situation for which 
there is no prior experience or known probability distribution (ibid: 233). For 
Knight the entrepreneur’s overriding uncertainty surrounding such judgement is 
that relating to the sale price of his product or service (ibid: 317). But to the 
extent that the price is determined by the intersection of the supply and demand 
curves, it can be argued that in fact their real uncertainty is the level of demand 
that will exist for the goods or services they are planning to supply. 
Considering the exercising of judgement under conditions of uncertainty, Knight 
draws a further distinction between ‘confidence’ and what he refers to as 
‘conative attitude’ and suggests that while some individuals will seek to avoid 
 Although the headlines are given to Knight, the question of uncertainty was also arguably 49
raised by Keynes when referring to the “extreme precariousness of the basis of knowledge on 
which our estimates of prospective yield have to be made” (2012: 149).
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uncertainty because they have an inbuilt need to feel sure about the actions 
they take, others seem prone to exploring original ideas and therefore “prefer 
rather than shun uncertainty” (ibid: 242). The comment is interesting in that it 
seems to mirror the tolerance of ambiguity predisposition identified by traits 
theorists. It points, significantly, to the importance of how an entrepreneur feels 
and thinks about the level of uncertainty that persists, the capacity for exercising 
judgement despite that uncertainty, and the possibility that some individuals 
think differently about such uncertainty.  
A similar line of reasoning is explored by Chell (2008: 259) when she observes 
that for entrepreneurs to be successful under contexts of uncertainty they must 
be able to make the right judgements at the right time. Determining that this 
constitutes a cognitive process, she goes on to suggest (ibid: 267) that 
entrepreneurs appear to share a common cognitive-affective core. Linking this 
with the third state of mind, conation, that was raised by Knight, would seem to 
suggest that there is something different in the way that entrepreneurs think. 
Indeed Chell goes on to suggest that they are in fact able to engage in framing 
different scenarios that they can then act out in their minds, as well as sounding 
them out with others, and consequently hypothesises that “entrepreneurs have 
a flexibility of mind that permits leaps of imagination through counterfactual 
thinking” (ibid: 259). Echoing Sarasvathy’s theories of effectuation, Chell     
(ibid: 172) draws on Gaglio (2004) and Gaglio and Katz (2001) to theorise that 
entrepreneurs use both counterfactual thinking and envisioning to imagine both 
what might be possible and how to bring that possibility about. This thought, 
that there is something in the attitude or mindset of entrepreneurs, is also 
identified by Isenberg (2013: 189) as fostering the contrarian thinking that leads 
entrepreneurs to perceive things differently, in particular the ability to see 
potential value where others do not (ibid: 58). 
When operating under conditions of uncertainty, entrepreneurs are forced into 
making subjective rule-of-thumb judgements that behavioural economists refer 
to as ‘decision making under heuristics’. Kahneman (2011: 21) identifies two 
fundamental cognitive approaches to decision making, which for convenience 
he labels ‘System 1’, concerned with quick, unconsidered, reflex and often 
impulsive thinking, and ‘System 2’, the seat of slow, rational, ordered thinking.  
!122
For Kahneman, it is thoroughly irrational to take the unquantified risks typically 
associated with System 1 thinking. By failing to draw on Knight’s key distinction 
between risk and uncertainty, he consequently characterises entrepreneurs as 
irrational, optimistic risk-takers and asserts that a cognitive bias causes them to 
neglect the role that luck plays in their success and makes them prone to an 
illusion of control (ibid: 259). He consequently dismisses their belief in the ability 
to shape their success (ibid: 260) and reduces entrepreneurship fundamentally 
to serendipity, whereby “undeserved rewards” are gained by individuals who 
“took a crazy gamble and won” (ibid: 204). His failure fully to address the key 
distinction between risk and uncertainty, though, represents a key flaw in his 
reasoning. If entrepreneurs have to make judgement calls in the absence of 
knowledge about the probabilities of possible outcomes, then castigating them 
for failing to base their decisions on probability and labelling them merely as 
lucky gamblers becomes wholly nonsensical when such statistical probabilities 
are simply not available. The underlying implication that they act without fully 
considering the implications of their actions also seems a poor fit with 
McClelland’s view that entrepreneurs seem to prefer contexts where the risks 
are intermediate. It also sits uncomfortably with Sarasvathy’s expert 
entrepreneurs’ capacity for calculating affordable loss.  
Failure to appreciate the significance of uncertainty can also be discerned in the 
2015 Human Development Report (World Bank, 2015). Drawing very heavily on 
Kahneman, it highlights poor people’s failure to act rationally and take the 
decisions that are in their own long-term best interest, such as their use of credit 
to fund current consumption when consistently foregoing such consumption 
could yield long-term savings that would obviate the need for credit. The report 
consequently appeals to development practitioners and governments to take 
measures to “improve the quality of the decisions that people make” (ibid: 31). 
Thus the subtext would appear to be a continued faith in the rational choice 
model and that action needs to be taken to hinder aberrant, irrational, behaviour 
that departs from the orthodox model. Although the report does make some 
important observations about behaviour and context, it tends to gloss over the 
reasons that underpin such apparently irrational behaviour, for instance the fact 
that many poor people are forced into using credit for consumption smoothing to 
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ensure their daily survival because they are managing an uncertain and 
irregular cash flow (Collins et al., 2009: 181).  
Tuckett (2011: xvi) makes an incisive point about this failure to address the 
issue of uncertainty when observing that economists are happy to define it in 
terms of the ‘unknown unknowns’, but then proceed to devote the bulk of their 
attention to risk - the ‘known unknowns’ - and largely ignore uncertainty. This is 
seriously problematic when the corresponding use of deductive logic treats an 
uncertain future merely as if it were a game of chance. Tuckett (ibid: 13) goes 
on to criticise behavioural economists, like Kahneman, for merely fitting their 
insights about cognition into standard economic theory, pointing out that 
behavioural economic theory is essentially concerned only with contesting the 
degree to which economic actors are rational, rather than recognising that in the 
context of uncertainty the exercise of reason alone is insufficient when dealing 
with the unknown unknowns, as there is simply no probability databank 
available on which to base a purely rational decision. Referring to Simon’s 
concept of ‘bounded rationality’ (1997, cited in Tuckett 2011: 185) Tuckett 
argues that under conditions of uncertainty, when the economists’ standard 
rational choice model is inapplicable, people still engage in what he describes 
as ‘rational action’ - action that is “rational from their point of view” (ibid: 184; 
original italics). Although Tuckett was writing primarily about the apparently 
irrational behaviour of financial investors, his insights resonate strongly with the 
actions taken by entrepreneurs under conditions of uncertainty who, in the 
absence of hard data on which to base a rational choice, may nonetheless still 
be acting in a manner that, for them, is highly rational within the particular 
context that they are experiencing. Indeed in the context of uncertainty, 
attempts to apply rational choice may be wholly irrational if it means behaving 
as if the unknown unknowns were known.  
Tuckett also introduces a concept he calls ‘groupfeel’ (ibid: 65) - a tendency to 
take reassurance from the fact that one is acting in a manner that is consistent 
with one’s peer group and where membership of the group feels good (ibid: 68). 
Thus even actions that would be considered by behavioural economists to be 
irrational, on the basis of having a high risk probability, can nonetheless acquire 
a degree of subjective acceptability by virtue of the fact that others are seen to 
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be pursuing the same course of action. Again, although Tuckett was writing 
specifically about the actions of fund managers, such a mindset might also have 
implications for entrepreneurship if intending entrepreneurs can draw 
reassurance from the observation that other intending entrepreneurs appear to 
be following a similar path. This may well be a factor in Rwanda, where 
entrepreneurship is positioned as the country’s economic priority and is being 
very actively encouraged by the government, the major global financial 
institutions, NGOs and educational institutions.  
2.4.4 Summary 
Kahneman argues that under System 1 thinking individuals are prone to rely too 
heavily on evidence from small samples and therefore tend to draw false 
conclusions from unrepresentative data. But it is also possible to levy a 
reciprocal criticism at psychologists, who have an equivalent tendency to imply 
that the behaviour of an individual can be inferred from attributes displayed in 
large data distributions. Even if certain traits can be identified as being over-
represented amongst entrepreneurs, this plainly does not infer causality: that 
the mere presence of certain traits predetermines that an individual will 
necessarily follow an entrepreneurial course, or that there is a one-size-fits-all 
cocktail of characteristics that will facilitate accurate prediction of 
entrepreneurial success. As stressed by Low and MacMillan, the idiosyncratic 
nature of entrepreneurs is such that they essentially “defy aggregation” and 
means that attempts to provide a profile for a typical entrepreneur are 
“inherently futile” (1988: 148). Given the heterogeneity of individual 
backgrounds and experiences it is hardly surprising then that traits research 
quickly begins to feel like a search for the Holy Grail. 
A further difficulty is the assumed immutability of such psychological traits - that 
once evidenced they are fixed for all time and in all contexts. In reality, people 
and their characteristics may well change over time, or behaviour may well vary 
according to context and experience; so some form of longitudinal evidence is 
surely required before any definitive conclusions can be reached about the 
predictive value of psychological biases that are exhibited in what is in reality a 
mere snapshot at one moment in time and in one context. This in turn gives rise 
to arguably the biggest weakness of the whole psychological approach to 
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entrepreneurship: that it is based exclusively on studies of extant entrepreneurs, 
and has not been tested for predictive validity against intending entrepreneurs 
(Chell, 2008: 258). In observing this fact Chell touches on a very significant 
problem, namely that no distinction is made between the ex-ante and ex-post 
characteristics of an entrepreneur. In the absence of longitudinal evidence 
spanning both the pre- and post-entrepreneurial experience it is simply 
impossible to asses the degree to which entrepreneurial traits existed prior to, 
and therefore predicated the entrepreneurial course being followed, or whether 
they were learned via the experience of setting up and running an enterprise.  
This longitudinal problem is equally problematic for Sarasvathy’s theories of 
effectuation. Whilst at one level her insights would seem to echo the envisioning 
and counterfactual cognitive style highlighted by Chell, because Sarasvathy’s 
work was restricted exclusively to expert entrepreneurs in one highly developed 
economy (the USA), it is also impossible to determine the extent to which their 
predilection for effectuation might be a learned behaviour resulting from an 
accumulation of experience. By suggesting that entrepreneurs follow an 
iterative path when developing enterprises Sarasvathy’s theory does though 
point to a significant weakness in Kahneman’s approach, namely, that life is not 
lived as a series of self-contained one-off laboratory experiments. Life, by its 
very nature, is an iterative process where certain decisions taken today can be 
modified tomorrow if they are found to be inappropriate; hence Tuckett’s 
‘rational action’ might indeed be a vey rational way to proceed under the 
conditions of uncertainty that entrepreneurs are confronted with.  
Knight’s key distinction between risk and uncertainty was a crucial observation 
and one that has considerable implications. External observers of 
entrepreneurial behaviour, who fail to recognise this subtle but critical 
distinction, can wrongly associate being prepared to act under conditions of 
uncertainty with risk-taking, even when the individuals under observation may 
actually be attempting to minimise risk. Indeed it might even be argued that 
acting under uncertainty might well be an essential precondition of 
entrepreneurship: if there were no uncertainty, then markets would presumably 
be exhibiting perfect information and be in the hypothetical state of equilibrium, 
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which has already been shown to be a condition where entrepreneurs and 
entrepreneurial profits could not exist (see section 2.2.2).  
Curiously, and despite his critical insight on this distinction between risk and 
uncertainty, Knight towards the end of his book seems to presage Kahneman 
when intimating a belief in the superiority of taking calculated risks rather than 
embracing what he refers to as the “essential evil of uncertainty” (2006: 347). 
Given the highly objective nature of his prior analysis, this is a surprising 
departure and contrasts starkly with, for instance, Keynes who noted that the 
preparedness of some to engage with uncertainty is an extremely important 
quality, as eloquently expressed in his observation that: 
 If human nature felt no temptation to take a chance, no satisfaction 
(profit apart) in constructing a factory, a railway, a mine or a farm, there 
might not be much investment merely as a result of cold calculation 
(Keynes, 2012: 150). 
Rwanda needs such individuals who eschew the behavioural economists’ 
lauding of rationality, are comfortable with embracing uncertainty and prepared 
to engage in action that is “rational from their point of view” (Tuckett: 184; 
original italics) and can thereby lead to successful enterprise creation. 
2.5 Conclusion 
None of the three dominant approaches that have been reviewed in this chapter 
can offer a satisfactory explanation for the lack of SMEs in Rwanda. The 
economists’ positioning of entrepreneurs as a key factor in economic 
development and their emphasis on the institutional context and greater 
efficiencies that accrue to firms versus individuals underpins the Rwandan 
Government’s focus on entrepreneurship and SME sector development. It was 
seen, in the first chapter, that an enterprise climate has been fashioned that is 
very much in line with the institutional context that most economists call for. The 
absence of a vibrant SME sector, the missing middle, does not, therefore, 
appear to be due to any lack of diligence in pursuing the prevailing prescription. 
If having the right institutions is a necessary precondition for entrepreneurship 
and SME sector formation, the evidence from Rwanda would suggest that it is 
by no means a sufficient one.  
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The allocationists’ explanation for the missing middle would rest in arguments 
around the problem of access to financial, human and social capital in 
developing economies. In this they are supported by the global institutions’ 
forceful assertions that the dearth of SMEs in developing economies is linked 
particularly to their difficulties in accessing credit. Following this line of 
reasoning the Rwandan Government has been very active in initiating strategies 
that conform to the allocationists’ arguments. It has raised levels of access to 
credit, invested in human capital and devised programmes, such as Hanga 
Umurimo, which are designed specifically to prime entrepreneurship and 
support SME development. Yet this too has failed to deliver the desired dynamic 
SME sector. There is considerable evidence, in fact, that the allocationists’ 
prescriptions for stimulating enterprise formation are fundamentally flawed. This 
includes the well documented tendency for microcredit to prompt consumption 
smoothing, rather than enterprise creation, and the apparent inappropriateness 
of investments in specific human capital, such as entrepreneurship training. 
Worryingly too, arguments in favour of social entrepreneurship, used as a 
screen to excuse the allocationists’ failure to catalyse viable self-sustaining 
commercial enterprises and economic dynamism, raises the risk of prompting 
neo-dependency rather than the development of the self-sufficient SME sector 
that is desired. 
The psychological approach also struggles to provide an explanation for the 
missing middle. Although it does point to factors that might have a bearing on 
entrepreneurial behaviour, such as attitude to risk, use of effectuation and 
psychological traits, the arguments centre exclusively on extant entrepreneurs 
in developed economies. It cannot be concluded, therefore, that traits theory or 
Sarasvathy’s theory of effectuation can simply be extrapolated to a developing 
economy context. Additionally, even if the theories were applicable, a further 
weakness prevails. By focussing only on individuals who have successfully built 
enterprises, it cannot be inferred that the observed characteristics existed prior 
to and preconditioned setting up an enterprise. Hence there is no basis for 
drawing any inferences about whether the attributes associated with 
entrepreneurs in developed economies are present in Rwanda. 
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Finding explanations for the low incidence of SMEs in Rwanda is also 
hampered by the discovery that the dominant theories frequently present 
arguments that are contradictory. The allocationists’ assumption that there is a 
veritable ocean of ‘entrepreneurs in waiting’ appears to conform with 
economists Kirzner and Baumol, and the GEM’s ever expanding definition of 
entrepreneurship. But the very idea that there could be a vast contingent of 
potential entrepreneurs is at odds with traits theorists’ and Schumpeter’s 
position that entrepreneurial characteristics are possessed by a minority of 
individuals. Sarasvathy on the other hand appears to be hedging her bets: 
initially observing that effectuation is exhibited by expert entrepreneurs, who are 
few in number, but simultaneously promoting it as a skill that can be taught to 
anyone. 
One can also discern a dissonance between the allocationists’ propensity for 
prompting neo-dependency and the rational choice model that underpins most 
economic arguments. While the former requires the continuing support of 
external agents, the latter assumes that SMEs are the result of the utility 
maximising behaviour of independent entrepreneurs. It might be argued that the 
behavioural economists’ approach bridges this divide with its argument that 
individuals do not always act in their own best interests, so external agents 
have to be brought back into the mix in order to induce rational choice. The net 
effect though is merely to reinstate the core logic of the rational choice model. 
Difficulties with this approach are betrayed, however, by Kahneman’s painting of 
entrepreneurs as foolish gamblers who just got lucky. Were this to be the case, 
and everyone followed the invocation to act rationally, then by deduction there 
would be no entrepreneurs in the first place. There would also presumably be 
no SMEs, no employment opportunities and no economic growth. Following 
Kahneman’s logic leads inevitably to the fatuous conclusion that the SME sector 
in Rwanda has not developed either because the nation’s foolish gamblers have 
not yet become lucky, or that the population is dominated by expert System 2 
thinkers who would not consider anything so irrational as trying to start an 
enterprise in the first place.  
The theoretical review conducted in this chapter revealed that entrepreneurship 
theory is fragmented and characterised by inconsistencies and contradictions. 
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Various factors that might have a bearing on entrepreneurship and enterprise 
creation were identified, but none were able to provide an explanation for 
Rwanda’s missing middle. The next chapter will seek to find a way through 
these contradictions and shortcomings and define a methodology that can yield 
insights that should help explain the observed lack of SMEs in Rwanda. This 
will be undertaken within the definitions framework established in the Preface 
and the introduction to this chapter .  50
 See pages 19 and 69.50
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Chapter 3 Research Objective and Methodology 
This chapter explains the rationale for the research design that was selected, 
how the data was collected and analysed and how the findings will 
subsequently be presented. 
3.1 The Rwandan Enterprise Paradox 
Macroeconomic stability and the institutional settlement that has emerged since 
the genocide would appear to be consistent with what most economists claim 
should be conducive to entrepreneurship and the formation of the vibrant SME 
sector that is envisaged by the government’s economic plan, Vision 2020. 
Similarly, investments made in general human capital development and 
enhanced access to credit should be supportive according to the arguments 
advanced by the allocationists, as should government instigated measures, 
such as Hanga Umurimo and the SME Cluster Strategy, which were geared 
towards promoting and nurturing the SME sector specifically. Yet the data from 
the Rwandan enterprise survey, examined in detail at section 1.6, indicate a 
large skew towards single-worker micro-enterprises, which make up 94 percent 
of total enterprises, and a dearth of SMEs, which at best make up only              
6 percent of the total . There is, therefore, something fundamentally 51
paradoxical about the enterprise distribution that is observed in Rwanda. 
Despite everything that has been done to stimulate and support them, 
entrepreneurs have failed to emerge and create the SMEs that were 
anticipated. 
The research aims to resolve the contradictions that are apparent in the 
Rwandan enterprise paradox and thereby answer the specific research 
question: why it should be that the new class of entrepreneurs and the vibrant 
SME sector, which were envisaged in Vision 2020, are still struggling to emerge 
in post-genocide Rwanda despite the concerted effort that has gone into 
building a context that should encourage and support their formation. 
 And may be as low as 2.5 percent - see Footnote page 62.51
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3.2 Research Permission 
Undertaking academic research in Rwanda is subject to fulfilling certain strict 
requirements. Obtaining the necessary clearances for the research proved to be 
a highly bureaucratic and time-consuming process, that in the interests of 
brevity is summarised as follows. 
The first requirement is that the research must be endorsed by a Rwandan 
university or government ministry, who must confirm their support in writing and 
under the institution’s official seal. Once this has been obtained a formal 
application to conduct the research has to be submitted to the Rwandan 
Ministry of Education. The written application, addressed to the minister in 
person, has to be accompanied by the endorsing institutions’s letter of 
recommendation, a letter of recommendation from the researcher’s university, a 
proof of good standing certificate issued by the police in the researcher’s main 
country of residence , and a copy of the formal research proposal. Once the 52
application has been vetted and approved, the Ministry of Education issues a 
certificate confirming that it has sanctioned the research. This certificate then 
has to be presented to the Ministry of Immigration, who issue a two-year 
research visa allowing the researcher to undertake the specific research .  53
This particular research was endorsed by two Kigali based institutions: the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry (Minicom) and the School of Finance and 
Banking (SFB), which at the time was one of Rwanda’s six public universities.  
In 2014 the government’s restructuring of tertiary education created a single 
national body, the University of Rwanda. SFB was subsequently renamed the 
College of Business and Economics (CBE), a self-governing college under the 
newly created national institution.    
3.3 Research Design 
The literature review undertaken in the second chapter concluded that 
entrepreneurship theory is fragmented and characterised by inconsistencies 
 If the original is not in English, then a verified English translation of the certificate must also 52
be supplied. 
 While this proved to be a lengthy and often frustrating process, one must recognise that in the 53
aftermath of the genocide there are considerable sensitivities around the purpose and 
methodology of any research undertaken in Rwanda.   
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and contradictions. A number of factors were identified that could bear on 
entrepreneurship and enterprise development, such as psychological traits, use 
of effectuation and access to finance, but it was not possible to know in 
advance which factors identified from the literature might contribute to 
explaining the SME sector’s failure to materialise, or whether the Rwandan 
enterprise paradox might be explained by other elements that were absent from 
the literature. 
An additional difficulty that had to be addressed was how to overcome the 
problem of merely observing static variables. Much of the existing 
entrepreneurship research has a tendency to atomise the entrepreneur and 
analyse individual factors within a narrow specialist field, rather than attempting 
a cross-discipline integration of knowledge . Such atomisation is fraught with 54
difficulty as it can only ever yield isolated and disjointed snapshots that record a 
given situation in a single context and at a single moment in time, and tends to 
ignore the scope for any subtle interaction between individual factors. Yet any 
attempt to integrate individual static variables is also problematic as it can lead 
to a hugely diverse set of outcomes. The problem is easily illustrated by 
considering a palette of just ten variables . If the presence of each of these 55
factors was assessed on a simple decile scale, the ten variables taken together 
would yield 10 billion possible combinations - more than the entire global 
population. Each additional variable that is subsequently admitted to the mix 
consequently moves the total number of possible permutations in the direction 
of infinity. Any attempt to integrate a diverse set of individual and static factors is 
therefore likely to yield the unsurprising conclusion that entrepreneurs are a 
heterogenous group, where each entrepreneur is unique. As a result, the finer 
the analysis one attempts the more understanding seems to recede, much as 
staring at individual pixels hinders the perception of a coherent picture. 
Commenting on this very problem, Knight (2006: 8) observed that when the 
factors that need to be considered become too numerous, interpretation 
 Whilst it could be argued that the behavioural economists have at least attempted to integrate 54
psychology and economic decision making, it has largely tended to become sidetracked into a 
debate about economic actors’ lack of rationality and how this can be corrected (see section 
2.4.3).
 For example, Costa and McCrea’s (1992) ‘Big Five’ model of personality, three variables 55
covering access to capital (financial, human and social) and two for Baumol’s (2010) distinction 
between replication and innovation.
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becomes unmanageable and leads to errors to such an extent that results lose 
more significance than they gain.  
Thus, although the research had to be capable of engaging with multiple and 
diverse factors that might have influenced the phenomenon under investigation, 
it was clear that it would be necessary to move beyond simply cataloguing the 
presence or absence of certain variables. It was concluded that obtaining the 
level of insight required to address the research question would mean focussing 
instead on the process that derives from the complex interaction of such 
variables. This would require achieving an understanding of how aspiring 
entrepreneurs (AEs) went about creating enterprises and transitioned to 
becoming successful entrepreneurs (Es), as stylised in Figure 3.1  
Figure 3.1 Aspiring Entrepreneurs and Entrepreneurs 
As this would require entering into a dialogue with individuals about their 
attributes and behaviour it was deduced that it would be appropriate to adopt a 
qualitative approach to the research, which would facilitate probing for individual 
attitudes and experiences of the process of enterprise formation. This would be 
consistent with Gartner and Birley, who concluded “that many of the important 
questions in entrepreneurship can only be asked through qualitative 
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‘Plunge’
AEs Es
time
methods” (2002: 387), and Smith et al.’s (2013: 364) argument that qualitative 
research into entrepreneurship is fundamentally more enriching than 
quantitative research.  
It was also clear that exploring the processes employed in enterprise formation 
meant that the factor of time had to be admitted to the analysis in some way, as 
such actions would be dynamic rather than static. This need to include time is 
also implicit in Sarasvathy’s observation that enterprise formation is largely an 
iterative process (2008: 370). The importance of addressing the dynamic 
processes that are at work is also indicated by Chell’s (2008) repeated 
observation that there is a need to enhance understanding by extending 
research beyond expert entrepreneurs, to include aspiring entrepreneurs who 
are engaged in enterprise creation. McMullen and Dimov (2013) have gone 
even further and argued explicitly that enterprise formation should be seen as 
an “entrepreneurial journey”, because “entrepreneurship is a process that 
transpires over time” (ibid: 44). Despite the apparent logic of looking at 
entrepreneurship as a longitudinal process McMullen and Dimov also observed, 
however, that the most significant aspect of such calls for the use of longitudinal 
methods is the fact that they have largely gone unheeded (ibid: 2). By failing to 
address this call, entrepreneurship theory has tended as a result to become 
locked into focussing exclusively on the attributes of expert entrepreneurs, after 
enterprise formation, and then to infer rather than establish that those same 
attributes existed prior to enterprise formation and were causal in nature.    
Shifting the focus to the entrepreneurial journey also avoids the trap of treating 
entrepreneurs as if they were homogenous. It allows that a heterogeneous 
group of individuals could converge on a shared objective, that of creating a 
viable enterprise, and allows commonalities between them to emerge rather 
than testing for evidence of any preconceived homogeneity. 
It must be acknowledged, though, that undertaking the kind of longitudinal study 
that could facilitate insight into the process of enterprise formation in Rwanda is 
highly problematic. If only 8 percent of a population are likely to be engaged in 
setting up an enterprise, as suggested by Dichter (2008: 181) and the OECD 
(2013), and only 20 percent of them are ultimately expected to succeed, then 
using a randomly generated sample from the general population of Rwanda 
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would have implied tracking a relatively large initial sample, in order to identify 
the resulting 1.6 percent of the population that could be expected to succeed in 
their efforts to establish a viable enterprise. In the absence of any prior 
knowledge about which individuals from a random sample would be likely to 
embark on the entrepreneurial journey and be successful in their endeavour it 
would have been necessary to recruit, interview and track a sample that would 
include a very high degree of wastage - the 92 percent of individuals in the 
sample that would not actually attempt to set up an enterprise . It would also 56
have meant tracking the full set of individuals over a relatively long period 
(probably several years) in order to identify both the 8 percent that would 
attempt enterprise creation and the 1.6 percent who would subsequently be 
likely to succeed. The scale and length of time this would have implied was 
beyond the scope of an individual thesis.  
Any attempt to narrow down the universe for the research in order to draw a 
more manageable sample would have also been problematic, as it would have 
meant making assumptions in advance about attributes that might affect the 
phenomenon that the research was attempting to explore. It was therefore 
concluded that it would be appropriate to use a purposive sampling method, 
even if this meant accepting that there would be a necessary trade-off between 
the external validity of a random sample and the need to obtain participation by 
interviewees who could provide insights into the phenomenon under 
investigation. Whilst it must be admitted that purposive sampling risks 
incorporating bias into the research, it does have the advantage that research 
samples can be built that provide an opportunity to explore complex 
phenomena and thereby yield meaningful insights.  
The research had to find a way around these problems if it was to throw light on 
the reasons for the missing middle, which led to the following considerations.    
If the term entrepreneur is reserved for one who has established a viable 
enterprise (ex-post), then it is feasible that prior to taking the entrepreneurial 
plunge there was a corresponding ex-ante proto-entrepreneur (PE) who 
 For example, to produce a sample of just ten individuals who had embarked on the 56
entrepreneurial journey and were successful in their endeavour would mean having to recruit, 
interview and track circa 625 subjects (10 ÷ 1.6%), of which it would be expected that about 575 
would make no attempt to form an enterprise (625 x (100% - 8%)).
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mirrored the ex-post entrepreneur’s makeup apart from having taken the 
enterprise plunge, as stylised in Figure 3.2. Even if some aspects of the 
entrepreneur’s character are shaped by the entrepreneurial journey itself, it was 
concluded that it should be possible to identify commonalities between 
entrepreneur and proto-entrepreneur, such as psychological traits, use of credit 
or attitude towards risks. The research therefore aimed to compare successful 
entrepreneurs with those individuals who aspired to set up enterprises and to 
assess the degree to which proto-entrepreneurs appeared to be present 
amongst the set of aspiring entrepreneurs. 
Figure 3.2 Proto-entrepreneurs 
In essence this meant that the methodology had to be retrospective in 
approach. It had to begin by looking for characteristics that appeared to be 
shared by a sample of entrepreneurs in Rwanda and then it had to attempt to 
identify the extent to which these characteristics appeared also to be present 
amongst a sample of aspiring entrepreneurs. The degree of commonality 
between the two samples would then facilitate a determination of the degree to 
which proto-entrepreneurs are present. This in turn could then provide insights 
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into why a dynamic SME sector is still struggling to emerge in post-genocide 
Rwanda. 
It was concluded that the most appropriate qualitative method would be the use 
of semi-structured face-to-face interviews in order to uncover, retrospectively, 
the narrative underpinning the entrepreneurial journeys that had been 
undertaken by successful entrepreneurs and the forward journeys that aspiring 
entrepreneurs were intending to embark upon. It was anticipated that this 
approach would provide optimum flexibility for exploring themes that were 
suggested by the literature review, while simultaneously providing scope for 
uncovering factors that were not suggested by the existing literature. It must be 
acknowledged that this approach implies that the resulting analysis incorporates 
two levels of interpretation, as the accounts given by the interviewees are 
influenced by their own subjective interpretations of their experiences, which are 
then in turn subject to the researcher’s interpretation of their meaning. However, 
this type of approach is supported by Desai and Porter’s observation that it can 
yield an “understanding of complex realities and processes” (2012: 117) and 
also conforms with the aim of “understanding lives in context” (Cole and 
Knowles, 2001: 23). Furthermore, the technique of analysing the narratives of a 
purposive sample closely matches that used by Tuckett (2011) in his 
investigation of hedge fund managers. The fact that Tuckett was able to use this 
methodology to generate insights into the attitudes and processes employed by 
these investors provided a degree of reassurance about the validity of the 
chosen approach.  
As already noted, the research was of necessity exploratory and had to proceed 
from a pragmatic worldview. The pragmatic orientation holds to the view that 
there is an objective real world that exists independent of our knowledge of it, 
but that our understanding is mediated by subjective perceptions of that world, 
thus implying an integration of realist ontology with constructivist epistemology 
(Creswell and Clark, 2011: 45). This had the benefit of emphasising the 
research question over any particular method and obviated the need to engage 
with metaphysical debates about the nature of truth or reality. It also had the 
additional advantage of facilitating both inductive and deductive analysis, which 
allows emerging insights to be contrasted with existing theoretical approaches 
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and thereby to shed light on a phenomenon that appears to contradict existing 
theory. 
3.4 Interviewees 
Generating the successful and aspiring entrepreneurs’ samples for the 
interviews was not an easy task. Formal records, from which contact lists could 
be produced, are rarely compiled, even for the government’s SME support 
programmes. A meeting with the Head of Trade and Manufacturing Department 
at the Rwanda Development Board (RDB), for instance, confirmed that the RDB 
did not have any records of individuals who had participated in the SME Cluster 
Strategy. The two purposive samples therefore had to be drawn from a number 
of different sources. This included the Rwandan Private Sector Federation 
(PSF), a body that is broadly equivalent to a chamber of commerce, who were 
able to provide a telephone contact list of 40 members who were thought to be 
owners of SMEs. Attempts were made to contact all 40 members, however the 
list was found to be of generally poor quality, with telephone numbers that were 
often out of date. It was actually only possible to contact and obtain agreement 
to participate in the research from seven individuals on the original PSF list. 
This was supplemented by referrals from the Grow Movement, direct 
approaches made by the author to enterprise owners and snowballing, whereby 
additional referrals were obtained from interviewees. Notices were displayed in 
two Rwandan Universities - the School of Finance and Banking and the Kigali 
Independent University - inviting direct telephone contact from individuals who 
intended to create or were in the process of creating an enterprise. In addition 
to aspiring entrepreneurs, these notices also produced responses from two 
entrepreneurs. The combined approach yielded a total of 33 interviewees. With 
internet penetration in Rwanda low, at 8.7 percent (World Bank, 2015a), making 
and maintaining contact with interviewees had to be undertaken predominantly 
via telephone. This was handicapped by a government anti-terrorism measure 
that was undertaken during the period of the research, which involved switching 
off all the country’s mobile phone accounts where the owner’s personal details 
had not been formally registered with their airtime provider. 
It was crucial ahead of the fieldwork to establish a way of distinguishing clearly 
between entrepreneurs and aspiring entrepreneurs. This was achieved by 
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setting two criteria that had to be met before an individual could be classified as 
an entrepreneur. As was seen at section 2.2.5, the Global Entrepreneurship 
Monitor (GEM) uses a weak classification that includes individuals who have 
merely expressed an intention to set up a business as early stage 
entrepreneurs, even though no action has been taken. While it does use a 
three-month threshold to differentiate nascent entrepreneurs from new 
businesses owners, this was felt to be insufficiently robust as an indicator of 
long-term viability. While there is no particular timescale that could be reliably 
used to imply viability it was felt that there should be evidence that an enterprise 
was a going concern, other than the fact that it had been created, before an 
individual should be classified as an entrepreneur. A threshold of twelve months 
was therefore set, such that a business founder would only be classified as an 
entrepreneur if they had established an enterprise that had survived market 
entry for a minimum of twelve months. Whilst this cutoff is still somewhat 
arbitrary, it corresponds with the standard accounting definition of a going 
concern , and so has the advantage of providing a greater degree of 57
robustness than the lower GEM threshold. The second requirement was that 
the enterprise had to have yielded incremental employment, beyond an 
individual business founder, in order to filter out the self-employed. Thus in 
summary, enterprise creators were only classified as entrepreneurs if they had 
formed an enterprise that had been trading for a minimum of twelve months and 
had produced incremental employment, as evidenced by employment numbers 
at the time of the interview. Individuals who were only at the planning stage or 
had an enterprise that had been in existence for less than twelve months and/or 
had not produced incremental employment were categorised as aspiring 
entrepreneurs. The resulting segregation between entrepreneurs and aspiring 
entrepreneurs and their source is indicated in Table 3.1.         
 Accountants define a going concern as one that is able to meet its liabilities for twelve 57
months. Although this is a forward rather than retrospective assessment, it does give validity to 
selecting the minimum twelve months trading cutoff.
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Table 3.1 Source of Interviewees 
As shown, this classification generated a sample of twelve successful 
entrepreneurs and twenty-one aspiring entrepreneurs. 
3.5 Research Instrument 
The research instrument comprised semi-structured interviews with two groups 
of individuals: entrepreneurs and aspiring entrepreneurs. For the entrepreneurs’ 
group the interviews were designed to explore their commercial life histories 
and to probe for insights into their personal characteristics, attitudes and the 
processes involved when their companies had been brought into existence. A 
guide sheet, which is included in Appendix C, was prepared for the interviews. It 
covered the main themes that had been identified from the review of the 
theoretical literature, such as sources of finance that were used to get the 
business off the ground, evidence for the presence of psychological traits, 
especially the ‘Big 3’ of need for achievement, locus of control and risk 
propensity, and use of effectuation. The guide sheet also included items such 
as the importance of role models and the interviewees’ attitude towards trust. It 
included sample questions that could be used to explore a particular theme, but 
as the research was exploratory in nature, specific questions were kept to a 
minimum in order to allow scope for the interviewees’ individual narratives to 
emerge.  
A slightly modified version of the interview guide sheet was prepared for 
interviews with aspiring entrepreneurs and is also included in Appendix C. 
Whilst this took a similar form to that used for the entrepreneurs, it recognised 
Source of Interviewees Entrepreneurs Aspiring Entrepreneurs Total 
Private Sector Federation 4 3 7
Referrals 4 3 7
School of Finance and Banking 1 5 6
Kigali Independent University 1 7 8
Grow Movement 1 1 2
Direct Approach 1 2 3
Total 12 21 33
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that those planning or attempting to set up a venture were only just starting out 
on their entrepreneurial journey. These interviews would therefore be capturing 
information relating to the processes they planned to use, rather than the fuller 
narratives that could be provided by the successful entrepreneurs.  
Basic demographic data was also obtained, such as interviewee age, 
education, marital status and family background. Supplementary information on 
government programmes was obtained from meetings with the Director General 
of Minicom, the Professional in charge of Innovation and Business Development 
at Minicom and the RDB’s Head of Trade and Manufacturing Department, who 
were all extremely helpful and supportive. 
3.6 Data Collection 
Interviews were conducted prior to April 2014 so that they could be completed 
ahead of the twentieth anniversary of the 1994 genocide, which was expected 
to include 100 days of official mourning and a heightened security level that 
might have adversely affected participants’ preparedness to take part in the 
research. All interviews were conducted in English, which was adopted as the 
country's official language following Rwanda’s accession to the Commonwealth 
of Nations, and were recorded. At the beginning of each interview the purpose 
of the research and how it would be conducted was explained fully to the 
interviewee. It was also explained that the material provided during the course 
of the interview would be for the sole purpose of the author’s research and that 
all recordings, transcripts and field notes would be kept securely. All 
interviewees were given the opportunity to use pseudonyms, but only one 
person actually took up this offer. Interviews typically lasted between sixty and 
ninety minutes and were transcribed verbatim. In total they amounted to just 
under a quarter of a million words. Transcriptions were provided to interviewees 
for checking strictly on the proviso that only factual corrections could be made, 
rather than allowing embellishments to the information obtained during the 
interviews, and follow-up contact was made where the transcriptions required 
clarification. With the obvious exception of the one pseudonym the thesis uses 
the interviewees’ real first names. Where there is more than one individual with 
the same first name an extra suffix, A or B, has been added to differentiate 
between them. 
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Deliberate obfuscation, which can be encountered when conducting qualitative 
interviews, did not appear to be an issue with the research participants. All were 
open about their experiences and expectations and although there was clearly 
a risk that some of the narratives might have been coloured by the respondents’ 
wish to be perceived in a positive light, this did not appear to be the case. 
Rather they tended in the main to be acutely aware of their own failings and 
limitations and genuinely modest about their achievements. Similarly, while 
some interviewees were reasonably ambitious, this did not appear to be 
overstated. 
It should also be noted that interviews invariably had to be conducted in 
situations that were less than ideal. Locations were varied and included 
guesthouse common areas, communal meeting and working spaces, and 
shared offices. They also frequently had to cope with considerable background 
interference in the shape of the ubiquitous Rwandan cockerel, chainsaws, and 
drumming troupe practices. On one notable occasion an interview had to be 
interrupted when an overhead storm blew in the windows of the room where the 
interview was being conducted. 
3.7 Data Analysis 
Individual hand-drawn mind maps were first used to identify the main themes 
that were present in each successful entrepreneur’s interview transcript. This 
initial long list of themes was seen to contain several items that were related, so 
the initial long list was aggregated to produce eight categories for analysis: the 
motives for starting the business, source of funds used to launch the enterprise, 
business planning, attitude to risk and corresponding behaviour, use of 
networking, trust, role models and a general category for additional attributes 
that were not captured by the other seven categories. These were used to 
produce eight initial ‘parent nodes’ for Nvivo qualitative analysis software, which 
was used to manage interpretation of the entrepreneurs’ accounts. Subdividing 
these into ‘child nodes’, yielded a total of 35 nodes that were used to manage 
the data. Once the analysis of the entrepreneurs’ sample had been completed, 
the same broad approach was then used to record and manage interpretation 
of the aspiring entrepreneurs’ interviews. This used the same eight parent 
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nodes, which when subdivided generated a total of 37 nodes for managing the 
information gleaned from the aspiring entrepreneurs’ accounts.  
Although Nvivo proved to be a high-quality tool for organising and managing the 
interview data, it cannot replace careful deliberation and interpretation of the 
information that was obtained or the representation of its meaning. It also does 
not provide any particular formula for presentation of the insights, which must 
simultaneously allow the “participants’ voices [to be] heard” (Cole and Knowles, 
2001: 114) and facilitate the type of expository writing that builds an 
understanding of the key themes that emerged from the data. 
Insights gained through analysing the interviews with successful Rwandan 
entrepreneurs will be dealt with first, in Chapter 4. Each key topic that emerged 
from the analysis will be supported by comments taken directly from the 
interviews. The entrepreneurs’ narratives will thus be gradually built through 
exploration of the themes that were revealed when analysing the interviews, 
thereby ensuring that their voices will be heard in context. Chapter 4 will 
conclude by assessing the characteristics and processes that Rwandan 
entrepreneurs appeared to have in common. Chapter 5 will then analyse the 
narratives provided by the aspiring entrepreneurs in Rwanda and contrast these 
with the key findings derived from the analysis conducted in Chapter 4. It is 
anticipated that this comparison of aspiring entrepreneurs with successful 
entrepreneurs will reveal the extent to which proto-entrepreneurs appear to be 
present among the set of aspiring entrepreneurs. If present, this could then 
shed light on the reasons underlying the Rwandan enterprise paradox.   
Chapter 6 will subsequently attempt to draw together the meaning of the 
insights gained and to answer the specific research question: why it should be 
that the new class of entrepreneurs and the vibrant SME sector, which were 
envisaged in Vision 2020, are still struggling to emerge in post-genocide 
Rwanda despite the concerted effort that has gone into building a context that 
should encourage and support their formation. 
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Chapter 4 The Interviews with Rwandan Entrepreneurs  
This chapter will begin with a brief introduction to the entrepreneurs that 
participated in the research. It will then present the main findings that emerged 
from analysing the interviews that were conducted with them. Throughout the 
chapter, the findings will be illustrated with verbatim quotes from the 
transcriptions, thereby ensuring that the interviewees’ voices are heard in 
context .  58
The accounts given were dominated by six key themes that described how the 
entrepreneurs went about setting up their enterprises. These appeared to be 
underpinned by a common motive that shaped the decision to embark upon a 
future that most would regard as too risky to undertake. Each of these factors 
will be dealt with individually in order to aid presentation of the findings. 
4.1 Introducing the Entrepreneurs 
The twelve Rwandan entrepreneurs that participated in the interviews are listed 
in Table 4.1. They had all built an enterprise that had been trading for a 
minimum of twelve months and all had created incremental employment via 
their businesses. At the time of the interviews their enterprises were employing 
a total of 224 people. The businesses were predominantly orientated towards 
the economy’s services sector, but also included food processing and quarrying.   
 Wherever possible the quotes have been given in their original form. Editing has been kept to 58
a minimum in order to be true to the objective of letting the respondents’ voices be heard. This 
occasionally means that the language used is imperfect, but it was felt preferable to over-
editing. Square brackets have been used to indicate clearly where it was necessary to clarify a 
comment. 
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Table 4.1 The Entrepreneurs and their Businesses 
Thirteen of the fourteen enterprises operated by these entrepreneurs had 
reached SME scale according to the Rwandan size classification . One, 59
Damien’s food processing business, had actually passed through this level and 
achieved LSE scale. Akaliza’s multi-media design business had achieved SME 
scale in 2011, but at the time of the interview it was employing only three 
people  as the headcount had to be reduced from four following a cash flow 60
glitch that resulted when her accountant miscalculated taxes that were due to 
the Rwandan Revenue Authority.  
While the majority had started only one business, three were clearly on their 
way to being portfolio entrepreneurs, having already started or planned a further 
Name Age Gender Enterprise Year Started Employees
Akaliza 27 Female Multi-media design agency 2011 3
Annette 33 Female TV and film production 2012 7
Bosco 36 Male Building materials supply 2010 11
Retail pharmacy 2012 5
Christian 37 Male Business consultancy 2007 7
Damien 45 Male Food processing 2008 103
Eric A 33 Male Business consultancy 2008 4
Gilbert A 27 Male Business stationery supplier 2011 4
Jacques 38 Male Football academy 2010 5
Jean 27 Male Business software development 2012 5
Jimmy 30 Male Music studio 2008 14
Sharon 27 Male Quarry 2012 15
Waste management 2013 30
Willy 28 Male Translation and business services 2012 12
total 224
mean 16
median 7
 Defined as providing employment for 4 to 100 people.59
 In the interview Akaliza suggests that the enterprise employed two, though this was later 60
corrected to three.
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enterprise at the time that the interviews were conducted. In addition to the 
quarry business that he had started in 2012, Sharon had established a waste 
management business in June 2013. Although at the time of the interview this 
second business had only been trading for seven months, it was already 
employing 30 people. Bosco too, at the time of the interview, already owned two 
businesses and although Gilbert A had only set up a stationery business, the 
interview with him revealed that he had identified two further opportunities: a 
microcredit lender and an enterprise that was so secret that he was reluctant to 
provide the author with any information about it.  
The first topic that will be addressed is how the entrepreneurs went about 
funding the creation of their enterprises. Although the interviews revealed a 
wide range of views and experiences there was a common thread running 
through them. In particular it shed light on their attitudes towards credit. 
4.2 Financing the Startup 
Section 2.3.1 explored the argument that potential entrepreneurs in developing 
economies struggle to obtain credit (IFC, 2010: 23) and that as a consequence 
this limits the development of SMEs in low-income countries (ibid: 6). It was 
seen that considerable effort has gone into policies designed to facilitate access 
to credit in low-income countries in the expectation that it will be taken up by 
entrepreneurs who will subsequently have a disproportionately positive impact 
on economic development (Beck, 2013: 25). A belief in the transformational 
impact of credit was also seen in Yunus’ hypothesis that access to small 
amounts of unsecured credit can enable anyone to become an entrepreneur 
(Yunus and Jolis, 2003; Yunus and Weber, 2007; 2010) and was additionally 
reflected in de Soto’s (2001) belief that establishing poor people’s property 
rights would also bring about the realisation of collateralised debt which could 
similarly be used for investment.  
Facilitating access to credit for individuals who want to create businesses is 
also seen in the strategies that have been deployed in Rwanda, which were 
reviewed in the first chapter. Raising access to credit was seen to be an explicit 
component of the SME Cluster Strategy and the Hanga Umurimo programme 
included measures that sought to predispose financial institutions’ executives 
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towards advancing credit to aspiring entrepreneurs. It was also apparent in the 
Business Development Fund’s 75 percent loan guarantee scheme and the huge 
expansion of Saccos, the savings and credit cooperatives. The method of 
funding used to start a business was therefore probed for specifically in the 
interviews with entrepreneurs. 
4.2.1 Use of Personal Savings 
Contrary to the proposed theoretical importance of access to credit, the 
narratives revealed that four of the entrepreneurs had used their own personal 
savings to fund the enterprises that they started.  
Akaliza, having completed her bachelor’s degree in multimedia technology and 
design at the University of Kent, had been deliberately building up her personal 
savings in order to further her education via a Master’s degree. This was in 
order to achieve her initial career goal of finding employment with a large film 
animation company, such as Pixel, and thereby open up the possibility that at a 
later date she could move into producing animated cartoons for the African 
market. While studying for her first degree Akaliza had gained initial experience 
of digital consultancy by designing and implementing a website for a local 
antique shop. In Rwanda she subsequently bid for and won a tender for the 
design and build of a government website. On being awarded the project 
Akaliza abandoned her plans for returning to university and decided instead   
“to use this money I’ve saved up to start a business”. The enterprise she 
founded was Shaking Sun, her digital media agency.  
Funding the enterprise out of personal savings was also the method employed 
by Christian when he set up his business consultancy company Outreach 
Development Services. Previously business development director of the 
Rwandan arm of Tanzanian-owned consultancy Kilimanjaro International, he 
had been responsible for securing consultancy contracts for the Rwandan 
office. After winning a major DfID contract worth $400,000 for Kilimanjaro, he 
became so disillusioned with the way the project was managed by his 
employers that he decided to leave to form his own enterprise. Probed about 
the use of credit to fund the business, Christian’s response was an emphatic 
“no, no, no it was just our savings”.  
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When Sharon and seven of his colleagues started their waste processing 
business they also avoided borrowing any money. Asked about how they had 
raised the money to start the enterprise, he explained that they too “didn’t 
borrow money from the bank”. Instead they used their combined savings to 
subscribe for shares in the business, thereby generating the initial risk capital of 
circa Rwf 5 million that was needed to get it started. This was supplemented by 
a windfall cash prize when Sharon entered and won a business plan 
competition. Jean too had built up his personal savings through working as a 
freelance IT contractor while he was studying for his bachelor’s degree, so that 
he “had some money on the side”. When he graduated that money was used to 
start his own software development company Torque.   
4.2.2 Consumption Sacrifice     
The narratives also revealed that another three of the entrepreneurs had used 
an alternative source of personal funds. Instead of taking on credit or using their 
personal savings, they consciously reduced their outgoings and engaged in 
what could be termed ‘consumption sacrifice’ in order to free up money that 
could be invested in their businesses. 
Jimmy and his two partners, King Victor and Singeras, are the owners of music 
recording studio True Friends Records. Jimmy had originally studied Applied 
Chemistry at the Kigali Institute of Science and Technology (KIST) and was 
subsequently employed by the NGO One Laptop per Child. While at university 
he and a number of friends, including King Victor, began exploring ideas for 
starting their own businesses. With a shared interest in music they decided to 
experiment with creating a home studio, which Jimmy and King Victor ultimately 
turned into True Friends Records. Asked where they had got the money to start 
the business, Jimmy’s answer was that they both used part of their salaries:  
 By our self sponsoring. He [referring to King Vincent] and I have jobs, so 
that sustains our family and the remainder is the one that we use. 
Unlike Jimmy and King Victor, the third partner in the business, Singeras, does 
not have a parallel job. He is employed full time as the studio’s producer. 
Damien too started his food processing company, Shekina Enterprises, by 
foregoing an element of income. Asked about whether he had borrowed money 
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to start the business, he revealed that he had used the rental income that he 
made from letting his deceased father’s house to fund the business startup: 
 No I was just using the small money that I had. The money that I started 
with, it was just a heritage my father left me: I was renting the house to 
get money to use in my business. 
Jacques, an ex-footballer who was also employed in a senior position at a 
government agency, was frequently approached for financial help by former 
team mates who were short of money. Allied to his desire to see Rwandan 
football improve its international ranking, he decided to start the Dream Team 
football academy that could train young players but would also provide 
employment for some of his former team mates. He got the enterprise off the 
ground initially by diverting some of his salary into it, but with 400 trainees it 
became clear that the enterprise was beyond his means. He discussed the 
problem with his former football coach, who advised him to “stop spending your 
own money”. The coach then also informed the trainees’ parents that he “had a 
meeting with Jacques and we found he spent a lot of money from his pocket” 
and that going forward “the only way to survive is to introduce fees”. This had 
the benefit of reducing the number of trainees to a more manageable level of 
circa 100. It also secured jobs for five of his former team mates who are 
employed as the academy’s football trainers and removed the necessity for 
Jacque’s ongoing consumption sacrifice. 
4.2.3 Positive Cash Flow 
Three of the interviewees were able to use positive cash flow to fund their 
businesses, rather than taking credit or using their own money. 
Eric A’s enterprise, Indigo, is a business consultancy which undertakes market 
research, business planning, product testing and auditing. Prior to starting the 
business he was employed as a trainer at the Private Sector Federation (PSF). 
When aid donations to the PSF began to decline, he and his future partner 
Norman recognised that there was a risk that the PSF might have to downscale. 
They decided to pre-empt the risk of redundancy and form their own business 
consultancy, which could bid for projects that would be subcontracted by the 
PSF. Although they would have to resign from their jobs at the PSF ahead of 
bidding for any such contracts, they calculated that they would be highly likely to 
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succeed in the tendering process and expected to obtain a project that would 
be of considerably greater value to them than any money that they might 
receive if the PSF did indeed downsize and they were included in the 
redundancies that might follow. Their confidence was well placed. They were 
awarded the contract for a PSF-outsourced project that was worth $70,000, with 
40 percent of the project fee paid in advance. Probed about how they had 
funded the business Eric A explained “you know in consultancy, you got money 
from the client to use. Because when you won a contract they give you            
40 percent”. Thus they were able to use the advanced fee they were paid to 
establish the business out of the resulting positive cash flow.   
Annette was working for Rwandan film producer Eric Kabera’s company, The 
Kwetu Film Institute, when she was approached by two executives from an 
advertising agency in Kigali, who suggested that she should set up her own film 
production company to undertake the production of a new TV commercial for 
one of the advertising agency’s major clients. Although initially uncertain, she 
was eventually persuaded and started the business with a guaranteed contract 
for production of the commercial. Asked whether she had to borrow any money 
to get the business started she responded with an emphatic “no” and explained 
that “when a client comes in they put in a deposit”, which meant she too could 
establish her business out of the positive cash flow that the first contract 
yielded.  
Willy owns a translation and business services company, which was also 
funded out of positive cash flow. When starting the venture he had no savings 
or income to invest, having been made redundant, so when discussing whether 
he had put any of his own money into the startup his reply was a straightforward 
“no because, as I said, at the time I was no longer employed. I spent all the 
money I had”. When probed further about the use of credit he insisted “no, I did 
not” and explained that it was possible to use “the first client or the first money 
you get” to start the business. 
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4.2.4 Finding a Strategic Partner 
By finding and bringing in a strategic partner another entrepreneur, Gilbert A, 
also challenges the mainstream notions about the importance of access to 
credit. 
Gilbert A is the co-owner of a stationery business which he set up in 2011 and 
which sells to local businesses. He identified the stationery market as an area to 
invest in after having worked part time in another stationery business, where he 
had the opportunity to learn about suppliers and the tendering process and saw 
the kind of profit margins that were available. He calculated that he could 
operate a viable stationery business himself, but had neither savings that he 
could call on nor a regular income and so had to employ an alternative strategy 
to get the money that he would need to get the venture started. His chosen 
route to realise the opportunity that he had identified was to seek a partner who 
would be able to provide the risk money that would be required. Gilbert A 
produced a brief outline showing that “we can sell and make a profit” and talked 
it through with a friend he thought might have the funds needed for the start-up 
capital. The friend that he approached was impressed with the financial 
potential that appeared to exist and agreed to provide the funding that was 
required. Both parties took equal shares in the business - Gilbert 50 percent for 
having the idea and identifying the potential, his partner 50 percent for putting 
up the risk money required to get the business off the ground.  
4.2.5 The Compound Solution 
In one particular case a compound solution to the problem of start-up capital 
was found, which involved using multiple sources of finance. 
Bosco’s retail pharmacy business started operating in 2012. He initially 
calculated that he would need a total of Rwf 20 million to fund it. The initial 
funding estimate was made up of three elements. He took out a bank loan for 
Rwf 7 million and put in 3 million of his own savings as well. He also brought in 
a partner, his cousin, who was a qualified pharmacist. This cousin, Denise, 
provided the balance of Rwf 10 million that Bosco calculated would be needed 
to start the enterprise, for which she received 50 percent of the company. He 
also negotiated extended payment terms with the pharmacy’s suppliers. 
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Receiving payment from customers at the point of purchase, but paying his 
suppliers three months after delivery of goods, he was also able to benefit from 
the positive cash flow that resulted from the float period between when he was 
paid by customers and when he had to pay suppliers. Having initially 
underestimated the amount of money that would be required meant, though, 
that he also had to “tighten [his] belt” and divert some of his regular income into 
the enterprise. Thus of the twelve entrepreneurs interviewed, Bosco had the 
most elaborate approach, using five sources of money. 
When probed during the interviews about their source of start-up capital, two of 
the entrepreneurs spontaneously volunteered negative comments about taking 
on a loan. Akaliza, when asked about how she had funded her business and 
whether she had considered taking a loan responded that it was “something I’ve 
really tried to avoid”. She also revealed that her father had offered to provide 
her with money, but that this too had been rejected. Jean, the owner of business 
software company Torque, also revealed an underlying aversion to taking on 
credit to fund the enterprise when he made the interesting point that if he had 
taken on a bank loan it would have been like working for someone else: 
 I never wanted to work for anyone, that was the first thing…and I 
considered borrowing money…it’s almost in the same context because 
you have to report to someone again. Like I’m not really formally 
reporting to someone, but someone is monitoring your success. So I 
really wanted to keep independent. 
These comments would seem to match the observation at section 1.5.5 that 
Rwandans generally have a fundamental aversion to credit, with 68 percent of 
the adult population preferring to save up to buy something rather than 
borrowing.  
4.2.6 Summary 
Table 4.2 summarises how each of the twelve interviewees financed the startup 
of their enterprises. 
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Table 4.2 Source of Start-up Funds 
In total, eight of the entrepreneurs interviewed used their own money to get 
started, either in the form of personal savings that had been built up or by 
sacrificing part of their income, of which four - Bosco, Jacques, Jean and Jimmy 
- indicated clearly that this had been derived from wage employment . A further 61
three found creative ways to start the business without having to borrow or use 
their own money. Credit played only a very minor role. It was only used by 
Bosco who employed it as part of a compound funding strategy, where it 
represented only 35 percent of what he initially calculated he would need. It is 
worth noting that at the time he took out the bank loan Bosco was head of retail 
banking at KCB Rwanda, the Rwandan subsidiary of the Kenyan Commercial 
Bank, so could have been expected to have a reasonably favourable attitude 
towards credit. But the fact that he decided that credit should make up only 
about a third of the start-up capital for his retail pharmacy and that he preferred 
to put his own money at risk as well as sharing ownership of the business is 
revealing, given his position at the bank. It suggests that on balance he too had 
Interviewee
Personal 
Savings
Consumption 
Sacrifice
Strategic 
Partner
Positive 
Cash Flow Credit
Competition 
Prize Money
Akaliza x
Annette  x
Bosco x x x x x
Christian x  
Damien x  
Eric A  x
Gilbert A x
Jacques x  
Jean x   
Jimmy x  
Sharon x x
Willy  x
 Off-farm wage employment by farmers was identified by Kitching (1982) as a means of 61
increasing income and facilitating savings. These savings were often invested in acquiring 
additional land and/or stock but could also be used to establish non-farm commercial 
enterprises (ibid: 370).
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a greater preference for funding sources other than credit. Apart from Bosco’s 
partial use of credit, none of the other entrepreneurs took out loans to get their 
businesses started. 
The implications of the Rwandan entrepreneurs’ use of funding mechanisms 
other than credit are considerable. If they tended not to use credit and are as 
averse to it as the rest of the population appear to be, then a serious question 
mark is placed against the ongoing drive to increase access to credit on the 
premise that it automatically translates into higher levels of entrepreneurship 
and SME sector formation. On the contrary, the evidence from the interviews 
suggests that the received wisdom that SME formation is constrained by poor 
access to credit does not apply in the Rwandan context. The finding also 
provides tangible evidence to support the argument, advanced in section 2.3.2, 
that microcredit’s main role appears to be that of consumption smoothing, not 
enterprise creation.  
If the efforts being placed behind promoting access to credit are therefore 
misplaced, it raises the obvious question of whether the money earmarked for 
providing such credit to aspiring entrepreneurs might better be deployed to 
support alternative strategies. It also raises the additional question of what sort 
of support, other than credit, Rwandan entrepreneurs might actually benefit 
from. The implications of this will be addressed further in Chapter 6. 
4.3. Effectual versus Causal Reasoning 
This section will examine the extent to which the entrepreneurs appeared to use 
effectual or causal reasoning when they set about creating their enterprises. 
Section 2.4.2 observed the contrast between Sarasvathy’s theory of effectuation 
and the causal logic that underpins approaches to teaching business 
management skills based on the traditional segmentation-targeting-positioning 
(STP) process. Effectuation begins by identifying a set of means that are at the 
entrepreneur’s disposal: who they are, what they know, and whom they know. It 
then involves an iterative process of creating and choosing between alternative 
paths as they are encountered (Sarasvathy, 2008: 38). In contrast, the causal 
approach sets a fixed end goal and then seeks to identify and martial the 
resources required to achieve it.   
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As observed in section 2.4.4, Sarasvathy’s theory of effectuation was born out 
of research conducted exclusively with expert entrepreneurs in the USA who 
had built major corporations with annual sales in excess of $200 million, as well 
as having had experience of floating an enterprise on a stock market. 
Consequently the degree to which the predisposition for effectual reasoning 
might be a learned, as opposed to being an innate, characteristic was not 
addressed. Similarly, whether it might be a predominantly developed economy 
phenomenon was also left open.  
It was felt, however, that it would be valid to probe for evidence of effectual 
versus causal reasoning in the Rwandan entrepreneurs’ interviews, as this 
could reveal important information about the process by which they had brought 
their ventures to market. This was explored by asking the interviewees to talk 
about the planning process that they had used when developing their 
businesses. In particular it sought to explore the degree to which they had 
employed a causally reasoned STP process to produce a business plan, as 
opposed to the effectuation preference for diving in and developing an 
enterprise contingently. 
4.3.1 Evidence for Effectuation. 
Although Sarasvathy’s expert entrepreneurs were able to reason both 
effectually and causally, she discovered that they had a strong preference for 
the former. This predilection also appeared to be indicated in the interviews with 
Rwandan entrepreneurs. It was revealed particularly in the comments that were 
made in relation to business plans, dealing with failure and customer demand.  
Rather than writing causally reasoned business plans for their enterprises, nine 
of the entrepreneurs revealed that they had started their ventures without a 
formal plan. It appeared that they had dived in and set about developing the 
enterprise as an iterative journey, exactly as predicted by effectuation theory. 
The reasons given proved to be sometimes quite straightforward. Jacques, for 
instance, admitted that he was simply unaware that “people should have a 
business plan” while Sharon, whose first enterprise was a quarry, pointed out 
that at the time his “skills in business planning [were] still limited”. Christian on 
the other hand pragmatically maintained that if he had set about writing a 
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business plan ahead of launching his enterprise it would have been a mistake, 
as he would probably have been too ambitious and as a result might never 
have actually got the business started. One would have expected though that 
Eric A, who with his partner Norman had been working as a PSF trainer 
extolling the virtues of writing a business plan, would have followed his own 
advice, but he did not. He too took the plunge and set up his business 
consultancy, Indigo, without any kind of formal plan and recognised the irony 
that this implied: 
 …every training we used to be training as [like] the preachers. We 
[would] say: if you don't [do] planning guys, you are planning to fail. But 
we entered in[to] a business without planning. 
This apparent contradiction was also exhibited by Annette who did eventually 
write a business plan for her TV and film production company A Wiz Media, but 
this was a full year after it had started trading. Similarly, when probed about the 
importance of planning Sharon claimed that “a business plan is vital for the 
success of a business” despite having revealed that his first successful 
enterprise, the quarry, was also started without one.  
Three of the interviewees, Akaliza, Jimmy and Willy, did claim to have produced 
formal plans for their businesses, but it became clear during the interview with 
Akaliza that she too had actually registered, and therefore committed herself to 
her enterprise, before writing the business plan. Additionally, when Jimmy was 
probed about his claim to have produced a business plan for True Friends 
Records it transpired that it was just one of several plans, for various 
businesses, that he and his fellow students had experimented with while at 
university and that it had not been subsequently updated to match the current 
enterprise. Willy too, when made redundant, formalised activities that he had 
previously been undertaking on an informal and unplanned basis, in parallel to 
his main employment. If Akaliza’s, Jimmy’s and Willy’s claims to have produced 
business plans are consequently discounted, there was little or no evidence that 
business plans were actually produced ahead of committing to the ventures. 
Instead the narratives seemed to point strongly to a predisposition for diving in 
without a plan, and developing contingently, in line with effectuation theory.  
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In aggregate the narratives seemed to reveal a significant mismatch between 
the perceived importance of formal business planning and its actual absence, 
which will be explored more fully at section 4.3.2. 
The preparedness to develop the business contingently was also seen when 
the interviewees were asked about the possibility of enterprise failure. 
According to effectuation theory, effectuators “do not seek to avoid failure; they 
seek to make success happen” (Sarasvathy, 2008: 17). As a result “surprises 
can be positive” for a business rather than terminal (ibid: 255) as they can be 
leveraged to create new opportunities. This attitude did seem to come to the 
fore when exploring the prospect of enterprise failure with the interviewees. It 
was clear that they were quite sanguine about the possibility that their 
businesses could fail, with eleven of them making comments that suggested 
they regarded it as an opportunity to learn and change tack, rather than being a 
reason to give in. Whether it was Akaliza’s “the worst thing that can happen is I 
lose everything and start again”, Bosco’s “I always look for option A, B, plan A, 
B, C and D”, or Jimmy’s “you need to learn from that failure and then build 
something new”, it was evident that confronting and being prepared to deal with 
failure, should it arise, was part of the iterative journey in which these 
entrepreneurs were engaged. Annette too indicated that she would “just keep 
going, just keep trying every avenue”, and echoed Bosco when asserting that 
“there’s plan A to Z and ZA, ZB” as alternative options. The recognition that he 
had started off on the wrong track with the Dream Team also meant that 
Jacques “changed the configuration and we came up with a different approach”. 
The entrepreneurs’ reaction to probing about the prospect of failure would seem 
to confirm, too, the observation made in section 2.4.2 that enterprise failure 
should not be conflated with failure of the entrepreneur, as learning from 
venture failure might represent one step on an entrepreneur’s iterative route to 
eventual success. This was seen explicitly in Jean’s assertion that if a venture is 
to fail it is better to fail quickly “so that [I can] start something new”. 
Sarasvathy’s claim that through effectual thinking markets are more likely to be 
created than discovered was also borne out by the interviews. It was evident 
when Damien described how he had gained acceptance for his processed 
cassava leaves. He took a stall at a trade fair in Kigali and offered the product 
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for sale. Although consumers would have been familiar with other dried 
produce, they were initially highly sceptical about Damien’s new product, having 
never before seen dried cassava leaf. And rightly so; quite apart from concerns 
about how it would taste, incorrectly prepared cassava is highly poisonous. 
Undeterred, he decided to give the product away free for two days to people 
who visited his stall on the condition that they “look on the packaging [where] 
there was a telephone number to call me back to give me feedback”. On day 
three trialists started to return to his stall and were prepared to pay him for the 
product, having been convinced of its quality. By midday on the fourth day he 
had sold his entire stock.  
Armed with the evidence consumers would buy his dried cassava leaf, Damien 
was then able to approach supermarkets:  
 I said: okay, can you please just put your [my] products in your shelf and 
give me a small space where I can put a small table with two people who 
can try to explain to the customer how to use the product. And maybe 
[in] two or three weeks you will see what profit you will make through my 
product. 
From this humble beginning, Damien’s business Shekina has developed to the 
extent that it employs more than a hundred people and, in addition to its home 
market, now exports to Europe, Canada, the USA and South Africa.  
Damien’s tactic of distributing his dried cassava leaf free in exchange for 
feedback on its quality raises an interesting point with regard to supply and 
demand, namely, whether it could be argued that his action was an example, 
per Say’s law, of supply creating demand. To address the question one must 
first consider that when he offered the product for sale, no one was willing to 
pay for it. His supply did not lead to a transaction, thus supply had not created 
demand. His free samples tactic worked though, suggesting there must have 
been latent demand for the convenience and long shelf-life that the product 
provides , which was being suppressed by a lack of familiarity with the product. 62
By allowing potential consumers to try it free, he was able to overcome their 
 Latent demand was also evident when one of the early adopters explained that she wanted to 62
“buy this because I have a relative who stays in Europe and he wants to go back taking together 
with your product”. Being light in weight the dried cassava leaves are ideal for Rwandans living 
abroad.
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initial reluctance and reap the pre-existing latent demand, which had been 
suppressed by doubts about product quality. 
An alternative demand generating tactic was used by Jean when he decided to 
start his business software company, Torque. He identified a potential first 
customer for his inventory management system and pre-sold the idea: 
 Actually, it’s possible to go to someone who you think they have a need 
and tell them exactly what you want to do for them, and see if you can 
engage a contract with them. If that works out then there is a potential 
that you can get money…to build…and that’s what I did up to my third 
client. 
Thus Jean was able to get buy-in from a key first customer who had a shared 
interest in realising the vision that he had: 
 …he was also very helpful. He realised it was a good idea, so he kept 
injecting…more money into the company. He did a really good job…
because he knew he needed that such a product. 
It is interesting to note that this approach, getting buy-in from a first key 
customer, is also a tactic that was identified by Sarasvathy as a characteristic of 
effectuation employed by her expert entrepreneurs. Yet in this case it is being 
used by an individual who is far removed from the context and profile of 
Sarasvathy’s expert entrepreneurs sample. The fact that an inexperienced 
entrepreneur, in a low-income context like Rwanda, should be expressing so 
eloquently a technique that Sarasvathy associates with expert entrepreneurs in 
the USA was unexpected and points to the possibility that aspects of her theory 
of effectuation may indeed be generalisable beyond her expert entrepreneurs 
sample and beyond a developed economy setting. 
Jimmy too adopted a creative approach to building his portfolio of recording 
artists. He approached school headteachers and gained permission to run 
talent shows for the pupils that attend their schools. The prize for individual 
winners was the opportunity to have three songs recorded free of charge and 
for these recordings to be promoted to radio stations by True Friends Records. 
Thus he has been able to create a continuous stream of new talent rather than 
competing on the open market for recording artists. As with Damien and Jean, 
this tactic too is far removed from the classic STP approach that would normally 
feature in causally driven business planning. Rather, it would appear to sit well 
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with effectuation - the ability to use the means at hand to fashion a market, 
rather than seeking to discover one. 
This recognition of the importance of demand or the need to stimulate it, rather 
than relying purely on the supply side of the equation, was also apparent when 
Akaliza, for example, commented that she “saw there was a demand” for 
websites in Rwanda. Annette similarly said that she “realised there’s such a 
great need in the market” for film and TV production, while Bosco too affirmed 
during the interview “I know my demand”. Willy went a stage further and sought 
to stimulate market demand by using the initial client income that he received to 
fund promotional activities for his translation and business services. Similarly, 
Jacques “posted a small announcement on the social media” and also 
displayed posters in embassies and places frequented by ex-pats in order to 
recruit children of foreign nationals as well as those of Rwandans for his football 
academy.  
There is no doubt that Jean’s pre-selling to a first potential user and the market 
fashioning tactics used both by Damien and Jimmy are straight out of 
Sarasvathy’s (2008) effectuation theory. It would be wrong though to think that 
all the successful entrepreneurs were fully-formed effectuators that completely 
mirrored Sarasvathy’s expert sample. No one else replicated the techniques 
used by Damien, Jimmy or Jean. Additionally, other key aspects of effectuation 
theory were either only weakly expressed, or absent. For instance, although the 
author tried to use the discussion of topics such as risk and expectations of 
success to draw out the affordable loss principle of effectuation         
(Sarasvathy, 2008: 34), there was no evidence that it formed part of the 
Rwandan entrepreneurs’ calculations. Similarly, deploying the means at hand 
was only partially observed inasmuch as there was little evidence, as will be 
seen at section 4.5, for leveraging a key individual relationship: the ‘whom I 
know’ in Sarasvathy’s theory.  
Consequently, although effectuation was clearly evident in the predilection for 
diving in and developing a business contingently and the preparedness to 
embrace unanticipated ends including dealing with failure, the overall evidence 
from the interviews seemed to suggest that the entrepreneurs in Rwanda were 
predisposed only towards a dilute form of effectuation. They were all though, 
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quite clearly engaged in the broad effectual process of seeking “to make 
success happen” (ibid: 17).  
4.3.2 Evidence for Causation 
Although a majority of the interviewees revealed that they had started their 
enterprises without a business plan, their apparent preparedness to dive in and 
instigate an enterprise without a formal plan should not be taken to imply a lack 
of foresight. Rather than just diving in and acting contingently, it became clear 
from the narratives that it was common for the entrepreneurs to seek a degree 
of reassurance that their enterprise ideas were viable before taking the plunge. 
Even if this did not constitute actually producing a formal business plan, it often 
involved actions that appeared to indicate the use of the causal reasoning that 
is found in the STP process. The interviews often revealed that the 
entrepreneurs had undertaken a considerable amount of research to assess the 
viability of the intended business. This research proved to be broad in its range 
and quite time consuming. 
When Damien noticed that small-scale farmers selling perishable vegetables at 
market would throw away any unsold produce at the end of the day, he realised 
that “these people, they are throwing money [away], but they don’t know [it]”.  
He decided to build a small oven so that he could undertake his own research 
to see if it was possible to preserve cassava leaves by drying them. He invested 
two years in researching whether he could get his dried cassava leaves to the 
point where he could be sure his production process would yield a non-lethal 
and consistently high-quality product with a long shelf life. Gilbert A, too, 
revealed that he spent a whole year investigating the stationery tendering 
process, sources for materials supplies and profit margins before concluding 
that he could start a viable stationery business himself.  
Other research activities that were volunteered in the course of the interviews 
included Sharon’s analysing how district level authorities collected and disposed 
of waste, and the research Bosco undertook to determine the best retail sites 
for a new pharmacy. In Jimmy’s case a considerable amount of effort also 
appears to have gone into determining how True Friends Records could carve 
out a niche in the music recording industry. This involved briefing their recording 
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engineer, Singeras, to visit existing recording studios in order to determine the 
equipment that was being used and how these studios dealt with their clients. 
The recording engineer even went as far as working in some of the studios that 
would become their competitors in order to gain insights that would help True 
Friends Records to differentiate their particular offering from the rest of the 
market: 
 …we told him to visit all the studios in Kigali and Rwanda if possible. 
And he’s been in all those studios. The aim was to see their equipment, 
to see the artists - are they happy. To see, like to know what the 
business is like. How do they approach the artists, how do they 
approach the presenters…the radio presenters…so we did the market 
research and he has been in all the studios. 
These entrepreneurs all appeared to be seeking rational reassurance that their 
effectuation instincts were well grounded. Set against the effectuation 
predilection that appeared to be present, such reassurance seeking looks 
initially contradictory. It appears to reflect the use of a degree of causal 
reasoning, which effectuation theory argues is sidelined by the entrepreneur’s 
preference for effectuation. This apparent contradiction was not restricted to 
research activities either; it also surfaced in other ways. Bosco, for example, 
explained that even though he did not produce a business plan he had 
nevertheless spent time checking the underlying financial assumptions for his 
retail pharmacy: 
 I make sure I know the start-up capital - how much it is and…what is the 
income statement. How does it look like, the projected income 
statement. So long as I put there some assumptions, I test, I try to 
change some scenarios then as long as I’m satisfied, I don’t need to go 
into the details of…well I know my supply, I know my demand, and then 
as long as the figures…I know my costs, everything. 
Once he has checked his assumptions, he feels he can “move forward. I don’t 
need to go into a very elaborate business plan”.  
Similarly, Gilbert A produced a brief outline covering the key assumptions and 
profit potential when he sought to persuade a friend to invest in the stationery 
business. Jean too was clear that he could not write a business plan, admitting 
that on “the business side I’m not that strong”. But like Gilbert A he had 
produced a rough outline, and insisted that it was “not really a formal business 
plan, it’s more like a concept note”. 
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This causally derived reassurance that the business idea is broadly sound falls 
far short of the STP business planning methodology, but is nonetheless highly 
rational in its approach. It is perhaps best described as ‘sketching’, whereby the 
basic assumptions that underpin the commercial opportunity that was being 
considered are checked for validity. The resulting sketch might be committed to 
paper, as in Jean’s “concept note”, Gilbert A’s profit outline and Bosco’s 
scenario planning, or it might merely be a mental process, as appeared to be 
the case with Christian when he:   
 …calculated that the four years I was with [Kilimanjaro International] I 
had managed to bring in projects worth $2.8 million, and I said if I was 
lucky to be having the same capacity, where would I be now?”.  
In reflecting on what he had contributed in the past to his employer, Christian 
too seemed to have been seeking to validate his decision to abandon 
Kilimanjaro and start his own business. 
A further contradiction was also observed when the interviewees talked about 
what their enterprises would look like in the future. Although the Rwandan 
entrepreneurs did not use business plans with fixed end goals that characterise 
the STP process, and instead developed contingently, they nevertheless had 
little difficulty in envisioning what their enterprises might look like in the future. 
Eleven of them volunteered a very specific longer-range vision for the business 
that they had created. This was sometimes expressed as a view of the future 
geographic reach of the enterprise. In Eric A’s case it meant expanding into 
Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, while Christian had his 
sights set on Mozambique and Tanzania. Jean meanwhile saw his business, 
Torque, ultimately operating across the whole of Africa. For others what was 
envisioned had more to do with qualitative dimensions such as Jacques’ 
expectation that in five years his football academy would have its own sports 
complex, or Jimmy’s belief that True Friends Records would be recording some 
of Rwanda’s top artists and would develop a future winner of Guma Guma, the 
nation’s biggest talent contest. Annette too seemed to have a clear view of what 
the future holds when reflecting on the growing significance of television in the 
Rwandan media market and the expectation that in the future it would be her 
main source of revenue rather than film production. Whilst this might all be 
wishful thinking that might not be actually realised, what was obvious during the 
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interviews was the fluency with which the participants were able to express their 
expectations for the future of their businesses and that they saw it as thoroughly 
within their power to bring that vision about.  
Despite acknowledging that her expert entrepreneurs were capable of using 
both causal and effectual reasoning, Sarasvathy argues for treating causal and 
effectual approaches “theoretically” as a strict dichotomy (2008: 16, original 
italics). The Rwandan interviews, though, seem to call into question the 
usefulness of such a dichotomy. While on the one hand the entrepreneurs had a 
predilection for a dilute form of effectuation, they also simultaneously sought 
reassurance about their effectual instincts by using causally orientated 
techniques like basic research, demand assessment and scenario testing. 
Additionally, despite developing their enterprises iteratively they also seemed to 
have a future vision for their business, which would seem to contradict the    
non-predictive basis of effectuation (ibid.) and thus also suggests the 
simultaneous coexistence of elements of causal and effectual reasoning. 
Furthermore, obvious contradictions were also seen in the entrepreneurs’ 
espousing of the benefits of a business plan, but not actually writing one. While 
Sarasvathy might have found it useful to treat effectuation and causation as 
theoretically dichotomous when developing her theory, the extent of the 
incongruity observed during the interviews questions the usefulness of this in 
practice. Rather than just treating these contradictions as elements of an 
unresolved, possibly spurious, dichotomy there is likely to be more value in 
attempting to resolve the inconsistencies that were observed.  
4.3.3 Addressing the False Dichotomy 
As was observed at section 4.3.1, nine of the twelve entrepreneurs admitted to 
diving in without a business plan, two more wrote plans after committing 
themselves to their enterprise, and the twelfth had been operating informally 
without a plan before formalising the business. Taken together this would seem 
to suggest a clear cut preference for effectual over causal reasoning, even if the 
former only amounts to a dilute form of effectuation. However, it must be 
acknowledged that the entrepreneurs had a very diverse range of backgrounds. 
With the obvious exception of Eric A, who had been advocating and teaching 
business planning, the apparent broad rejection of traditional business planning 
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may have been influenced by a lack of specific knowledge about how to write a 
business plan, rather than necessarily indicating a clear-cut predilection for 
effectuation. Indeed it is significant that five of the interviewees felt that their 
lack of traditional business planning skills represented a gap in their knowledge, 
which they later endeavoured to address by enrolling on short duration 
courses . Thus rather than there being a simple binary split between producing 63
a business plan or diving in and developing iteratively, the interviews seemed to 
suggest that these two conditions actually represent opposite ends of a 
continuum, between which there seemed to be an intermediate space where 
the Rwandan entrepreneurs had undertaken some degree of scenario planning 
or basic research, termed sketching, in order to verify the commercial 
opportunity that they thought they had seen, and which they then set about 
developing contingently. 
Given this apparent conjunction of sketching and a dilute form of effectuation, 
one would expect to find that the Rwandan entrepreneurs would be able to 
move freely between causal and effectual approaches. While restricted to just 
two examples, this did appear to be suggested by a curious, and contradictory, 
variant that was observed. Although having eventually produced a plan for her 
initial enterprise, the web development agency Shaking Sun, at the time of the 
interview Akaliza was seeking to realise her ambition of producing animated 
films for the African market but volunteered that this time she was “kind of just 
diving in - I don’t have a plan”. Whilst at one level this might be taken as support 
for the idea that effectuation is an acquired skill, it is counterbalanced by 
Sharon, who did the exact opposite. Having dived in without a plan with his first 
business, the quarry, he meticulously planned the second one, the waste 
management enterprise. “When I started the business of waste management, 
the company it was very well planned and very well organised”, he said .The 
claim would seem to be justified, as his business plan for the enterprise won 
first place in a business plan competition that yielded a cash prize that was also 
put into the business: 
 Foremost amongst which were the part-time courses offered by the Rwandan Business 63
Development Centre.
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 …in June 2013 we participated in a business competition from the 
National Youth Council. I was in charge of building a business plan. A 
business plan…the business plan entered through a competition, and 
the business plan that I made won the first place. And once we won the 
first place it was guaranteed to receive I think 3 million Rwandan Francs.  
These two examples would seem to correspond to Sarasvathy’s observation 
that, although her expert entrepreneurs favoured effectual reasoning, they were 
also able to use causal reasoning. If their preference for effectuation was an 
acquired characteristic though, then one might conclude that with growing 
experience Akaliza and Sharon would both migrate in the direction of the 
effectuation end of the continuum from the intermediate area of sketching. But 
in fact they seem to be moving in opposite directions along the continuum. With 
only two examples it is not appropriate to read too much into this observation, 
although it could provide a fruitful area for further research.  
The existence of an intermediate space where the Rwandan entrepreneurs 
engaged in sketching, also appeared to be reflected in their capacity for 
envisioning what their enterprises would look like in the future - a facility that 
would not be encompassed by Sarasvathy’s strict dichotomous spilt between 
effectuation and causation. The former is expressed as a purely exploratory and 
non-predictive approach to enterprise formation based on the logic that if an 
effectuator is able to control the future, there is no need to predict it 
(Sarasvathy, 2008: 17). In contrast the inverse, causation, is concerned with 
realising a very specific and clearly articulated future goal. The successful 
entrepreneur’s facility for describing their future expectations for their 
businesses appeared to fall midway between these two extremes. They were 
plainly not pursuing the fixed end goals of a casually constructed formal plan, 
but they were equally clearly able to engage in a degree of prediction that 
Sarasvathy had excluded when defining effectuation. Again, it would seem that 
there is more to be gained by conceptualising an intermediate space, where the 
successful entrepreneurs drew on elements of both effectuation and causation, 
than in maintaining Sarasvathy’s strict theoretical dichotomy. It is worth keeping 
in mind though that the interviewees had already established successful 
enterprises, and so were well beyond the initial stage of considering what range 
of future outcomes might be possible with the means at hand. In developing a 
successful business they had in fact already narrowed down those future 
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imagined possibilities and decided to pursue a single option, even if its 
exploitation still required thinking and acting contingently.  
4.3.4 Summary 
While there is strong evidence that the entrepreneurs in Rwanda were prepared 
to dive in without a business plan and employ a degree of effectuation to build 
their enterprises iteratively, they also seemed to simultaneously employ causal 
reasoning to gain a degree of reassurance about the validity of the commercial 
opportunity they were intending to exploit. It also allowed them to construct an 
image in their minds for what the business would look like in the future, even 
though they were not pursuing a fixed end goal. The observed lack of formal 
business planning prior to launch is perhaps then far from surprising. If the 
Rwandan entrepreneurs had undertaken sufficient background research to 
determine that their ideas appeared to have traction and they were not planning 
to access a bank or microcredit loan to fund the enterprise, then there would 
seem to be little sense in producing a traditional ‘bankable business plan’ in the 
first place. Even less so if they were aware that they would be embarking on a 
journey that would require taking incremental iterative steps instead of seeking 
and marshalling resources to pursue a clearly determined fixed end goal. 
Furthermore, at the point where they felt they had gained a sufficient degree of 
reassurance about what they were planning to do, it would make sense to push 
ahead and launch the business if all the signals were broadly positive, rather 
than taking the risk that someone else might occupy the commercial space that 
had been identified.  
It is also worth noting that the entrepreneurs had all been successful, otherwise 
they would not have been in the entrepreneurs research sample, so even if they 
had written a business plan they would clearly not have needed it. This raises 
an important issue. If Rwandan entrepreneurs did not use, or indeed need, 
traditional business plans before starting their enterprises, is there really any 
sense in teaching someone how to write a business plan in advance of having 
identified a commercial opportunity if, as was suggested by the interviews, 
entrepreneurs will eventually seek out the input that they need when they feel 
they need it? The implications of this question will be revisited in Chapter 6.     
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4.4 Dealing with Risk 
At section 2.4.1 it was seen that theories relating to the question of how 
entrepreneurs engage with risk are contradictory. While McClelland (1967: 211) 
argued that entrepreneurs have an appetite for intermediate level risk, others 
have claimed that they have a heightened propensity for risk-taking when 
compared to business managers (Sexton and Bowman, 1985: 134; Begley and 
Boyd, 1987: 88; Busenitz, 1999: 336; Baumol, 2010: 66). Kahneman (2011) 
went even further and characterised them as nothing more than foolish 
gamblers who wilfully ignore the probability of enterprise failure, and therefore 
adopted the position that entrepreneurial success is a function of luck rather 
than judgement. This last position is the popular conception, that enterprises 
are started by individuals who are prepared to take risky actions that the 
majority would avoid. Against this contested backdrop, the interviews 
undertaken with Rwandans who had built successful businesses were highly 
revealing and provided significant insight into their attitude to risk and the 
behaviour that resulted from it.  
4.4.1 Ignoring, Embracing or Averting Risk? 
The entrepreneurs’ narratives did initially appear to provide evidence for a 
propensity to engage with risk. 
Akaliza, Eric A and Sharon all commented that they did not think they had taken 
any significant risks when they started their businesses, while others tried to 
legitimise the risks they had taken by claiming that it was a necessity. While 
admitting that he “didn’t see it as a risk” Jean also pragmatically observed that 
“as an entrepreneur you always have to be ready to take such kinds of risk”. 
This latter sentiment was also apparent in Damien’s “sometimes in business 
you must take risks”. Jacques too, when asked whether he took any personal 
risks in founding the Dream Team replied “No I didn’t. In fact I didn’t realise that 
when I was thinking to start the initiative”, indicating that he did not perceive his 
actions when launching as risky. He went on to explain though that after getting 
started he did begin to perceive risks that he had initially overlooked: 
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 In the course of implementing the initiative I found a lot of risks that 
[laughs] I didn't analyse before I started the project and I had some risk 
analysis that was so minor, and some of the points I didn't take them into 
consideration. 
In particular he came to realise that enterprise failure could have seriously 
damaged his professional reputation. As the director of information technology 
at the government agency that issues national identity cards and driving 
licences, he enjoys a certain standing in the community that could have been 
significantly dented if it became known that he had started an enterprise that 
subsequently failed. 
Taken together, the comments would seem to conform to the common 
perception that entrepreneurs are risk takers by virtue of either failing to 
perceive the risks they were actually facing or, if they are perceived, being 
prepared to tolerate them. It is also worth reflecting though on the point that, by 
definition, all of the interviewees had created successful enterprises. So when 
asking them to talk in retrospect about the risks they had faced when setting up 
their ventures, it is feasible that their responses were coloured by their proven 
success. Specifically they had all, in hindsight, correctly identified an opportunity 
and used their skill and judgement to exploit it. As a result there might be a 
considerable dissonance between the reality of their commercial success and 
the author’s questions about the risks they had taken when they got started, 
which could have led to a tendency to understate or dismiss the risks that had 
actually existed at the time that the enterprise was created. If this were the 
case, then the risks at the time of enterprise formation would have been greater 
than as described during the interviews, in which case the arguments that they 
were risk-takers would be amplified beyond the level that the entrepreneurs 
claimed. It became clear during the interviews, though, that their apparent 
attitude to risk was more complex. 
4.4.2 Mitigating Risk 
When scrutinised, the successful entrepreneurs’ narratives did not match the 
popular notion of them as careless risk takers. Far from it, the interviewees 
seemed instead to have assessed the risks they might encounter when starting 
their businesses and then attempted to act rationally to limit their exposure. This 
tendency to appraise and mitigate risk was a common feature, but was revealed 
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in a diverse set of tactics. It was evident, for instance, in the sketching process 
that was employed by some of the interviewees, such as Bosco, who explained 
that his risk-mitigating strategy first involved gathering information: 
 …you’ve collected some data, you’ve done research to make sure that 
you are investing in the right business. But you have that fear for the 
unknown and that was the first risk. Taking the risk of putting money in 
something, yet you don’t know whether you are sure of the return…you 
do your research, you interview people, you get information from 
different offices.  
Once he was sure that he had the requisite information, he engaged in scenario 
planning, so that he had a range of options that he could deploy if things did not 
go to plan. Thus in his own words, “plan B will be there if plan A is not moving. 
So even plan C, even D”. 
Such scenario planning is far removed from the popular conception of 
entrepreneurs being predisposed to taking risks. Indeed this very point was 
noted at section 2.4.1, that deliberate action related to risk assessment and 
reduction can nonetheless be missed by an external observer, who then 
wrongly judges an action as risky. This scope for external misjudgement of the 
risks was expressed very clearly by Annette when she explained that she takes 
only calculated risks. When pressed about what others would think of her being 
prepared to take risks she replied that “I calculate pretty much, but I don't think 
that they see that I’ve sort of taken my notes before I take a decision”. In her 
particular case, the decision to start her own business was taken after she was 
approached by two executives from Saatchi and Saatchi’s Kigali advertising 
agency, who were looking for a production company that could take on 
producing a TV commercial for their major client MTN, the largest 
telecommunications company in Rwanda. Although Annette was initially unsure 
about taking the risk of going alone, she was eventually persuaded to do so 
because she had the guarantee of a first major production contract and one that 
would afford her company a high profile when the commercial was aired. She 
freely acknowledged that it “probably wasn’t the most ethical thing to do” as the 
contract could have gone to her employer at the time, but she calculated that 
she would be able to start her own production company without taking any 
significant risks, even though external observation might have judged her action 
in starting her own production company as risky. Similarly, Akaliza didn't just set 
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up Shaking Sun and then go looking for business. She reduced the risk of 
market entry via the expedient of first tendering and winning the contract for 
creating a government website. The normal risk of market entry was therefore 
mitigated by the fact she had already secured a major first client. 
A further tactic was revealed by Sharon, who indicated that when confronting 
risk he “must make an analysis of it and see whether there is a way of reducing 
it”. When he set up his waste processing business, he got the local authority to 
enter into a memorandum of understanding in which the responsibilities of the 
local authority and those of his company were spelled out. Although not carrying 
the legal weight of a contract, Sharon felt that this was enough of a commitment 
from the local authority for him to move forward with the new venture as he 
believed the memorandum of understanding would in due course translate into 
a formal contract. 
Additional evidence for the degree to which the interviewees were attuned to 
risk and sought to reduce it was also given by Jean, who revealed that he was 
“a little bit paranoid” about the risk that a larger, global, competitor could 
discover how successful he had been with Torque and might enter the Rwandan 
market and potentially damage his business. His anxiety was heightened at the 
time of the interview, as he was on the verge of landing a deal which could have 
a huge and positive impact on his business. The main user of his inventory 
management software was the Rwandan drinks company Bralirwa, which is    
40 percent owned by the major drinks corporation Heineken. Having seen 
Jean’s inventory management software operating within Bralirwa, Heineken had 
also become interested in becoming a Torque client. But rather than being 
carried away by the prospect of growth that this represented, Jean’s immediate 
preoccupation was what he should now do to further improve his product and 
maintain his competitive advantage. Far from being cavalier about risk, he was 
clearly attuned to it, explaining: 
 I always have a kind of fear, so that really push[es] me ahead to always 
look around and see if there is something…I cannot sit still.  
Even though he has been successful he had not stopped scanning the horizon 
for risks, beyond those encountered at launch, and thinking about ways to 
mitigate them. The prospect of gaining Heineken as a client had actually 
!172
increased his awareness of the risk of a larger competitor entering the market 
and had prompted him to start thinking about what he could do to mitigate the 
increased risk that he perceived. Additionally, it will be recalled that Jean had 
deliberately sought the support of a first key customer who had a shared 
interest in the successful development of Torque’s inventory management 
software, and who would therefore fund its development. Thus he too had 
reduced the risk of market entry. 
Three of the interviewees - Bosco, Jimmy and Jacques - had full-time parallel 
jobs. This also had the clear benefit of mitigating the risk of enterprise failure as 
operating costs could be kept to a minimum during the setup phase. When they 
were probed about whether they intended to move full time into the enterprise 
themselves it was clear that they had in mind that the enterprise would first 
have to generate a threshold level of income before they would countenance 
adding their own full-time salaries as an incremental cost to the business. 
Although it will be seen at section 4.6.1 that this threshold might be set at a 
level that represents a discount on the income from their wage employment, the 
critical point is that they all had in mind that the enterprise would first have to 
demonstrate its ability to produce this threshold level of income, so that the 
decision to move across full time would be relatively risk-free. 
Gilbert A, who was a student when he set up his stationery company, did not 
have the benefit of a secure job to offset the risk of starting a company. But he 
had used the experience of working part time for another stationer to learn 
about the business. Far from embracing risk, he spent a whole year researching 
the commercial potential from the inside and only launched the business when 
he had learned enough to be sure he had identified a viable opportunity. 
Furthermore, by the expedient of bringing in a partner he was able to obviate 
the need to borrow money to start the venture; he had managed to get it to 
market by putting someone else’s money at risk. Eric A too seems to have gone 
through an objective risk and return assessment when concluding that his 
chances of securing a lucrative contract for an outsourced PSF project 
outweighed the risk and returns of redundancy.  
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4.4.3 Tolerance of Ambiguity 
Operating under conditions of uncertainty means that outcomes are ambiguous. 
The majority of individuals find such outcome ambiguity stressful. In contrast, 
entrepreneurs are believed to be able to handle uncertain situations with 
relative ease, are thought to actively seek out and enjoy such situations (Sexton 
and Bowman, 1985) and “prefer rather than shun uncertainty” (Knight, 2006: 
242). The observation was made at section 2.4.3 that this emphasises the 
importance of how entrepreneurs think and feel about the uncertainty they face.  
The interviewees’ attitudes to such outcome ambiguity were explored by asking 
them to talk about the uncertainty they had faced, the stress they had 
experienced and how they felt about such stress. The comments that were 
volunteered by ten of the respondents appeared to indicate the presence of the 
tolerance of ambiguity trait. For most of the respondents there was an 
acknowledgement that the experience of creating their enterprises had been 
stressful, but that it had been something that they could deal with. This was 
seen in Willy’s “when you are working on your own thing sometimes you don't 
even count that as stress. It is part of your life”. Eric A too appeared to be 
composed when acknowledging “in business life, it’s all about stress”, a 
sentiment that was also indicated by Jimmy’s “It’s life. It makes us live. Makes 
us feel that we are living, you know”. 
Jacques cited his “patience and the determination” as personal qualities that 
had enabled him to cope with the stresses and uncertainties he had faced. 
Akaliza, when talking about the fact that her business had followed a trajectory 
that was very different to her expectations, including having to downsize 
because of financial pressures, explained “it’s disappointing, but I’m glad I went 
through it”. Rather than being negative about the experience, she felt that it had 
strengthened her ability to deal with future difficulties that she might encounter, 
affirming “I feel if something worse happened I would know how to deal with it”. 
Some of the responses, though, went even further than this apparent ability to 
accept and deal with ambiguity. Jean claimed that “it actually excites me, 
because I’ve seen…so many things taking different directions”. Similarly Bosco 
asserted “you need to absorb it and have it as a fuel - to move forward”.       
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Both of these comments would seem to echo Sexton and Bowman’s (1985) 
suggestion that entrepreneurs seem to actively seek out and enjoy ambiguity, 
which the majority of individuals find stressful. 
While the ability to tolerate, even welcome, ambiguity seemed to be strongly 
represented amongst the entrepreneurs who were interviewed it must, however, 
be seen in the context of other factors that were observed. Although tolerance 
of ambiguity is treated in the literature as an independent predisposition it is 
unlikely to exist in complete isolation. As already seen, the entrepreneurs in 
Rwanda took rational steps in order to increase their chances of success. 
Although the future is uncertain, in the Knightian sense of an unknowable 
unknown, it is clearly feasible that the more the Rwandan entrepreneurs felt 
able to take measures to control that future, by virtue of mitigating risk, 
sketching and acting contingently, the more likely it is that they would feel 
confident in addressing the ambiguities that they were facing. Thus it would be 
logical that the entrepreneurs’ tolerance of ambiguity would increase in line with 
the rational steps they had been taking. It would also strongly suggest that the 
tolerance of ambiguity observed in the interviews was a dependent, rather than 
independent, variable.  
4.4.4 Summary 
In contrast to the popular notion that entrepreneurs are individuals who possess 
a propensity for engaging in risky undertakings, the interviews with these 
successful entrepreneurs suggested they had an aversion to risk . 64
McClelland’s argument that entrepreneurs are likely to favour situations where 
risks are intermediate, would thus seem to miss the point.  
The Rwandan entrepreneurs had recognised that they are operating in an 
uncertain context, but through sketching and basic research they were able to 
obtain knowledge and thereby to reduce the realm of uncertainty. In effect they 
had transformed some ‘unknown unknowns’ into ‘known unknowns’ and could 
thereby form an assessment of the risks they would be likely to face. They then 
 By definition the interviews were conducted after they had established a viable commercial 64
enterprise, so the comments made cannot necessarily be taken to imply that the interviewees’ 
risk profile had always been absolutely fixed. It is clearly feasible that this changed over time. 
What is important though is that their narratives indicated quite clearly that action had been 
taken to frame and reduce risk.
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took deliberate action designed to modify those risks, even though they could 
not know with any certainty what the outcome of their actions would be. This 
suggests a high degree of rational deliberation and behaviour, rather than a 
predisposition for irrational behaviour and corresponds well with Tuckett’s idea 
of rational action (Tuckett, 2011: 184), which was explored in the second 
chapter. It is also redolent of Sarasvathy’s observation that her expert 
entrepreneurs saw themselves as being able to change the odds in their favour 
(2008: 138), thereby allowing them to turn what might be games of chance for 
others into games of skill for themselves. 
4.5 Social Networks 
The literature reviewed in Chapter 2 indicated that entrepreneurs build and 
maintain social networks that they can subsequently exploit for commercial 
advantage. In particular it is argued that it is the breadth of networks that is 
important, rather than the intensity of the relations (Kreiser et al., 2013) and that 
such breadth correlates with enterprise success. The logic runs that having a 
broad range of weak ties exposes entrepreneurs to a wider range of resources 
that they can access as well as exposing them to a greater range of potentially 
exploitable opportunities. The interviews therefore sought to probe for evidence 
that the entrepreneurs were actively engaged in network building. 
4.5.1 Network Building 
The interviewees certainly appeared to confirm the theoretical view that 
entrepreneurs seek to establish social networks that might be beneficial to their 
businesses. Seven of the interviewees made unprompted comments about the 
importance of building and maintaining a network of contacts that could be 
beneficial commercially. In some cases this appeared to be a faculty that came 
quite naturally to them. Willy volunteered “I like to interact with people” while 
Jean similarly commented “I like to do that a lot”. However, the apparent 
gregariousness expressed by these two was not universal. Akaliza revealed that 
building a network that might help her is something she does quite deliberately, 
although she has to work at it:  
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 …in myself I’m not a very social person, but I know that for the business 
to survive you need to connect to people…I do try to make an effort to…
to connect with people. Either people who can give me advice, or that 
can connect me to a potential client, or who might be a client. 
The necessity of taking such calculated actions was also mirrored in Christian’s 
“I put a lot of effort [into it], because I know it’s a key component”, and was also 
apparent in Jean’s assertion “it is very important for you…if you really want to 
grow a business”.  
It would also appear that the interviewees are tuned into the long-term potential 
of the networks that they establish, rather than expecting any immediate payoff. 
Thus for Willy the contacts that he adds to his social network are individuals that 
may at some time in the future become clients: “they are potentials; they are 
people who are going to help us grow our business”. Similarly, for Gilbert A it is 
important to work at maintaining contact with people he has never done 
business with as they may still become clients in the future. For Eric A this has 
even extended to being prepared to undertake work for free, if he thinks that it 
might lead to future opportunities for remunerated work - in his own words “even 
doing something for free, it can be also an opportunity for future cooperation”. 
The accent throughout the interviews was very much on building contacts with a 
wide range of potential customers, rather than focussing on building strong 
relationships with key individuals and would therefore certainly seem to fit with 
the idea that what is sought is the creation of a broadly based network of loose 
ties, rather than a narrow intense network. 
4.5.2 Trust 
The decision to probe for trust in the interviews was influenced by the thought 
that the 1994 genocide might have had an impact upon trust and social 
cohesion, which in turn could have affected the capacity for network building. 
Although the government has made considerable efforts at bringing about 
reconciliation, it is easy to imagine that residual knowledge of ‘who perpetrated 
what’ might have acted as a significant break on developing the kind of social 
networks that might play a role in entrepreneurship and SME development.      
In this context, it was interesting to see that the regional product cluster strategy 
(Minicom, 2012) made a direct reference to trust, initially referring to “low levels 
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of societal trust” as a challenge for SMEs (ibid: 11), but also noting that the 
cluster strategy would help to develop dialogue and trust (ibid: 3). 
The World Values Survey conducted in 2007 did appear to confirm a low level 
of trust in Rwanda (WVS, 2016). In response to the survey question “generally 
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be 
very careful in dealing with people?” only 5 percent of those interviewed thought 
others could be trusted, which was the lowest level recorded for African 
countries. A similar picture was also suggested by Hatzfeld’s The Strategy of 
Antelopes (2009) . Talking about the reconciliation process, one of Hatzfeld’s 65
interviewees asserted “trust has been driven out of Rwanda” (ibid: 204). While 
one might have anticipated that difficulties would persist between perpetrators 
and victims, it was also clear from Hatzfeld’s interviews that perpetrators could 
be reproached over their gaçaça  admissions by other perpetrators (ibid:7), 66
and that survivors also had difficulties interacting with each other, even when 
they had been together during the genocide:  
 Today those six have broken up, and the friendship with it. We don't get 
together…we six manage just in time to steer clear of one another    
(ibid: 43). 
It has been suggested though that entrepreneurs exhibit a tendency to over-
trust: to trust to a level that exceeds that which the context suggests is rational 
(Goel and Karri, 2006: 479). Thus even if trust had been fractured by the 
genocide, it was still feasible that the Rwandan entrepreneurs might have 
exhibited greater levels of trust relative to their peers. Attempts to probe for 
levels of trust and over-trust in the successful entrepreneurs’ interviews proved 
though to be rather fruitless.  
Comments on trust were obtained from ten of the interviewees, but these 
tended to indicate that the respondents had a highly pragmatic view that if one 
was going to develop a business then there was little option other than trusting 
others, be they suppliers, partners or customers. It was a fact of life for them 
 Written in French the book was first published in France and the English translation referred 65
to here was published two years later. Hence Hatzfeld’s interviews would have been 
contemporaneous with the 2007 WVS survey.   
 With so many perpetrators to deal with, the normal legal system would have collapsed. 66
Instead the traditional gaçaça communal justice system was employed. 
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and if the trust they placed in someone was betrayed, then that was really just 
part of the price they felt they had to pay for setting up and remaining in 
business. Even though several of the respondents were able to quote instances 
where their trust had been exploited, the pragmatic nature of their need to trust 
is seen for example in Gilbert A’s rational justification “I see the business in the 
people”. This sentiment was also apparent in Bosco’s comment that:  
 …any person in business should have trust, actually. That’s very 
important. Why? Because without trust then you won’t move forward.  
It was also seen in Willy’s assertion “I have to trust people because people are 
the bridge to my success” and Sharon’s assertion that it is “for the sake of the 
business”.  
The more positive attitude to trust that was present in the interviews was also 
reflected in the most recent edition of the World Values Survey (WVS: 2016). 
Compared to its 2007 level of 5 percent, by 2014 the level of trust in others had 
risen to 17 percent. Whether this increase and the pragmatic comments seen in 
the entrepreneurs’ accounts are due to the cumulative efforts at reconciliation 
and social cohesion, or suggestive of an increased inability to discuss or admit, 
in the face of such efforts, that problems still persist remains unclear.  
4.5.3 Summary 
The interviews provided evidence that the entrepreneurs actively set about 
building broad networks with weak ties, which were focussed particularly on 
their potential for delivering future customers for their businesses. They also 
appeared to recognise that developing such networks was dependent upon 
trusting people, and therefore had a very pragmatic attitude to trust. It was 
essentially seen as a pre-requisite for developing the business. 
The evidence that entrepreneurs spontaneously engaged in such network 
building does, though, question the suggestion that specific action is needed to 
build their social capital via mentoring and the input of external advisors, as 
suggested by Lingelbach et al. (2005: 7). If entrepreneurs in Rwanda 
instinctively know that network building is critical to their success and have no 
difficulty initiating it, then there is presumably no need for external input.  
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4.6 Motives for Starting the Business 
The second chapter showed that there is a considerable divergence of opinion 
over the motives that drive the entrepreneurial process. On the one hand is the  
economic argument that individuals are pursuing the opportunity to capture 
entrepreneurial rents that arise from Kirznerian arbitrage opportunities or 
equilibrium disturbing, Schumpeterian, creative destruction. In contrast to such 
acts of volition the GEM argument is that, in developing economies, the 
decision to start an enterprise is predominantly grounded in necessity. 
Individuals who have no realistic alternatives for obtaining wage employment 
form enterprises that can provide them with an income. The psychologists 
meanwhile posit that following the entrepreneurial track is preconditioned by the 
presence of certain character traits, particularly the need for achievement, 
internal locus of control and risk propensity. The allocationists’ orientation on the 
other hand is that anyone can become an entrepreneur, and would be inclined 
to do so, if they could access various forms of capital. Thus the economists’ 
universal ‘homo economicus’ is trumped for the allocationists by a ubiquitous 
‘entrepreneur in waiting’ who possesses the power to transform economic 
fortunes once access to capital has been assured. 
If the economists are right about the capture of entrepreneurial rents, or GEM 
are right about the need to create an enterprise that can generate an income 
where none exists, then one might anticipate that monetary concerns would 
have been very much front of mind when Rwandan entrepreneurs started their 
businesses. Alternatively, if the traits theorists are correct then one might expect 
to find that monetary considerations would be relegated in importance, while for 
the allocationists financial motives might or might not be uppermost. The 
interviews with the entrepreneurs sample therefore sought to achieve some 
degree of resolution of these conflicting views and shed light on the extent to 
which the decision to set up an enterprise appeared to be shaped by the 
financial returns that were on offer or whether they were influenced by other 
factors. 
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4.6.1 Not Just About the Money 
When talking about why they had decided to set up a business, the 
entrepreneurs advanced explanations that were couched in terms that 
appeared to indicate that they were not motivated primarily by material gain. 
The clearest indications were evident in Christian’s “it’s not just about the 
money”, Sharon’s “it’s not a matter of money”, Willy’s “the main thing was not to 
sustain myself in terms of financial [gain]”, and Gilbert A’s assertion that in a 
hierarchy of motives money ranked only fourth in importance for him. Instead 
the narratives frequently referred to motives that were beyond material gain, 
such as Eric A’s insistence that the “love of the job is [more] essential than even 
money”. Annette too explained that money for her is really just a tangible 
indication of how clients see the quality of her creative output, rather than an 
end in itself: 
 I think that’s part of the excitement, to actually see your art also valued 
monetarily. So it is very important - for me I think I value people’s 
response to my art by how much they are willing to pay for it. So it’s a 
very good indicator. 
This concern with customer response to the business was also evident when 
Akaliza explained “I love when my clients are happy. When they…when they’re 
surprised, that’s my favourite thing. Yeah I think that’s the best thing” and was 
quite clearly uppermost in Jean’s mind too when he drew the important 
distinction between external perception of success versus what he regarded as 
important: 
 Well, the financial is always what the outside [world] will look at and say: 
this is success. But the reward…for me [the] first really big reward was 
my clients saying: oh wow, this is really good software. 
This apparent absence of materialism was well demonstrated by Annette’s 
broader narrative. Although having completed a first degree in accounting and 
an internship at KPMG , she abandoned a career in auditing and accounting to 67
complete a B.Tech in motion picture production. She then went to work for the 
Kigali based Kwetu Film Institute where she earned little more than a “stipend” 
that was only enough to cover her travel and basic subsistence costs.         
 One of the leading global business services corporations, providing audit, tax, and business 67
advisory services.
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Asked further about the decision to abandon a career in finance Annette’s 
disregard for the material was obvious when replying “am I working hard to just 
make money in life? At some point just making money didn't make sense”. 
Questioned further about how she would equate realising her vision for the 
company versus the financial returns it could produce for her, elicited the 
response “as long as I can break-even, as long as I don’t go bankrupt”, 
indicating that her overriding concern was that the business should earn 
enough to ensure its survival rather than enrich her. 
Bosco, Jimmy and Jacques, who were all running their enterprises in parallel to 
having full-time jobs, also revealed a low level of materialism when talking about 
when they would move full time into running their enterprises. The decision did 
not seem to be shaped by any expectation that running their own businesses 
would produce higher levels of income. Jacques hoped only to maintain the 
same standard of living rather than expecting an increment. Bosco too, when 
asked about what level of income he would need to achieve before moving 
across full time to run his two enterprises, initially replied that the same level of 
income would be the benchmark but then later confided that he would be 
prepared to sacrifice “even 50 percent of the income” if it meant he could satisfy 
his desire for self-determination. According to Jimmy, he and his partner King 
Victor were also prepared to “lose 30 percent, or 40 maybe” of their wage 
income if it meant they could devote themselves fully to running True Friends 
Records. 
If they did not start their enterprises in order to make money, why did the 
Rwandan entrepreneurs embark on a track that is so shrouded in uncertainty 
and where they potentially stand to lose the money they had invested? Why 
were some of them also prepared to countenance the acceptance of negative 
financial returns? Addressing these questions pointed to motives that lay 
beyond the material. 
4.6.2 Internal Locus of Control 
As discussed at section 2.4.1, entrepreneurs are thought to have an internal 
locus of control. They feel that they are able to take measures to control their 
own destiny (Chell, 2008: 98) and, as posited by de Vries (2000: 5), have a fear 
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of being controlled by others. The interviews suggested that this characteristic 
was present amongst the Rwandan entrepreneurs, as was evident in comments 
that were volunteered by eight of the respondents.  
It was clearly indicated by Jean who, it has already been noted, equated taking 
a loan with a lack of independence (see section 4.2.5). This was amplified when 
he made it clear that he felt he could only achieve his true potential by taking 
full responsibility for his future rather than relying on others. Two of his 
comments made this clear and were both highly suggestive of his having an 
internal locus of control. The first was when he said that he always felt that he 
had great potential, but was concerned that no one else would ever recognise 
it. This led him to worry that if he did not take his future into his own hands then 
“someone could just give me a mediocre job and [I would] end up not doing 
what I’m supposed to do”. A similar sentiment was also expressed by Akaliza. 
When discussing what running her own business meant to her she insisted that 
she just “couldn’t imagine the alternative of taking a 9 to 5” job. Even though 
she had earlier in the interview indicated that prior to starting Shaking Sun she 
had envisaged working for a spell for a company like Pixel as a precursor to 
setting up her own business, Akaliza seemed to imply that she saw it only as a 
worthwhile short-term compromise on the route towards the independence she 
ultimately sought through running her own company. 
Christian’s desire for self-determination was illustrated by two key incidents in 
his personal narrative. His first job after graduating was in a debt recovery 
department, a role that he found so bureaucratic and personally unrewarding 
that he quit after only three weeks, as it was clear to him that this was not the 
type of job that he wanted. A second major incident led him to leave his job at 
Kilimanjaro International. Having won a large DfID sponsored contract for his 
employer, worth $400,000, he fully expected to be responsible for its 
implementation, but was relegated by the firm’s head office to a minor 
administrative role on the project. His frustration was clear when he described 
what happened: 
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 I spent about a month writing this proposal. We won it; it was a tight 
competition. It was DfID sponsored and here now I’m managing a 
project that has outsiders who are managing it for me. Yet I’m the one 
who had conceived everything, so I knew what I really wanted. So with 
the outside interferences from the headquarters, from the Tanzanian 
office, I didn’t take it well. So I said let me close shop with them. 
If, as would appear to be the case, he is an individual with an internal locus of 
control then finding himself in a context that would better suit someone with an 
external locus of control, it is hardly surprising that he felt frustrated and decided 
to take ultimate responsibility for his future, even if this meant taking a leap into 
the unknown. Furthermore, during the time he was employed by Kilimanjaro, 
Christian earned his income entirely on commission - a fact that seems to 
corroborate the view that he clearly felt sure of his ability and in control of his 
life.  
This need for self-determination was also reflected in comments made by 
Jimmy that revealed a desire to move out of regular employment, where one’s 
decisions are compromised, and into running True Friends Records full time: 
 You know when you are working for somebody sometimes you want to 
do things your way, but he [the boss] says: no, I want you to do this. And 
you’re always saying: okay, if I would do this it would be better. But if it’s 
your [own] business you take the risk. You say let’s do this. And then you 
have the control. 
Sharon put the point more bluntly with his assertion that “I don’t like to work for 
others”. Expanding on the point he described working for someone else as      
“a situation where I don’t know where I’m going”. What is especially fascinating 
about this admission is that he seems to equate an independent entrepreneurial 
future, with all its attendant uncertainties, as less uncertain than being in paid 
employment, a position that can only be explained if he feels comfortable in 
taking full responsibility for his own decisions and fully capable of shaping his 
own future. When he was asked about what it is about running a company that 
gives him pleasure, his answer demonstrated the value that he places on being 
in control: 
 Number one, taking a decision. When you are running [a] company, you 
know what to do and how to do it. You know where you are and where 
you want to go. You know [what will happen] if you do [something], and 
what [will happen] if you do not do [something]…you plan for yourself - 
that is what I am meaning. I want to mean that you plan for yourself. 
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This was clearly in evidence too when talking to Gilbert A, a final year 
economics student. He revealed that he had already been offered two jobs after 
graduation, one at a bank and a second at an insurance company, but he had 
turned down both. Pressing him about the wisdom of turning down the certainty 
of a regular salary for the uncertainty of running his own business it became 
clear that he was determined to press on with his own venture, not least 
because he was aware that the effort expended working for someone else 
would increase the value of their company, while the same effort expended 
working for himself might increase the future asset value of his enterprise. The 
prospect of maintaining his freedom of action and having the possibility of 
building something of value for himself, outweighed the prospect of well-paid, 
secure, employment. 
In a low-income context like Rwanda, where uncertainty is likely to be 
heightened, one might expect that there would be a marked preference for the 
security of a ‘safe’ job. But the narratives suggested that the interviewees 
appeared to have a strong preference for the comparative uncertainty that 
characterises entrepreneurship, over the relative security of a regular salary. It 
is reflected in the fact that Annette, Christian, Damien and Eric A had all 
abandoned the relative safety of secure employment in favour of the uncertainty 
that came with starting a business. An additional four, Akaliza, Gilbert A, Jean 
and Sharon, had launched straight into starting businesses rather than seeking 
a regular job in the first place and a further three, Bosco, Jimmy and Jacques 
were planning to move from wage employment to running their ventures full 
time as soon as the business had achieved a threshold level of income. The 
Rwandan entrepreneurs then seemed strongly to be indicating the presence of 
the internal locus of control trait and that they were uncomfortable in positions 
where they feel it was being stifled. Instead of being daunted by the uncertainty 
that following an entrepreneurial course implies, they actually seemed to feel 
empowered by it.  
4.6.3 Need for Achievement 
The need for achievement expresses itself as a predisposition for striving to 
overcome difficult challenges and a desire for personal improvement, and has 
also been associated with a preparedness to accept negative financial returns. 
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Sarasvathy (2008: 122) noted too that her experts research sample also 
frequently commented that “failure is not an option”, to the extent that she 
identified it as “a dominant theme”. It is highly significant that it also appears to 
be strongly represented amongst the Rwandan entrepreneurs’ comments. 
No fewer than nine of the interviewees made comments during the interviews 
that would seem to be consistent with its presence. The language they used to 
describe why they were building their businesses was frequently peppered with 
expressions that seemed to indicate a strong urge to strive for personal 
achievement for its own sake. Annette for instance described herself as a 
“driven die hard” and Bosco had a need for “proving to myself…that I can do it”. 
Jacques too explained that for him “quitting or stopping was not an option” and 
that he “had to stay strong and try my best so that I can make the project 
successful”. When talking to Sharon, he too insisted “my head is full of 
ambitions. I have much to do”.  
Akaliza also betrayed a determination to “go out and do something on my own”. 
She feels driven especially to move into producing animated cartoons for the 
African market - cartoons that feature black African characters in place of the 
stereotypical white characters that dominate the cartoon market. But she feels 
she is “running out of time” to achieve what she describes as her “duty”. This 
was no small matter for Akaliza, who was deeply concerned about the 
subliminal values that the stereotypical images that are used in cartoons 
communicate to black African children: 
 When I was growing up I had friends who would say: oh I wish I had 
blonde hair…I wish I had blue eyes. Even now in Rwanda I talk to my 
young cousins, who are like ten years old and they say the same 
things…I remember, one of my cousins came over to play the Wii…the 
Nintendo Wii…and you know how you make these little Wii characters of 
yourself, to play on the game? And when she was designing hers she 
made it a little white girl, and I kept telling her, this is a ‘me’…this is 
supposed to be you and she was like: oh, this one’s so pretty. And those 
kind of things really upset me. 
This compulsion to achieve was also obviously felt by Christian who, on the one 
hand said he feels there is nothing worse than failure, yet simultaneously feels 
driven to try because he doesn’t want to fail by not trying, as if not trying would 
somehow represent an even greater level of failure for him. 
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The clearest revelations though were provided by Jean, who is quite plainly 
striving to achieve the esteem of others: 
 I don't want people to know me as Jean, just as Jean who creates 
software; I need people to look at my software and say: oh this software 
was created by this person. 
This would clearly have been a challenge, and friends and family had put it to 
him that he could make good money by developing applications on third party 
software, rather than developing his own computer code. But he was adamant 
that he wanted to be, and now is, known as the person who created the 
software that runs his own inventory management system. Rejecting safe 
options he asserted: 
 I need excitement. I need something that would really challenge me…
pushing me to do something that was going to impress people. That’s 
the whole thing, the whole image that I had. 
In section 2.4.1 it was pointed out that there is a problem with treating the Big 3 
traits as wholly independent variables and that the internal locus of control and 
need for achievement traits may covary. Interestingly, the Rwandan 
entrepreneurs appeared to provide some evidence that corroborates this, with 
comments made during the interviews that seemed to indicate the need for 
achievement trait was indeed present alongside the internal locus of control 
trait. Whilst there was not a perfect correlation between those making 
comments that seemed to echo the internal locus of control trait and those 
appearing to show the need for achievement trait, there was a high degree of 
overlap, as indicated in Figure 4.1. 
Figure 4.1 Internal Locus of Control and Need for Achievement 
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Another aspect that became clear in talking to the interviewees was that they 
were not short of confidence in their own abilities. Typical assertions that were 
made during the interviews in relation to starting the business included Akaliza’s 
“I felt so sure. I still feel very confident. I can do it…I can do anything really. 
Nothing ever feels too impossible”, Bosco’s “I’m self-confident. Whatever I want 
to do, I try to do it and I commit to it” and Eric A’s “I was very confident”. 
Similarly it was also present in Jean’s “I always felt like I had a great potential”, 
Sharon’s “we were very confident. I believe in myself” and Damien’s “I was 
confident I will be successful”. If such comments were shaped primarily by 
entrepreneurs’ internal locus of control and need for achievement, one might 
conclude that they indicate a tendency to be overconfident. Indeed that is 
probably what would normally be deduced by an external observer. However, if 
they felt that they had identified a viable opportunity, had checked it for validity 
via sketching as well as mitigating the identified risks, then the comments might 
well be a realistic reflection of a perfectly justified confidence, rather than 
overconfidence, and would therefore contradict the argument that 
entrepreneurs tend to be overconfident (Busenitz, 1999; Salamouris, 2013). 
4.6.4 Capacity for Working Long Hours 
As the narratives seemed to be confirming the presence of the need for 
achievement trait, the respondents were also asked about the hours they 
worked in a typical week, to see if the need for achievement might be reflected 
in a tendency to work extended hours. This did appear to be the case, with a 
clear indication that the entrepreneurs were used to working long hours. For 
some the workload was flexible, depending on whether there was a deadline to 
meet, but even when the load was relatively light the lower range for the hours 
worked was still high. Christian and Eric A, for example, might at the lower end 
of their ranges work only 56 or 54 hours a week respectively, but when there is 
a deadline to meet, such as preparing a tender, then this would typically rise to 
84 or 98 hours a week. A similar variable pattern was also described by both 
Annette and Willy.  
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Table 4.3 summarises the typical working week for the entrepreneurs. For those 
responses where a range was given the table shows the range midpoint. 
Table 4.3 Hours Worked by the Entrepreneurs 
The attitude that generally came through the narratives was one of being 
positively disposed towards working whatever hours might be needed to 
complete the task in hand. Akaliza insisted “I enjoy it, so it doesn’t always feel 
like work”, which echoed Jimmy’s “for me [when I finish] work, when I come 
here I don't feel it like a burden…I like it and there’s no big problem in that”. 
Jean too explained “I know I can stay night after night trying to solve one 
problem, or trying to make sure I will meet a deadline” while Christian answered 
pragmatically that “at the end of the day I think it pays; the long hours pay”. 
The comments suggest they did not regard themselves as being coerced into 
working long hours or exploited in any sense and that they did not appear to 
see any contradiction between their internal locus of control and the hours 
Entrepreneur Typical Weekly Hours Worked 
Akaliza 70
Annette 77
Bosco 70
Christian 70
Damien 60
Eric A 76
Gilbert A 77
Jacques 67
Jean 70
Jimmy 62
King Victor 68
Sharon 84
Singeras 77
Willy 81
Mean 72
Median 70
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worked. Rather, the comments would be consistent with the view that 
entrepreneurs possess high energy levels, which are expressed as an ability 
and preparedness to work the long hours required to establish a venture 
(Begley and Boyd, 1987; Sexton and Bowman, 1985). However, at this stage it 
is not possible to draw any great conclusions from this observation, as there is 
no way of knowing whether a capacity for working long hours may be a 
characteristic of all Rwandans, as opposed to being a tangible aspect of the 
entrepreneurs’ need for achievement. Whether the observation has any 
significance might become clearer when the next chapter looks at aspiring 
entrepreneurs and the hours they anticipate working. 
4.6.5 The Significance of Role Models 
Passing references are occasionally made in the theoretical texts that suggest 
entrepreneurs could have been influenced by role models, although the 
comments appear rarely to be developed. The interviews therefore also probed 
to see whether there was any evidence to suggest that the motive for starting 
an enterprise was influenced by the entrepreneurs striving to match role 
models. The responses split into three categories: individual, family and 
religious references. Individual references included the obvious ones - Nelson 
Mandela and President Paul Kagame - as well as famous individual 
entrepreneurs such as Warren Buffet or Steve Jobs. There was little evidence 
though that the Rwandan entrepreneurs were trying deliberately to emulate 
anyone in particular and where successful entrepreneurs were mentioned, this 
was really in the context of providing incidental confirmation that the 
entrepreneurial track was a good one to pursue.  
Three of the entrepreneurs made comments that suggested family backgrounds 
might have had a minor influence, such as Akaliza’s recognition that she had 
benefitted from a comfortable upbringing which her father had made possible 
through his own career struggle, and she did seem to want to prove that she 
could emulate his success. Bosco too had during his school holidays helped his 
mother with her food trading business and had noticed that compared to his 
father, who was a teacher, she was able to earn “more, very, more than 
whatever the father was earning”. Sharon’s mother had been killed during the 
genocide when he was only six years old, and it did seem to be the case that he 
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was striving to create a future for himself that his mother, were she alive, would 
have been proud of.  
There was also a minimal suggestion that religious conviction played a support 
role during times of stress, with both Bosco and Willy making comments that 
suggested they took comfort from their religious convictions, although there was 
no real evidence this provided any significant role model that they were 
following. Taken in aggregate, it was concluded that there was no strong 
evidence in the interviews to suggest that the entrepreneurs’ motives were 
derived from attempting to follow role models.  
4.6.6 Affecting the Lives of Others 
When exploring the motives behind starting a business, four of the interviewees 
made unprompted references to what appeared to be an altruistic desire to 
have a positive impact on the lives of other people. Akaliza indicated that she 
“really enjoyed training people”, while Bosco took satisfaction from the fact that 
his enterprises were able to provide incomes for his employees and their 
families and that he saw this as contributing more broadly to Rwanda’s 
economic development than his previous job as head of retail banking at KCB: 
 I’m impacting people and I’m supporting them and I’m supporting the 
growth of this economy…rather than being in a comfort zone and without 
making any impact, without helping others. 
Willy too appeared to take pride in “impacting as many people as possible”, 
while Jacque’s original motive in starting Dream Team was, as already pointed 
out, quite clearly grounded partially in his altruistic desire to see his former team 
mates able to earn a living from teaching football skills rather than having to 
borrow money from him. The desire to impact positively was also seen in his 
comment “it is my passion [laughs] maybe seeing, supporting, a kid and them 
become a very good football player in his life”. 
Although altruism appeared to be present, it figured explicitly in only four of the 
narratives suggesting that, if anything, it was nothing more then a subsidiary 
motive. It must be considered too that such expressions of contributing to the 
greater good of Rwandan society could be shaped to a high degree by the 
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government’s positive promotion of entrepreneurship and the role that it is 
expected to play in building the country’s economic success. 
4.6.7 Summary 
The Rwandan entrepreneurs’ narratives consistently downplayed the 
importance of personal financial gains that might accrue from enterprise 
ownership. They claimed to be driven instead by a need to determine, for 
themselves, the course that their lives would take in the future. If true, this 
represents a departure from the economic theory that entrepreneurs are driven 
to capture entrepreneurial rents that are on offer. The narratives also suggested 
that the decision to start an enterprise was an act of volition, rather than being 
driven by necessity. Even Willy, who had been made redundant, was already 
operating an informal enterprise in parallel to being employed and took the 
opportunity to formalise his previous activities. Thus the narratives add weight 
to the argument, expressed at section 2.2.5, that the GEM opportunity-necessity 
model is a false construct. 
Internal locus of control and need for achievement were both strongly in 
evidence and appeared jointly to play a role in shaping the entrepreneurs’ 
prioritisation of self-determination over financial gain.  
4.7 Conclusion 
The interviews with Rwandan entrepreneurs did correspond to aspects of the 
theoretical literature. However, they also clearly contradicted other theoretical 
arguments that have come to be closely associated with the development 
prescription promulgated by the leading global institutions and international aid 
agencies. 
The narratives cast doubt on the view that entrepreneurs seek to capture 
entrepreneurial rents. Rather they appeared to concur with the arguments 
advanced by Schumpeter, Baumol and McClelland that entrepreneurs are 
prepared to accept negative financial returns in exchange for the psychological 
rewards of running their own business. The preparedness to accept such 
negative financial returns was suggested in particular when those interviewees 
who were running a business in parallel to having a full-time job talked about 
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the level of salary they would be prepared to sacrifice in exchange for working 
full time in their enterprises. This raises an important point. Before they could 
move across full time it would be necessary for the enterprise to reach a level of 
income that could support them, even if they were accepting a discount on their 
existing salary. Clearly too the business would have to be able to generate long-
run profits if it were to be viable and deliver the psychological rewards they were 
seeking. Thus a financial dimension cannot be entirely separated from the 
primary motive claimed by the successful entrepreneurs. Furthermore the 
accounts were retrospective in nature and would have been influenced by the 
interviewees’ own subjective recollections and interpretations of their 
experiences, which, post-facto, may have led to a tendency to underplay the 
relevance of financial considerations prior to creating their enterprises.  
The presence of need for achievement, internal locus of control and tolerance 
of ambiguity were all observed in the interviewees’ narratives. However, the 
reality was more nuanced than was suggested by the respective theories. The 
narratives suggested that internal locus of control and need for achievement 
were both interconnected and appeared to inform the entrepreneurs’ desire for 
self-determination, which then seemed to provide the main motive for the 
interviewees’ decision to set up enterprises. 
Although effectuation was indicated, it was only partially observed. The core 
technique of calculating affordable loss was missing from the accounts. 
Leveraging ‘whom I know’ was evident only in Gilbert A’s account of how he 
convinced a friend to put up the risk capital that was needed to get his business 
stationery enterprise started. Additionally, the principle of creating as opposed to 
discovering markets was also only observed in a small number of instances. 
The resulting dilute form of effectuation was seen in the predilection for diving in 
and developing an enterprise contingently. However, the theory that causation is 
rejected in favour of effectuation was not supported. Although the entrepreneurs 
did not use the traditional STP process to create business plans, they did 
nonetheless use causal reasoning in the form of sketching to reassure 
themselves about the commercial opportunities that they thought they had 
identified. Thus although effectuation was present in a diluted form, it was 
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counterbalanced by an entirely rational approach to checking the validity of the 
enterprise idea. 
The popular notion that entrepreneurs are risk tolerant was thoroughly 
undermined by the interviews. In fact the Rwandan entrepreneurs took 
measures to assess and then mitigate the risks that they would face. In this they 
conformed to Sarasvathy’s argument that entrepreneurs appear to believe they 
have the ability to change the rules of the game and thereby to “make success 
happen” (Sarasvathy, 2008: 17). Although the Rwandan entrepreneurs were 
prepared to countenance the possibility of enterprise failure and to engage with 
the uncertainty that is associated with venture formation, the combined 
evidence indicates that they were far from cavalier in their reasoning and 
decision making. Rather, they appeared to be acting in a manner that is fully 
consistent with Tuckett’s theory of rational action (2011: 184), which argues that 
when the standard rational choice model is inapplicable individuals still take 
action that appears to be rational from their point of view. Thus, despite the 
inherent uncertainty they faced, the successful entrepreneurs gathered 
information, assessed their options and attempted to take decisions that would 
increase their prospects of success, even though the outcome of their actions 
could not be predicted with any certainty.  
When an internal locus of control and need for achievement are combined with 
the risk-mitigating and sketching techniques that were employed, the 
entrepreneurs felt empowered to engage in enterprise formation, despite the 
attendant uncertainties. Hence instead of being a psychological predisposition, 
the entrepreneur’s tolerance of ambiguity appears to be a perfectly logical 
reaction to having taken the rational steps that they believe will increase the 
likelihood of their success. Such rational action also appeared to extend to the 
entrepreneurs’ predisposition for acting contingently. Being attuned to the 
possibility of failure they would readily pursue rational alternatives, rather than 
clinging on to failed models. As a result their behaviour can be seen to be highly 
redolent of Tuckett’s observation that decision making is “consistently context-
dependent and path-dependent and also reversible when contexts 
change” (Tuckett, 2011: 188). 
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Most striking, though, was the extent to which the interviews contradicted 
arguments about the importance of access to credit (OECD, 2004, 2006; IFC, 
2010; Beck, 2013). The interviewees did not need nor indeed want credit. They 
preferred instead to use their own money, which was often derived from wage 
labour, when starting their enterprises. When this proved to be insufficient or 
unavailable, they were adept at finding other ways to fund the business that 
obviated the need for credit. This is clearly at odds with the argument that the 
low incidence of SMEs in developing economies is the direct result of intending 
entrepreneurs’ difficulties in obtaining credit and therefore calls into question the 
strategy of increasing access to credit on the pretext that it will automatically be 
taken up by intending entrepreneurs who will use it to fund enterprise formation. 
Actively building a network of weak ties was seen to be employed as a 
deliberate strategy by the entrepreneurs, but was designed to increase 
exposure to individuals who may become future customers rather than creating 
opportunities to leverage resources or provide preferential access to 
commercial opportunities. 
In summary, the narratives indicated that the Rwandan entrepreneurs preferred 
funding options other than credit, used sketching rather than traditional 
business planning, acted contingently, identified and mitigated the risks that 
might be associated with the intended venture, developed social networks that 
could help deliver future business to their enterprises and could envision what 
their businesses would look like in the future. These six key characteristics were 
underpinned by a dominant motive, that of achieving self-determination - a 
motive that is considerably more important to the Rwandan entrepreneurs than 
the financial gains that could accrue to them. 
The following table summarises the degree to which the dominant motive and 
the six key characteristics were present in the interviews. While the table 
indicates the frequency with which these characteristics were evidenced, this is 
not meant to imply any ranking of importance. As the research was exploratory 
such ranking or any subsequent assignment of weightings would require further 
research designed specially to follow up on these insights. 
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Table 4.4 Motive and Characteristics Displayed by Entrepreneurs in Rwanda 
The next chapter will examine the extent to which these attributes also appear 
to be present amongst individuals who aspire to create businesses. The degree 
to which they appear to be replicated may then shed light on the phenomenon 
under investigation: why it should be that the new class of entrepreneurs and 
the vibrant SME sector, that were envisaged in Vision 2020, are still struggling 
to emerge in post-genocide Rwanda despite the concerted effort that has gone 
into building a context that should encourage and support their formation.  
 
Self-
determination
Dilute 
Effectuation
Avoidance 
of Credit at 
Startup
Use of 
Sketching Envisioning
Risk-
mitigation
Network 
Building
Akaliza x x x x x x
Annette x x x x x x
Bosco x x x x x
Christian x x x x x x x
Damien x x x x
Eric A x x  x x
Gilbert A x x x x x x
Jacques x x x x x x x
Jean x x x x x x x
Jimmy x x x x x x
Sharon x x x x x x
Willy x x x x x x
Frequency   11 12 11 11 9 9 7
Percentage 92% 100% 92% 92% 75% 75% 58%
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Chapter 5 The Interviews with Aspiring Entrepreneurs  
This chapter examines the interviews conducted with aspiring entrepreneurs in 
Rwanda - individuals who intended to create an enterprise or were in the initial 
stages of setting one up. It seeks to determine the extent to which they 
appeared to mirror the attributes that it was concluded, in Chapter 4, 
characterised successful entrepreneurs in Rwanda. The insights gained will 
then facilitate an assessment of the Rwandan enterprise paradox and its 
possible explanation, which will be undertaken in Chapter 6.  
While Chapter 4 analysed a wide range of themes, in order to identify key 
characteristics, processes and motives associated with successful 
entrepreneurs, Chapter 5 will focus more narrowly on these particular attributes 
as it is looking for evidence for their replication. This will sometimes mean it is 
necessary to look at the antithesis of a particular characteristic in order to 
clearly differentiate between the accounts given.  
The analysis will again be illustrated throughout with verbatim quotes from the 
interview transcriptions. As with the previous chapter this may mean that the 
English is occasionally imperfect, but it does ensure that the interviewees’ 
voices are heard accurately and in context. 
5.1 Introducing the Aspiring Entrepreneurs 
The author interviewed a total of 21 aspiring entrepreneurs in Rwanda. They 
are detailed in Table 5.1 along with the types of businesses that they intend to 
develop. Two of the interviewees, Daniel and Rehema, were collaborating on a 
joint concept although Rehema was additionally exploring, on her own, the 
potential for a second enterprise.  
One of the interviewees, Augustin, wanted to establish a new tourist centre, 
which would additionally provide training facilities for those seeking jobs in the 
tourism industry. He had also previously started a tour and travel agency, which 
he claimed during the interview employed six people. On closer examination, 
though, it became apparent this was not actually the case. The agency merely 
referred business to other tour operators, and income was derived from taking a 
markup on third-party costs. The claim to be employing six people included the 
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self-employed drivers whose costs Augustin marked up. It was therefore 
concluded that he should be categorised as an aspiring entrepreneur. 
Table 5.1 The Aspiring Entrepreneurs 
Name Age Gender Planned Enterprise
Aloys 26 Male Trading 
Aphrodice 28 Male Medical mobile application
Augustin 42 Male Tourist centre
Claire 31 Female Health centre
Claude 28 Male Undecided
Colette 35 Female Event management
Daniel 31 Male Event management
Emile 36 Male Tour operator
Eric B 22 Male Business consultancy
Germaine 26 Female Leather goods manufacturer
Gilbert B 28 Male Food processing
Janvier 26 Male Bakery
Jessica 23 Female Foreign exchange bureau
John 41 Male Engineering consultancy
Josh 31 Male Electrical equipment installation
Mark 24 Male Food delivery service
Queen 22 Female Fashion design
Rehema 27 Female Event management
Direct selling agency
Robert A 25 Male Import/export
Robert B 46 Male Guesthouse
Samuel 28 Male Private school
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5.2 Motives for Starting a Business 
The theoretical arguments explored in Chapter 2 suggested entrepreneurs are 
either motivated to capture the entrepreneurial rents on offer, are forced into 
pursuing an entrepreneurial course because of a lack of realistic alternatives, or 
are driven by specific psychological traits that predispose them towards setting 
up enterprises. It was argued at section 4.6 that if entrepreneurs were motivated 
by the opportunity to capture entrepreneurial rents, or were driven to start an 
enterprise that could generate an income where none exists, then one might 
anticipate that monetary concerns would be uppermost when Rwandan 
entrepreneurs had started their businesses. Chapter 4 concluded, though, that 
the successful entrepreneurs’ narratives diverged from these theoretical 
positions. They claimed they had not been driven by the financial returns on 
offer or by necessity and seemed to be primarily motivated by a desire for self-
determination. This section will look at the extent to which the aspiring 
entrepreneurs replicated this orientation.  
5.2.1 Is It Just About the Money? 
The accounts given by the successful entrepreneurs consistently negated the 
idea that they had been driven primarily by financial motives. With this in mind, 
one might have expected that the aspiring entrepreneurs’ narratives would also 
relegate the significance of a financial motive as they were seeking to follow the 
same path. But this was not found to be the case. 
Of the twenty-one aspiring entrepreneurs interviewed, only five - Aphrodice, 
Colette, Daniel, Eric B and Mark - gave accounts that specifically refuted the 
idea they were motivated by financial considerations. This lack of concern for 
material gain was evident when Mark talked about Foodcourt, the food home 
delivery business he was in the process of developing. Asked to describe what 
his future success would look like, he declared:  
 Me personally? Well, I’m not in it for the money [laughs]…I mean that 
would be the easiest way to put it…say make a million dollars. No, that’s 
not it for me. I want to do things that matter. 
Pressed on the point, he explained he was more interested in seeing “people 
using tools that I’ve put in place to make their lives better”.  
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This rejection of a financial motive was also indicated by Colette, who had been 
organising events as an informal “hobby”. She had also been helping a friend 
who had a contract for writing reports that were used during events organised 
by the Imbuto Foundation - a charity set up by President Kagame’s wife. When 
this friend “got a better job” she handed the contract for report writing onto 
Colette, who saw it as an opportunity to “expand that business, instead of doing 
only reports”. She decided to register her own company and wanted to use the 
Imbuto Foundation contract as a platform for formalising her hobby. When 
asked what it was that drove her to want to have her own event management 
business, Colette justified the decision in terms of the wider contribution she felt 
it would make to the community: 
 First, I’d love to offer the best that I can offer for my community. Because 
I’m sure if I’m working full time in business, I will be very useful to the 
community. But where I’m working now, I have to do what they tell me to 
do. I can be of course innovative, but I don’t see really the impact there I 
think I’m able to offer to the community. 
Probed about how she would judge her future success produced the reply “if I 
have a good number of contracts, and I’m fulfilling the duties - I’m honouring 
what I pledged for”, and when the author raised the question of the financial 
performance of the business, it was clear material gain was far from being 
uppermost in her mind:  
 …at the beginning I will not focus more on money. It’s more on the 
service, quality service that I am offering. Building a name, or a brand, to 
get more contracts in the future. 
Interestingly, Colette’s prioritisation of living up to her clients’ expectations 
closely resembled the narrative provided by successful entrepreneur Akaliza at 
section 4.6.1, who also prioritised her clients’ reaction to her work.  
Like Colette, Daniel was coincidentally also planning to develop an event 
management company with his colleague Rehema. He too volunteered 
comments that were highly suggestive of his being focussed on seeing his 
concept realised, rather than the material gain that could accrue when stating   
“I love the idea and I think even if doesn’t bring so much profitability I still 
believe in the idea”.  
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It would be wrong, though, to conclude that all five were ambivalent about 
financial matters. Aphrodice for instance, was endeavouring to start a company 
that would produce software applications for mobile phones. At the time of the 
interview he was developing a medical application that provides personalised 
health advice and remote access to a panel of doctors. He was confident he 
would “make money, for sure”, despite asserting he was “not focusing too much 
on money”. Rather, he saw it as a means to an end. He wanted “to work, get 
money and solve problems with money I worked for”. This was also seen in the 
account related by Eric B, who planned to create a business services venture 
called Start Up Rwanda, which could provide consultancy advice to foreign 
businesses who want to invest in Rwanda. He too was aware the enterprise he 
wanted to create would need to make money, but when asked whether success 
would be seen in the profits made by the business Eric B unambiguously replied  
“no”. Asked to explain, he went on to say:  
 …because I think the main thing, although we also need money in our 
business, the most [important] thing is that we attract more investors into 
our country. More people getting employment. That will…when we…the 
company is growing of course, more people will get employment, more 
investment in our country. Then we will think we have contributed to the 
welfare of our people.  
Thus, although he was aware of the need for the business to produce money to 
be viable, it appeared to be located within the context of being a means for 
achieving a more altruistic end. The account he provided suggested that making 
money was not his main driver. 
Ranged against these five instances, though, were thirteen accounts where the 
motive for starting a business appeared to be quite plainly focussed on the 
prospect of making money. This was often expressed unambiguously, for 
instance in Augustin’s “to me money comes first”, Gilbert B’s “I want to be rich” 
and Jessica’s explanation that she wanted to create her own forex bureau 
because “it is profitable”. She also went on to imply that it would provide an 
opportunity to circumvent having to pay income tax that would be due if she 
were employed. Such candidness was also seen in Claude’s account. He 
wanted “to make much more money”, a comment that was virtually identical to 
Janvier, who explained he wished to start a business because he too “wanted to 
make more money”. In the same vein, Samuel also stated during his narrative 
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“making money is really very good”, while Queen insisted “everybody wants to 
make money”. 
Asked about his motives for starting his electrical installation business, Josh 
explained he was seeking to match the personal gains he had seen accruing to 
others in similar undertakings: 
 Okay, the motivation presently, I’ll tell you that we have seen other 
businesses that are like ours and if we see what they are getting we…   
it just drived us and we have the potential. These people have this, have 
this. Buildings, they have good vehicles, they have good families, they 
have money. Meaning that we said: oh, we can also hustle and fight and 
sweat but we can get this. 
Pressed about the balance between financial gains and pride in seeing the 
business succeed, yielded a reply that diverged from successful entrepreneurs’ 
tendency to prioritise the non-material: 
 Well, finance is more better. Finance is more better because getting 
proud of the company is different. You might be getting proud of the 
company that is not generating anything.  
He expanded on the point by adding that the company had been brought into 
existence specifically to make money. “So finance is the great, great point that 
made us go for the business, because what we are looking for is money” he 
said. 
The most extreme case, though, was Robert B, who was aiming to establish a 
guesthouse on the highway between Kigali and Nyamata, where a new airport 
is planned. His whole narrative was peppered with overt references to making 
money. These included his volunteering that he “always thought it’s a good idea 
to be rich, to make money” and “I knew I wanted to make money - much money 
and real quick”. This desire to make quick money had even led him to take 
some substantial risks. When referring to the website he had once created for 
the Rwandan Police Force, he freely admitted he had very little idea at the time 
how to design a website. As a result he had created one that “was a bunch of 
too many pictures, bundled up to just make a web page”. It was so poor “it could 
not load” properly, so he had to keep deflecting criticism about his work:  
  
!202
 …the speed was too slow. So each time the police would tell me: but 
your thing is not loading. I’d say: but it’s not me, it’s your server, it’s your 
speed. I always went round like I didn’t know what this was - I was really 
venturing into an empty world. 
But in recounting the experience Robert B was, nonetheless, obviously proud of 
the amount of money he had made from the project: 
 I earned five thousand dollars, which was probably 120 more times the 
salary I would get a month. It’s like I had earned myself 120 months. It 
was amazing. I didn’t think I could do this. That motivated me. 
When the author asked him to assess the importance he attached to the 
monetary reward he could obtain from a business versus the freedom it might 
afford, he had no hesitation in replying “80 percent I need that money - give me 
that money, I will get my freedom [laughs]. Give me that money, I will get my 
freedom”, and went on to indicate a clear means-ends rationality when adding 
“I’m looking at money as being a means to the end”. 
The interviewees’ narratives were at times, though, contradictory. Claire, a 
qualified radiographer, wanted to establish a health promotion centre that would 
provide a range of facilities including nutritional advice and health counselling. 
Her account had initially seemed to imply she was motivated by the prospect of 
being her own boss and the altruistic opportunity to encourage people to take 
greater responsibility for their health. But when asked to assess the relative 
importance of the financial returns versus being her own boss, it was clear she 
too was more focussed on the fact the planned enterprise “can generate 
money” and added in confirmation “financial independence for me is the first”.  
The sense of contributing something that would be of benefit to others was also 
apparent, initially, when Germaine justified her desire to create an enterprise 
that would manufacture leather goods:  
 And for me it’s pleased me because I help others. You see if you run 
your own business, you don’t work alone. You need some other people 
whom you will work together [with]. So I feel happy because also me I 
have some people who I help. 
But when asked how she would judge her success, the reply indicated her 
motives were also partly shaped by the financial returns: 
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 What I do for saying that it is successful, seeming that I have to calculate 
my expenses and compare to my investment and then see the income. If 
my balance sheet is okay, and I see the benefit, money, is okay, that’s 
how I see that I am successful. 
Similarly, Rehema expressed her view that it “would be nice also [to] empower 
other people...for them to actually fend for themselves”. Pressed to expand on 
this point and compare it with the financial benefits, she too prioritised the 
financial - although this was within the context of being able to facilitate helping 
her family to be “empowered and succeed also in whatever they want”. The 
contradictory nature of these accounts was also evident when Robert A was 
asked about how he would judge success of his plan to create a business that 
would import and resell food processing equipment. He initially couched his 
reply in terms suggesting he was focussed more on the growth of the enterprise 
than the financial gain he might accrue from it. Asked to assess the relative 
importance of business growth versus the salary it could provide, he replied “the 
performance of the business is more”. However, in practically the same breath 
he also made it clear he had a longer range anticipation he would eventually be 
“arriving at the level which I want to be”. Although he was patient about the 
enterprise’s rate of development, he was nonetheless aware “a business can 
earn much money” in the future and elaborated “as the time is going that’s how 
also the profit will [be] growing, earning more”. Thus, while he might not have 
been overly motivated in the short term by the financial gain that could accrue 
from a business, he was clearly anticipating it in the longer term. 
In the course of the interviews, eleven of the aspiring entrepreneurs also 
volunteered comments that showed that the decision to start a business was 
influenced, at last in part, by recognition that the job market in Rwanda was 
weak and that the government was actively encouraging people to set up 
businesses as an alternative to wage employment. It was observable, for 
example, when exploring Aloys’s desire to start a trading company that would 
import consumer goods:    
 I wanted to start my own business simply because in Rwanda there is a 
problem. The job market of Rwanda is not a lot, simply because most 
people, most graduates are waiting for, are seeking for a job from the 
government. 
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This concern about the job market was also shared by Emile, who commented 
that “to get a job is difficult”. Similarly, when Gilbert B was asked why he wanted 
to start a business he revealed his “purpose to start this kind of business is to 
be self-employed”. Asked to elaborate, he explained he had been unemployed 
since graduating from university and when pressed further that he had 
essentially been surviving by “begging from my close relatives”. Queen too cited 
the weakness of the job market and a deeper concern that sprung from it when 
talking about her wish to develop her own fashion business: 
 …in Rwanda there is some risk. When girls come and go to ask for a job 
there, there’s some men [who] tell you if you want a job you got to have 
sex with us…yourself, to give…to have sex. I think that is difficult to me, 
if the man asks me to do that. So I think that I can’t go to ask him, the 
man, asking for a job. Because they know we are, the women, we are 
weak. To the other things. So they think that we will… our wages is low, 
and they think that we would love to have money and that they think…he 
think that I will accept if he ask me…that I will accept because I want this 
job. So I think that I can’t go ask for a job for that reason. 
When talking to Janvier about his intention to start a bakery, there was also 
evidence to suggest that this too was linked initially to the need to fashion a job. 
Delving into his plans for the enterprise revealed he had no personal 
experience of working as a baker. Questioned specifically about who then 
would be producing the finished products he intended to sell revealed he was 
reluctant to employ anyone because “that can cost me”. Exploring his plan 
further, it appeared Janvier intended to exploit a classic Kirznerian arbitrage 
opportunity. He meant to buy finished products in Kigali and resell them in the 
village of Nyabugogo. In fact this was a well established pattern for him to earn 
an income, as Janvier’s narrative included a string of past activities that are 
best described as petty vending. These included hawking clothes and sorghum 
beer, photography, and reselling beverages. It appeared that what he really had 
in mind was another petty vending operation, which would initially provide him 
with an income. In time this might then generate personal savings that he could 
subsequently invest in building a bakery.      
Spontaneous comments that were volunteered by six of the interviewees also 
appeared to confirm they had been influenced directly by the government’s 
promotion of entrepreneurship as a career choice. This included Aphrodice’s 
explanation that “our President encourages the start up of our business…you 
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have to start your business”, Claude’s “our government are encouraging people 
[who] want to run their own business, to be entrepreneurs” and was suggested 
by Jessica’s assertion that “the government has a vision of the country”. Robert 
A too, while discussing risk, explained that the government “want us to start a 
big business” and Samuel also asserted “the government has tried to teach 
people about how they can be job creators”. The clearest explanation though 
was given by Aloys’s further comments, which placed the government’s SME 
strategy firmly within the context of a weak labour market:  
 Unfortunately Rwanda doesn’t have job market enough. That is why the 
Rwandan Government always encourages those people who are 
finished their studies to create their own business through for instance 
through entrepreneurship like that what we are talking about and other 
activities that can help them getting income. That’s the reason why the 
Government of Rwanda encourages you, broadly the students, 
graduates or other people who have finished their studies to create their 
own businesses. 
In summary, thirteen of the twenty-one aspiring entrepreneurs made comments 
that appeared to suggest they were financially motivated, which would be 
consistent with arguments that entrepreneurs are driven to capture 
entrepreneurial profits that are on offer. Eleven of the interviewees also made 
nuanced comments that indicated they were responding directly to the 
government’s invocation to create an enterprise as an alternative to competing 
in a weak labour market, thereby echoing the view explored at section 2.3.2 that 
some individuals may seek to start an enterprise in order to create some form of 
‘job’ where none exists (Banerjee and Duflo, 2011: 26). Only five of the aspiring 
entrepreneurs’ accounts seemed to mirror the successful entrepreneurs’ 
rejection of financial motives. 
5.2.2 Internal Locus Of Control 
As explored in the second chapter, entrepreneurs are thought to have an 
internal locus of control. They feel empowered to take measures to control their 
own destiny (Chell, 2008: 98) and have a fear of being controlled by others    
(de Vries, 2000: 5). Section 4.6.2 observed that successful entrepreneurs in 
Rwanda exhibited this internal locus of control trait, in line with the theoretical 
arguments.  
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The characteristic was also seen to be present amongst the aspiring 
entrepreneurs. Fourteen of them made comments during the interviews that 
suggested an internal locus of control, of which five appeared to indicate a 
particular antipathy for authority. It was evident in Claude’s:  
 I want to prepare my own life without the interference of others, and the 
pressure of others. You know it’s very difficult when someone can often 
command you what to do.  
This was also seen in Colette’s “where I’m working now, I have to do what they 
tell me to do”. When it was pointed out to her that being employed might be a 
safer option than starting her own business, she replied “it’s always better to 
work for yourself, instead of working for somebody”. The same sentiment was 
also expressed by Eric B, who felt having his own business would be “better 
than going in there and working according to what the boss wants”, as was the 
case with Claire who maintained:  
 …people who are like me, they do not like bosses giving instructions. 
Some time when they are giving instruction, you want to do it your own 
way.  
Robert A, meanwhile, bluntly observed “I can’t work for someone else” -            
a comment that was very reminiscent of successful entrepreneur Sharon’s        
“I don't like to work for others”. 
Four of the interviewees were quite explicit about wanting to feel in control. 
Germaine volunteered “when you own your own business you control yourself” 
and Rehema, when talking about a publicity campaign she had managed for a 
previous employer recounted how she had enjoyed the control she had exerted 
over the project. Mark too joked that while not being “a control freak” he 
nonetheless liked situations where he “could be in control [laughs]”, and Daniel 
explained he “would totally love to have control of my life so that I can decide to 
do what I want”. In a comment that bore a remarkable similarity to successful 
entrepreneur Jean’s remarks, Daniel went on to explain that working for 
someone else would mean he would:  
 …not be able to control my life because I will get a particular job to do 
and I will be stuck there. And all the dreams I’ve ever had, all I wanted to 
do for myself, maybe for my future family…I will not be able to achieve. 
And so for me I think if I can be able to control my life it will make me 
more happier. I think I will get more happiness from it. 
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Four of the interviewees’ accounts also featured overt references that judged 
working for someone else as more stressful than the uncertainty they would 
face when creating their own business. It was seen when Eric B, for instance, 
claimed working to another’s agenda imparted stress, whereas setting up an 
enterprise would bring freedom from such stress:  
 I think the first stress is working on the things you think…you are guided 
to do. That somebody is the one guiding your thoughts to do this. I think 
that is the first stress. But when you do the things you have passion to 
do, I think it’s not stress.  
A broadly similar point was made by Samuel who felt too that creating an 
enterprise would free him of the pressure that comes with working for someone 
else:  
 …because sometimes when you have your employers, sometimes they 
tell you to do things which even you, you are not…maybe with your 
conscience, you feel you are not supposed to do. But you do it simply 
because it’s your superior you will have to obey. And sometimes you can 
even do something that you don’t like, which…but when you are doing 
your own business, you are free. You get more freedom. Getting more 
freedom means that you do something as you want. 
The same preference was also seen when Emile recounted “working for others, 
[that] is where I get stress” and in Aphrodice’s “I want to be independent” and 
his further justification that:  
 …if I work for someone all my energy, my intelligence will contribute to 
the development of the progress of that owner’s business. 
Josh too explained that he and his partners would rather “drink water and eat 
one chapati but work for ourselves”. For Josh this was preferable “because it’s 
me who makes a decision for myself. No one is on my back”. 
This preference for the uncertainty of enterprise creation over the relative 
security of wage employment might seem unusual in a developing economy 
context, given the absence of social safety nets. Yet it was also seen to be a 
dominant characteristic in the successful entrepreneurs’ accounts. The apparent 
paradox might be readily explained, though, if these individuals see a qualitative 
difference between the externally imposed stress of working for someone else, 
versus the self-imposed stress of creating an enterprise. Having an anti-
authoritarian predisposition and a fear of being controlled, individuals with an 
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internal locus of control may feel their natural instincts are severely 
compromised by being in wage employment, despite its relative security.  
When exploring the paradox with aspiring entrepreneurs several of them 
rationalised their preference for entrepreneurial uncertainty by offering 
explanations that echoed the comment made by successful entrepreneur 
Gilbert A: that as an employee the salary one earned was conditional upon 
enriching one’s employer. Like Gilbert A their expressions of internal locus of 
control had a corresponding monetary dimension, where it was viewed as 
preferable to engage with uncertainty rather than contributing disproportionately 
to someone else’s financial success. “The way people are giving you a greater 
amount of salary, it means that they have earned more” commented Robert A, 
adding further that he wanted to be someone “offering a good salary, not being 
someone receiving a good salary”. Samuel similarly observed “the kind of job 
I’m doing is generating to my boss, for maybe an example $2 million. And       
$2 million I’m only getting $100 out of it [laughs]” and added that the realisation 
one was enriching an employer could have a knock-on effect on one’s 
motivation: 
 …it makes you discouraged and you don’t even fulfil your duties as 
you’re supposed to do it, because you find that you are not the most 
beneficiary. He wants to be the most beneficiary in the business, not 
you. So if you want to be the most beneficiary, start your own business. 
Beyond her concerns about the risk of sexual exploitation, Queen too cited the 
problem of contributing to someone else’s enrichment: 
 To work with someone is difficult because he…you work with all [your] 
strengths to give him a company [that will] grow up. I think that in my 
mind, I think why can’t I go and give my own company - why can 
[should] I give him all…I can work for him for many years for a little thing 
[money]. And he…that man…he grow with that business, but I no have 
[don’t have] profit for that. So I think that I can’t go and ask for a job. 
This sense that one’s contribution would be undervalued was also present when 
Josh, in the same vein, asserted “what we have discovered is that what they 
pay you is not worth what you’ve done”. 
Contrasting the fourteen accounts that were suggestive of an internal locus of 
control with the accounts explored in the previous section revealed that 
expressions of an internal locus of control could be associated with quite 
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contradictory attitudes towards money. Five of the aspiring entrepreneurs 
exhibiting an internal locus of control - Aphrodice, Daniel, Mark, Eric B and 
Colette - had also explicitly rejected being motivated by money, while the 
remainder had indicated the exact opposite. Claude, Claire, Robert A, 
Germaine, Rehema, Samuel, Queen, Josh and Emile had all given accounts 
that showed they were specifically motivated by the money they hoped to make, 
and that this was often related to trying to create a job in a weak labour market.  
The question of how to deal with such linkages and contradictions will be picked 
up in the final chapter.       
5.2.3 Need for Achievement 
Section 4.6.3 explored evidence to support the theory that entrepreneurs have 
a need for achievement. It was seen that this characteristic was present in the 
successful entrepreneurs’ narratives. Nine of the aspiring entrepreneurs also 
gave accounts that contained references that appeared to match the successful 
entrepreneurs’ need for achievement. 
Confiding that his family expected he would fail to make a success of his 
planned food delivery service Foodcourt, Mark felt he had “to make it” and, in a 
comment that echoed both the Rwandan entrepreneurs and Sarasvathy’s 
expert entrepreneurs asserted “as far as giving up is concerned, there is no 
giving up”. His desire for success and capacity for perseverance were conveyed 
in his “I don’t mean to boast here, but I think an average guy would have given 
up a long time ago”. The narrative also encompassed his refusal to accept 
mediocrity. It was plainly apparent when he recounted his decision to abandon 
his university studies, a decision fuelled in part by the poor quality of the 
teaching he had experienced: 
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 …all I expected from certain institutions is thirty percent…I know that I 
can come up with the seventy percent. But I didn’t even get fifteen 
percent from there, for the three years I was there. And by this I mean 
lecturers that are interested in building, really smart minds and minds 
that are going to change…bring about change and, you know, the real 
change in Rwanda. Like, smart minds, I [laughs] I expected so much 
from these guys and it was the complete opposite. I mean, they just 
threw lecture notes at us and at times I felt like…I mean to them it was 
just another way to get money, a salary. I have a salary, so I can show 
up to class if I wanted to…I mean I can leave notes behind, let them 
[students] do exams and then move onto the next level. I mean that’s 
what it looked like to me and…you see, I put up with that, because that’s 
how it was from the beginning, the first year, I put up with that. 
However, the teaching input wasn’t his only concern. Mark also went on to 
express his disillusionment with the fact the student body were complicit in the 
mediocrity he perceived: 
  But what really killed me mostly was the students, the environment. I 
couldn’t put up with that. I couldn’t put up with people who were okay 
with mediocrity. I mean, we all see that man this is so mediocre…I mean 
those guys can do there…we can stand up and ask for…for a better 
education system but no, everyone was fine with it. 
This desire for moving beyond the average was also apparent with John, who 
was the managing director of Gasabo 3D, an agency that specialised in 
producing three-dimensional designs for architectural, engineering and 
industrial clients. “I want to be a great leader and a successful managing 
director”, he announced and embellished the comment that such an 
achievement would give him confidence he could “be a successful entrepreneur 
in my own business at any time”. 
A need to demonstrate one’s value was also strongly evident in Eric B’s 
account. When asked where he thought he got his motivation from, Eric B 
revealed a highly personal experience that had, at the time, caused him 
considerable distress and appeared to have spurred him on to prove himself. 
He explained that at the age of 16, while at school, he had been wrongly 
accused of a misdemeanour. “I was not the one who did it” he recounted, 
although he “was suspected to be the one because I was stubborn ” and was 68
subsequently “thrown out of the school”. Despite pleading his innocence, the 
school principal, a bishop, refused to believe Eric B and told him “you have to 
 ‘Stubborn’ is used in Rwanda as a term implying misbehaviour. It was encountered on several 68
occasions. 
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go out there and suffer. Live a bad life so that others should look at you and you 
should be an example”. Eric B went on to explain:  
 Then in my heart…I didn’t say anything at that time, but in that time I 
thought [when] he told me that, I thought that I have to be successful. 
What you think should not be what should be. Then it’s like, I lived some 
difficult life by that time. But later it started going on well and I think that’s 
the main thing that motivates me. That I have to be successful - at any 
cost.  
The refusal to accept failure also appeared in Augustin’s account. He explained 
he had to abandon university because of the genocide, as he was “on the list of 
people who must be killed in Butare”. Having to quit his studies had obviously 
left its mark, and Augustin recounted at length that he wanted to return to study 
and had set his sights on going “back to school because I won’t die not having 
PhD”, adding “if I don’t do it, it would be a failure”. In particular Augustin was 
keen to prove his worth to his family, especially his mother, because “they were 
expecting to have in me someone who has studied…who has got far”. 
Josh’s account, although lacking the intensity of the accounts given by Eric B, 
Augustin and Mark, also included the admission that he wanted to prove to his 
father that his business would be successful. Jessica similarly explained “I wish 
to be a strong woman, a strong girl. I wish to be an important person in my 
family”, while for Claire it was important “to have something of your own that is 
having your name”. The account given by Rehema also showed she felt a “need 
to do something” because she could “create something more” out of her life 
than the job she currently had. When exploring Daniel’s motives the dialogue 
turned to his natural competitiveness, and although initially talking about his 
experience of playing basketball, he went on to assert that his desire to win 
applied more generally to “anything I do”. 
At section 4.6.3 it was observed that the successful entrepreneurs’ need for 
achievement was accompanied by expressions of confidence in their abilities. 
Far from being overconfident it was suggested this was a natural reaction to 
having spotted an opportunity, which had been checked for viability and could 
therefore be safely exploited. Being at the early stage of their entrepreneurial 
journey, it would not have been surprising to find that aspiring entrepreneurs 
would not express this confidence with such clarity. However, the accounts 
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given did, interestingly, reflect the aspiring entrepreneurs’ confidence in a small 
number of cases. “I’m very optimistic” asserted Aphrodice, adding “I think I’m 
talented”. Similarly, when exploring why Colette felt confident she would 
succeed, she answered:  
 I don’t know why but I’m not worried about the future of the business. All 
I need is to start. When I will have started, it will be fine. 
Emile too felt sure his business would be successful, Josh said he was “really 
confident” and Robert B confided “I have confidence” and in amplification          
“I don’t have a confidence crisis”. 
It was noted in Chapter 4 that a high degree of overlap appeared to exist 
between internal locus of control and need for achievement for the successful 
entrepreneurs. For the aspiring entrepreneurs, though, this was much less in 
evidence with only five of them displaying both characteristics, hence the 
accounts given by the aspiring entrepreneurs appeared to resolve into a small 
minority that bore close resemblance to the successful entrepreneurs, and a 
larger group that appeared to diverge from the characteristics they had 
exhibited. This divergence also seemed to be supported when the aspiring 
entrepreneurs were asked about the hours they anticipated working. 
5.2.4 Capacity for Working Long Hours 
In Chapter 4 it was suggested that the successful entrepreneurs’ need for 
achievement could be reflected in a tendency to work long hours. Comments 
about actual or anticipated working hours were also identified in fifteen of the 
interviews with aspiring entrepreneurs, facilitating a direct comparison with the 
hours worked by successful entrepreneurs. 
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Table 5.2 Aspiring Entrepreneurs’ Estimated Weekly Hours    69
Although the mean, at 71 hours, is comparable with that of the successful 
entrepreneurs’ 72 hours, it is skewed by the very high figures quoted by Robert 
B and Augustin. The median, at 63, is probably more revealing and is lower 
than that for the successful entrepreneurs’ figure of 70 hours. A large proportion 
of the aspiring entrepreneurs estimated that their weekly working hours would 
be considerably lower than was the norm for the successful entrepreneurs. For 
the latter the lowest weekly hours worked was 62, but more than half the 
aspiring entrepreneurs who quoted a figure anticipated working less than this. 
Additionally, only three of the aspiring entrepreneurs’ estimates matched or 
exceeded the successful entrepreneurs’ median figure of 70 hours. Taken 
together this might suggest they had a tendency to underestimate what it might 
Aspiring Entrepreneur Weekly Hours
Aphrodice 48
Augustin 133
Claire 58
Colette 75
Daniel 60
Emile 79
Gilbert B 65
Claude 55
Janvier 45
Jessica 65
John 50
Mark 61
Queen 56
Rehema 70
Robert B 119
mean 71
median 63
 As with the successful entrepreneurs, where a range was given the midpoint was used for the 69
tabulation.
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take to develop their businesses. However it would be a mistake to read too 
much into the difference as the successful entrepreneurs’ were revealing actual 
hours worked, versus the aspiring entrepreneurs’ expectations. Had they been 
asked ahead of starting their businesses, the successful entrepreneurs might 
also have underestimated what would be required.  
5.2.5 Summary 
Chapter 4 concluded that the successful entrepreneurs appeared to be 
motivated by a desire for self-determination, rather than the opportunity for 
financial gain and that this appeared to be shaped by an internal locus of 
control and need for achievement. Such claims were also apparent in five of the 
aspiring entrepreneurs’ accounts.   
It must be acknowledged, though, that the successful entrepreneurs’ accounts 
were retrospective, while the aspiring entrepreneurs were imagining an 
entrepreneurial future that may or may not come about. Furthermore, it was 
noted in Chapter 4 that financial concerns cannot be entirely divorced from the 
successful entrepreneurs’ primary motive . There is consequently no way of 70
inferring, merely from the motives expressed, which of the aspiring 
entrepreneurs are more likely to be successful - those who claim to be 
motivated by personal financial gain, those who are seeking to create a job, or 
the small sub-set of five who appeared to mirror the successful entrepreneurs’ 
relegation of financial motives. 
It might be also be argued that the successful entrepreneurs and the subset of 
aspiring entrepreneurs who appeared to match them might have been 
influenced by social pressure against acquisition, and that this might have 
shaped their denial of overt financial motives. Such a phenomenon was 
observed by Kennedy (1988:140) in Kenya, where kinship or community 
expectations of wealth redistribution caused individuals to downplay their 
financial success. However, this would imply a zero-sum context, where one’s 
gain would be at another’s expense. This would seem to be far removed though 
from the Rwandan context, where for sixteen years the government and media 
have promoted the social and economic benefits of entrepreneurship and 
 See section 4.6.7.70
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successful enterprise formation on the basis that it will lead directly to economic 
growth, poverty reduction, peace and prosperity . The result is a thorough 71
acceptance of the benefits that will be borne out of Vision 2020 and a context 
that appears to be a decidedly net-positive one. A zero-sum context would also 
be at odds with the evidence from the majority of the aspiring entrepreneurs’ 
accounts, where frequent and unprompted comments were made in support of 
the government’s economic strategy and the ease with which the majority of 
interviewees volunteered their overt financial motives. 
In this context, it was also clear that the government’s active promotion of the 
benefits of entrepreneurship over wage employment had also helped shape the 
aspiring entrepreneurs’ aim of creating their own enterprises. Indeed it is clearly 
feasible that such overt promotion of entrepreneurship, amplified by high levels 
of media, NGO and international development agency endorsement has 
narrowed the rhetorical space in Rwanda to such an extent that those 
competing in a weak labour market would find it difficult to countenance 
alternatives to setting up an enterprise. 
Internal locus of control was well represented amongst the aspiring 
entrepreneurs’ sample, but overlaying this aspect of the narratives onto the 
financial comments suggested a divergence in attitudes. All five aspiring 
entrepreneurs who were dismissive of financial motivates exhibited an internal 
locus of control, in line with the trend observed in the successful entrepreneurs’ 
interviews. But ambiguously, internal locus of control could also be associated 
with an overtly financial means-ends orientation.   
The need for achievement was also indicated in the majority of the interviews. 
However, it did not carry over to a corresponding expectation about the effort 
that would be required to realise the goal of developing a business, as 
displayed by the much lower estimates for weekly hours versus the estimates 
made in Chapter 4 by the successful entrepreneurs. Of the nine aspiring 
entrepreneurs who demonstrated the need for achievement, only three 
anticipated a working week that matched or exceeded the median level for the 
 Additionally Kennedy’s observations were based on what he referred to as “traditional 71
societies” (1988: 140). It is debatable whether modern day Rwanda, where Vision 2020 has 
played out for sixteen years, would be an accurate reflection of the context that Kennedy was 
writing about. 
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successful entrepreneurs. However, the variance between successful and 
aspiring entrepreneurs may simply reflect the latter’s lack of experience rather 
than indicate any significant differences in attitude.  
Taken together, although internal locus of control and need for achievement 
were prevalent in the aspiring entrepreneurs’ accounts this did not translate into 
a correspondingly high representation of the self-determination motive that was 
observed in the successful entrepreneurs’ narratives. Rather the aspiring 
entrepreneurs’ accounts were polarised between a small set that corresponded 
to the successful entrepreneurs’ self-determination motive and a larger set that 
had financial motives, including the desire to create a job in response to a weak 
labour market. 
5.3 Effectuation and Causation 
Sarasvathy’s theory of effectuation, explored at section 2.4.2, distinguished 
between two types of reasoning, the effectual and causal. Her theory holds that 
effectual thinking enables one to construct possible future scenarios in a context 
of uncertainty while its inverse, causal thinking, helps individuals to make 
decisions through the application of deductive logic. The theory holds that 
entrepreneurs have a preference for effectual thinking over causal thinking 
when developing new enterprises. Although falling short of the full phenomenon 
exhibited by her expert entrepreneurs, it was concluded in Chapter 4 that 
successful entrepreneurs in Rwanda did have a preference for a dilute form of 
effectuation when they developed their businesses. As was the case with 
Sarasvathy’s expert sample, they were often familiar with causally orientated 
formal business planning, which sets predetermined fixed end goals and seeks 
to identify and martial the resources to achieve them, but this classic approach 
was consciously ignored. Instead the successful entrepreneurs had a 
predisposition for diving in and developing their enterprises as circumstances 
dictated, but also used a degree of causal reasoning, termed sketching, to 
obtain reassurance about the validity of the commercial opportunity they had 
identified. 
This section will explore the extent to which this was also the case with the 
aspiring entrepreneurs. Although they were only at the early stages of 
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developing a business and had less experience to draw on than the successful 
entrepreneurs, the interviews nevertheless proved to be rich in content. 
5.3.1 Predilection for Effectuation 
Broaching the question of business planning with the aspiring entrepreneurs 
yielded clear evidence that six of them shared the successful entrepreneurs’ 
predilection for diving in without a business plan. It was seen in Aphrodice’s 
narrative when reflecting, philosophically, that “sometimes you…how can I 
say…you jump in”, adding “some times we do things like fools…we don’t think, 
you jump in a…you jump in a business”. It is especially interesting that this 
explanation should virtually paraphrase Keynes’ observation that, under 
conditions of uncertainty, there would be no investment unless certain 
individuals were prepared to act in a manner that might be judged as irrational 
(Keynes, 2012: 150). 
This lack of concern for formal business planning was also apparent in the 
account given by Rehema who, in a comment reminiscent of Christian at 
section 4.3.1, insisted that pausing to write a business plan might mean never 
getting started with the business:  
 …if you wait to complete your business plan you never will. It may take 
you a whole year to just detail as much as you want. And…yeah, I think 
I’d just want to take the risk and just actually start. 
A similar sentiment was also expressed by Mark when asked whether he had 
written a business plan for Foodcourt, the food delivery business he was in the 
process of developing. “No I didn’t write a business plan” he replied, adding      
“I felt like that was too much, that I didn’t need a business plan”. He went on to 
explain he saw no value in writing one and “just dived in”. Mark justified this 
conscious decision by asserting he didn’t need one “since I was in control”, a 
comment that showed a remarkable resonance with the effectuation theory 
premise that to the extent one controls the future, one has no need to predict it 
(Sarasvathy, 2008: 17). When Colette was asked about whether she had 
prepared a plan for her event management business, she too was comfortable 
to concede “no, no. No special business plan”. As was the case with Akalisa in 
Chapter 4, Colette had pressed ahead and formally registered her business 
even though she did not have a plan for it. She just “decided to register a 
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company and start working for myself”, she confided. Josh too conceded that he 
had started developing his electrical installation business without a formal plan 
and Robert B, when talking about his previous audiovisual production company 
volunteered “I will tell you something - I didn’t have a business model. I didn’t 
have a business plan. But I knew what I wanted”.  
These interviews with aspiring entrepreneurs also revealed attitudes amongst a 
minority that mirrored the successful entrepreneurs’ technique of developing 
their enterprises iteratively. It was detected when Aphrodice described how he 
was developing his medical mobile application. He explained he had first set out 
to create a website that would provide agricultural information to farmers, but 
this failed because the farmers “didn’t have access on internet”. This led him to 
move on, instead, to explore “giving advice on agriculture by using a mobile”. At 
the time he was working in the Food and Agriculture Organisation’s department 
of nutrition, which made him think about providing nutritional advice. But when 
he started talking to doctors about the idea, he was surprised to find “every 
doctor I approached, it seems like he doesn’t know about nutrition”, so 
Aphrodice started talking to dieticians. He found, though, that providing 
appropriate dietary advice depended on having additional information such as 
age and blood type. From here he started exploring providing medical advice, 
but found “that a doctor cannot consult you when he is not seeing you. He has 
to see you physically”. Unbowed, Aphrodice “changed the methodology and the 
strategy”. Thus each time an obstacle was encountered he took another 
incremental step, which gradually but progressively reshaped the commercial 
concept. Rather than abandoning the idea, Aphrodice doggedly persisted with 
addressing shortcomings as they became apparent. Such persistence in the 
face of difficulty was also suggested by Colette’s reaction when she was asked 
how she would feel if her planned venture were to fail. “I would be sad” she said 
“but I would still go on and start again”, while Josh similarly explained that if his 
business was proving to be unsuccessful he would “sit down again and analyse 
where the problem came from”.  
Another, highly informative, account of iteration at work was observed when 
Mark talked about developing his food delivery enterprise. He described the 
process he was employing as “more of learning by doing” and went on to 
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explain “I don’t expect myself to be successful overnight”. Convinced there 
would be demand for a food delivery service, Mark had originally planned to 
“build an application that restaurants can use to bring their products and 
services closer to their customers”. But when he went to talk to restaurant 
owners about the idea, he found it was a concept they simply didn’t want. They 
were perfectly happy with business as usual: 
 When I went out there in the world, those guys weren’t…they weren’t 
about that [laughs]. They were fine with customers that come in. I mean 
they weren’t even ready to do the delivery.  
Undaunted by the lack of interest, and still convinced there would be a market 
for a food delivery service, Mark considered the reaction and reformulated his 
concept. In his own words he: 
 …thought about it and then decided, okay let me go back and this time I 
tell them: okay, I will do the delivery for you. I mean I went back with a 
different idea and… which was more…they were okay with. That is, I did 
the delivery, I managed the way [laughs]…they’re quoted on the 
application and they…I charge them a small percentage for that. They 
were fine with that. They were not fine with having to do the whole 
process. 
Instead of seeking to charge restaurants for advertising a home delivery service 
they did not want to organise themselves, he changed tack and decided to 
undertake the home delivery himself. Mark negotiated a discount with the 
restaurants, thereby creating an intermediary profit margin for Foodcourt. He 
had also set a timescale for formally assessing his progress: 
 So I know that by June if I’ve put, I mean, I’ve met all these conditions 
and I’ve not got a result like I planned for, then yes I can think of, you 
know, putting Foodcourt aside and start up something else. 
This preparedness for confronting and learning from difficulties encountered 
was also suggested by Claire’s account. Discussing the possibility of venture 
failure, she drew an analogy between developing a business and:  
 …a child learning to walk. You start the first step and then you fall. 
Sometime you get a fracture, injury, but the next day start again to walk. 
So I…for me, if my business fails, I may for example start another one, 
or I may see if the error was based on my low experience, for example. 
If the cause was inside the business, like not performing, like a bad 
conception, I may go for example to try to change or to qualify…to put 
more qualification…to put more standard if I may say. 
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The iterative nature of the journey was also seen in her explanation that “I can’t 
fail in all. I can try this…if it’s going I continue. If it’s failed, I can change the way 
I’ve made it or I can go for the next choice”. Eric B’s narrative too appeared to 
reflect the preparedness to act iteratively, when commenting “if there will be 
some failures, I will keep persisting”, as did Germaine who, like Mark, planned 
to review her progress after the business had been running for six months and 
then to “mitigate where I have done the mistake, where I needed to improve, so 
that I continue better”. 
The interview with another aspiring entrepreneur, Samuel, was initially 
confusing (to say the least). Asked about the business he wanted to develop 
Samuel replied “what I am planning to do is, I want to invest in education”. He 
wanted to set up his own private school. The discussion revealed Samuel had 
made a previous attempt at teaching, but this had failed. Talking about his 
previous experience he explained he had tried teaching English, and had called 
this service the High Knowledge English School. Seeking confirmation about 
the name of the school produced the surprising reply:  
 Yes. It’s just an English school and we were teaching about driving. 
People who want driving licence, we help them. That’s what we do. 
When asked to explain why a service called the High Knowledge English 
School should have been teaching people how to drive it became clear the 
attempt to teach English had stalled, so Samuel had switched to teaching 
people to drive. To rationalise the apparent inconsistency he offered that the 
“English school is like one department but we have also a department about 
driving”. 
This capacity to change tack was also seen in Augustin’s narrative. Indeed his 
whole account is of repeated attempts to find the right commercial answer to 
satisfy his entrepreneurial ambitions. When working as a refugee camp 
manager for the Irish NGO Concern Worldwide he had tried a whole string of 
ideas:  
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 Our businesses really didn’t develop well. To tell you briefly, I remember 
just when I reached the working area I done five kinds of businesses…
some services [were] lacking over there. Then I started showing…I 
bought a video and I started turning films…I think I found an orchestra. 
So as well as people could come there was a hall…I recruited people 
from Congo to play Congolese music. Then at weekends there were 
performances…it was like music performances, dancing. And then 
during other days I was showing movies for people to pay when they get 
in. Then when it…that didn’t work well I replaced by I think…I started a 
restaurant. Just food and when I tried to bring in some beer the landlord 
refused because I was living in a Muslim…in a Muslim area. Then…I 
decided to build my own property…my own premises. And then whereas 
I opened it was a kind of bar and restaurant known as La Fraicheur de la 
Rusizi.  
Augustin recalled “that one worked a bit well until I was moved to DRC. Then it 
started collapsing again”, so he started selling “breads and cakes” in order “to 
make sure that I can make money”. He also set up a shop in the city of 
Kamembe, near the Congolese border, and bought a car to rent out to tourists, 
which in turn led him to realise:       
 …during that period in Ruhengeri there was…a lack of accommodation 
for tourists coming for gorillas, hiking. Then I said, well I think with the 
little money I have now I think I can do something to accommodate 
tourists, to transport them and then provide them with some services…
other services like bookings, like contacts.  
So Augustin rented a building where he established another bar, as well as 
letting some rooms as dormitories. But this also struggled and required 
reconfiguring:  
 …at the end tourists were not enough to make me money and I start 
bringing in some other aspects to attract local people as well including 
reducing prices. I remember having brought this cultural tourism…and 
because tourists were much more interested in the drumming or 
traditional performances, but the local people were looking for other 
cultures…like Uganda, like... Then I made a group made of Congolese, 
Ugandans, Burundians and Tanzanians. So, by the time we were doing 
these other countries performances then some local people could enjoy. 
After this venture also collapsed, Augustin set up his current enterprise, the tour 
and travel agency. But this too appeared to be failing to meet his expectations, 
leading to the decision: 
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 …to be involved in consultancy as well. Because I also have these skills 
and experience I gathered from NGOs that I don’t want to lose…I used 
to help my organisations in designing the strategic plan, conducting 
surveys…like what you’re doing now…I’m very good at doing this as 
well. Facilitating workshops, facilitating training. 
Although Augustin’s narrative could be seen to paint a picture of serial failure, it 
nonetheless illustrates the iterative nature of his entrepreneurial journey, and 
one that for Augustin is still far from completed. Rather than being daunted by 
the failures he has encountered along the way, he is determined to keep trying. 
There is, though, an interesting difference between the approach that was seen 
in his narrative and that recounted by both Aphrodice and Mark. Although Mark 
and Aphrodice had also encountered difficulties with developing their ideas, 
their narratives showed they had stuck with a core concept and had modified it 
when a major hurdle was encountered. This dogged perseverance was less in 
evidence though with Augustin who, in the face of difficulties, appeared to be 
prone to casting around for a new idea for making money rather than assessing 
and addressing the limitations of the current undertaking.  
The successful entrepreneurs’ accounts analysed in Chapter 4 gave no 
indication that they had a history of serial failure before finally hitting on a 
successful formula, thus it is tempting to speculate that Mark and Aphrodice, in 
sticking to resolving hurdles as they are encountered, could be more likely to 
succeed than Augustin. However, as the interviews with the successful 
entrepreneurs had focussed on their successful businesses and had not 
specifically explored whether they had a prior history of failure, it would not be 
appropriate to draw any such inference at this point. The distinction could 
though be a valuable avenue for future research.   
While not expressed as plainly as by Mark and Aphrodice, the accounts given 
by Claire, Colette and Eric B were also suggestive that any failure would be 
followed by a period of introspection, in order to find out what had gone wrong 
with the enterprise idea, followed by an attempt to put it right. What these 
accounts all illustrated, though, was a high degree of comfort with the process 
of developing an enterprise ‘on the hoof’. Rather than following the traditional 
STP process and identifying a fixed end goal and then seeking to identify and 
martial the resources that would be required to achieve it, these aspiring 
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entrepreneurs were happy to dive in and see where their entrepreneurial 
journeys might take them. If their initial steps faltered they were quite relaxed 
about changing tack and modifying their approach or, if ultimately necessary, by 
abandoning the businesses they were endeavouring to set up and trying 
something else. Germaine, for instance, had identified that if her leather goods 
business was ultimately unsuccessful she could move to marketing “jewellery 
and the weaving” products. Similarly, although Mark was committed to his food 
delivery service, when asked about what he would do if it did not succeed 
explained he would “close shop [laughs]. Yeah, I’m always thinking up other 
ideas”. Even though they were persisting with their original ideas, they were 
aware of the possibility that their iterative journey might ultimately have to 
include abandoning a failing concept and trying something else. 
5.3.2 Sketching  
Rather than accepting Sarasvathy’s binary split between effectuation and 
causation, it was argued at section 4.3.3 that effectuation and causation 
represented opposite poles on a continuum, with an intermediate space where 
the successful Rwandan entrepreneurs had employed elements of both 
effectual and causal reasoning. Thus although they were prepared to dive in 
without a business plan and to build their enterprises iteratively, Chapter 4 
reached the more nuanced conclusion that they had simultaneously employed a 
degree of causal reasoning in order to gain reassurance about the viability of 
the commercial opportunity they were intending to pursue. They sought this 
reassurance by undertaking basic research or checking demand for their 
products or services, and sometimes committed their key assumptions to paper 
in the form of a simple concept note. These techniques did not constitute formal 
business planning based on the traditional principles of segmentation, targeting 
and proposition development (STP), but did provide a rational counterbalance 
to the predilection for diving in without a plan, and was seen to provide a degree 
of confidence about the commercial potential of the intended enterprise. 
Chapter 4 used the term sketching to describe this proclivity for 
counterbalancing a dilute form of effectuation with measures grounded in 
causation. This technique was also found to be present in a small minority of 
the interviews with aspiring entrepreneurs. 
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The narratives provided by four of the aspiring entrepreneurs contained 
comments that indicated they had produced, or were in the process of 
producing, rough concept notes that contained the key assumptions that had 
been made about the enterprises they intended to build. Asked about the 
planning process for the online business services enterprise he wants to 
develop, Eric B replied “it was not a big business plan. It was like one page”. 
This one page featured a basic vision of what he imagined the business would 
do and how it would be promoted, but did not include any financial projections. 
His justification for this omission was that he “didn’t know when I’m going to get 
customers, how much they are going to pay”. The rough outline was used by 
Eric B to garner support from volunteers who could help him develop the 
enterprise, just as successful entrepreneur Gilbert A had done when seeking 
the support of a strategic partner for his stationery business. Although the idea 
for Eric B’s enterprise was contained on a single piece of paper, it would be 
wrong to conclude that this implied a lack of diligence. When pressed about 
reducing the scope of the enterprise to just a single page, he insisted                
“I summarised it, but I thought more than I wrote”.  
Mark’s narrative indicated he too had followed a similar approach. He began by 
looking at a Swiss online planning tool, The Business Model Canvass 
(Strategyzer AG, 2015), which is designed to lead a prospective entrepreneur 
through the business planning process. It comprises nine building blocks that 
broadly follow the standard STP planning logic: customer segmentation, 
distribution channels, customer relationships, the value proposition, key 
partners, cost structure, key resources needed and revenue streams. Insisting 
he did not use it to produce a formal business plan, it did help Mark to define 
“the value proposition that I had of the customer”, which he wrote on a single 
page. Armed with this one page customer proposition he felt he “didn’t have to 
write a business plan” and “went out in the world, real life” to test reactions to 
his proposition. Mark went on to explain that armed:  
 …with that - just a piece of paper, I went out there. And I learned so 
much. Like I learned from the real world, I didn’t lock myself up and write 
up a business plan. I learned from the world. 
Rehema too had first referred to an online planning template. When trying to 
use it, though, she “realised it’s so much detail that actually I have to get from 
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outside…to actually put on paper. Like I’m trying to do projections of profit or 
trying to get the costs and all this”. Although she had consequently not 
completed a full plan and as was seen at section 5.3.1 had concluded “if you 
wait to complete your business plan you never will. It may take you a whole 
year to just detail as much as you want”, she nonetheless felt she should 
commit something to paper and had produced a “temporary” outline of her idea 
for the business. The temporary nature of Rehema’s plan was also matched by 
Aphrodice’s narrative: 
 Yeah I write down my idea. Every day I tried to revise… to revise…even 
today I was revising my business idea and I was saying I have to add 
this, remove that, you see. 
For Aphrodice the plan is never finished. It is in a constant state of flux, as he 
responds to new contingencies and modifies his approach. In this Aphrodice 
was pinpointing a methodology that is the very antithesis of orthodox planning, 
which is characterised by defining and then pursuing fixed end goals.   
What these narratives appeared to be indicating was a desire to commit 
something to paper, even if this was not extensive. As with the successful 
entrepreneurs, even a one-page outline could be used to talk to potential 
partners or customers, thereby generating a higher degree of confidence in the 
viability of the idea that was to be pursued. This use of sketching was also 
apparent in successful entrepreneurs’ attempts to assess the potential demand 
that would exist for their business concepts, and was replicated by a small 
number of the aspiring entrepreneurs. Aphrodice was a good example of this. 
He had: 
 …approached people and asked them if I give you this service are you 
ready to use this…and everyone I was…I told the product…the service, 
was happy and said that business I’ll be one of your clients. So like 
when you ask more than twenty people, and you see their reaction 
and…from different backgrounds…so I said this business will work. 
He had followed this route to get a steer on potential demand “because you 
know to do market research is not easy. Sometimes it requires a huge amount 
of money and I don’t have…I didn’t have, so I just had to do like that”. Janvier 
too had reasoned that there was potential demand for bakery produce in the 
village of Nyabugogo, as people were having to travel into Kigali to shop: 
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 …there is a big distance from here, Kigali, to go [to] that environment. 
The person who are enjoying the product of a boulangerie, they 
consume the cake or a similar product that come[s] from here, at Kigali 
city. You can see that there is a lack of a producer in that area. 
Mark had also identified potential customer demand for his food delivery 
service, while working at an advertising agency: 
 Two years ago I was working as a receptionist at an outdoor advertising 
agency and it was located in a place near a residential area. So the 
restaurants in this place were very…were overpriced. So most of my 
workmates couldn’t afford the place…the food in that place. So they had 
to move out a long distance…go to town, the city centre, to you know 
find food they can afford and all that. So I realised that…I’d been 
working there for over a year, so I realised how unproductive it made 
them. They spent so much time out on lunch. I…it started coming up… it 
came up, I mean how could I solve this problem. How could I bring the 
food, you know, make it easier for them to have their food.   
Seeing the potential that existed, he concluded “there’s people out there that 
really need the service, and they’re ready to pay for it.” But instead of writing a 
formal plan he visited “four restaurants in person” to test reaction to his initial 
idea. It is significant that Mark had pre-sold this first idea to potential users - an 
effectuation tactic that was also observed in Chapter 4. This meant he was able 
to identify limitations in his original concept and then to modify it. 
Six aspiring entrepreneurs’ narratives contained references showing that basic 
research was also undertaken to help shape the enterprise concept. When 
Emile thought there might be an opportunity for him to enter Rwanda’s 
embryonic tourist industry he: 
  …read the books and I checked the internet I have seen how in Rwanda 
that tourism [was] in third place to make money enter into our country at 
that time, five years past. But now tourism is now the first sector. 
From this he was able to verify the wisdom of his intention to “enter the tourism 
sector”. Germaine’s narrative too featured a specific reference to having “done 
the market research and analysis before I ran the business”. This included 
making four trips to Ethiopia to source leather: 
 …because here in Rwanda we don’t nowadays, we don’t have the 
leather industry. All raw materials are imported for making leather 
products. So when I was in Ethiopia I found the type of leather I had not 
seen here in the East African community. So I thought that it is the 
potential product here in Rwanda. 
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Josh’s account also included references to having undertaken a limited amount 
of research that would support the decision to start his electrical installation 
company. He found that contractors typically guaranteed their work for a year, 
and concluded he could achieve a competitive advantage by offering an 
eighteen month guarantee, which would translate directly into a cost benefit for 
his clients: 
 …it works because people say: oh, we are still with you for a long time. 
So all those months, all those months they maintain us…you know it’s 
six months beyond others. So every one month usually they are 
supposed to pay to us, they are supposed to pay 150,000…150,000 
Rwandan francs for maintenance. So we tell them we are the ones to 
maintain this machine but we give you a guarantee of one year and a 
half. So calculate 150 times 6, all that money you are saving, so give us 
a chance to work for you. 
An intention to conduct limited research was also evident in Rehema’s 
narrative, when she claimed she would “try [to get] as much information as is 
possible before I actually do something”. Similarly, Robert A, when asked why 
he thought his import/export business would be successful, indicated he 
intended to “capture information on the market”.  
Colette’s narrative featured comments that suggested she too was keen to 
obtain a degree of reassurance about her intended business. Although referring 
primarily to wanting to “have a small training online” in order to “refresh and get 
new hints”, embedded within the remarks was the additional comment that she 
also wanted “to know how other people do it”. When asked to expand on what 
she was thinking about, Colette revealed that she was confident about her 
abilities, but that she wanted to explore whether she could enhance her level of 
professionalism. 
It is important to recognise the techniques that the sketchers used to gain 
reassurance do also play a role in traditional business planning. The sequential 
process of market segmentation, targeting and proposition development also 
encompasses research and demand assessment. The key difference is the 
direction of travel. For STP-orientated planning, the customer proposition is the 
logical conclusion to a deductive process. For the successful entrepreneurs and 
a minority of aspiring entrepreneurs, though, the proposition was the starting 
point. Their use of limited research and demand assessment was part of an 
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inductive process, which sought to verify the preconceived proposition.              
It pragmatically tested the proposition for validity and used a feedback loop to 
modify it where necessary. Thus far from diving in blindly and hoping for the 
best, these individuals took deliberate steps to test the veracity of their idea. 
Their action thus conformed to the Keynesian principle that demand leads to 
supply (Ocampo et al., 2009: 8), rather than the Say’s Law principle that mere 
supply automatically creates demand.  
5.3.3 Predilection for Causation 
Nine aspiring entrepreneurs recounted narratives that were far more indicative 
of thinking which was firmly located at the causal end of the effectuation-
causation spectrum. Aloys was a prime example of this. He planned to start a 
company that would import consumer goods into Rwanda. Although he was 
vague about the type of products he anticipated importing, he was clearly 
familiar with market segmentation and had identified the market niche he would 
be targeting:  
 First of all I plan to target those lower income customers first of all. 
Lower income customers, because of Rwandan problems the most 
lower income customers are many compared to higher income 
customers. That’s the reason why I target those people who have lower 
income. For instance the villages, those people come from the village, 
those people who touch lower income for instance teachers who are 
from primary schools, secondary schools. 
It became even more apparent when asking him whether he had calculated 
how much money he would need to start his business. He did not know, and 
explained he “must first plan a business plan”, and that the money needed 
would be a logical output from the planning process: 
 So after doing a business plan; after doing the structure of business 
opportunity (pause) so those are the business factors that will frequent 
me to know how much I will need when I finish my business plan writing.   
Aloys also described the wide ranging feasibility assessment he intended to 
undertake:  
 The components of feasibility analysis, the first one is product and 
service, organisation of feasibility, financial feasibility (pause) as well as 
industry feasibilities. Those factors are related to proposed venture. If all 
of the four areas are aligned, proceed [with] the business idea. 
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Aloys’s description of the process he meant to employ also encompassed 
references to Porter’s ‘five forces’, further exemplifying the causal approach: 
 …there are five factors of Porter’s. The first one is the traits of new 
entrants; if you are a newcomer in an industry you will face a problem. 
Problems will come; you will face problems in terms of differentiation, 
competitive advantage, you don’t have experiences. Those are 
challenges that you will face in terms of starting business. 
Asked how he intended to overcome such challenges to market entry led to a 
further exposition of typical components of mainstream business planning, 
encompassing the importance of core competencies, competitive advantage, 
innovation, cost reduction and marketing. The same preference for causal 
reasoning was also indicated by Daniel who insisted “we will not set up the 
business until we have a plan” and went on to elucidate “we wanted to target 
particular…particular niches in the market. We want to see where the gap is”, 
and added “we intend to do proper research about this” . Other comments 72
suggestive of the intention to engage in formal business planning included 
Janvier’s “I have to do a feasibility analysis…whether the project will be viable” 
and Queen’s “I will write the plan”, which “can facilitate you to have the 
reassurance, the decision, and to organise how you want to continue your 
business”. 
It was clear during the interviews that four of the aspiring entrepreneurs derived 
their trust in traditional business planning from their formal studies. Aloys’s 
monologue about the “five factors of Porter’s”, for instance, is a classic and 
widely taught Harvard Business School model for strategic planning developed 
by Michael Porter. Aloys clearly took comfort from following the orthodox line 
taught in business studies classes. Jessica too, when asked why she would be 
successful with her forex bureaux, explained “it matches with my studies”, a 
comment that paralleled Claude’s “I have experience from my studies”. Gilbert 
B too, when talking about his plan for developing a food processing business, 
confided the idea had been the subject of the dissertation he had to write as 
part of his bachelor’s degree in economics. He planned “to fill the gap from the 
shortage of food” that this dissertation had identified.  
 Interestingly this was completely at odds with the views of his putative business partner, 72
Rehema, who had separately shown that she thought it better to dive in and develop 
contingently (see section 5.3.1).
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This trust in the benefits of orthodox business planning was also evident when 
talking to John about the privatisation of Gasabo 3D, the company he led as 
managing director. The business plan underpinning the privatisation had 
assumed the existence of a future flow of design projects, but it turned out 
“actually they were not there”. While the successful entrepreneurs reviewed in 
Chapter 4 had shown they were adept at reacting to the unexpected, and often 
had alternative strategies notionally mapped out, this flexibility had not been 
planned in with Gasabo 3D. Consequently, discovering that reality did not follow 
the logic mapped out in the business plan meant that things became “very, very 
stressful” for John, to the extent that he admitted it “almost killed me” - a 
revelation that contrasts starkly with the attitude expressed by the successful 
entrepreneurs in Chapter 4, whose contingent behaviour enabled them to cope 
with the unexpected. The Gasabo 3D problem was addressed by producing 
another formal business plan, with the help of experts from the Rwanda 
Development Board. When asked how closely reality matched this new formal 
plan produced the admission:  
 …but we are not achieving our targets as we expected, so we are a bit 
below the targets. Maybe we are a bit overambitious about the 
projections. It’s like, maybe it’s 50 percent. 
Thus two formal business plans had successively failed to accurately predict the 
future, even though Gasabo 3D had a track record and historical data on which 
to base its forecasts. 
As was the case with the successful entrepreneurs, the aspiring entrepreneurs’ 
accounts also contained contradictions. Colette, for instance, had demonstrated 
the predisposition for a dilute form of effectuation and had registered her 
enterprise without having produced a business plan. But when talking about the 
importance of having a business plan she paradoxically insisted “I will do it 
[laughs], I will do it”, and went on to add that she saw it as important “because 
in…any kind of project, you have to have a plan for it. To see the risks and 
expectations and so it should be the same with a business”. Thus although 
espousing the benefits of business planning, she had decided to press ahead 
and register her business without one. When pressed over when she intended 
to write her plan she replied “I think before I decide to be full time in it, I will 
have a plan for that”. In this her account closely paralleled that of successful 
!231
entrepreneur Annette, who had been trading for a year before she attempted to 
write a business plan. The same contradiction was also seen in Josh’s account. 
He too indicated he felt a business plan was important, indeed he and his 
partners had tasked one of their number with producing one. But when asked 
specifically if he had ever seen it Josh conceded “not yet, but he told me that he 
did it” and admitted he and his partners were pressing ahead and starting their 
business without a business plan anyway.  
Another interviewee, Robert A, also espoused the benefits of preparing a 
business plan, and intended to “have a proper plan” for his new enterprise, 
because “the plan is what guides you in the business”. But he also revealed he 
had started a business previously without one. Although his first attempt had 
folded, his comments closely matched those of successful entrepreneur 
Sharon, who had also started a first enterprise without a plan but then went on 
to start a second enterprise with one. Samuel also exhibited this apparently 
paradoxical attitude, insisting he had “just started” a previous enterprise but 
simultaneously claiming “but now I’m going to plan it…to make a business 
plan”. He justified this by citing his former youth and lack of knowledge about 
formal planning. “I didn’t know that I should even do it anyway”, he offered, a 
comment that bore a very close resemblance to the point made by successful 
entrepreneur Jacques who similarly admitted to being unaware that “people 
should have a business plan”. Though appearing to be paradoxical, there is a 
certain logic to Robert A’s and Samuel’s thinking. Both had tried once without a 
plan, and failed. They appeared to blame their failure on their lack of formal 
planning, so now anticipated proper business planning would lead to success. 
A more extreme contradiction was observed with Claire. Although it was seen 
above that she had espoused the virtue of acting contingently when developing 
an enterprise, citing the analogy of a child learning to walk, her narrative also 
indicated that she had already written a formal business plan for the enterprise 
she intended to create. Looking closely at her narrative also revealed three very 
specific references to the market segmentation and targeting she had 
undertaken for her business plan. Thus Claire appeared to be simultaneously 
expressing strong predispositions for a dilute form of effectuation and casual 
reasoning that went well beyond seeking reassurance via sketching. The oddity 
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of this is to a degree contextualised by the fact, observed at section 4.3.3, that it 
was common for successful entrepreneurs to seek to develop business 
planning skills some time after their enterprises had proven themselves. But in 
Claire’s case this sequence was reversed. Consequently, if she were indeed 
prepared to act in the iterative manner that she appeared to endorse, she would 
be faced with the prospect of having to abandon the very business plan she had 
gone to the trouble of writing. Taken in aggregate her narrative appeared to 
indicate that, on balance, she tended more towards the causal end of the 
effectual-causal spectrum.  
Like Claire, Augustin’s account too contained contradictory indications that he 
favoured following the sequential STP logic, despite his narrative having 
recounted a highly iterative course. Asked whether he had tended to follow his 
instincts or to write formal business plans for his enterprises he asserted “I have 
to write”, and amplified this by describing the approach he used:  
 What is my objectives, what is my vision, what is my routes, what are my 
objectives, how can I reach these objectives, what are my activities so 
what are the requirement, what are they in terms of resources. And then 
how much may I spend. 
In this Augustin appeared to be describing the very causal reasoning that 
Sarasvathy observed is endemic in business studies classrooms      
(Sarasvathy, 2008: 73). 
5.3.4 Envisioning an Alternative Future 
It was noted at section 4.3.2 that three-quarters of the successful entrepreneurs 
sample expressed a clear longer-range view of what their enterprises might look 
like even though they were developing their enterprises contingently, rather than 
pursuing fixed end goals. The same capacity was also seen in the accounts 
given by five of the aspiring entrepreneurs. Claire, Daniel, Germaine, Aphrodice 
and Mark were also able to express a clear vision for their enterprises.  
For Daniel this view of the future was located in the geographic reach of his 
planned business, as was seen to be the case with three of the successful 
entrepreneurs. He believed “that in a short time, in a few years to come, this will 
be one region, and people will be doing business across the border” and went 
on to assert he expected in the future he would “do business all around this 
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region”. Mark too made comments about wanting to have a wider impact across 
Africa. He mentioned West Africa and South Africa specifically, and also 
anticipated that in ten years’ time he would have “fifty employees”. 
For Claire and Aphrodice this future vision was located in the scale of their 
enterprises. “I have a big dream…I want to build a teaching hospital” claimed 
Aphrodice, while Claire was able to provide a lengthy description of the vision 
she had for her “health promotion centre”, which would provide a wide range of 
services including advice on nutrition, exercise, stress management and family 
planning. Although Germaine’s description of the future was more modest, she 
nevertheless anticipated that “in five years’ time” her business would “have the 
big shaving machine, two Singer machines and sewing machine and carving 
machine” and that she would be employing five people. 
This capacity for enunciating a future vision for the enterprise was, though, very 
limited. Despite probing, it was not really evident amongst the remaining 
aspiring entrepreneurs. Jessica for instance, when asked to describe what her 
forex bureaux might look like five years after its launch, was unable to provide 
anything beyond the thought she would “be having a computer in my office”. 
Queen’s comment too was limited to the thought “I think you will see that my 
business grow, and I think it would be changed. I don’t know”.  
The fact that only five of the aspiring entrepreneurs were able to volunteer a 
future vision for the enterprises they intended to create is illuminating. Given the 
extent to which the benefits of formal business planning had been espoused by 
the majority of the aspiring entrepreneurs, one might have reasonably expected 
to see support for such planning to translate into a far greater capacity for 
enunciating a clear future goal for their intended enterprises. But this was not 
the case. Only two of those who expressed support for formal business 
planning - Claire and Daniel - seemed to have a clear notion of what their plans 
were intended to achieve. It may suggest a tendency amongst the aspiring 
entrepreneurs to be attracted to the notion of being business owners without 
having a clearly formed business concept. It might also suggest a tendency to 
prioritise learning how to write a business plan over investing time and effort in 
developing a clear commercial idea. The implications of this possibility will be 
explored more fully in the next chapter.  
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The fact that the majority of successful entrepreneurs and a small number of 
aspiring entrepreneurs were able to envisage a longer-range future for their 
businesses is also important in that it casts at least a shadow of doubt over 
Banerjee and Duflo’s argument that individuals in low-income contexts tend to 
default into accepting their status quo due to an inability to envision future 
improvements in the quality of their existence (2011: 229).  
5.3.5 Summary  
Chapter 4 revealed that all of the successful entrepreneurs had been prepared 
to dive in without business plans and to build their enterprises iteratively. This 
dilute form of effectuation was combined with a degree of causal reasoning, 
termed sketching, through which they were able to derive a degree of 
reassurance about the validity of the commercial opportunity they subsequently 
went on to pursue. Sketching was seen to be present in three-quarters of the 
successful entrepreneurs’ accounts. These characteristics were also observed 
in the aspiring entrepreneurs’ narratives, but with a far lower level of 
consistency.  
Five of the aspiring entrepreneurs’ accounts included references to both diving 
in without a plan and acting contingently, three only mentioned acting 
contingently and a further three only mentioned diving in without a plan, thus 
yielding a total of eleven accounts that to a greater or lesser extent were 
suggestive of dilute effectuation. Under sketching, actions that could be clearly 
described as demand assessment appeared in just three narratives. Eight 
accounts were indicative of basic research, of which six did not specifically 
mention demand assessment but might have nonetheless encompassed its 
evaluation. Additionally, just five of the aspiring entrepreneurs were able to 
envision and express what their enterprises might look like in the future, 
although this was a facility that was evident in three-quarters of the successful 
entrepreneurs’ accounts.  
Table 5.3 summarises the comments relating to dilute effectuation, sketching 
and envisioning. The first two columns split dilute effectuation comments into 
those relating to diving in without a plan and those relating to acting iteratively. 
Comments relating to sketching are also split between those relating to 
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assessing demand, conducting basic research and producing a rough outline. 
The table also records where the aspiring entrepreneurs indicated the capacity 
for envisioning. By combining and summarising these characteristics it is 
possible to see which of the aspiring entrepreneurs appear to occupy the 
intermediate space on the effectuation-causation continuum that it was 
concluded in the fourth chapter was occupied by the successful entrepreneurs. 
Table 5.3 Dilute Effectuation, Sketching and Envisioning  
Dilute 
effectuation Sketching Envisioning 
Dive in Iteration Demand 
assessment
Basic 
research
Rough 
outline Frequency
Aphrodice  x x x x x x 6
Mark x x x x x x 6
Germaine  x  x x 3
Josh x x  x 3
Colette x x  x 3
Rehema x  x x 3
Robert A x  x 2
Claire  x x 2
Samuel x x 2
Augustin  x 1
Eric B    x 1
Robert B x 1
Emile  x 1
Daniel x 1
Gilbert B  1
Janvier x 1
Aloys 0
Claude 0
Jessica 0
John 0
Queen 0
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The diffuse pattern revealed suggests that very few of the aspiring 
entrepreneurs’ narratives provided evidence that they were in tune with 
successful entrepreneurs’ occupation of an intermediate space on the 
effectuation-causation continuum. Aphrodice and Mark certainly seemed to be a 
close match; Germaine, Josh, Colette and Rehema less so. All six though would 
add weight to the argument advanced at 4.3.2 that Sarasvathy’s theoretical 
treatment of effectuation and causation as a strict dichotomy is an 
oversimplification, and that more can be gained by considering a more nuanced 
interaction of elements of effectuation and causation.  
5.4 Financing the Startup 
In Chapter 2 it was seen that development policy generally assumes that 
access to credit for intending entrepreneurs is a fundamental constraint on their 
prospects, and that its absence is a major cause of low economic growth in 
developing economies. Chapter 4, though, concluded that successful 
entrepreneurs in Rwanda neither used nor needed credit to get their enterprises 
off the ground. This section will examine the extent to which this orientation also 
appeared to be present in the aspiring entrepreneurs’ sample. It will be seen 
that the interviews revealed a clear separation between one group of individuals 
who planned to access credit, in line with the received wisdom, and a second 
group who mirrored the successful entrepreneurs’ wish to avoid it.  
5.4.1 Drawing on Own Funds 
Ten of the aspiring entrepreneurs gave accounts that indicated they planned to 
use their own money to fund their businesses. This was typified by Colette. 
When asked about how she intended to fund her event management business 
Colette explained she was using her job at the National Bank of Rwanda to 
generate personal savings. Her goal was to save enough money to cover her 
living expenses for twelve months, so she could then quit her job and devote 
herself full time to developing her business. Asked specifically about whether 
she had considered taking a loan to get the enterprise started, she responded:  
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 I don’t like loans that much. I don’t know why. Because it’s a burden, like 
for the times that I was obliged to take some loans from my employer - 
maybe to pay for my school fees when I was still in school - it was really 
a burden to pay for it every month, every month, you know. So I do not 
like loans .  73
Colette’s preference for avoiding borrowing money was also expressed by 
Daniel. Acknowledging his personal funds were quite limited, he planned 
nevertheless “to invest that money”. When pushed about the wisdom of putting 
his limited savings at risk, and whether he had considered taking out a loan, he 
too made it clear his preference was to deploy his savings and that other 
alternatives would only be considered if his own money subsequently proved to 
be insufficient. His partner in this enterprise, Rehema, was also planning to 
invest her savings. She too revealed a desire to avoid credit when insisting   
“I’m going to be using up my savings, and I’m not trying to get a loan first”.  
When discussing Foodcourt, his food home delivery concept, Mark too revealed 
he was averse to borrowing. When asked where the money was coming from to 
develop Foodcourt, he explained he was using “just a few small monies I have 
saved” and that he had not “taken a loan from a bank or anybody”. Asked how 
he felt about taking a loan, Mark answered that he was “not happy with that 
[laughs]”. This preference for building an enterprise out of personal savings was 
also expressed by John, the managing director of Gasabo 3D. Originally 
government owned, Gasabo 3D had been privatised and at the time of the 
interview was dually owned by the Rwanda Development Board (RDB) and the 
Kigali Institute of Science and Technology (KIST). Although the interview 
indicated that John anticipated the RDB would eventually sell off its stake in the 
business, which might provide him with a management buy-in opportunity, his 
main route to realising his entrepreneurial ambition was to set up his own 
engineering consultancy. Asked about where the funds for this would come from 
he too indicated that he planned to “begin consulting from my savings then a 
consulting business will…can start. To grow and start new businesses. So 
precisely I can say from my savings”. 
Germaine, who arrived for the interview wearing an immaculate, striking and 
perfectly matched combination of green leather jacket, trousers and shoes, was 
 It is common for the interviewees to refer to university as ‘school’. Thus the loan Colette was 73
referring to was provided by her employer to cover part-time study at university. 
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in the early stages of developing a leather goods company. Asked whether she 
had obtained a loan to get her company started, she insisted firmly “no, no it is 
my own money”. When pressed about whether she had considered taking out a 
loan to start, her reply made it clear she was uneasy about owing money 
because any irregularities in her sales revenue could lead to repayment 
difficulties that might put her in jeopardy with a bank:  
 You see nowadays the bank encourages us to borrow money from them, 
but when you don’t have a market, when you didn’t schedule well your 
market, it’s become also a challenge. Because at the…depending on the 
contract you have with the bank, at the end of the month you have to 
give some money to the bank. If you didn’t have the customers it will 
create a problem for coming taking also your own products. That is why 
me, I’m still fearing to borrow money from the bank while I’m not yet 
getting the big market where I will get the income. 
Instead of borrowing, Germaine had managed to save up the Rwf 3 million she 
needed to start her company. Using savings was also the route preferred by 
Robert B, who had followed a career in television journalism from 1990 to 2000. 
Initially based in Uganda, he returned to Rwanda shortly after the genocide to 
work with the country’s new national television station, where he rose to the 
position of director of programming and broadcasting. In 2000 he left to set up 
his own audiovisual production company, the first of several failed attempts at 
running his own business. His current plan was to open a guesthouse on the 
highway between Kigali and Nyamata, where the government is planning to 
build a new airport. Asked about whether he would need a bank loan to develop 
the guesthouse he insisted “no I’m actually doing it from my own [funds]”. 
Having “started building it in 2011”, he was putting money into the project 
piecemeal, as savings became available. 
A further three interviewees - Claude, Samuel and Janvier - each indicated they 
did not yet have sufficient money to invest in a business, but planned to get jobs 
specifically to produce the savings they felt they would need. At the time of the 
interview Claude had not decided what type of business he wanted to establish, 
but planned to “get a job, [and] then I can find [save] money. I can start my own 
business”. This was also the approach Samuel saw himself following. He 
wanted to set up a new private school, and saw obtaining employment as a way 
of producing the savings he would need to invest in the business: 
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 Yeah, there will be a need to raise money and maybe what I need to 
think about is where I will have to raise that money. Money [laughs] is 
the [unclear] and it will always be a need. But the problem is how we get 
money. Get money in different ways. Now I am planning to get it at least 
when I get a job. Like now I am doing part-time jobs, I’m not getting as 
much money as I want. Actually it is very little money I get. But I’m 
planning that when I complete my master’s programme and I get a job at 
least I will try to save as much money as possible which can help me to 
start up.  
Like Samuel and Claude, Janvier too saw obtaining a job as the route to 
generating the personal savings he would need to invest in the bakery he 
wanted to start. Answering a specific question about where the money would 
come from, he was clear he still had to build up the start-up capital, and thought 
it would “come from my accumulative salary after finishing my studies”.  
In total six of the narratives contained explicit comments indicating that the 
savings to be invested in an enterprise would be derived from wage labour.       
A further four indicated they would invest their savings, without mentioning 
specifically how such funds would be accumulated, though in all probability 
these too would be derived from wage employment. 
Taken together, ten of the aspiring entrepreneurs intended to use their own 
money, rather than taking on credit, which closely mirrored the successful 
entrepreneurs’ aversion to credit.  
5.4.2 Seeking Credit  
Opposed to these ten interviewees who intended to use their own money were 
seven narratives that indicated a favourable disposition towards using credit to 
start a business, in line with orthodox development theory.    
Aloys, one of the seven, planned to start a company that would import 
consumer goods into Rwanda. When asked about where he would find the 
money to start the business, his reply indicated he anticipated using credit, as 
“most of businessmen seek funds from banks”, which he asserted “is the major 
source of, the major channel of funds”. Accessing bank credit was also the route 
that Queen envisaged using for the fashion design business she wanted to 
start. Although initially speculating “maybe my parents will give me money”, her 
account subsequently indicated she expected to “start from a loan”, which she 
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“will go to [the] bank” to obtain. When pressed about whether she thought it 
would be easy to get a bank loan Queen conceded “no, it’s not, because the 
bank wants collateral for security” and that this might present a difficulty. This 
problem of providing security against a bank loan was also identified by Jessica, 
who anticipated that she “will get a loan” for the Rwf 20 million she estimated 
she would need to start a forex bureaux. She had an ingenious plan, though,   
to overcome the collateral problem. “The bank will give me money”, she 
confidently asserted, adding “I tell the bank this is my property, give me…I want 
a loan”. When the author probed further about the procedure for obtaining the 
loan, Jessica saw it as a very simple process: 
 …I write a letter that I want a loan of 20 million. They ask me what 
business do you want to form. I tell them I want to make my forex 
bureau…I show them my collateral. If they feel fine, they give me a loan. 
Exploring the question of the collateral she would be putting up to secure the 
loan revealed, though, that Jessica did not actually own the property she 
intended to use as security. Rather, she explained that her “fiancé has a house” 
and that this was going to be put up as collateral for the loan. When asked 
about how her future husband felt about putting his house at risk, it transpired 
he was not yet aware of Jessica’s plan: 
 He has a house. But that system of telling him: let this house being a 
collateral - I’m now fearing. But the time will come…by this time my 
husband, he doesn’t know my plan of working myself. We are still 
there…we are still there…in that period of working in banks, I will get a 
job from a bank. He will find maybe a job from MTN company or Tigo 
companies. But time of working myself it is still secret, my secret. 
Jessica’s plan to use her future husband’s house as collateral against the loan 
that she will need to start her forex business closely resembled the logic that 
was apparent in Gilbert B’s narrative. Having recently completed a bachelor’s 
degree in economics, Gilbert B wanted to start his own food processing 
business, but he did not have the Rwf 100 million he estimated would be 
required. Like Jessica, he had devised a shrewd plan for obtaining the credit he 
would need to get his enterprise started. It involved leveraging other people’s 
money and obviated the need for him to provide any funding himself. Whether 
the other parties quite realise what he has in mind is a moot point, as are the 
ethics behind what he is planning to do. Gilbert B had engaged the help of a 
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local administrator and ten of his friends and family, who together had been 
working at persuading the farmers from his village of Kibungo to put their 
combined savings into establishing a farmers’ cooperative, which would then 
employ him as its manager. He anticipated raising Rwf 10 million from the 
farmers and that with this money he would be able to leverage a further        
Rwf 10 million in bank loans to fund the cooperative. While working as the 
cooperative’s manager he then planned to establish his own enterprise in 
parallel. This business would process the farmers’ raw materials, thus his 
strategy had two elements:  
 …the one part is to mobilise the agriculture, to produce many…to 
produce a high production of maize. This project, it requires about 20 
million [Rwfs]. The second part of our project is processing those results 
from maize. It requires about 100 millions [Rwfs] because it is required 
to buy machines and to introduce some machines with ICT. 
Once the cooperative is established he anticipated that, as the manager, he 
would be able to use the profits it generates to invest in building his planned 
new enterprise: 
 After getting money from…as profit from the cooperative, I will set the 
policies to be a big company. For that time, we are not shared those 
dividends. We accumulate those dividends as a new capital to start a 
new good business for growing. For development. 
When seeking clarification about where the money would come from to set up 
the processing factory, and whether it would require bank funding Gilbert B was 
clear that it would be funded: 
  …in two parts. One from the banks and the other from the income 
profitability of the current activities of our previous productivity.  
On the face of it this seems a fairly straightforward strategy if the cooperative is 
to be a significant shareholder in the processing enterprise, but on probing it 
became clear that Gilbert B saw the food processing company as his own 
private business. He planned to set it up initially as an informal enterprise, 
which would migrate into a formal enterprise two years later. When asked 
specifically about the shareholding in the formal enterprise he did not anticipate 
the cooperative being a shareholder, even when it was pointed out that the 
profits earned by the cooperative, which he intends to use as leverage for his 
own company, would belong to its members. Rather, he anticipated he “will 
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collaborate with two peoples, as advisors”. If his enterprise is successful these 
two colleagues would subsequently have the opportunity to “become 
shareholders in [his] company”. His whole strategy was predicated on the idea 
that he could use the farmers’ savings to leverage the bank loans that would be 
needed to set up the cooperative, and that the profits from the cooperative 
could then in turn be leveraged to obtain the additional credit to facilitate setting 
up his own processing company. 
A predisposition for using credit was also apparent in Augustin’s narrative. In the 
aftermath of the genocide Augustin was employed by Concern Worldwide in a 
refugee camp in Cyangugu, near the Congolese border. In August 2000 the 
camp was closed and he was transferred by Concern to work in another camp 
in Ruhengeri, in Rwanda’s northern province. Seeing the potential for tourism in 
the new location, he obtained a bank loan to buy a car that he used to make 
money by chauffeuring tourists:  
 I remember after only three months over there I applied for a loan from 
the bank…I bought a car, and the car was taking tourists. Because I had 
already identified some potentials in tourism industry. 
At the time of the interview he wanted to build a tourist centre combined with a 
training facility for individuals who want to work in the tourism industry, and 
intended to get a bank loan to fund it. Although Augustin claimed his business 
plan was well received by the RDB and retail banks, it had not reached fruition: 
 …I enter into an enquiry with Cogebank. They were ready to give me a 
hundred and twenty million [Rwfs] but before that I went to the [Rwanda] 
Development Bank. They said your plan of building tourist centre in the 
school is wonderful. We want to help that one. If you are ready and you 
can get like 15 percent of the investment, we can provide you with the 
rest. Then I said, no currently I don’t have any money. Then they advised 
me to go to the…those local banks which used to work with me, then 
choose anyone who could provide me with a loan to buy another facility 
to make sure that I don’t lose contacts and clients I had from the other 
property. I think…I applied for the loan, everything was processed. By 
the time of putting money on my account, then they had the other 
problem of a…a global crisis so the central bank had asked all banks to 
stop…to suspend long term loans. That’s why I didn’t get the other loan.  
Although Augustin’s initial application for the money he needed had stalled, he 
appeared to believe this was only a temporary problem that had its origins in the 
global credit crisis.  
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Robert A was also planning to use credit to start an enterprise that would import 
and resell food processing equipment. To get the business off the ground he 
speculated he could “take a loan from the bank…you can take a loan, then you 
start a business”. He too was planning to get a job after completing his studies 
but instead of using this to generate personal savings that would go into the 
enterprise, he saw it rather as a way to secure access to the loan he would 
need:  
 If I got a job I may also [be] getting with it a loan from a bank, because it 
is possible, possible to. Then my job is paying back to the bank, the 
business is growing, and do it simultaneously.  
Thus his consumption sacrifice differed from what was observed in the 
successful entrepreneurs’ accounts. They had sacrificed consumption in order 
to free up money that could be invested directly into the businesses they were 
developing. It was not connected to obtaining credit. But in Robert A’s case 
consumption sacrifice was specifically to facilitate ongoing repayment of the 
loan he intended to take. When probed further about how he felt about 
obtaining credit, his reply indicated he was prepared to take out a loan despite 
being aware of the risk of borrowing money: 
 …borrowing money from a bank also it is still a problem in this country. 
Because when you go to borrow money it is dangerous. Interest rates 
today, it is arrived at 20 percent.  
This plan to use consumption sacrifice to facilitate credit repayments, was also  
replicated by Claire. She wanted to start her own health centre, which would 
provide a broad range of health orientated facilities encompassing family 
planning, stress management, nutritional advice and a health food restaurant. 
Recognising this would require substantial funding, she intended to start by first 
establishing the health food restaurant. When asked during the interview how 
she meant to fund the enterprise, her reply also focussed initially on 
consumption sacrifice: 
 …if I have for example the salary of like one thousand dollars, I may say 
I’ll take half for business. It’s like I would consider myself my salary a 
half of it…to try to survive with that, and then the other half I say like if I 
lost, no problem, I survived. 
However it became clear during the interview that she too was not seeking to 
produce personal savings that could be used to fund her planned business.     
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At the time of the interview Claire was in the process of getting backing from her 
employer for a four-year postgraduate course in histopathology, which would 
facilitate a subsequent move into pathology. She felt this would signal both a 
longer-term commitment to her by her employer and her intention to stay in 
Rwanda, which she believed she could use to support her case for a loan 
application. Probed about how much she would need to borrow, she initially 
answered that she would need $10,000 but later raised this figure to between 
$10,000 and $15,000, and explained that she anticipated she would have to 
make a considerable investment in equipment. Thus her plan was to borrow a 
substantial amount from the bank and then to use half her salary to make the 
regular loan repayments. As was the case with Robert A’s account, her salary 
sacrifice was in order to guarantee her ability to make repayments on the bank 
loan she would need, rather than generating personal savings for direct 
investment in her business. 
5.4.3 Compound Strategies 
The narratives given by two further aspiring entrepreneurs, Emile and Eric B, 
indicated they were intending to pursue a compound strategy involving two or 
more components. Realising it would be difficult to raise the capital to start his 
own business, Eric B had decided to “be different and start a business that will 
require knowledge rather than capital”. The result was Start Up Rwanda, which 
Eric B intended would provide consultancy advice to foreign businesses wanting 
to invest in Rwanda. It required building and promoting an internet platform for 
the services on offer. Lacking the money that would be needed to build the 
website he managed to obtain help from a number of sources who contributed 
their input for free. He had been able to convince some of his colleagues about 
the merits of his idea and its potential for generating employment for them in the 
future: 
 They thought it was a good idea because even if you get one customer 
and he starts his business then at least five people or four people get 
employment. So they thought it was a very good idea. Then I 
consulted…I met one of the guys who helped me to create the website, 
free, volunteering, and I have some others who are helping me to create 
share-show, create networks on Facebook, Twitter, things like that. 
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The “guy” who helped him build the website was actually a woman from Israel 
who had been working in Rwanda, and who Eric B had been helping with 
translating English into Kinyarwandan. She took Eric’s text for the website and 
applied it to a free template she was familiar with: 
 …I told her about the business. She thought it was a good idea, then 
she asked me: what are you doing to make up the business. I told her I 
was raising some money to create a website. By then I was having 
100,000 [Rwfs]. I needed two or three thousand…three hundred 
[thousand], then she told me…she saw that website called Wix which is 
free - a free website. She told me about the free website called Wix, that 
she can figure it out. Then I said: are you willing to do it. Yes - she said 
yes. Then she did it for me. We had become friends because of the 
translating for her.   
This still left Eric B short of the funds he would need for promoting the website, 
but rather than borrowing money he planned to overcome the shortfall by 
finding work that would pay him enough to be able to promote it, such as “going 
[to] serve in hotels, things like that, in restaurants”. Asked whether he had 
considered applying for a bank loan or microcredit, he was convinced it would 
be “impossible to go in a bank when you don’t have an asset” to offer as 
collateral. Questioned further about whether getting support via the 
government’s Business Development Fund was an option, he was similarly 
dismissive: 
 I went to BDF - they are more like banks. They don’t just give money. 
You give them the idea [and] they spend three weeks, a month without 
any…when you go there they tell you that we need viability. They are 
more like banks.  
Eric B’s solution was therefore to combine consumption sacrifice with garnering 
the support of volunteers, especially individuals who saw the potential of future 
employment if the venture proved to be a success. 
Emile had served in the army for ten years, before returning to school at the age 
of 28. After finishing secondary school he worked as a tour guide in the volcanic 
national park, where he saw first-hand the potential that existed in the tourism 
industry. He decided he wanted to start his own tour operators business so 
enrolled at the University of Rwanda Tourism College and, at the time of the 
interview, was nearing completion of his studies. He had estimated what he 
thought it would take to get the business started, and also intended to use a 
!246
compound strategy to fund its development. This comprised three elements: 
savings, family support and credit. He had “started two accounts in the banks” 
to save money to invest in his business, and even though he recognised his 
savings were limited, insisted “my money, even if it is small but even those I will 
put in”. He went on to explain he was also getting help from his family: 
 …my family they have even just given me a car now. They have not told 
me that it is my own car, but they have told me okay if your business will 
grow maybe you can give back our car when you have your own cars. 
Emile anticipated getting the balance of the money that he would need from a 
bank loan. He calculated he would need something of the order of $10,000 to 
start the business, of which half would come from a bank loan secured on land 
he owns: 
 …I will show them the land I have because I have only prepared for five 
millions [Rwfs] - that’s ten thousand US dollars - so that we have only 
creating a website, paying salaries because I cannot say to workers you 
will only get paid when we get money, and also office…to rent the office. 
So that’s why I’ve only prepared for ten thousand US dollars. 
The figures Emile quoted during the interview at first looked a little confusing, as 
the narrative seemed to equate Rwf 5 million with $10,000 when it would in fact 
be closer to half that amount. On further consideration he seemed to be 
referring to needing a total of $10,000 of which half would come from the bank. 
What is clear though is that he anticipated using a compound strategy involving 
his own savings, a bank loan and the car donated by his family. 
Despite the fact that both Eric B and Emile were planning on employing a 
compound strategy, it is interesting to note the divergence in their thinking. Eric 
B’s use of a compound strategy was intended to obviate the need for credit. In 
contrast, Emile included an element of credit in his compound funding plan, and 
appeared to reflect the compound approach used by successful entrepreneur 
Bosco, who it was seen in Chapter 4 had combined personal savings, positive 
cash flow, finding a strategic partner and consumption sacrifice with an element 
of credit. Furthermore, if an allowance is made for the value of the car that Eric 
B had been given, the credit element probably reduces to about one third of his 
start-up capital, as was also the case with Bosco. Thus, even though his 
funding would include an element of credit it was, like Bosco’s, constrained. 
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5.4.4 Family Support  
The family support that was present in Emile’s narrative was also partially in 
evidence when talking to Germaine and Mark. Germaine revealed that if she 
ran short of cash, and needed a short-term advance, she would obtain it from 
her sister. She pointed out that her sister was more relaxed about when she is 
repaid, unlike a bank, which might take possession of Germaine’s stock or 
machinery if she were unable to meet the bank’s repayment terms: 
 …she’s able to help me without…she’s not stressing me. When I say no, 
you see I didn’t gain this month, so I will refund you next month, she 
says: no problem. While if it were the bank, they could have come to sell 
my product or my machines. 
Mark similarly revealed he occasionally relied on friends or family to help him 
out financially:  
 And at times I talk to a few cousins, friends to get small loans…money 
they won’t miss. Yeah and they understand where I am, so they really 
don’t expect me to give it back but they are always willing to, you know, 
lend a hand. 
In a measure of family support that paralleled Emile’s car, Mark also explained 
that he had been helped by a cousin when referring to “the laptop I’m using, she 
gave it up for me”.  
Josh’s family went even further. When he and three colleagues decided to start 
their own business installing electrical equipment, they calculated they would 
need to raise Rwf 1 million to set up, with each of them contributing a quarter to 
the start-up capital. Asked about where he had got the money needed to 
subscribe for shares in the business and whether he had used a bank loan or 
microcredit, Josh replied that he had not: 
 No. Some of us have been working for some time so we tried to gather 
the money, asked even our parents to support us. So they gave us some 
little money. I myself, that’s how I got the money.   
It is worth noting that such ‘soft money’ is qualitatively different to the ‘hard 
money’ that constitutes credit. It was clear Josh and Mark did not regard the 
money they obtained from family or friends as a loan, as they did not anticipate 
repaying it. Similarly, although Germaine does repay her sister, her comments 
made it clear there were no fixed repayment terms or interest rate attached to it. 
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Indeed the very motive for getting short-term help from her sister is the fact she 
is flexible about when the money is repaid versus the inflexibility that Germaine 
associated with formal credit. It was also clear from their comments that these 
aspiring entrepreneurs’ use of soft money resulted directly from a desire to 
avoid credit. This was seen in Josh’s explanation, in answer to a specific 
question about how he felt about borrowing money: 
 I feel it a burden - seriously. I feel it a burden because I don’t know what 
tomorrow will be. I might start up a business, my target is developing the 
business, but there are some - may I call them external forces that might 
lead to my business die, or fall. So that means the debt is going to be 
another problem, in case the business goes down. 
It was similarly evident in Mark’s “I’m not happy with that [laughs]” and “it’s 
scary borrowing money” as well as Germaine’s “I’m still fearing to borrow 
money from the bank”. 
5.4.5 Finding a Strategic Partner 
At the time of the interview Aphrodice was trying to create an enterprise that 
would use mobile phones to provide personalised health advice and remote 
access to a panel of doctors. He had estimated it would require Rwf 15 million 
to develop the application, but this was money that he did not have. To 
overcome the problem Aphrodice had followed the same route that was used by 
successful entrepreneur Gilbert A. He had found a strategic partner, a software 
developer, who could build the application for him. Aphrodice explained that he 
“told him you can develop and I give you shares in my business. He accepted”. 
Asked about how the shares in the business would be split, Aphrodice 
responded that it would be “fifty-fifty”. As was the case with Gilbert A, half of the 
business would belong to Aphrodice, for having the idea, while half would be 
owned by the software developer who would facilitate its realisation. 
5.4.6 Summary 
Of the twenty-one aspiring entrepreneurs interviewed, thirteen were following 
strategies that were intended to circumvent the use of credit, mirroring the 
funding approach that was employed by the successful entrepreneurs. Of these 
the majority, ten, planned to use their own funds exclusively. One had found a 
strategic partner, one had obtained the start-up capital he needed from his 
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family and another was using a compound strategy that combined consumption 
sacrifice with obtaining the support of volunteers.  
Seven interviewees planned to use credit as their sole source of enterprise 
capital. This included two interviewees who had made comments that initially 
suggested they planned to sacrifice consumption, but it became clear this was 
in order to guarantee their ability to make loan repayments rather than 
generating personal savings to be invested in the business. One further 
interviewee, Emile, planned to follow a compound strategy that included both 
personal savings and credit in the mix, which matched the compound method 
employed by successful entrepreneur Bosco.  
For all of these narratives, though, it is worth keeping in mind that the actions 
the aspiring entrepreneurs intended to take were largely a matter of conjecture. 
Those planning to use their own funds were making assumptions about their 
ability to save. Similarly, those planning to access credit were making 
assumptions about how their plans would be greeted by providers of such 
credit. It is only at the crunch point of discovering that assumptions made are 
unfounded, or overstated, that aspiring entrepreneurs would have to 
countenance alternative ways to bring their enterprise ideas to market. Thus the 
use of alternative techniques, such as using positive cash flow, would be 
naturally understated in the narratives versus the successful entrepreneurs’ 
accounts examined in Chapter 4. What is beyond dispute, though, is the fact 
that there was an observable separation between those aspiring entrepreneurs 
who matched the successful entrepreneurs’ wish to avoid using credit, and 
those who intended to access it. The implications of this separation will be 
addressed in the next chapter.  
5.5 Social Networks 
The theoretical arguments analysed in Chapter 2 concluded that entrepreneurs 
tend to form broad networks with weak ties. The narratives explored in   
Chapter 4 indicated that successful entrepreneurs in Rwanda also tended to 
build networks with loose ties, made up especially of individuals that might 
become future customers. This section will assess the extent to which 
establishing such networks also figured in the aspiring entrepreneurs’ accounts. 
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5.5.1 Leveraging Personal Networks 
Six of the aspiring entrepreneurs interviewed - Aphrodice, Daniel, Eric B, Josh, 
Rehema and Robert A - provided evidence for having started to build and 
leverage social networks. 
When talking about his own personal network, Aphrodice claimed his mobile 
phone contained the details of over 1,500 individuals that could help him 
develop his business. “I have a lot of friends” he explained, adding, “so if I have 
a problem I can find out a person who works in the domain and that person he 
can help me”. He went on to illustrate the point by talking specifically about how 
his network of contacts had helped him to develop the business concept he was 
working on. Planning to develop a medical application, but with limited medical 
knowledge, he had talked first to “a friend of mine who is now finishing his 
medicine school” about his concept and was able to obtain a list of medical 
questions he could build into his service. He then approached another individual 
in his network of contacts who “was working for call centre of MTN and that 
person directed me to the developer”. It was this software developer who went 
on to agree to partner Aphrodice and build the operating platform for his 
medical service. Asked about the time and effort he puts into keeping his 
network alive, Aphrodice described it as “a gift…something I have in me”.  
This ease of building and maintaining a network of contacts was also seen in 
the interview with Rehema, who described herself as “a really social person.” 
Probed about whether building her network was something she did consciously 
or whether it just happened by accident produced the reply “it just happens”. 
Rehema was very aware, though, of the reciprocal value that existed in her 
network. Observing she had in the past helped others develop their businesses, 
she expected now to be helped in return: 
 …from the friends I have helped…I’m helping them in their business…
why not me…why not the other way also, they can also help me [laughs] 
yeah? Like we can help each other. Because I’m helping them build their 
dream, they can also help me build mine. 
When she was questioned about whether there was anyone in particular from 
her social network who could be of help in setting up the business she 
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confirmed that there was, but her answer also indicated a certain reticence in 
exploiting this contact: 
 I realised when I was talking to this guy, earlier in the week, that I feel…
like I’m going to take advantage of the relationship I have with someone, 
trying to get them to buy or to help me sell the services I have. So my 
conscience is not okay [a] hundred percent in doing that.  
But despite asserting “I feel like I’m taking advantage of our relationship to get 
what I want. So I’ve been fighting with my conscience a lot [laughs]”, Rehema 
nevertheless went on to acknowledge that she would need to overcome her 
reticence if she was to get the enterprise moving. 
Daniel too was planning to leverage his contacts and mentioned in particular   
“a friend who works for the Rwanda Development Board” who was “well placed 
to help personally. If not he will find someone who is in the right place to help”. 
Eric B too had identified a key individual that could help him get his business 
started. He explained “I told him about the business idea and he said yeah it’s 
okay, I will be forwarding you these [leads]”. Probed about whether he would 
need to make any kind of commission payment for the information, Eric B 
indicated he would not, and that his friend was “just doing it”.  
When talking to Josh it was clear that he too had been able to identify and 
exploit a key individual from his social network. Listening to the impressive 
richness of Josh’s voice during the interview it comes as no surprise that he is a 
well known Gospel singer: 
 I sing base. Yeah. So because of music, and even my church, where we 
have many big people. I’m an Adventist, so I pray from Kigali English 
Church. Kigali English Church has many popular people. Some of them 
who are even ambassadors. And even today we have an ambassador 
who prays from there. So those people can connect me to others.  
He explained further that this meant “people know me” and that through his 
singing he “made a lot of friends outside here. Big people - Senate Ministers 
come to that”. Discussing how the business had got started, Josh identified that 
the enterprise’s first job came about as a result of his approaching someone 
from the church where he sings:  
 Personally, I’ll let you know that the first business it’s me who brought it. 
And I brought it from one official that was a governor in a place - 
northern part of Rwanda.  
!252
Asked how he had persuaded someone to take the risk of giving him his first 
installation contract, Josh explained: 
 …we just talked and I’m like, you know he’s an old guy, so I’m like dad, 
you know, we do ABCD and that’s the business that we do - we as 
young men. So if you have any opportunity please let us know, because 
we are very well skilled through the profile that we shall show you. Then 
he was like well, yeah, I’m actually even building up an estate so you 
can come and install power there. And I’m like: right, why not.  
Probed about whether he had to tender for the job, he answered: “no we didn’t 
tender. We didn’t tender, we just went direct”.  
When Josh was asked whether he had set out deliberately to cultivate his 
network of contacts or whether it was just something that happens naturally, he 
too thought: 
 It happens naturally. Why? Because as I sing they get to know me. As I 
get up I just greet them like friends, so accidentally I find them where I’m 
looking for businesses. 
Josh put this down to his natural gregariousness. Asked about how his friends 
might describe him produced a reply that mirrored those of both Rehema and 
Aphrodice. “They know me that I am first of all very, very, I am very social”, he 
replied. 
Robert A’s narrative also suggested a certain gregariousness. When asked 
about his personal characteristics and why he thought he would be successful, 
Robert A explained “first of all I like to have a collaboration with others”. Asked 
whether he was building this network deliberately, with a view to exploiting it for 
his business, revealed it had initially started as an accident, but that he had 
then come to “consider it as something that will be positive to me. Which will 
increase to me, which help me to achieve what I want to achieve”. He had 
realised that the contacts he was making as a student representative would be 
valuable to him in the future, and explained he planned to leverage the network 
he was building “to market my business”.  
5.5.2 Summary 
The pattern observed in the aspiring entrepreneurs’ narratives diverged 
considerably from that seen in the interviews with successful entrepreneurs.     
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It was seen in Chapter 4 that successful entrepreneurs in Rwanda deliberately 
set about cultivating a broad network of contacts who might in the future 
become customers. But this tactic was cited by only one of the aspiring 
entrepreneurs, Robert A, who had latterly started to cultivate his network in the 
expectation it could provide future customers but admitted it had started “as an 
accident”. Developing a network unintentionally rather than by design was also 
seen in specific comments made by Aphrodice, Rehema and Josh and 
appeared to be linked to their natural gregariousness.  
It was also apparent from the interviews that the aspiring entrepreneurs were 
more focussed on key individuals, who could help bring an enterprise into 
existence. This characteristic was not seen in the accounts given by successful 
entrepreneurs, even though it was probed for specifically. This is perhaps 
unsurprising. Building a network of potential future customers is clearly critical 
to long-run success, but takes time to develop. Furthermore, a network of 
potential future customers can only be exploited once the enterprise has been 
brought into existence. For the aspiring entrepreneurs finding a first key 
customer, or someone who can refer customers, is critically important and 
would therefore be likely to be uppermost in their minds. Without a first 
breakthrough deal, such as Josh’s first installation contract, the enterprise is a 
purely hypothetical construct. For the successful entrepreneurs that first 
customer would have been equally important, but has become merely one of a 
string of customers and so probably lost significance relative to the necessity for 
a network of potential future customers. What the divergence is almost certainly 
describing is the changing priority between the aspiring entrepreneurs’ need to 
get the enterprise started, versus the successful entrepreneurs’ need to keep it 
going.  
Interestingly, when Sarasvathy’s expert entrepreneurs reflected on how they 
would go about developing a new enterprise, they too had indicated they would 
focus on identifying and leveraging the relationship with a key individual who 
could help develop the enterprise. It is significant that inexperienced aspiring 
entrepreneurs in a developing economy context should parallel the approach 
that would be adopted by very experienced, expert entrepreneurs in a highly 
developed context such as the USA. 
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5.6 Dealing with Risk 
It was seen at section 2.4.1 that the popular discourse tends to regard 
entrepreneurs as individuals who are predisposed towards taking risks that 
others would avoid. Section 2.4.3 observed that Kahneman took this theoretical 
propensity for risk taking a stage further, leading him to position entrepreneurs 
as foolish gamblers who behave irrationally and wilfully ignore the probability of 
failure. Chapter 4 concluded, though, that this was not the case with successful 
entrepreneurs in Rwanda. Instead, their narratives revealed they had taken 
deliberate action to minimise the risks they would be facing when setting up 
their enterprises.  
This section examines the aspiring entrepreneurs’ comments about the risks 
associated with enterprise creation and will attempt to determine the degree to 
which they mirrored the successful entrepreneurs’ attitude towards and 
mitigation of risk. To aid the analysis, the narratives could be broadly split into 
three groups comprising the risk embracers, the risk averse and a third, 
intermediate group, the pragmatists.   
5.6.1 The Risk Embracers 
The first group contains the seven aspiring entrepreneurs Gilbert B, Robert A, 
Daniel, Claire, John, Robert B and Augustin. When talking about the risks they 
would be facing, all made comments that appeared to be in tune with the 
popular perception of entrepreneurs as risk takers.  
Robert B initially confided risk “makes you feel scared”.  His subsequent 
account made it clear though that he was nonetheless ready to take risks and 
included several references to actions he had taken, which were plainly risky. It 
was evident when he talked about outsourcing government contacts he had 
won for building websites. Although the government had a policy of supporting 
the Rwandan private sector in order to “make sure this money goes to the 
Rwandans”, Robert B was relaxed about subcontracting such contracts. One of 
these was a major project, for the RDB, which involved migrating 94 individual 
government websites to a new national standard. This he “outsourced to a 
company called DRC systems in India”, who he judged were “very cheap, very 
good”. Another contract, for the Rwandan Public Procurement Authority, he 
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outsourced to the Ukraine, which he justified on the basis that it cost him “a few 
thousand dollars”, while he earned “tens of thousands of dollars”. Pressed 
about the wisdom of the decision he admitted it was risky, but felt very 
comfortable about the action he had taken. He explained “I’m very okay with 
that. That’s why I think I’m a good manager”. He added in justification that he 
felt he was capable of taking “decisions that you think are very good for the 
company”. His earlier account of how he had built a website for the Rwandan 
police force and deflected criticism of the work, also spoke volumes about his 
preparedness to overcome any fears and engage positively with risk.  
An interesting variant on this apparent predisposition for risk taking was also 
seen in the comments given by Gilbert B and Robert A. When asked whether he 
was concerned about the risks he would be facing, Gilbert B gave an 
unequivocal “no’’ and went on to explain that when starting a business one had 
to “expect to meet with risks”. He legitimised his acceptance of risk by asserting 
“high risk, high returns. For me the risk is not a problem”. He expanded on the 
point by asserting:   
 Because when you start the business with high risk you expect to get a 
higher profitability from how you react to resolve all those kind of risks.  
Similarly, although Robert A had difficulty identifying specific risks he would 
encounter when starting his planned import/export business, he too asserted 
“where there is more risk is where there is more return”, adding “I know that 
where there is a high risk, that is where I can gain more”. This had led him to 
adopt a thoroughly positive attitude to risk, to the extent that he asserted “I like 
very much risk”. Diametrically opposed to the successful entrepreneurs’ 
avoidance of risk, Gilbert B and Robert A both appeared to have internalised an 
expectation that taking high risks would automatically translate into high returns 
for them, rather than increasing the probability of failure. It appeared they had 
both convinced themselves that the normal return versus risk trade-off would 
work in their favour, rather than against them. While not expressed quite as 
overtly, this propensity for high risk behaviour was also suggested in the 
narrative related by Augustin. Although they ultimately failed, he had a history of 
attempting to develop enterprises in parallel with his employment as a camp 
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manager at Irish NGO Concern Worldwide, even though it was specifically 
excluded in his contract of employment: 
 …it were not allowed to do businesses while you were working with the 
international organisation…so an humanitarian organisation. But I 
remember during the four or five years I worked for Concern [World]wide 
in the refugee camp, I was still doing businesses. 
In his pursuit of opportunities to create businesses, Augustin had been prepared 
to act in a manner that directly contravened the terms of his contract and 
actually put his full-time employment at risk.  
It is significant that Augustin, Gilbert B and Robert A were all seen at section 
5.2.1 to be individuals whose motives for starting a business were firmly located 
in the desire to make money. Robert A  “always thought it’s a good idea to be 
rich”, while Augustin asserted “to me money comes first”, and Gilbert B 
confirmed “I want to be rich”.  
Although not expressed in such an extreme way, this preparedness to embrace 
risk was also suggested in the narratives provided by Daniel, Claire and John. 
All three made comments that suggested they were stimulated by risk. Daniel 
positively asserted that facing the risks of starting a business was something he 
was actually “looking forward to”. John similarly, when talking about the risks 
associated with taking Gasabo 3D from the public to the private sector, claimed 
that he found the experience “exciting”, suggesting he too had a predisposition 
for embracing risk. This propensity was particularly evident with Claire who 
claimed “I like to take risks normally in life”. Beyond the intention to start a 
business, it was also seen in other aspects of her narrative, for instance when 
talking about her decision to learn to play the violin: 
 And another risk I’ve taken, it’s…I like classical music. I’ve been in a 
choir for long, but I say: ah, people are playing instruments. I say I have 
to take risk - in Rwanda we are not used to play violin. Now I…after 
this…I have to play violin. There is some risk that I take even I say it’s…I 
mean I may not reach the high level, but let me try. 
She also went on to amplify her attitude to risk by using as an example her 
decision to become “the first lady to play Taekwondo in Rwanda”. 
While they had indicated a readiness to embrace risk, this set of aspiring 
entrepreneurs nevertheless also volunteered comments relating to actions that 
!257
could have a risk-mitigating effect. It was seen in Chapter 4 that Sharon used a 
memorandum of understanding to secure commitment to his enterprise, in the 
expectation it would in due course lead to a formal contract with his client, the 
local authority. It was an approach that appeared to be echoed in Robert A’s 
belief in the importance of committing an agreement to writing: 
 Yeah, you have to make a contract which is clear, defining every issues, 
how it will be. Then you, after defining that, he agree, you sign a contract 
then by contract you will follow the contract and he will follow the 
contract. 
Aspiring entrepreneur Robert B’s narrative also featured an account that bore 
comparison with another of the successful entrepreneurs, Annette. Although he 
was referring to an enterprise that had ultimately failed, the account is 
interesting inasmuch as it closely paralleled Annette’s experience when she set 
up her film production company. While Robert B was working as 
communications director at Simtel, a banking consortium, he was approached 
by one of Simtel’s clients about taking on, independently, a project to develop a 
single electronic payment platform for one of the consortium’s banks. Like 
Annette he perceived the conflict of interest this implied, as the project could 
have been undertaken by his employer, but he nevertheless teed up the 
contract while still employed at the consortium. He explained that he then 
resigned and “signed that contract” for the project “two days later”. As was the 
case with Annette, he had been able to mitigate start-up risk by circumventing 
the perceived conflict of interest so that he could launch his business on the 
back of having secured a first major contract that could initially bankroll the 
enterprise. 
The intention to build an enterprise from the comparative safety of having a 
parallel full-time job was seen in the accounts given by Claire, Daniel and 
Robert A. Robert B too was using his full-time job to produce personal savings, 
which he was gradually putting into building the guesthouse he was planning to 
open. In his case, this was a well-established pattern, as he had followed a 
similar route when he had tried to develop an audiovisual company while he 
“was still working” for the national TV station. It was also explicit in Gilbert B’s 
plan to be employed by the farmers cooperative that he planned to establish in 
his home village and which would provide the platform for his production 
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company. Additionally, the tactic of transferring risk to others, which was 
observed in Chapter 4, also obviously figured in Gilbert B’s highly questionable 
plan to put the savings of farmers in his village at risk in order to establish his 
food processing business. 
Augustin too had attempted to build an enterprise in parallel to being employed 
by Concern Worldwide. The paradox with Augustin, though, was that 
establishing an enterprise while in wage employment was explicitly prohibited 
by his contract of employment. Thus although he had been able to mitigate risk 
by setting up businesses in parallel to his job, this put at risk his ongoing wage 
employment, which was the very thing that enabled him to mitigate risk in the 
first place. 
In summary, being prepared to embrace risk did not preclude taking deliberate 
steps to mitigate it  - a nuance that will be picked up in the final analysis in 
Chapter 6.  
5.6.2 The Pragmatists 
Queen, Samuel, Claude, Rehema, Aphrodice, Germaine, Eric B and Mark all 
gave accounts that indicated a more moderate, or essentially pragmatic, 
attitude to risk. Their accounts suggested they believed risk was an unavoidable 
necessity when starting a business, and that they were resigned to accepting it.  
This was evident when Queen observed “you can’t fight the risk” and Samuel 
commented “if you are discouraged by the risk, then you are not a good 
entrepreneur”. Similarly, although Claude acknowledged he would prefer to 
“start a business that is less risky” he also recognised you “have to take risks” 
otherwise “you cannot start a business”. The same sentiment was present too 
when exploring the question of risk with Aphrodice. He too replied levelheadedly 
that “to start a business is a risk”. Asked how he felt about the risks he would 
encounter, he conceded “it was not easy” but that he nevertheless felt optimistic 
on the basis of the informal feedback he had received when talking to people 
about his idea. A similarly balanced attitude towards risk was also evident when 
talking to Mark. Exploring how he felt about the risks he would be taking he 
insisted he was “not really afraid of that”. Pressed further about whether it made 
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him feel nervous, he conceded “yeah, it does at times, but it doesn’t stop me 
from waking up the next morning and do it all over again”.  
Pragmatism also seemed to be behind Rehema’s “I’m willing to take the risk”, 
and although Germaine was fully aware of the risk she would be facing she 
could talk dispassionately about it and claimed to be “relaxed”. Similarly, when 
Eric B was pressed about whether he was nervous about the risks he might be 
taking he responded:  
 No [laughs]. No I’m not nervous about it. If I get a job I will invest 
everything in the business, whatever it will take. If it takes a long time,     
I don’t care. But I have to do it.  
As with the previous section, the interviews with these aspiring entrepreneurs 
also revealed they were acting in a manner that they thought would help limit 
the risks they might face. The strategy employed by successful entrepreneur 
Gilbert A - that of putting someone else’s money at risk - was also reflected in 
the accounts given by Aphrodice. On probing him about the intended venture, it 
transpired that his business partner was intending to put cash to the tune of  
Rwf 600,000 into the business “because he’s a rich guy”, while Aphrodice would 
be investing only Rwf 15,000 to register the company plus the $200 that was 
needed to obtain an SMS mobile code. Eric B’s use of volunteers also arguably 
transferred the risk to those colleagues who contributed their help free of charge 
in the hope it might lead to employment. In reality these jobs would be wholly 
dependent upon the success of the enterprise, which was by no means a given. 
Consequently the volunteers were taking on a considerable proportion of the 
enterprise risk. They were speculating that the business they are helping to 
establish, free and for someone else, would ultimately succeed and provide 
them with wage employment. 
Developing an enterprise in parallel to having a full-time job was seen in the 
accounts given by Rehema and Germaine. Rehema explained she thought she 
would “still keep my job and still do this other one until I make it work”, while 
Germaine referred to “still doing both jobs”, a reference to running her 
embryonic enterprise in parallel with working as the manager of a handicrafts 
cooperative. 
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5.6.3 The Risk Averse 
Only four of the twenty-one aspiring entrepreneurs, Colette, Josh, Janvier and 
Emile, volunteered comments suggesting they shared the successful 
entrepreneurs’ aversion to risk. When she was asked how she felt about the 
risks she would be facing, Colette replied “I’m scared, actually. I’m scared - 
that’s why I’m still doing my job”. Putting the same question to Josh elicited a 
similar response. “I was worried” he said. Their discomfort was also seen in 
Janvier’s account, when he was talking about the bakery he wished to create. 
Although he initially had difficulty enunciating the specific risks he would be 
facing, he volunteered his judgement that “if it is risky, I can’t implement it”. 
Similarly, Emile was confident his enterprise would not entail risk, and 
maintained “if I feel it, I cannot even open my business”. 
Clear evidence for risk mitigation measures was only apparent in two of these 
four accounts. In Colette’s case she was planning to develop her business 
alongside her job at the National Bank of Rwanda, thereby echoing the tactic 
employed by Bosco, Jimmy and Jacques: 
 If I was not sharing that much the risk I would have resigned and be full 
time in the business. But I’m still doubting to…to start without any capital 
that I’m sure it’s going to help me for the first…the first year. Because I 
can’t be sure that I’m going to get the contracts immediately, so I will 
have to wait some time, and I still shall expect that risk. 
In Josh’s case it was clear that a whole range of risk-mitigating tactics had been 
employed. This included the decision to partner with experienced electrical 
engineers who were moonlighting from their full-time jobs. Asked specifically 
about whether his business had been born out of his own work experience 
revealed that it was rather based on: 
 …the experience for our engineers, who I got from a company called Rio 
Contractors. They work from here - Rio Contractors. So those engineers 
worked with Rio Contractors in installation of networking, cameras, 
CCTV - those things, you know. 
When discussing dealing with risk Josh also explained that he and his 
colleagues had “recognised some of the risks” and had taken specific action to 
offset them. The electrical loads associated with heavy equipment, such as the 
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lifts and office air conditioning systems they were installing, meant that there 
was a risk that some: 
 …materials get burned in the period that we had given the clients. 
Before they hand over, or we hand over the material, we are like, it might 
be burnt up.  
This specific risk had been addressed by taking out insurance:  
 …we said let’s go and see the insurance companies outside here. And 
then we said we shall see how to deal with those issues with these 
insurance companies.  
Additionally, although not able to afford to insure against personal injury, they 
took the precaution of setting money aside to cover for the eventuality: 
 …we know that our people when they are installing, sometimes they 
might even get an accident and they fall down. We said for that matter 
we shall be seeing - we ourselves - we shall be holding those cases.  
We can gather some money to take that person to the hospital. 
On the specific question of financial risk, Josh explained that this too had been 
mitigated “because we are not the ones who pay the money for the machines. 
Rather the client tells us that I want this material and then we are like: can you 
pay?”. By getting their clients to pay directly for the materials to be installed, 
such as a lift system, Josh’s firm was able to minimise its working capital 
requirement and thereby reduce its financial exposure. Far from the popular 
notion that entrepreneurs embrace risk, Josh’s approach illustrated a wide 
ranging capacity for identifying the risks he would be facing and for taking highly 
rational measures to minimise them. 
5.6.4 Tolerance of Ambiguity 
With a heightened tolerance of ambiguity, entrepreneurs are thought to be able 
to cope well with the ambiguous situations that others would find stressful. It 
has been further argued that they tend to actively seek out and enjoy such 
situations (Sexton and Bowman, 1985) and “prefer rather than shun uncertainty” 
(Knight, 2006: 242). Evidence for a heightened tolerance of ambiguity was 
identified in the Rwandan entrepreneurs’ accounts and was connected with their 
having validated and de-risked the opportunity they intended to pursue. 
Although the aspiring entrepreneurs were only just starting out on their 
entrepreneurial journeys, the comments offered by seven of them pointed also 
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to a heightened tolerance of ambiguity. It was apparent when they discussed 
the possibility that their intended enterprises might fail and the stresses that 
they thought they would encounter.   
Eric B was aware that developing a business would be challenging and at times 
discouraging, but observed “you have to deal with it. You have to be patient”. 
Similarly, Daniel explained “I expect a lot of stress and I know that it’s not going 
to be a problem to have it” and “if it doesn’t work out, it’s still fine, at least I gave 
it a try”. His attitude towards possible failure was also echoed in Claire’s “but 
I’ve tried even if I have failed’, a stoicism that was also seen in Germaine’s 
narrative. When asked what she would do if her business was unsuccessful she 
showed no sign of being disconcerted by the possibility when replying matter-of-
factly “if it become unsuccessful I will close, and sell what I have”, and Jessica, 
when asked if she was worried about the fact her business might fail, replied 
forthrightly “no, I can manage”.  
Colette’s attitude was also markedly relaxed. Asked whether she felt concerned 
about the stresses she would be facing when starting her business produced 
the straightforward answer “no, no. Not that much. No”. Pressed further on the 
point she insisted:  
 I think all I need is to start. When I’ll have started it will be fine. Of course 
there are always ups and downs and everything. I think I’m ready for 
that.  
The most eloquent account, though, was given by Mark, who explained:  
 I don’t expect myself to be successful overnight. I understand that every 
time I feel like giving up I remind myself that I’m…I know that…the steps 
I have to go through. The pain I have to go through…I’m not special. And 
because…and me understanding that, it keeps me in the game [laughs].  
He plainly felt able to deal with the stress he would be facing, but it was also 
clear he was not blasé about it: 
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 Yeah, stress, this is very stressful because…well, in most cases I’ve…    
I mean to start off, right, I don’t have the skills…not to…achieve what it 
is that I want. So I know that I have to build…find and build those skills. 
That’s very stressful, that’s… that means learning how to programme 
from a finance background. This is a whole new territory. It is very scary, 
you know. But I have to go through that and master the fundamentals 
and stuff, step by step. Also, the fact that you expect, things to come 
your way but they just don’t because of the environment you’re in. At 
times I feel like I don’t belong here [laughs]. Yeah, but then to me that is 
really a good sign that I’m on the right track. 
In fact he went on to echo Germaine’s stoicism when adding “I’m not afraid 
June coming around and I close shop because it didn’t work out”. 
At section 4.4.3 it was suggested that the successful entrepreneurs’ tolerance of 
ambiguity was shaped by the fact they had taken steps to mitigate the risks they 
would be facing. Five of these seven aspiring entrepreneurs accounts had 
similarly quoted risk-mitigating actions they could take. The remaining two, Mark 
and Jessica, gave accounts that demonstrated a tolerance for ambiguity but 
their narratives did not include any reference to measures that might specifically 
mitigate risks. 
5.6.5 Summary 
The majority of the aspiring entrepreneurs, fourteen, made comments that 
signalled they were favourably disposed towards risk or pragmatically resigned 
to accepting it. Their accounts were commensurate with or tended towards the 
perception that entrepreneurs take risks, but were at odds with the conclusion 
derived from the accounts given by the successful entrepreneurs in Rwanda, 
who were plainly risk averse. In comparison, a cluster of only four aspiring 
entrepreneurs’ narratives deviated clearly from the argument that entrepreneurs 
wilfully engage with risk, and corresponded to the successful entrepreneurs’ 
aversion to risk.  
Actions that would mitigate risk were observed across the sample. Importantly, 
it was clear that even individuals who appeared to be more favourably disposed 
to risk would nevertheless still seek to mitigate the risks they expected to 
encounter. Nine of the aspiring entrepreneurs intended to develop their 
businesses in parallel to being in wage employment. The decision to launch 
from the safety of a parallel job brings two clear risk-reducing benefits. First it 
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means they can bide their time and ensure the new enterprise can support them 
financially before abandoning income from wage employment. In a developing 
economy context where social safety nets are typically absent, this obviously 
makes sense. Second, it means the embryonic enterprise is not loaded with a 
founder’s full salary costs, thus reducing its operating overheads and thereby 
increasing the likelihood of commercial success. This in turn enhances the 
probability that an entrepreneur will eventually be able to abandon parallel 
employment and move safely into the enterprise in the full knowledge that the 
move has become less risky.  
The dominance of parallel employment may be explained in part by the fact that 
this group were only in the very early stages of enterprise development. They 
were therefore making assumptions about their ability to put enough money 
aside, from their future income, to fund launching a business. Additionally, those 
who were yet to find a job were speculating that they would be able to find 
employment, despite the weakness of the labour market. If these two 
assumptions turned out in retrospect to be overly optimistic, then one might 
expect the balance to shift away from reducing risk through parallel employment 
towards alternative risk-mitigating measures, or abandoning plans to develop an 
enterprise altogether. 
Only a very small number of the aspiring entrepreneurs, three, intended to use 
risk-mitigating tactics that did not include a parallel full-time job. This included 
Aphrodice’s putting someone else’s money at risk, Eric B’s transferring risk to 
volunteers who hoped success would lead to a job, and the wide range of 
measures Josh took. 
Contradictions were again seen to exist within individual narratives. Robert B for 
instance had taken actions to mitigate risk by developing an enterprise in 
parallel to being employed, but had also demonstrated considerable bravado 
when outsourcing government contracts and producing a website for the police 
force. Similarly, Augustin had paradoxically put at risk the very thing that 
underpinned his ability to develop an enterprise. The implications of such 
contradictions will be addressed fully in the final chapter.  
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Tolerance of ambiguity, which was present in all of the successful entrepreneurs 
accounts, was far less evident in the aspiring entrepreneurs’ narratives. It was 
seen in only seven of the twenty-one aspiring entrepreneurs’ accounts. Of these 
seven, all bar two had volunteered corresponding evidence for risk-mitigating 
action that they would take, which matched with the deduction in Chapter 4 that 
tolerance of ambiguity is an expression of confidence in the commercial 
opportunity that is to be pursued and that it has been de-risked.  
5.7 Conclusion 
Although the sample of aspiring entrepreneurs comprised individuals who were 
only at the early stage of their respective entrepreneurial journeys, the accounts 
they gave were nevertheless rich in content. On all the criteria examined in this 
chapter there appeared to be subsets of aspiring entrepreneurs that resembled 
the successful entrepreneurs, even though the former were only projecting 
forward into the future. 
When exploring the motives for starting an enterprise, very few of the aspiring 
entrepreneurs’ accounts reflected the successful entrepreneurs’ apparent 
rejection of financial motives. Rather, the majority appeared to be driven in the 
main by the desire to make money or create a job because prospects were 
constrained by a weak employment market. There was also evidence that this 
had been influenced to a degree by government programmes that actively 
promoted entrepreneurship as a viable alternative to competing for scarce wage 
employment. 
Both internal locus of control and a need for achievement were seen to be 
present in the aspiring entrepreneurs’ accounts, but the high degree of overlap 
that was observed in Chapter 4 was less in evidence in the aspiring 
entrepreneurs’ accounts. Only five of the twenty-one aspiring entrepreneurs 
exhibited both characteristics and, unlike the successful entrepreneurs, this did 
not track across to a clear-cut rejection of being financially motivated. Three of 
the five - Mark, Daniel and Eric B - did give accounts suggesting they were not 
financially motivated, but the other two, Claire and Josh, included quite specific 
reference in their narratives that suggested they were orientated towards the 
monetary gains that they could accrue.    
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Chapter 4 also revealed that all of the successful entrepreneurs had exhibited a 
dilute form of effectuation and that sketching was simultaneously used by three-
quarters of them. This level of consistency was far less in evidence though in 
the aspiring entrepreneurs’ accounts. Only eleven of the sample of twenty-one 
gave comments indicative of either diving in without a plan or acting 
contingently. The use of sketching was suggested in ten of the aspiring 
entrepreneurs accounts, which was also considerably lower than for the 
successful entrepreneurs’ sample. Taken together, the combination of 
sketching, diving in without a plan and acting contingently indicated a further 
polarisation in the aspiring entrepreneurs’ sample. It was exhibited clearly by 
only five of the twenty-one interviewees. One further interviewee, Robert A, had 
in his account indicated support for both dilute effectuation and sketching, but 
also contradicted this by simultaneously expressing strong support for 
causation.  
Importantly too, where the aspiring entrepreneurs indicated a preference for 
more causally-based formal planning this was rarely matched by comments 
indicating an ability to envision what their intended enterprise might look like in 
the future. This was somewhat unexpected, given that the orthodox STP 
process is concerned with identifying and striving to achieve clearly articulated 
fixed end goals, indeed the very process of writing a formal business plan 
hinges on having a clearly defined expression of such a goal and then 
methodically plotting the resources necessary to achieve it. Taken together the 
evidence from both samples suggests that the ability to envision a future for the 
enterprise was more associated with the interaction of dilute effectuation and 
sketching than with formal business planning. 
John’s account of the failure of two carefully constructed formal business plans 
written for Gasabo 3D to match reality is also informative in this regard. If 
successive formal business plans for a going concern like Gasabo 3D had failed 
accurately to predict the future, then attempting to write such a formal plan for a 
new enterprise where there is no historic data and where the future is shrouded 
in Knightian uncertainty would seem futile. Indeed the formal business plan, 
with its preordained objectives, strategies and anticipated cash flows would 
seem to be the very antithesis of the contingent behaviour observed in the 
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accounts given by the successful entrepreneurs and the predisposition 
expressed by a minority of the aspiring entrepreneurs. It consequently raises 
questions about the wisdom of teaching formal business planning skills to 
intending entrepreneurs, which will be addressed in Chapter 6. 
On the question of how the enterprise was to be funded, the aspiring 
entrepreneurs were generally much more in tune with the successful 
entrepreneurs’ aversion to credit. Thirteen of the interviewees anticipated 
avoiding using credit altogether. Only seven interviewees intended to use credit 
as their sole source of funds, in line with the orthodox theory that intending 
entrepreneurs need access to credit. One additional interviewee included an 
element of credit in his compound funding plan, as had been the case with 
successful entrepreneur Bosco. This raises serious doubts about arguments, 
explored at section 2.3.1, that supply of credit is critical to SME development 
(OECD, 2004: 5) and that its absence in developing economies is “especially 
worrisome” (OECD, 2006: 11).  
Polarisation was also evident when exploring the subject of risk. Only four of the 
aspiring entrepreneurs, the risk averse, gave accounts that clearly mirrored the 
successful entrepreneurs’ avoidance of risk. A far larger proportion, fourteen, 
diverged from the successful entrepreneurs’ sample and tended rather towards 
the popular conception of entrepreneurs as risk takers. This larger proportion 
included individuals who were decidedly pro-risk as well as the pragmatists who 
saw it as an inescapable and acceptable accompaniment to enterprise 
formation. It was also clear though that those who were prepared to embrace 
risk would, nevertheless, still seek to mitigate the risks they would be likely to 
confront.  
A much narrower range of risk-mitigating strategies was in evidence compared 
to the successful entrepreneurs’ sample and was dominated by the preference 
for developing a business in parallel with being in wage employment. Only three 
aspiring entrepreneurs intended to use risk-mitigating tactics other than parallel 
employment. Given that they were only at the early stages of developing their 
enterprises it is not surprising that this should be the case. The intention to 
develop an enterprise in parallel to being employed features two levels of 
assumption. For those without a job it is dependent upon first finding a job in a 
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weak labour market. Having found a job, the aim of developing a business is 
still dependent upon the aspiring entrepreneurs’ capacity for saving money to 
invest in an enterprise. It is not until such assumptions have been fully tested 
and possibly found to be wanting that the aspiring entrepreneur would be forced 
to countenance alternative strategies.   
Tolerance of ambiguity was observed in only seven of the aspiring 
entrepreneurs, whereas all of the successful entrepreneurs indicated they were 
tolerant of ambiguity. Rather than being an independent psychological trait, it 
was argued in the fourth chapter that it is a natural expression of confidence in 
having identified a viable commercial opportunity, which has been de-risked. 
The low incidence amongst aspiring entrepreneurs may therefore indicate that, 
for the majority, serious but unexpressed doubts still persist about the viability of 
the idea that they intend to develop.  
Rather than indicating polarisation in the aspiring entrepreneurs’ accounts, the 
comments relating to networking revealed a fundamentally different pattern to 
the successful entrepreneurs’ accounts. The aspiring entrepreneurs were much 
more fixed on leveraging relationships with key individuals who can help realise 
the enterprise concept, whereas the successful entrepreneurs were more 
concerned about building a broad network of potential future customers who 
can keep the enterprise going. 
Chapter 1 observed that the vibrant SME sector envisaged in Vision 2020 was 
absent in Rwanda, even though it was seen in the second chapter that the 
government had created a context consistent with the dominant theories 
relating to entrepreneurship and SME formation. Chapter 4 identified that the 
motives and behaviour of successful entrepreneurs in Rwanda diverged from 
these theories. This chapter, though, revealed that aspiring entrepreneurs’ 
accounts were polarised between those who mirrored the theoretical arguments 
and those who conformed to the more antithetical characteristics exhibited by 
the successful entrepreneurs. While these polarisations are of themselves 
important, they are nevertheless insufficient if the analysis merely points to the 
existence of clusters of interviewees who appeared to conform to, or diverge 
from, the individual characteristics associated with the successful entrepreneurs 
in Rwanda or the theoretical arguments that were explored. Restricting the 
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analysis to an observation of such isolated and disjointed snapshots was 
identified in the third chapter as problematic. Chapter 6 will therefore attempt to 
bring together the observations and conclusions drawn from the previous 
chapters and address the specific research question: why it should be that the 
new class of entrepreneurs and the vibrant SME sector, which were envisaged 
in Vision 2020, are still struggling to emerge in post-genocide Rwanda despite 
the concerted effort that has gone into building a context that should encourage 
and support their formation. 
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Chapter 6 Resolving the Rwandan Enterprise Paradox 
Written in 2000, the Rwandan Government’s economic and social development 
plan, Vision 2020, anticipated the emergence of an entrepreneurial class that 
would create a vibrant private SME sector that will spearhead economic 
development, generate employment and thereby ensure a stable and secure 
future for the country’s citizens. The core thinking underpinning this strategy is 
the belief that Rwanda possesses an extensive pool of individuals who have the 
potential to become entrepreneurs and subsequently deliver entrepreneurially-
led economic success, which will enable the country to progress rapidly to its 
specifically articulated goal of achieving middle-income status by 2020. The 
strategy is buoyed along by the received wisdom that SMEs in developed 
economies account for 95 percent of all firms, are responsible for 60 to 70 
percent of employment, account for 50 percent of all new jobs created and      
55 percent of GDP (Minicom, 2012: 11). 
In implementing the plan, the government has established an institutional 
context that - as orthodox thinking would have it -  should favour enterprise 
development. This is evidenced by the positive ratings achieved in good 
governance indices, widespread access to credit, human capital investment and 
commitments to infrastructure development. Programmes designed specifically 
to support aspiring entrepreneurs have also been implemented, including 
national business plan competitions, government underwritten business loans 
and the sensitising of financial managers to the need to advance funds to 
prospective entrepreneurs. However, in the face of all that has been done, and 
three-quarters of the way through Vision 2020’s twenty-year term, the 
anticipated vibrant SME sector remains conspicuous by its absence and, as 
observed at section 1.6, the distribution of establishments remains heavily 
biased towards single-employee micro-enterprises. 
Gaining an understanding of the underlying causes of the mismatch between 
the plan and the current situation is extremely important. With a median age of 
18.8 years and 61 percent of its population under 25 (CIA, 2016), post-genocide 
Rwanda faces a considerable demographic challenge. There is an urgent need 
to create a large and sustainable volume of employment opportunities - indeed 
this was an explicit objective of Vision 2020. Critically too, the prescription that 
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Rwanda has followed is widely endorsed and promoted by the main global 
institutions: that domestic entrepreneurs and SMEs hold the key to the 
economic progress of developing economies. If the prescription is failing in 
Rwanda it is important to know why this should be the case, as it could have 
implications well beyond the context of this thesis. 
The methodology outlined in the third chapter argued that comparing attributes 
of successful entrepreneurs, and the process they employed when forming their 
enterprises, with the attributes and intended entrepreneurial journey of aspiring 
entrepreneurs could reveal the extent to which proto-entrepreneurs are present 
amongst the aspiring entrepreneurs. It was argued that this could then provide 
insights into the Rwandan enterprise paradox. This led to the decision to use 
semi-structured face-to-face interviews, designed to explore the narratives of 
both successful and aspiring entrepreneurs. It facilitated an exploration of 
themes that were suggested by the literature review, while simultaneously 
providing scope for uncovering factors that were not suggested by the literature.  
The findings from the interviews with successful entrepreneurs were highly 
revealing and often antithetical to existing theories of development, which were 
explored in the second chapter. Contrary to arguments advanced in favour of 
increasing access to credit, the interviews indicated that successful 
entrepreneurs in Rwanda used funding mechanisms other than credit when 
starting their businesses. They also preferred sketching and acting contingently 
to traditional business planning, and departed from the popular perception that 
they are risk takers. It was also found that they contradicted the mainstream 
economic view that entrepreneurs are driven to capture entrepreneurial profits 
that are on offer. Instead it was seen that their decision to establish enterprises 
was underpinned by a desire for self-determination, rather than the financial 
gains that could accrue from their enterprises. There was also no evidence in 
the successful entrepreneurs’ narratives to support the GEM position that 
entrepreneurship in developing economy contexts is driven by necessity rather 
than opportunity. Instead there was strong evidence that the successful 
entrepreneurs’ decisions to establish enterprises were deliberate acts of 
volition.   
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Analysis of the interviews with aspiring entrepreneurs concluded that the 
characteristics exhibited by the successful entrepreneurs could indeed be 
discerned amongst the narratives given by aspiring entrepreneurs. This 
replication was, though, far from universal. For each individual characteristic 
examined, the aspiring entrepreneurs’ accounts were seen to be polarised 
between a group that suggested a close match to the successful entrepreneurs 
and those that deviated. This deviation frequently included comments that were 
diametrically opposed to those encountered in the successful entrepreneurs’ 
accounts.  
It was concluded, though, that there was limited value in merely observing the 
existence of the isolated snapshots that these polarisations describe. Indeed 
such a restricted approach was criticised specifically in the second chapter 
when reviewing the existing field of entrepreneurship theory. The individual 
polarisations and the various contradictions that were exhibited would need to 
be fully integrated if the Rwandan enterprise paradox was to be addressed 
properly.    
6.1 Integrating the Findings 
To provide insights that could answer the research question posed by this 
thesis, an approach was needed that could facilitate an integration of the 
isolated characteristics that were observed and thereby identify those aspiring 
entrepreneurs that had multiple points of similarity with the successful 
entrepreneurs . This was achieved by revisiting and scoring the NVivo codings 74
that formed the basis of the analysis in the last chapter. The individual 
components that were seen to be present in the successful entrepreneurs’ 
accounts were all assigned a score of +1 where they were replicated in the 
aspiring entrepreneurs’ narratives. A score of -1 was assigned where their 
antithesis was observed. A score of zero was applied where there was no 
evidence in the narrative for the attribute or its antithesis. Thus, a need for 
achievement and an internal locus of control were scored +1 when exhibited in 
the aspiring entrepreneurs’ narratives. Overt expressions of financial motives, 
including references to the necessity of creating a job, were coded -1 as they 
 Multiple, but not universal, as it was seen that the successful entrepreneurs did not all exhibit 74
every characteristic that was identified. 
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represented the antithesis of the successful entrepreneurs’ rejection of financial 
motives.  
Diving in, without a business plan, market creating activities and developing the 
enterprise contingently were also scored +1 while the opposite, an expressed 
preference for causally orientated formal business planning, was scored -1. 
Undertaking basic research, assessing demand, producing a rough outline 
containing the basic enterprise assumptions and being able to express a clear 
long-term vision for the enterprise’s future were similarly all coded +1.  
Risk aversion, risk mitigation and tolerance of ambiguity were also scored +1, 
while comments indicating a predisposition for risk taking attracted a score of 
-1. Avoiding using credit when starting a business was also scored +1 and its 
antithesis, the intention to access credit, was scored -1. Evidence for building a 
network of weak ties with individuals who could be potential future customers 
was also assigned a score of +1. 
It is feasible that some of the exhibited characteristics might have a greater 
bearing than others on the decision to set up an enterprise or the subsequent 
degree of success, but no such inference could be drawn on the basis of the 
information contained in the interviews. The scores were therefore given equal 
weighting and then aggregated in order to give a cumulative score that would 
represent the extent to which the multiple characteristics associated with 
successful entrepreneurs were replicated in the individual aspiring 
entrepreneurs’ narratives. In addition to drawing together the fragmented 
polarisations observed in the aspiring entrepreneurs’ accounts in Chapter 5, this 
approach had the advantage that contradictions could be dealt with effectively. 
For instance it will be recalled that Claire’s narrative, in the context of effectual 
and causal thinking, had included a strong expression of support for developing 
her enterprise iteratively, which matched the successful entrepreneurs’ 
predilection. However, Claire had also already produced a formal business plan, 
which was the antithesis of the successful entrepreneurs’ rejection of formal 
planning. Under the scoring system this contradiction would yield a score of +1 
for her support for iteration and a score of -1 for her use of formal planning and 
remove the necessity to make an overly subjective judgement about where 
Claire would fall on the effectuation-causation continuum. These two 
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contradictory components would, in Claire’s case, cancel each other out and 
leave the evidence from the rest of her narrative to determine the degree of 
proximity between her account and the characteristics that were seen to be 
associated with the successful entrepreneurs in the fourth chapter. Table 6.1 
summarises how the various components were scored. 
Table 6.1 Scoring System 
Assigning the scores to the aspiring entrepreneurs’ accounts produced the 
results indicated in Table 6.2, which are ranked according to their aggregate 
score. The full spreadsheet is included in Appendix D. 
Characteristics Components Coding Score
Self-determination Non-financial motives +1
Need for achievement +1
Internal locus of control +1
Financial gain -1
Creating a job -1
Credit Avoiding credit +1
Seeking credit -1
Dilute effectuation Diving in +1
Iteration +1
Market creation +1
Formal business planning -1
Use of sketching Demand assessment +1
Basic research +1
Rough outline +1
Envisioning Future vision for the business +1
Risk Risk aversion +1
Mitigating action +1
Tolerance of ambiguity +1
Predisposed towards risk -1
Networking Potential future customers +1
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Table 6.2 Characteristics Observed in Aspiring Entrepreneurs’ Accounts 
The aggregate scores reveal the extent to which each individual aspiring 
entrepreneur’s account replicated the multiple characteristics associated with 
the successful entrepreneurs, but they do not indicate where a line could be 
drawn to demarcate those that were a close match to the successful 
entrepreneurs. The same coding system was therefore applied to the 
successful entrepreneurs’ accounts, so that their aggregate scores could be 
compared directly with those from the aspiring entrepreneurs.  
 Self- determination
Credit 
Avoidance
Dilute 
Effectuation
Use of 
Sketching
Risk 
Aversion
Network 
Building
Envisioning Total 
Score
Mark 3 2 2 3 1 0 1 12
Aphrodice 2 1 2 3 1 0 1 10
Colette 2 1 2 1 3 0 0 9
Eric B 3 2 0 1 2 0 0 8
Germaine 0 2 1 1 2 0 1 7
Josh 1 1 2 1 2 0 0 7
Rehema 0 1 1 2 1 0 0 5
Daniel 3 1 -1 0 1 0 1 5
Emile 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 3
Claire 1 -1 0 0 1 0 1 2
Robert B -1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1
Samuel -1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1
Robert A -1 -1 0 1 0 1 0 0
John 0 1 -1 0 -1 0 0 -1
Janvier -2 0 -1 1 1 0 0 -1
Claude 0 0 -1 0 -1 0 0 -2
Augustin -1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 -2
Aloys -1 -1 -1 0 0 0 0 -3
Jessica -1 -1 -1 0 1 0 -1 -3
Gilbert B -2 -1 -1 -1 0 0 0 -5
Queen -1 -1 -1 -1 0 0 -1 -5
mean 2.3
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The results for the successful entrepreneurs are presented in Table 6.3 and are 
also ranked according to their aggregate score. The full spreadsheet is again 
included in Appendix D. 
Table 6.3 Characteristics Observed in Successful Entrepreneurs’ Accounts 
Comparing tables 6.2 and 6.3 shows a cluster of six aspiring entrepreneurs who 
have aggregate scores that fall within the range describing the successful 
entrepreneurs. Although only at the early stage of their respective 
entrepreneurial journeys, Mark, Aphrodice, Colette, Eric B, Germaine and Josh 
displayed characteristics that in aggregate would mark them out as            
proto-entrepreneurs. They are typically more likely to be motivated by self-
determination rather than financial gain, to dive in without a formal plan and 
develop their businesses as circumstances dictate, but reassured by having 
sketched out and de-risked the commercial concept they intend to exploit. 
6.2 The Proto-entrepreneurs 
The six proto-entrepreneurs identified above appear to represent the kind of 
individuals that Rwanda needs if it is to constitute the desired class of 
 Self- 
determination
Credit 
Avoidance
Dilute 
Effectuation
Use of 
Sketching
Risk 
Aversion
Network 
Building Envisioning
Total 
Score
Bosco 3 3 2 3 2 0 1 14
Jean 3 2 3 1 2 1 1 13
Christian 3 1 2 2 2 1 1 12
Sharon 3 3 1 1 2 0 1 11
Jacques 2 2 3 0 2 0 1 10
Jimmy 2 1 3 1 2 0 1 10
Gilbert A 2 1 1 3 2 1 0 10
Akaliza 3 1 2 1 2 1 0 10
Willy 2 1 3 0 2 1 1 10
Annette 2 1 2 1 2 0 1 9
Damien 1 1 3 1 1 0 0 7
Eric A 1 1 2 0 1 1 1 7
mean 10.3
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entrepreneurs who will form the vibrant SME sector that it is anticipated will 
catalyse Rwanda’s economic development. Having a close fit with the multiple 
characteristics associated with successful entrepreneurs in Rwanda, they would 
appear to be well equipped for the entrepreneurial journey they intend to take. 
While this does not guarantee them success, it does indicate that their chances 
of establishing viable businesses are enhanced. They are, however, few in 
number. Those who are best equipped to deliver against the government’s 
economic plan constituted less than a third of the aspiring entrepreneurs’ 
sample. It is not only their low incidence that is significant, though. The 
characteristics they displayed also have important implications.  
It was seen that the successful entrepreneurs typically avoided risk, rejected the 
use of credit and sought reassurance, via sketching, that their enterprise 
concepts were viable. It was also seen that this could be a painstaking and 
time-consuming process that might be measured in years. As the               
proto-entrepreneurs closely replicate successful entrepreneurs’ characteristics it 
can be deduced that they too will engage in the same time-consuming process, 
and will be reluctant to act until they feel they have de-risked the pursuit of the 
opportunity that has been identified. This delay in getting their ventures to 
market will be further compounded by the proto-entrepreneurs’ preference for 
using their own money rather than credit, as it will also take time to accrue the 
personal savings that will be needed for the risk capital that they intend to 
invest.  
The inescapable conclusion is that the limited number of aspiring entrepreneurs 
who seem best equipped for success are also the ones who are likely to take 
the longest to make the transition from enterprise conception to enterprise 
creation. Taken together this all points to a lengthy gestation period, which will 
have a damping effect on the rate of SME sector formation and, critically, was 
not foreseen when Vision 2020 was written.  
A further complication can be found in the unintended consequence of the 
proto-entrepreneurs’ revealed preference for savings over credit. Viewed from 
the perspective of orthodox macroeconomics, this preference would appear to 
be consistent with the theory that savings lead to investment. Indeed this very 
assumption is made explicit in the Rwandan economic plan update, EDPRS 2, 
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which identifies the need to increase long-term savings that can be recycled to 
private sector investors (Minecofin 2012: 20). But seen from the Keynesian 
perspective, savings are made at the expense of consumption and therefore 
lead to a reduction in investment and employment (Keynes, 2012: 210). Thus 
during the period they are building the savings that will eventually be invested in 
enterprises, the proto-entrepreneurs would be unwittingly contributing to a 
reduction in investment and consequently depressing the very employment that 
Vision 2020 assumes they will create. 
6.3 The Gamblers 
The corollary to the low incidence of proto-entrepreneurs is the observation that 
the aspiring entrepreneurs’ sample is dominated by individuals who deviated 
from the successful entrepreneurs’ core attributes. Unlike the proto-
entrepreneurs, they are typically more likely to trust in the benefits of formal 
business planning, have a heightened acceptance of risk, a greater propensity 
for using credit to start an enterprise and are motivated to make money or 
create a job where none exists. This does not mean that failure is pre-ordained 
for this larger set of aspiring entrepreneurs, any more than proto-entrepreneurs 
are necessarily assured of success. But being less well equipped for the 
entrepreneurial journey than the proto-entrepreneurs, their chances of success 
are, on the basis of the analysis and evidence in this thesis, likely to be lower.   
If Kahneman’s categorisation of entrepreneurs as foolish gamblers has any 
resonance, it is with this residual set of aspiring entrepreneurs. 
To classify them as ‘foolish’ would, though, be overly pejorative. They are, as 
was seen in Chapter 5, often responding to the government’s active promotion 
of entrepreneurship, the provision of business training aimed at producing 
entrepreneurs and enhanced access to credit, which is supposed to help them 
get their businesses started. In this regard it is significant, as already noted, that 
all fifteen of this residual set made overt comments about being motivated by 
money or the need to create a job in the face of a weak employment market. 
Thus, far from being foolish, they too would seem to be trying to act in a way 
that they perceive to be rational. They have been convinced that creating an 
enterprise represents a credible alternative to seeking wage employment in a 
weak labour market. They are unaware, though, that they are relatively ill 
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equipped for the journey they intend to take and that they will consequently be 
taking a gamble where the odds are likely to be stacked against them.  
The skew towards gamblers is further complicated by a particularly pernicious 
aspect of development policy advocated by the major global institutions - the 
presumption that supply of financial and specific human capital inputs will 
automatically lead to higher levels of entrepreneurship and SME sector 
formation, with all its attendant benefits. 
6.4 The Supply Fallacy 
It was seen in the second chapter that calls to increase access to credit are 
predicated on the argument that it will be taken up by prospective entrepreneurs 
who will create SMEs, which will then deliver economic growth, employment 
and poverty reduction. The evidence from the Rwandan interviews does not, 
though, support this. Neither the successful entrepreneurs nor the               
proto-entrepreneurs had a desire for credit and all the aspiring entrepreneurs 
who did intend to use credit to start a business fell outside the                    
proto-entrepreneurs’ set. Hence credit advanced is most likely only to satisfy a 
pre-existing demand amongst those gamblers who are planning to use credit to 
start businesses, but have a heightened propensity to fail. There is no reason to 
assume, therefore, that increasing the supply of credit will lead to the formation 
of SME sector businesses that have long-run viability.  
A similar criticism can be levied at programmes designed to equip aspiring 
entrepreneurs with a range of business planning skills encompassing how to 
construct a profit and loss account, a balance sheet, cash flow forecasting, 
marketing, personnel management and strategic planning. It is assumed that 
what emerges at the end of the process is a cadre of fully formed embryonic 
entrepreneurs, who will subsequently have an enhanced capability for 
establishing viable enterprises. But here too, the research evidence from this 
thesis indicates that proto-entrepreneurs did not want or need such training 
when conceptualising their businesses. Instead, those who expressed the 
highest levels of support for such formal planning again fell outside the       
proto-entrepreneurs’ group. Detrimentally, they are also likely to be the very 
individuals that providers of credit are seeking: aspiring entrepreneurs who can 
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write a business plan and want credit, irrespective of their being less well 
equipped for creating viable enterprises.  
6.5 Ramifications  
Failure to recognise the supply fallacy means that resources intended to 
stimulate creation of a vibrant SME sector are likely to be misdirected and 
ultimately counterproductive. Taken up by those gamblers who are planning to 
use credit to start businesses rather than by proto-entrepreneurs, it is likely that 
enterprise formation will be skewed towards businesses that have a heightened 
propensity to fail, thereby further exacerbating the problem of the slow gestation 
period identified at section 6.2. 
Worse still, gamblers who have been encouraged to borrow money to set up a 
business, but fail, are very likely to find themselves much poorer than when they 
started. Risk capital invested in a failed business is likely to have been 
dissipated and collateral used to secure credit forfeited. They will also have 
failed to create the alternative source of personal income, which they had 
intended would overcome the problem of competing in a weak employment 
market. Compounding the problem, the absence of a vibrant SME sector and its 
concomitant employment opportunities means that those gamblers who try and 
fail will be thrown back into a labour market that cannot support them. 
Vision 2020 set a twenty-year timescale for delivering against its aims. With 
only four years remaining of this term the evidence indicates there is a serious 
risk that the anticipated vibrant SME sector will not materialise, that the 
employment opportunities it was expected to create will not occur, and that the 
desire to move from development dependency to self-sufficiency will not be 
realised. Failure to deliver against the aims of the economic plan risks leaving 
behind a large body of well-educated but disillusioned individuals who 
anticipated being included in an economic success story, which has not come to 
pass and generated the employment opportunities that were desired. 
Policymakers are left facing something of a conundrum: how best to support 
proto-entrepreneurs, who have a heightened propensity to be successful, when 
they don't want or need the inputs that supply side thinkers are eager to 
provide? It also raises questions about what, if anything, might be done to 
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safely bring forward the proto-entrepreneurs’ decision to launch their intended 
enterprises and thereby accelerate their contribution to populating the missing 
middle. The word ‘safely’ is chosen advisedly, as it is clearly important that any 
interventions should avoid prompting an increase in the incidence of enterprise 
failure. Given the proto-entrepreneurs’ observed aversion to credit, such 
interventions could focus on non-credit alternatives. This could include deferred 
or preferential taxes, reducing the time to build savings by supplementing 
personal savings that are destined for enterprise investment with government 
matched funding, or equity investments via a small enterprise venture capital 
fund. The latter option would have the key benefit that returns to a venture 
capital fund would depend upon investments being made in viable businesses, 
thereby shifting the focus of attention to the validity of aspiring entrepreneurs’ 
commercial concepts rather than their ability to service bank debt or microcredit 
repayments. Clearly this suggests a basis for further research to identify what 
proto-entrepreneurs genuinely need, rather than the strategy of offering them 
what they don't want . 75
The successful entrepreneurs’ and proto-entrepreneurs’ preference for acting 
contingently, and resolving challenges as and when they arise, also indicates an 
area for further research. Specifically, the benefits of moving beyond the 
orthodox and prescriptive approach to business skills training and providing a 
more flexible, modular, alternative that could facilitate the acquisition of a 
specific incremental competence at the point in an individual’s entrepreneurial 
journey where new contingencies dictate that it is needed. 
6.6 Validity  
The exploratory nature of the research dictated the use of in-depth interviews 
with relatively small samples. In the case of the successful entrepreneurs, the 
accounts were by definition retrospective, while the aspiring entrepreneurs were 
commenting on a future that might or might not be realised. Despite these 
limitations the narratives provided consistent and convincing explanations of the 
interviewees’ characteristics. They facilitated the identification of a subset of 
 It also indicates the importance of endogenous factors (motives, characteristics and thought 75
processes) versus the exogenous factors that make up the standard development prescription 
(access to credit, STP-orientated business plans and opportunities awaiting discovery).
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aspiring entrepreneurs who resembled the successful entrepreneurs and may 
consequently be better equipped for success, although this cannot be predicted 
with certainty.  
Internal validity was ensured through purposive sampling and an interpretive 
style that gave priority to ensuring the interviewees’ voices were heard 
accurately and in context. The commitment to ensuring internal validity meant, 
though, that a trade-off between internal and external validity had to be 
accepted. As the research was located in the narrow realm of successful and 
aspiring entrepreneurs in post-genocide Rwanda, no overt claims can be 
advanced about its generalisability to contexts beyond Rwanda. 
This does not mean, though, that the findings have no external validity at all. 
Comparing the research findings with the literature review conducted in the 
second chapter is suggestive of what Cohen and Manion term “convergent 
validity” (1995: 281). This is seen in the fact that the successful entrepreneurs 
and proto-entrepreneurs in Rwanda mirrored certain key aspects of the 
predilection for effectuation, which Sarasvathy had observed in her expert 
entrepreneurs’ sample in the USA. Similarly, although the thesis took issue with 
the tendency to focus on individual psychological traits rather than the 
aggregate picture, the interviews did indicate the presence of internal locus of 
control, need for achievement and tolerance of ambiguity. Furthermore the 
covariance that was observed in the interviews between internal locus of control 
and need for achievement is supported by Rotter’s original, though generally 
ignored, work that suggested such an interaction.  
The findings also converged with Tuckett’s views on rational action taken under 
conditions of Knightian uncertainty and conformed to arguments advanced 
individually by various authors, including Schumpeter, Baumol and McClelland, 
that entrepreneurs are prepared to accept negative financial returns. Similarly, 
the risk-mitigating actions that were observed conformed to arguments 
advanced by Isenberg, McGrath and Sarasvathy.  
6.7 Postscript 
Finally it is important to note that the government and citizens of Rwanda have, 
in good faith, followed the theoretical prescription promoted by the major 
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development institutions, and billions of dollars of development aid have been 
advanced to maintain their commitment to the strategy. Having diligently 
followed the prescription for sixteen years, the people of Rwanda have every 
right to demand explanations for why it does not appear to be working, and 
what refinements or alternatives its promoters might now suggest.  
One is also entitled to ask who benefits most from the prescription that has 
been advanced when the formula is based, at best, on untested extrapolations 
from developed economy contexts. The evidence presented in this thesis would 
suggest that the balance is weighed more heavily in favour of those advancing 
the prescription, rather than those it is meant to help. Whether it is sovereign 
wealth funds and high-net-worth individuals extorting profits under the fantasy 
that microcredit catalyses entrepreneurship, or vendors of entrepreneurship 
training programmes under the Yunus myth that all can be entrepreneurs, there 
appears to be no shortage of gains to developed nations and their institutions 
under the guise of supporting the economic development of low-income 
countries. 
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Appendix A   
Exchange Rate Modal Values 
(Source: Fxtop.com) 
Year Mode Minimum Maximum No. of Working Days Percentage Change
2003 523.947401 479.629007 556.543621 255
2004 560.064215 530.382711 577.501026 259 +6.9%
2005 546.655327 534.634105 556.468503 257 -2.4%
2006 549.392311 536.468778 555.285272 255 +0.5%
2007 546.220436 540.256976 550.576180 255 -0.6%
2008 544.905623 535.842208 556.978642 256 -0.2%
2009 566.044777 554.908529 574.546786 256 +3.9%
2010 582.150605 564.244424 596.569963 258 +2.8%
2011 594.775593 588.006039 602.974671 257 +2.2%
2012 607.549659 593.599733 631.440236 256 +2.1%
2013 649.729260 624.756786 680.451618 255 +6.9%
2014 679.528567 673.006509 691.422024 255 +4.6%
2015 712593814 648.776415 752.875589 256 +4.9%
2016 755.729671 741.001400 766.485683 44 +6.1%
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Appendix B  
SME Cluster Strategy 
District 
Kicukiro  Weaving-handicrafts 
   Meat 
   Furniture 
   Juice, maize, agro-processing 
   Coffee 
Nyarugenge  ICT-software development 
   BPO 
   Restaurant and accommodation 
   Furniture 
   Welding 
Gasabo  Fashion and tailoring 
   Furniture 
   Maize 
   Basket [weaving] 
   Bakery 
Nyagatare  Milk 
   Maize 
   Rice 
   Wildlife tourism 
   Tiles and bricks 
Gatsibo  Leather 
   Maize 
   Rice 
   Coffee 
   Cassava 
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Kayonza  Macadamia 
   Milk 
   Maize 
   Fashion and tailoring 
   Mushrooms 
Rwamagana  Banana wine 
   Leather 
   Coffee 
   Maize 
   Fashion and tailoring 
Bugesera  Fish farming 
   Cassava 
   Rice 
   Pineapple 
   Fashion and tailoring 
Ngoma  Pineapple 
   Banana wine 
   Maize 
   Rice 
   Coffee 
Kirehe   Essential oil 
   Banana 
   Maize 
   Milk 
   Fish farming 
Muhanga  Pottery 
   Fashion and tailoring 
   Furniture 
   Maize 
   Mushrooms 
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Kamonyi  Pineapple 
   Cassava 
   Coffee 
   Pottery and stones 
   Vegetables 
Ruhango  Geranium essential oil 
   Spices 
   Maize 
   Cassava 
   Weaving 
Nyanza  Milk 
   Cassava 
   Coffee 
   Maize 
   Silk 
Nyamagabe  Pork 
   Treated wood 
   Honey 
   Wheat 
   Coffee 
Huye   Wine 
   Juice 
   Fresh milk 
   Coffee 
   Wood crafting  
Gisagara  Pork 
   Rice 
   Bricks 
   Cassava 
   Cheese 
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Nyaruguru  Furniture 
   Tea 
   Coffee 
   Religious handicraft 
   Charcoal 
Musanze  Rose and geranium essential oil 
   Irish potatoes 
   Construction materials  
   Jewellery-handicrafts 
   Eco-tourism 
Burera  Fishing 
   Irish potatoes 
   Silk 
   Wheat 
   Cassiterite 
Gicumbi  Butter-dairy 
   Irish potatoes 
   Tea 
   Wheat 
   Mushroom 
Gakenke  Passion fruits 
   Pineapple 
   Coffee 
   Fresh milk 
   Fashion and tailoring 
Rulindo  Spices 
   Vegetables 
   Wheat 
   Eggs 
   Tiles and Bricks 
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Nyabihu  Milk 
   Patchouli essential oil 
   Irish potatoes 
   Tea 
   Leather handicrafts 
Rubavu  Eco-tourism 
   Coffee 
   Leather 
   Fashion and tailoring 
   Tiles and bricks 
Rutsiro  Honey 
   Coffee 
   Fruit and vegetables 
   Bamboo furniture 
   Cheese 
Ngororero  Mining 
   Cheese 
   Maize 
   Wheat 
   Coffee 
Karongi  Silk 
   Coffee 
   Tea 
   Maize 
   Macadamia 
Nyamasheke  Indagara-fish flour 
   Tea 
   Coffee 
   Fashion and tailoring 
   Treated wood 
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Rusizi   Furniture  
   Coffee 
   Fruit and vegetables 
   Fishing 
   Rice 
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Appendix C 
Interview Guide Sheets 
This appendix contains the guide sheets that were used during the interviews. 
They were used as a reminder of the main themes that featured in the review of 
entrepreneurship literature. The questions listed were examples only, which 
could be used to open up a discussion of a particular theme. 
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